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Abstract 
 
Within the context of South Africa‘s diverging religious, cultural and social backgrounds, 
new questions on the nature of a multicultural society are raised from the perspective of 
human rights.  The universality and indivisibility of human rights are challenged by this 
diversity and consequently implies that standards, concepts and structures for 
implementation have to be reconsidered.  International and national standards are being 
(re)interpreted and attention is not only focused on the contents of the norms but on the 
limitations imposed thereupon.  
 
The debate on whether limits should be set in permitting or accommodating cultural or 
religious pluralism is becoming extremely relevant.  The manner in which these questions 
are responded to is even more prominent in the light of our history of apartheid which 
has disregarded respect for religious and cultural diversity.  In the scope of this research 
emphasis will be placed on the right to freedom of religion and in particular the limitation 
of the right to religion in an attempt to balance conflicting rights and accommodates 
religious diversity. 
 
The right to freedom of religion albeit constitutionally entrenched is subject to reasonable 
and justifiable limitations. However, no clear guidelines have been formulated on the 
criteria for limiting the right to freedom of religion.  The main aim of this research is to 
find guiding criteria to facilitate the imposition of limitations on the right to freedom of 
religion.  The limitations of the right to freedom of religion are interrelated with the 
following research questions:  Firstly, the definition afforded to the right to freedom of 
religion in accordance with national and international standards; secondly, the 
relationship between culture and religion and any interconnection that exists between 
these rights.  This is followed by the influence of the particular value framework or 
normative commitments of the judiciary on the interpretation of the right to religion, as 
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well as the relationship between the state and religion.  The above issues will be 
researched both on a national and an international level. 
 
The aim is to conduct research that will build on an appreciation of the guidelines that 
should be employed in ensuring the protection of the right to freedom of religion.  To this 
end comparisons will be drawn with other legal systems, which on the one hand 
acknowledge the protection of the right to freedom of religion and on the other hand have 
to find ways in which the right can be balanced in the event of conflict. 
 
It is envisaged that the research of the criteria imposed on the limitation of the right to 
religion both on a national and an international level will assist in suggesting criteria that 
will influence scholarly debate on the topic.  In addition that this debate will allow for the 
formulation of a transformative approach within the South African context that sanctions 
the celebration of diversity in all its aspects and in particular the right to freedom of 
religion. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the study  
 
The freedom of individuals to hold their own religious beliefs is one of the basic 
characteristics of a democratic society.  It is a fundamental right that is enshrined in a 
number of international agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),
1
 regional instruments, such as the European Convention for Human Rights 
(ECHR),
2
 and national legislation.
3
  Notwithstanding the protection afforded to the right 
                                                          
1
 In this regard see article 18 of the UDHR which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948.  UN Doc. A/3/810 (1949) as discussed in section 4.2.1, 
and article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by the General Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 2200 
(XXII) of 16 December 1966 as discussed in section 4.3, and article 1 of the 1981 Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981 
Declaration), proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 36/55 of 25 November 
1981 as discussed in section 4.4.  See also Human Rights Committee General Comment 22: The Right to 
Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (article 18), paragraph 4, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (30 July 1993) (hereinafter General Comment 22).  The body of independent 
experts monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the ICCPR is known as the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC).  For purposes of clarity and to avoid confusion with the Human Rights Council (HRC) 
this committee is referred to as the ICCPR Human Rights Committee.  For a further discussion on the role 
of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee see section 4.7.1. 
2
 See also article 9 of the ECHR which was adopted by the Council of Europe on 4 November 1950 in 
Rome (entered into force 3 September 1953) as discussed in section 4.8.1; also article 12 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José) adopted by the Organization of American States on 22 
November 1969, San José, Costa Rica (entered into force on 18 July 1978) as discussed in section 4.9 and 
article 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter) adopted by the 
Organization of African Unity at the 18th Conference of Heads of State and Government on 27 June 1981 
in Nairobi, Kenya (entered into force on 21 October 1986) as discussed in section 4.10. 
3
 In the United States of America the most important protection of the right to freedom of religion is 
contained in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees in Article 2(a) that: Everyone has … freedom of thought, conscience and belief, 
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to freedom of religion, there are many places in the world where followers of a particular 
religion may not lawfully practice their religion in their daily lives, and many individuals 
face restrictions on their right to freely manifest their religion or belief.
4
 
 
Throughout history there are numerous incidents in which adherents of different religions 
have failed to tolerate each other.  The use of religion for repression and even terror is 
well recorded.  For example, the bloody religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries,
5
 
the atrocities committed during the Second World War and the persecution of the Jewish 
people are testimony to human rights abuses of the past.
6
  Even today inter-religious 
conflict still forms the basis of major disputes worldwide as seen, for example, in the 
Balkan States,
7
 Israel-Palestine,
8
 Sudan
9
 and Nigeria.
10
  Furthermore, intra-religious 
conflicts, for example between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland,
11
 have also 
tainted our history. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
whilst The Constitution of the Republic of SA, Act of 1996 guarantees the right to freedom of religion in 
section 15. 
4
 See generally PM Taylor Freedom of Religion - UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice 
(2005).  For example in Burma, the Government arrests and imprisons Buddhist monks who promote 
human and political rights.  For a detailed overview of countries in which religious freedom is restricted see 
the United States of America Department of State: The International Religious Freedom Report for 2010, 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/index.htm last accessed on 6 December 2011. 
5
 See generally S Carroll Noble Power During the French Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the 
Catholic Cause in Normandy (2005); MP Holt The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629 (1995); G Parker 
The Thirty years‟ War (1997). 
6
 See generally G Franz-Willing ‗The Origins of the Second World War‘ (1986) 7(1) Journal of Historical 
Review 95. 
7
In this regard see generally V Perica Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (2004). 
8
 See generally BM Edwards The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: a People's War (2009). 
9
 See generally CU Orji Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Africa: an Analysis of Bias, Decline, and 
Conversion based on the Works of Bernard Lonergan (2008). 
10
 See generally T Falola Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies 
(1998). 
11
 See generally J McGarry and B O'Leary The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements 
(2004). 
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The term inter-religious conflict is used to indicate relations across religious difference, 
for example between Muslims and Christians.  While the term intra-religious conflict is 
used to illustrate competing interpretations within the same religion, for example between 
Sunnis Muslims and Shi'is Muslims. 
 
Religious intolerance continues to incite conflict, and as a consequence, human rights 
abuses often follow.  The September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001 played 
a role in the increase in religious intolerance.  This is confirmed by the director of 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ambassador Janez 
Lenarčič who states that: 
Some of these challenges are very present at the beginning of the 21st century: certain 
tensions and difficulties linked to religions and beliefs have come to the fore.
12
 
 
Intolerance and discrimination towards Muslims has caused the Commission for Human 
Rights to react with calls for appropriate control of the mass media to prevent incitement 
to violence and intolerance towards Islam.
13
  Simultaneously traditional Islamic practices 
are increasingly considered as indications of extremism.  It is argued that this point of 
view is biased and has influenced certain European States, notably France, to react 
against traditional Muslim observances such as the wearing the Islamic headscarf in State 
schools.
14
  In this and other regards the relationship between the state and religion 
remains a controversial issue in some societies.  A more recent development has been the 
emergence of political parties campaigning for the introduction of government based on 
religious law.
15
 
                                                          
12
 Address by Ambassador Janez Lenarčič, the Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on ‗Freedom of Religion or Belief‘ 
Neuer Saal, Hofburg, Vienna 9 July 2009, available at  
<http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2009/07/38726_en.pdf> last accessed on 13 July 2009. 
13
 Resolution 2002/9 15 April 2002 Commission on Human Rights. 
14
 France Country report filed by the OSCE, available at  
<http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2008/10/34058_en.pdf> last accessed on 13 July 2009. 
15
 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v Turkey (2003) 37 ECHRR 1 229, 314,335.  The Turkish 
courts had dissolved one of the largest Turkish political parties because of its alleged support for Islamic 
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These events referred to briefly above were not anticipated by the founders of UDHR and 
the ICCPR, which both protect the right to freedom of religion.  This has caused 
speculation as to whether existing international instruments are capable of meeting the 
challenges posed by modern events.  It has been claimed that ‗[t]he twentieth century is 
pre-eminently the century of religious persecution‘16 and that the right of religious 
freedom is one of the weakest rights, both as regards its recognition and enforcement, of 
all the rights contained in the UDHR.
17
  The right to manifest one‘s religious belief can in 
this regard be said to be nothing more than an ‗empty vessel‘.18 
 
1.2 Title of the study 
 
The title of this study is ‗The right to freedom of religion in the public domain in South 
Africa‘.  This study encapsulates the following question:  ‗Does a secular argument for 
the return of religion to the public domain ensure the optimal protection of the application 
and limitation of the right to manifest religious belief?  This question is approached from 
an international and comparative perspective with specific reference to South Africa as a 
case study. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
fundamentalism, including advocating the introduction of Shariah law in Turkey. The European Court held 
that it could be appropriate for a State to dissolve a political party if it appears that the party may be on the 
verge of obtaining political power (Refah Partisi para 108) and if some of its proposals are against the 
State‘s constitutional order (Refah Partisi paras 59-60, 67, 93) or fundamental democratic principles (Refah 
Partisi paragraph 98). 
16
 See G Wiegel ‗Religion as a Human Right‘ (1984) 3 Freedom at Issue 77. 
17
 RB Lillich ‗Civil Rights‘ in T Meron (ed) Human Rights in International Law, Legal and Policy Issues 
(1984) 160. 
18
As the right to freedom of religion is often disregarded, it is my premise that the right to freedom of 
religion is an empty right, just as Westen argues that the notion of equality is an empty vessel.  See 
generally P Westen ‗The Empty Idea of Equality‘ (1982) 95 (3) Harvard Law Review 537.  It is possible to 
argue this point of view with regards to the application of other fundamental rights as well.  However, this 
thesis will focus on the right to freedom of religion in particular as well as the right to non-discrimination 
on the ground of religious belief. 
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Why „a secular argument‟? 
 
The relationship between the state and religion can be structured in various ways.  This 
relationship may range from states in which there is no separation between the state and 
religion and a state church or state religion exists, to states in which there is separation 
between the state and religion, so called secular states.
19
  The premise of this study is that 
the right to freedom of religion of all faiths is generally better protected in a state in 
which there is no relationship between the state and a particular religion, as all religions 
are more likely to be treated equally.
20
 
 
Why „the return of religion to the public domain‟? 
 
Secular states in generally defend the principle that secularism demands a neutral public 
domain in which religion is relegated to the private sphere.  The premise of this study is 
that a strict division between the public and private sphere is problematic, as the very 
nature of religion does not generally allow for a distinction between public and private. 
For many believers, their relationship with God or creation is central to all their activities. 
It concerns their capacity to relate in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of 
themselves, their community and their universe.
21
 
 
The division between the public and private is employed here similarly to the theory 
underlying much liberal political thought, in that the public sphere is used to indicate the 
world of paid employment and public affairs, while the term private sphere is used to 
indicate the private world of the household or family.  This division is even more 
challenging for those religions in which the manifestation of religion in the public sphere 
is obligated as, for example, the requirement of the wearing of the Islamic headscarf-
hijab does.  It is the premise of the study that the principle of secularism ought to be 
                                                          
19
 See section 3.4. 
20
 See section 3.6.3. 
21
 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC), 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 
(CC) paragraph 37. 
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interpreted to mean religious impartiality.  Secularism should not to be interpreted that 
the public sphere should be void from religious influence. 
 
Why „the application and limitation of the right to freedom of religion‟? 
 
The scope of a right is determined by the restrictions imposed upon the right.
22
  The right 
to have religion of one‘s choice (forum internum) is unconditional and may not be 
limited.  The right to manifest one‘s religion (forum externum), through worship, 
observance, practice and teaching may however be limited.
23
  The actual scope of the 
right to freedom of religion is therefore determined by the manner in which the right to 
manifest religious belief is limited.  If the right to manifestation is extensively limited, 
then the right to freedom of religion may therefore effectively be rendered without 
meaning.  It is the premise of this study, that in light of the importance of the right to 
freedom of religion for the individual‘s sense of self-worth and dignity, it is in the interest 
of society as a whole that any limitation on the right is subject to strict scrutiny. 
 
Why „the right to manifest religious beliefs? 
 
From an analysis of international jurisprudence it is apparent that the manifestation of 
religion through worship and teaching has been less fraught with interpretational 
difficulties, while the manifestation of religion through practice and observance has been 
more controversial.
24
  Observances may include, for example, the right to observe 
religious personal and family law, the right to undertake religious pilgrimages, the right 
                                                          
22
 M Nowak U N Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary (1993) 311. 
23
 In this regard see generally A Krishnaswami ‗Study of Discrimination in the  Matter of Religious Rights 
and Practices‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective (1996) 
1, 17; see generally D Meyerson Rights Limited: Freedom of Expression, Religion and the South African 
Constitution (1997). 
24
 For a general discussion on the differences between belief and practice see G Moens ‗The Action-Belief 
Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion‘ (1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 195. 
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to observe religious days
25
 and the right to display religious symbols.  Observances may 
also include the right to observe religious rites,
26
 dietary practices or the right to cultivate 
a religious appearance as prescribed by a particular religion, for example adhering to a 
dress code,
27
 such as wearing the Islamic headscarf or by growing a beard or fashioning 
hair in a particular manner, for example Rastafarians wearing dreadlocks.
28
  Other 
examples of religiously motivated dress include Jews wearing yarmulkes, Christians 
wearing crucifixes, Hindus displaying a bindi or nose-ring
29
 and Sikhs wearing a turban 
or kirpan.
30
 
 
The focus of this study is on the manifestation of religion through practice and 
observance.  In particular the right to observe religious rites as well as the right to 
cultivate a religious appearance, which has recently been the subject of much debate and 
controversy,
31
 is emphasised. 
                                                          
25
 This study will not provide a comprehensive overview of these components of the right to freedom of 
religion.  In this regards see G van der Schyf The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa LLM Thesis 
Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (2001) 133 onwards. 
26
 Moreover, the 1981 Declaration further specifies the freedom to: ‗make, acquire and use to an adequate 
extent the necessary articles and materials related to rites or customs of a religion or belief.‘  See Article 6 
(c) of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief (1981). 
27
 General Comment 22 on Article 18 of the ICCPR elaborates that ‗The observance or practice may 
include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as … the wearing of distinctive clothing or head 
coverings.‘ See General Comment 22 paragraph 4. 
28
 Rastafarians are obligated not to cut their hair which results in dreadlocks, as according to the King 
James version Numbers ch 6 1:6. In terms of the Nazarene vow, only foods in their natural state may be 
eaten, alcohol may not be consumed and Rastafarians may not cut their hair.  
29
 The wearing of a nose-ring is a time-honoured family tradition.  In this regard see generally BN Banerjee 
Hindu Culture, Custom, and Ceremony (1978). 
30
 The kirpan is among the five religious obligations of orthodox Sikh males and serves as a reminder of the 
constant struggle between good and evil.  In this regard see generally HS Dilagira Who are the Sikhs? 
(2000). 
31
 A comparative analysis shows regulation or prohibitions on wearing religious symbols in more than 25 
countries in the world.  See the comparative table on prohibitions of wearing religious symbols.  Available 
at< http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/kopftuch/ReligiousSymbols.pdf> last accessed on 9 September 2010. 
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Why „an international and comparative perspective‟? 
 
The international and regional instruments in terms of which the right to freedom of 
religion and in particular the right to manifest religious belief is entrenched have globally 
influenced the formulation of national human rights instruments.  Similarly the 
jurisprudence of these international bodies have impacted on the manner in which the 
right to manifest religious belief is protected.  National jurisdictions have also been 
required to investigate the application and limitation of the right to manifest religious 
belief.  The manner in which the right has been protected in these jurisdictions has been 
dependant on various factors, such as the relationship between the state and religion.  The 
purpose of this survey is to determine the constitutional, juridical and philosophical 
framework that ensures the optimal protection of the right to manifest religious belief. 
 
Why „with specific reference to South Africa as a case study‟? 
 
South Africa is the country in which this study takes place.  South Africa further has a 
diverse population and is home to adherents of various religions.  Within the relative 
short span of the constitutional democracy the South African courts have had the 
opportunity to address the question of the right to manifest religious and cultural 
practices on more than one occasion.  From an analysis of these cases it is clear that the 
that the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court in particular has truly 
recognised the right to manifest religious belief and cultural practices.  In following this 
approach the court has ensured that the right to freedom of religion is acknowledged, 
protected and furthered. 
 
1.3 Terminology and normative approaches 
 
A number of terminological choices have been made throughout this study.  In order to 
simplify the text, unless the context requires otherwise, this study shall try to use 
consistent terms throughout.  Some of these terms are explained below. 
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Definition of the concept „religion‟ 
 
The right to freedom of religion has not been defined in any of the international 
instruments.  There is no generally accepted definition for religion in international law.  
Neither the ICCPR nor the ECHR have developed a detailed definition.
32
  None of the 
instruments describe the expression ‗religion or belief‘.  The bodies implementing the 
ICCPR as well as the ECHR have however given some guidance.  The ICCPR Human 
Rights Committee states that ‗freedom of religion or belief‘ denotes freedom of theistic, 
non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs, as well as the freedom not to profess any of these 
beliefs.
33
  The European Court of Human Rights also acknowledged that the religious 
dimensions of article 9 had meaning for ‗believers, atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned‘.34  In addition the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has indicated that the 
expression is not limited in its application to ‗traditional religions or to religions and 
beliefs with institutional characteristics or practice analogous to those traditional 
religions‘.35 
 
Edge and Harvey provide the following definition of religion: 
Religions are diverse ways of being human and there are many various ways of being 
religious.  All are concerned with ways of seeing and being in the world (some 
considering that this influences existence in post-mortem destinations).  Perhaps religion 
                                                          
32
 See generally MW Janis & C Evans Religion and International Law (1999); P Cumper ‗Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Belief‘ in D Harris & S Joseph The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and United Kingdom Law (1995). 
33
 See General Comment 22 on Article 18 ICCPR paragraph 2, as well as the Krishnaswami Study of 
Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices (UN Doc e/cn.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1(1960)).  
For a general overview of the European definition of freedom of religion see BG Tahzib-Lie ‗The 
European Definition of Freedom of Religion or Belief‘ (1998) 17 Helsinki Monitor 17. 
34
 See Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 260 A Eur Ct H R, 31. 
35
 The ICCPR Committee determined that a belief consisting primarily or exclusively in the worship and 
distribution of a narcotic drug cannot be brought within the scope of Article 18 of the ICCPR - see M.A.B. , 
W.A.T. and J.-A.Y.T v Canada (Communication no 570/1993), inadmissibility decision of 8 April 1994 UN 
Doc CCPR/C/51/D/570/1993, 4.2. 
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is concerned with the transcendent, but not all religions are necessarily concerned with 
that which some claim transcends time and space.
36
 
 
This study will not provide a fixed definition for the concept of religion.  A 
comprehensive definition will be used and the term will be used in a broad sense, 
inclusive of non-religious or secular life stances, as suggested by Edge and Harvey. 
 
In addition the term right to freedom of religion is used with essentially the same 
meaning as freedom of thought and conscience in that reference to thought and 
conscience does not intend to indicate different rights, but is merely to recognise the 
diverse profiles of the same right.
37
  Accordingly, the term right to freedom of religion 
includes religious thoughts and conduct as well as deeply held conscientious beliefs and 
conduct, and will be used as such throughout this study.  Furthermore, as the scope of the 
right to freedom of religion is determined by the manner in which the right to manifest 
religious belief is limited, the term ‗right to manifest religious belief‘ is used with 
appreciation that this terms incorporates the right to freedom of religion. 
 
Alternative approach to defining religion – religion as a way of life 
 
An alternative approach to defining the concept of religion is to recognise the value of the 
role of religion in the lives of adherents, through emphasising the various ‗facets‘ of 
religion.
38
  Three ‗facets‘ can be identified: firstly, religion as a belief; secondly, religion 
as a way of life; and finally, religion as an identity.  Religion as a belief accentuates, for 
example, the existence of a deity or the adherence to doctrines, as discussed above. 
 
                                                          
36
 PW Edge & G Harvey Law and Religion in Contemporary Society: Communities, Individualism and the 
State (2000) 8-9. 
37
 J Martínez-Torrón & R Navarro-Valls ‗Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of 
Europe‘ in T Lindholm, WC Durham & BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A 
Deskbook (2004) 210. 
38
 JT Gunn ‗Definition of ―Religion‖ in International Law‘ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Law Journal 
189, 200. 
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The second ‗facet‘ of religion accentuates religion as a way of life.  In this facet religion 
is associated with actions and rituals that may distinguish the believer from adherents of 
other religions.  The traditional Christian view of religion focuses primarily on religion as 
belief and, moreover, religion as a private belief.
39
  For adherents of other religions the 
belief component may be of less importance.   Religion as a way of life may perhaps be 
the most salient aspect of their lives.  For example, adherence to their religion may 
demand prayers five times a day may impose certain dietary requirements and may 
demand that certain religious dress and grooming requirements be complied with.  The 
concept of religion as a way of life may further be linked to the interconnectedness that 
exists between religion and culture as more fully discussed in section 5.2.1.1. 
 
Traditional western states often are reluctant to make accommodations for this religious 
way of life and in doing so often reveal the dominant facet of the religion of the majority 
of the state as a religion of belief.
40
  These states may claim that by enforcing so called 
‗neutral laws‘ that are applicable to all religious and ethnic groups, the state is treating all 
religions as equal.  However, adherents to religion as a way of life may suffer 
disproportionately.  This may have a devastating impact on the individual‘s ability 
practice her religion.
41
 
 
Alternative approach to defining religion – religion as identity 
 
None of the international, regional or national instruments mentioned previously provide 
for a specific right to identity.  Consequently, no definition for the right to identity exists.  
The South African Constitutional Court in the matter of Pillay,
42
 however, convincingly 
reasons for the importance of identity in the following manner: 
                                                          
39
 Ibid 204. 
40
 Ibid 205. 
41
 Ibid 214. 
42
 See section 8.7.1.1. 
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Dignity and identity are inseparably linked as one‘s sense of self-worth is defined by 
one‘s identity.43 
 
Identity is therefore linked to the self-worth of an individual.  The importance of self-
worth is appreciated by Rawls who speaks of a ‗sense of belonging‘.44  A sense of 
belonging is made possible through the individuals‘ location in for example, a religious 
or cultural community.  The role of religious and cultural practices in relation to human 
dignity and identity is also confirmed in that: 
[R]eligious and cultural practices are protected because they are central to human identity 
and hence to human dignity which is in turn central to equality.
45
 
 
Religion as identity accentuates affiliation with a group, such as ethnicity, race or 
nationality.  Religion as identity is accepted by Benito,
46
 who holds that ‗religion usually 
encompasses more than faith.  Often it is the focal point of the cultural tradition of a 
group‘.47  Religion as identity is most vividly reflected in the case of Jews, in that ‗they 
are primarily a religious group, they are likewise viewed as a race, a nation, a people, a 
culture‘.48 Here too, the concept of religion as identity may be linked to the 
interconnectedness that exists between religion and culture as more fully discussed in 
section 5.2.1.1. 
 
                                                          
43
 MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) (Pillay) 
paragraph 53. 
44
 J Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971) 62.  See also and I Berlin ‗Concepts of Liberty‘ in I Berlin (ed) Four 
Essays on Liberty (1969) 118,154-60. 
45
 Pillay (note 43 above) paragraph 62. 
46
 EO Benito, Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based 
on Religion or Belief for the period 1983 – 1986. 
47
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, Sub-Commission on the Prevention and Protection of Minorities, Commission 
on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, 39
th
 Session at paragraph 183 U N Doc E/CN.4/Sub 
2/1987/26/(1986). 
48
 GW Allport The Nature of Prejudice (1979) 446. 
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In addition, it is sometimes impossible to separate defining characteristics of a group‘s 
cultural composition as religious belief is often an integral part of ethnicity.
49
  Both 
religion and ethnicity play an important role in people‘s self identity.  Religion may 
further form the foundation of the existence of a specific ethnic group as supported by the 
following definition of ethnic group as a group of people who are seen as: 
[S]haring a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a belief in a common 
origin, a common history and a common destiny [as well as] culturally specific practices 
and beliefs. Physical appearance, language, a shared territory and religious beliefs may 
further contribute in varying degrees to ethnic identity.
 50
 
 
Identity consequently relates to various distinctive characteristics such as language, 
culture and religion; these aspects are all relative.  However, the very nature of universal 
human rights prefers to deal with universalities and generalities.
51
  Consequently the 
importance of these relative attributes is often insufficiently considered.  It is this 
interrelation between religion and ethnicity that will be explored next. 
 
It is the premise of this study that this alternative approach to defining religion as a way 
of life and religion as an identity is of particular importance in attempting to ensure the 
optimal protection of the right to manifest religious belief in a diverse society.  Regarding 
the definition of religion as identity it is further important to acknowledge the cultural 
and ethnic interconnection. 
 
Cultural, ethnic and racial interconnection 
 
                                                          
49
 J Haynes ‗Religion, Secularisation and Politics: A Postmodern Conspectus‘ (1997), 18 (4) Third World 
Quarterly 709, 721. 
50
 A Odendaal „Ethnic Conflict and its Management: A Position Paper‟ Centre for Conflict Resolution 
(1998), available at 
<http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/staff_papers/odendaal_ethnic.htm> last accessed on 10 March 2009. 
51
 C Douzinas ‗Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can Hegel Teach Us About Human Rights (2002) 29 
(3) Journal of Law and Society 379, 402. 
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The interconnection between race and religion is suitably portrayed among the people in 
the Cape during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Religion rather than race 
provided the categories for defining differences.  In light of this categorisation, black 
people were grouped with Islam.
52
  Religion was also often interlaced with ethnicity or 
nationality.  For example Muslims in the Cape were referred to as ‗Malays‘; this was not 
a racial or ethnic designation in that the term ‗Malays‘ signified the Muslims of the Cape 
who ‗embrace every shade, from the blackest to the most blooming Englishwoman.53  In 
Natal too, ethnicity or nationality was attached in a similar manner.  Muslim merchants 
from India settling in Natal set themselves apart from Indian labourers, who were mostly 
Hindu, through calling themselves ‗Arabs‘.54  Likewise the Jewish population that settled 
in Johannesburg was also divided by social class; the poorer underclass known for their 
illegal liquor trading and prostitution acquired the ‗ethnic‘ designation of Peruvians.55 
 
Religion, race,
56
 and ethnicity
57
 are all types of cultural groupings.  The concept ‗cultural 
group‘ refers to a group of people who to a large extent share similar customs, lifestyles, 
values, religious beliefs, historical continuity, physical characteristics and/or language.
58
  
The overlap between ethnicity and religion has also been recognised by the Abdelfattah 
Amor, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief who states 
that:  
                                                          
52
 D Chidester Religions of South Africa (1992) 89. 
53
 In this regards see Chidester (note 52 above) 162 where he refers to a comment in the 1860s by an 
aristocratic English visitor to the Cape, Lucy Duff Gordon. 
54
 F Ginwala Class, Consciousness and Control: Indian South Africans, 1860-1946 (1947) PhD Thesis 
Oxford University, 136. 
55
 Chidester (note 52 above) 177. 
56
 The term race or racial group usually refers to the categorisation of humans into populations or ancestral 
groups on the basis of various sets of heritable characteristics.  The physical features commonly seen as 
indicating race are salient visual traits such as skin colour, cranial or facial features and hair texture. 
57
 Ethnicity like race is concerned with the notion of descent or genealogy.  The terms ‗ethnicity‘ and 
‗ethnic group‘ are derived from the Greek word ethnos, normally translated as ‗nation‘ or commonly said 
people of the same race that share a distinctive culture. 
58
 Y Tseming ‗Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion‘ 
(1997) 37 Indiana Law Journal 119, 127. 
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[T]he distinctions between racial and religious categories … are not clear … There are 
borderline cases where racial and religious distinctions are far from clear-cut.  Apart from 
any discrimination, the identity of many minorities, or even large groups of people, is 
defined by both racial and religious aspects.  Hence, many instances of discrimination are 
aggravated by the effects of multiple identities…59 
 
The importance of religion and ethnicity (or race) is situated in the fact that religion and 
race not only has significance for the individual within the framework of the religious 
belief system or biological foundation of race.  Religion and ethnicity (or race) in 
addition to creating multiple identities also creates collective or shared identity, which 
has a cultural and social significance for the individual.
60
  Therefore, race, ethnicity and 
religion are indicative of the individual‘s self identity as well as of the individual‘s sense 
of belonging to a cultural community.  Consequently, the similarities between race, 
ethnicity and religion are located within the fact that all play comparable roles in 
determining the position of an individual within society.
61
  It is the premise of this study 
that in advancing the protection of the right to freedom of religion it is imperative that the 
collective nature of the right is taken into account. 
 
Ascribed or acquired nature of religious belief 
 
A further factor that may influence the value that religion imposes on the development of 
an individual‘s identity rests on divergent views.  On the one hand, some see personal 
identity as an acquired set of characteristics,
62
 while on the other hand, others view 
identity as the result of ascribed set of characteristics.
63
  It has been suggested that race 
                                                          
59
 United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief A Amor, Racial Discrimination 
and Religious Discrimination: Identification and Measures [29] UN Doc A/CONF. 189/PC. 1/7 (2000). 
60
 Tseming (note 58 above) 123. 
61
 Ibid 121. 
62
 See generally S Macedo Liberal Virtues, Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism 
(1990). 
63
 See generally C Taylor Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity Harvard University Press 
(1989). 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
and ethnicity on the one hand and religion on the other, appear to deal with entirely 
different personal attributes.  Race and ethnicity are concerned with unchangeable 
involuntary attributes such as skin colour and genetics, whilst religion appears to have a 
voluntary nature.
64
  However, the individual in determining her identity is not free to 
reject all forms of ascribed identity.
65
  Limitations are imposed by culture and society.
66
  
The identity of an individual is therefore shaped by the individual herself but always in 
light of the community to which she belongs. 
 
Therefore, this study is based on the premise that both race and ethnicity are social 
constructs.  Similarly this study asserts that religious belief is usually instilled at an early 
age, transferred by family, and taught as part of a person's value and belief system,
67
 and 
therefore is ‗something the individual did not choose, but which chose him‘.68  
Nonetheless, irrespective of whether race and/or religion are/is considered ascribed or 
acquired, both have a great affect on the individual‘s self-identity and group membership. 
 
Islamic headscarf-hijab 
 
It is interesting to note that just as the right to freedom of religion is subject to many 
interpretations, so too is the Islamic headscarf, both in language and appearance.  The 
English term headscarf and veil, as well as the French terms foulard, voile and chador 
differ markedly from the Arabic hijab: 
Hijab means curtain, and barrier is an important part of its meaning.  It doesn‘t at 
any rate mean headscarf (the Arabic word for that is khimar) ... Hijab is 
commonly used to mean Muslim dress...
69
 
                                                          
64
 Ibid. 
65
 KA Appiah ‗Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction‘ in A 
Gutman (ed) Multiculturalism.(1994)149-163.  See also in general A Gutmann Identity in Democracy 
(2003). 
66
 KA Appiah & A Gutman Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (1998). 
67
 Tseming (note 58 above) 133 
68
 TL Hall ‗Religion, Equality and Difference‘ (1992) 65 (1) Temple Law Review 50, 62. 
69
 M Martin ‗Cry Freedom and Accept the Muslim Headscarf‘ The Times 1 February 2004. 
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Within Islamic tradition the extent of covering required from women may differ in 
accordance with different interpretations of the requirements of the faith.  The extent of 
covering may vary from the headscarf (hijab),
70
 to coverings such as the face veil that 
leaves an opening for the eyes (niqab), to more extensive coverings such as the head-to-
toe all enveloping garment (jilbab).  The most extensive covering is the burqa which 
covers the entire body and face with a mesh screen for the eyes. 
 
Unless the context requires otherwise, this study will try to be consistent and use the term 
headscarf-hijab, acknowledging that although the headscarf-hijab is a form of veiling it 
can be much more extensive, covering most parts of the body.  Furthermore this study is 
appreciative of the fact that arguments advanced in favour of restricting the face veil 
(niqab) may be more persuasive at times those advocating limitation on the use of for 
example the headscarf-hijab.  These limitations may for example be justifiable when it 
may be important to identify an individual. 
 
Not only is there vagueness about the language used for describing the headscarf-hijab 
but further disagreement exists over whether the Islamic religion mandates the headscarf-
hijab at all.  Within the scope of this thesis these debates are not explored on the basis 
that the core aspect of the right to freedom of religion is that religious groups have the 
rights to interpret their own religion.  In this regard see the position of the European 
Court of Human Rights when it takes the view that: 
... in principle the right to freedom of religion for the purposes of the Convention 
excluded assessment by the State of the legitimacy of the religious beliefs or the way in 
which those religious beliefs are expressed.
71
 
                                                          
70
 A female wears the headscarf over her head, generally covering her hair, ears and neck.  The term hijab 
in Arabic means ‗barrier‘ or ‗screen‘ from the Arabic word hajaba meaning to hide from view or conceal. 
See Islam on line, Hijab: A Must, Not a Choice, 29 February 2004, available at 
<www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1123996016350&pagename=Islam> last accessed on 10 
September 2010. 
71
 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others of Moldova, Application No 45701/99, ECHR 2001 XII, 
paragraph 117. 
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Therefore the point of departure of this study is that the manner in which the right to 
manifest religious belief is exercised should be left to the individual herself to determine.  
For this reason, the public domain, including institutions or courts should not entangle 
themselves in dogmatic questions pertaining to the manifestation of religion. 
 
1.4 Statement of the problem 
 
Increasing visibility of the conflict relating to the manifestation of religion in the public 
domain 
 
The visibility of conflict with regards to the manifestation of religion in the public 
domain, whether it is in places of employment or education, is on the increase.  This is in 
general due to an array of factors including but not limited to increase in the number of 
people migrating, followed by a diversification of religious belief systems within what 
traditionally could have been considered a homogeneous society.  As a result, conflict 
between different religions as well within individual religions has become more 
prevalent.  In addition non-believers have actively employed the concept of state 
neutrality to actively push religion out of the public and other spheres. 
 
South Africa with its traditional multicultural society and increasing migrant population 
is a sound example of this emerging diversity and corresponding potential for conflict.  
Therefore the duty to protect the right to freedom of religion is often confronted with 
more complexity. 
 
The right to freedom of religion is intrinsically linked to the achievement of every 
individual‘s inherent dignity; a limitation of the right in principle hinders the full 
enjoyment of the broad spectrum of fundamental human rights.  Consequently, the failure 
to adequately protect the right to freedom of religion must be acknowledged as not only 
an obstacle to the full realisation and protection of human rights.  At the same time it is 
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acknowledged that the right to manifest religious beliefs may be subject to reasonable 
limitations. 
 
Scope and meaning of the legal text protecting the right 
 
Despite the existence of relevant international and regional instruments, as well as the 
protection of the right to freedom of religion in national constitutions and legislation, the 
interpretation and application of the rights to freedom of religion and to the manifestation 
of religious beliefs continues to be problematic and unclear.  The potential for conflict in 
a religiously diverse society is exacerbated by this uncertainty.  The following issues 
regarding the scope and meaning of the right to freedom of religion are evident: 
 
First, the right to freedom of religion is cast as an individual liberty right.  The right to 
freedom of religion therefore confirms our right to be different.  The right to freedom of 
religion also acknowledges diversity and the right not to be discriminated against because 
of this difference.  The provisions relating to equality and non-discrimination are of 
particular significance with regards to ensuring the optimum protection of the right to 
manifest religious belief in a diverse society.  The interrelated nature of the right to 
freedom of religion and the right to non-discrimination is fittingly captured in the 
following statement by Sachs: 
This is one of the most important areas for asserting the simultaneity of the right to be the 
same and the right to be different.
72
 
This recognition of our right to be different plays a crucial role in the shaping of identity 
as this recognition validates our humanity, difference and uniqueness.
73
 
 
Second, in addition to the interrelated nature of the right to freedom of religion and the 
right to equality, the right to freedom of religion is also protected in terms of other 
provisions.  Principles stem from more general provisions, such as those for example 
                                                          
72
 A Sachs Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (1990) 44. 
73
 C Douzinas ‗Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can Hegel Teach Us About Human Rights (2002) 29 
(3) Journal of Law and Society 379,383. 
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pertaining to the right to freedom of association.  Therefore the right to freedom of 
religion cannot be protected only as an individual right.  The collective nature of the right 
to freedom of religion must be protected as well. 
 
Third, religion and culture play a constitutive role in the formation of identity.
74
  As a 
result, if the demands of the law place a religious observer in a position of conflict 
between the dictates of her religious practices and the obligations imposed by the law, 
she accordingly faces a ‗special‘ harm.75  Culture and religion also in general form the 
basis of the manner in which a minority identifies its difference from the rest of the 
population.
76
 
 
Finally, the right to believe is a key ingredient of any person‘s dignity and for many 
believers religion is central to all their activities.  Religion concerns their capacity to 
relate to their sense of themselves, their community and their universe.  Religion awakens 
concepts of self-worth and human dignity in every adherent.
77
 
 
The need to balance either the accommodation or the limitation of the right to manifest 
religion in the public domain needs to take pace with full appreciation of the interrelated 
scope and meaning of the right to freedom of religion. 
 
Relationship between the state and religion 
 
One approach to furthering the equal treatment of different religions has been in terms of 
the structure of the relationship between state and religion.  States may display degrees of 
                                                          
74
 M Menachem ‗From ―Honor‖ To ―Dignity‖: How Should A Liberal State Treat Non-Liberal Cultural 
Groups?‘ (2008) Legal Pluralism, Privatization of Law and Multiculturalism 609, 610. 
75
 JH Garvey ‗Free Exercise and the Values of Religous Liberty‘ (1986) Connecticut Law Review 179. 
76
 K Henrard ‗The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities in Africa‘ in 
SA Dersso (ed) Perspectives on the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Africa (2010) 207, 209. 
77
 The importance of religion described by Sachs J in Christian Education v Minister Education 2000 (4) 
SA 757 (CC) paragraph 36 as discussed in section 8.8.1. 
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separation (often termed secularisation)
78
 between state and religion.  Secular states are 
said to be neutral toward all religion and in are therefore premised to advance the equal 
recognition of all religions.  The secular nature of the state is founded on the principle 
that public sphere must be free from religious influence.  This foundation however denies 
the fact that the very nature of religion is that religious people often see life as a whole 
and aspire to manifest their beliefs in their private and public lives.
79
 
 
1.5 Aims of the study  
 
The principal aim of this study is to identify the constitutional, juridical and philosophical 
framework in terms of which the right to manifest religious belief is optimally protected.  
To this end the following secondary questions are explored: 
 
Firstly, how the relationship between the state and religion should be structured and 
interpreted to enhance the protection of the right to freedom of religion and the right to 
manifest religious belief of all its citizens. 
 
Secondly, how the right to freedom of religion should be interpreted to ensure the optimal 
protection of the right to freedom of religion and the right to manifest religious belief in 
diverse societies. 
 
Thirdly, how the adherents of different religions should be assured of equal protection of 
the right to freedom of religion and the right to manifest religious belief in a diverse 
society. 
 
                                                          
78
 The term secularism was first introduced by the George Holyoake.  In this regard see G Holyoake 
Secularism, the Practical Philosophy of the People (1854). Holyoake defined secularism as ‗the doctrine 
that morality should be based on regard for the well-being of mankind in the present life, to the exclusion 
of all other considerations drawn from a belief in God or a future state‘ 
79
 See section 5.2.2. 
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1.6 Research methodology  
 
This thesis is conducted by means of a critical review and analysis of books and journal 
articles as well as relevant legal texts, followed by an overview of the appropriate 
international, regional and national instruments protecting the right to freedom of 
religion.  At the level of the United Nations this research discusses the practices of the 
ICCPR Human Rights Committee as well as the reports of the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, appointed by the Commission on Human 
Rights to examine incidents and governmental action inconsistent with the ICCPR and 
the 1981 Declaration.  General Comment 22 is of particular importance.  In addition, the 
ICCPR Human Rights Committee‘s considerations regarding those countries who have 
accepted the right of individual petition under the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
are considered.  Furthermore the results of examination of State reports submitted under 
article 40 of the ICCPR are analysed. 
 
On a regional level the regional instruments such as the ECHR, the Pact of San José and 
the African Charter are analysed as well as the decisions of regional judicial bodies, 
primarily the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  On a national 
level a comparative survey of a mainly five countries France, the United Kingdom (UK) 
(England), Germany, the United States of America (USA) and Canada is conducted.  The 
application, limitation and interpretation of the right to freedom of religion in these 
judicial systems are analysed. 
 
At the foreground of this analysis of the application, limitation and interpretation of the 
right to freedom of religion is the approach of the South African judiciary regarding the 
interpretation and protection of the right to manifest religious and cultural practice in a 
diverse society.  On the basis of the aforesaid, recommendations will be made as to the 
jurisprudential and legislative context in terms of which the fullest enjoyment of the right 
to freedom of religion is most likely to be achieved. 
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1.7 Limitations of the study 
 
Not a comparative study 
 
This study is not a comparative study as understood in its strict sense where three (in 
some respects, five)
80
 successive stages of description, comparison and explanation are 
employed.
81
  While at some stages, comparisons are made in such a way as to reflect 
what the jurisdictions may learn from each other, the aim is to assess the domestic laws, 
policies, and practices of the countries in the evaluation.  The purpose of the assessment 
is to appreciate the effectiveness of the South African national legal norms and practices 
and to gather suggestions about how best to interpret these norms in the event of future 
challenges. 
 
Choice of jurisdictions 
 
The study covers mainly five countries: France, the UK (England), Germany, the USA 
and Canada.  It is not assumed that other countries would not have been able to do equal 
justice to the discussion.  In addition, every attempt is made to ensure that substantial 
uniformity exists in the discussion of the countries.  However, there may be a dominance 
of information from particular countries in the study, as a result of for example the 
availability of resources. 
 
The choices of the countries in the study were made on the basis of a combination of 
thematic and practical considerations.  These criteria are summarised as follows:  First, as 
a common feature all five countries share is a commitment towards the respect for 
fundamental human rights and all are parties to international and regional texts protecting 
                                                          
80
 E Orucu ‗Methodological aspects of Comparative Law‘ (2007) 8 (29) European Journal of Law Reform 
37, 40. 
81
 For a discussion of what comparative family law entails see, generally K Boele-Woelki ‗What 
comparative family should entail‘ in K Boele-Woelki (ed.) Debates in Family Law around the Globe at the 
Dawn of the 21
st
 Century (2009) 3. 
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the right to freedom of religion.  However, all these countries are confronted with 
challenges posed by religious diversity.  Second, the historical culture in France, 
Germany and the UK is comparable in that all three these countries demonstrate an 
existing majority culture, predominantly either Roman Catholic or Protestant.  The USA 
and Canada are countries settled by settlers of predominantly European descent.  Thirdly, 
all five countries represent a different arrangement between the state and religion.  This 
relationship ranges from a strictly secular state as present in France, to an established 
church as found in England.  Finally, four of the five countries have written constitutions 
in terms of which the right to freedom of religion is protected.  In the UK the right to 
freedom of religion is protected in terms of non-discrimination legislation. 
 
Following the survey of these five countries an analysis of the juridical, constitutional 
and philosophical approach of the South African courts with regards to the protection of 
the right to manifest religious and cultural practices will be conducted.  The South 
African courts have had the amply opportunity to address issues concerning the right to 
manifest religious and cultural practices and in particular the Constitutional Court is held 
in high esteem with regards to the manner in which it has ensured the optimal protection 
of the right to manifest religious belief and cultural practices. 
 
Restrictions exercised regarding jurisdictions chosen 
 
The comparative aspect of this thesis aimed to include at least one African state.  Similar 
to the situation in South Africa, the United States of America (USA) and Canada, many 
African states emerged from British rule.  In addition, of these states follow a common 
law tradition, in which legal development rests primarily in the hands of courts.  Some of 
these states further follow a system of constitutionalism and secularism.  Furthermore 
religious and cultural heterogeneity is prevalent in most African states and incidences of 
religious conflict are customary.  All of these factors lead to the desirability of the 
inclusion of at least one African state.  However, as the main aspect of the thesis is an 
analysis of the jurisprudence pertaining to a limitation of the right to manifest religious 
belief, African jurisprudence was limited in this regard.  The only matter that was 
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referred to the African Commission was the South African case of Prince
82
.  Therefore 
the inclusion of an African state other than South Africa was discounted. 
 
India was also considered as a possible state for comparative purposes for the following 
reasons:  India too emerged from British rule and in this respect is similar to South 
Africa, the United States of America (USA) and Canada.  In addition, India makes use of 
a common law tradition, bestowing legal development primarily in the hands of courts.  
However, India was discounted for the following reasons:
83
 
 
Firstly India is deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines following independence.  
This divide together with the highly heterogeneous nature of Indian society has made any 
attempt to define the role of religion in India to be a complex issue.
84
  Secondly, the 
multicultural composition of the Indian society made the separation of religion and state 
not viable and attempts to demarcate this relationship has resulted in a deeply polarising 
social conflict.  Thirdly, the Indian Constitution provides for a distinct concept of 
secularism, significantly different from the liberalist ‗wall of separation‘ as employed in 
the USA.  Secularism in the Indian Constitution entails two concurrent and seemingly 
contradictory objectives: the concept of State neutrality towards religion, in terms of 
which all religions are equally protected, coupled with the possibility of State 
intervention in religious affairs for the purpose of uplifting the disadvantaged groups and 
accelerating their social integration offering special protections to India‘s Scheduled 
                                                          
82
 To date only five matters concerning the right to freedom of conscience have been received by the 
African Commission of which only the matter against South Africa (Prince v South Africa 255/2002 
EC.CL/167 (VI)) related to the right to manifest religious belief. 
83
 See generally Jacobsohn GJ The Wheel Of Law: India‟s Secularism In Comparative Constitutional 
Context (2003); Liviatan O ‗Judicial Activism and Religion-Based Tensions in India and Israel‘ Vol. 26, 
No. 3 (2009) 26 (3) Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 583. 
84
 The U.S. Department of State 2008 Religious Freedom Report on India estimates India‘s population at 
1.1 billion, with Hindus constituting 80.5% of the population, Muslims 13.4%, Christians 2.3%, Sikhs 1.8% 
and others including Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, Jews and Baha‘s at 1.1%. USA Department Of State, 2008 
International Religious Freedom Report 2008: India (2008), available at  
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108500.htm last accessed on 10 November 2010. 
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Castes and Scheduled Tribes also known as Dalits or Untouchables.  Fourthly, Hindu 
nationalism has been a permanent feature of Indian politics advancing the notion of 
Hindutva which illustrates Hindu supremacy for the purpose of achieving national unity.  
Employing Hindutva Hindu-Muslim conflict has been exacerbated as illustrated by the 
Hindu demolition of the Babri Masjid mosque at Ayodhya. 
 
Finally, and most compelling, India has since independence being delaying the 
implementation of a uniform civil code aimed at replacing the separate systems of 
personal law that regulated family matters (including marriage, divorce, guardianship, 
and inheritance) according to the religious doctrines of each faith.  A series of law know 
as the ‗Hindu Code‘ places the Hindu community along with Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs 
to a uniform system of secularised personal law with religious underpinnings while 
Muslims, Christians, Parsees, and Jews continued to follow their own personal laws.  A 
uniform civil code geared towards legal uniformity and equal protection has still not been 
achieved.  In particular Muslims are against such a code arguing that their constitutional 
guarantees to religious freedom as well as India‘s commitment to multiculturalism 
provided for a separate system of regulation.  In terms of Muslim Personal Law Muslims 
are entitled to take a second wife a practice which is forbidden for Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, 
and Sikh men.  As illustrated by this example, provisions of personal law are often 
considered in conflict with fundamental human rights. 
 
Not an enquiry into the meaning and truth of religion 
 
This study is not concerned with a systematic inquiry into the meaning and truth of 
religious beliefs, nor is it focused on the defence of any particular outlook of any religion.  
Moreover, the philosophy of religion with the aim of seeking a critical understanding of 
purpose and meaning of the various religious beliefs in human life also falls outside the 
scope of this research.  However, the research conducted is based on the premise that 
religious life, in all its various manners and forms, such as emotions, belief and practice, 
permeates human culture and shapes the conduct and experience of mankind. 
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Cognisant, informed and uncoerced decision 
 
This study, in the evaluation of the right to manifest religious belief through the display 
of religious dress and in particular the Islamic headscarf-hijab, focuses on the rights of 
religious women who make a cognisant, informed and uncoerced decision to wear the 
Islamic headscarf.  There are of course competing claims based on equality and 
provisions of non-discrimination which are advanced in support of arguments that restrict 
the right of religious women to wear the Islamic headscarf.  However, this study is based 
on the premise that the right of women to manifest their religious belief should not per se 
be limited in an attempt to ensure their equal treatment. 
 
1.8 Chapter outline  
 
Chapter 1 
 
This chapter is introductory and sets out the context of the research, identifies the 
problem and outlines the methodology.  The background to the study is set out, as well as 
the aims of the study and the questions the study will try to answer.  Certain definitions 
are put forward.  The limitations of the study are set out and a chapter outline is provided. 
 
Chapter 2  
 
This chapter provides a historical overview of the right to freedom of religion.  It 
examines historical religious conflicts and consequent abuses of the right to freedom of 
religion.  The need to formulate agreements aimed at the protection of the right to 
freedom of religion is discussed.  A historical perspective of the international human 
rights regime, in so far as its development identifies religious conflict as a source of 
human rights violations and the need to protect the right to freedom of religion, is 
offered.  This chapter concludes that the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of religion are central to ensuring peaceful co-existence in a religiously diverse 
community. 
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Chapter 3 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the relationship between the state and religion.  The 
historical origin of this relationship is identified and the influence of religious conflict on 
the structuring of the relationship between the state and religions is recognised.  A range 
of permutations of possible relationships between the state and religion is identified.  The 
advantages and possible disadvantages of the various permutations, ranging from 
theocratic to secular states, relating to the protection afforded to the right to freedom of 
religion, is documented.  This chapter argues that the right to freedom of religion of all 
adherents and not only the dominant religion should be protected and promoted.  This 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of religion requires that religion be 
afforded a more public role and that religion should not be restricted to the domain of the 
private. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
This chapter outlines the international legal context of the right to freedom of religion and 
examines the important international treaties and declarations protecting the right to 
freedom of religion.  The role, significance, impact and implementation as well as status 
of ratification of the foundational instruments protecting the right to freedom of religion, 
namely, the UDHR; the ICCPR and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion (the 1981 Declaration), are dealt 
with.  Selected regional human rights instruments, namely those of the European, 
American and African systems are dealt with as well. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
This chapter argues for an alternative approach to ensuring the protection of the right to 
manifest religious belief.  Drawing from the conclusions in previous chapters an 
argument is put forward for a post modern approach to the right to freedom of religion.  
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The return of religion to a neutral public sphere is suggested.  In addition the duty of the 
state to promote the right to freedom of religion through taking positive measures to 
protect in particular the religious rights of the minority and marginalised religions is 
emphasised.  This chapter argues that the most extensive promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of religion is central to a fulfilling and dignified life.  A celebration of 
difference is exclaimed. 
 
Chapter 6 
 
This chapter outlines the manner in which the international and selected regional judicial 
bodies (the European Court of Human Rights) have interpreted the right to manifest 
religious belief through the observation of religious rites and the display of religious 
dress.  The consequent limitations on the right to manifest religious belief are analysed.  
The need to balance the right to freedom of religion with other conflicting interests is 
emphasised.  This chapter argues that the most extensive promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of religion is central to a fulfilling and dignified life and any limitation 
to the right to manifest religious beliefs must be interpreted in a restricted manner.  With 
regard to the analysis of the regional judicial bodies the emphasis is primarily on the 
European Court of Human Rights, as to date only five matters concerning the right to 
freedom of conscience have been received by the African Commission of which only the 
matter against South Africa (Prince v South Africa 255/2002 EC.CL/167 (VI)) related to 
the right to manifest religious belief.  From an evaluation of the jurisprudence of the Inter 
American Court on Human Rights it is apparent that the right to manifest religious belief 
has not yet been interpreted by the IACtHR. 
 
Chapter 7 
 
This chapter outlines the national legal context of the right to freedom of religion in the 
following countries: France, the UK (England), Germany, the USA and Canada.  The 
applicable national legal instruments and the application thereof by the judiciary are 
evaluated.  The legal application of the right to manifest religious belief is analysed in 
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these countries to appreciate the validity and effectiveness of the South African national 
legal norms and practices and to gather suggestions about how best to interpret these 
norms in the event of future challenges. 
  
Chapter 8 
 
This chapter focuses on the historical and philosophical context of the right to freedom of 
religion in South Africa as well as the application of the right to freedom of religion by 
the judiciary with reference to international and regional practice.  Drawing on the 
manner in which the right to freedom of religion is applied in a South African context, 
this chapter examines possible alternative approaches to the protection of the right to 
manifest religious belief.  The focus again is on the jurisprudence relating to the right to 
manifest religious belief. 
 
Chapter 9 
 
The chapter will provide various conclusions and recommendations on the 
implementation of the right to freedom of religion in South Africa generally with specific 
reference to the right to manifest the right to freedom of religion through the wearing of 
religious adornment or dress or the observances of rituals or practices. 
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Chapter 2 
A brief overview of the development of a regulatory framework for the protection of 
the right to freedom of religion in response to religious conflict 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
It is sound to maintain that the regulatory framework (in terms of which the right to 
freedom of religion is protected today) developed historically in response to certain 
religious conflicts.  These historical conflicts also in general influenced the manner in 
which the relationship between the state and religion ultimately took shape.  The 
relationship between the state and religion is considered in a subsequent chapter.
1
  In this 
chapter is an overview of these religious conflicts, as well as the ensuing development of 
the stages of protection of the right to freedom of religion is offered. 
 
The overview of historical conflicts contained in this chapter does not suggest that all the 
conflicts discussed were entirely driven by religion.  The true cause of conflict is often 
difficult to determine.  Frequently, a combination of factors - for example, political 
alliances, economic, ethnic and / or religious differences - may play a role.  In addition, 
there are indications that religious conflicts are often used as a pretext to disguise 
political, dynastic, or even personal power struggles.  For this reason the conflicts that are 
discussed in this chapter are conflicts which relate predominantly to the issue of religion. 
 
In addition, the brief synopsis of religious conflict and present day challenges to the right 
to freedom of religion does not claim to be an all-inclusive overview of religious conflict 
per se.  This chapter places an emphasis on historical conflicts which resulted in the 
conclusion of treaties or agreements aimed at addressing or resolving these conflicts.  The 
chapter is therefore based on the following theoretical approach: 
                                                          
1
 See section 3.4. 
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[T]hat human rights however fundamental are historical rights and therefore arise from 
specific conditions characterised by the embattled defence of new freedoms against old 
powers. ... Religious freedom resulted from religious wars.
2 
 
The historical origin of the legal regulatory framework protecting the right to freedom of 
religion is put forward.  Followed by an outline of the manner in which the protection of 
the right to freedom of religion developed throughout history.  The development is 
structured in three distinct phases; firstly, the protection afforded in terms of the maxim 
cuius regio, eius religio,
3
 which provided for the territorial separation of Roman 
Catholics and the Protestant reformed Lutherans and Calvinists; secondly, the protection 
of the right to freedom of religion in terms of the minority protection model;
4
 and lastly 
the international human rights model.
5
  This is in order to set the foundation for a more 
detailed consideration of the current protection afforded to the right to freedom of 
religion in later chapters.
6
 
 
The development of provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion also provides 
the background for the analysis of the application thereof in South Africa and 
recommendations as how best to ensure the most comprehensive protection of the right to 
freedom of religion in religious and cultural diverse nations.
7
 
 
                                                          
2
 HJ Steiner International Human Rights in Context Law Politics and Morals (2007) 480 where the remarks 
of Noberto Bobbio are included from N Bobbio The Age of Rights (trans. Allan Cameron) (1996) 18. 
3
 Translated to read where there is one lord there shall be one religion.  Available at 
<http://www.yuni.com/library/latin_1.html> last accessed on 23 October 2010. Further discussed in section 
2.3.1. 
4
 See section 2.4. 
5
 See section 2.5. 
6
 See section 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
7
 See section 5.7. 
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2.2 The origin of the protection of the right to freedom of religion: The Edict of 
Milan (313) 
 
The first declaration of religious freedom is found in the Edict of Milan,
8
 proclaimed by 
St. Constantine, Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire.
9
 Following the crucifixion of 
Jesus, the Romans persecuted Christians for approximately the first three hundred years 
of Christian tradition.  In terms of the Edict of Milan the right to religious freedom was 
decreed as follows:  
We thought it fit to commend these things most fully to your care that you may know that 
we have given to those Christians free and unrestricted opportunity of religious worship. 
When you see that this has been granted to them by us, your Worship will know that we 
                                                          
8
 DH Davis ‗The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: Examining the Role of the 
1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief‘ (2002) Brigham Young University Law Review 217, 225. 
9
 Kelly summarises the development of The Roman Empire as follows:  The Roman Empire developed 
after the ancient Roman civilization.  During the Roman Empire the approach towards religion was less 
spiritual and more based on a relationship between man and the forces (gods or goddesses) which were 
believed to control people's existence and well-being.  Due to its vastness the empire was often divided 
along an East/West axis, namely the Eastern Roman or Byzantium Empire and the Western Roman Empire.  
In 313 AD in the Edict of Milan, Christianity was recognised as a religion.  Following the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire in 476 AD Europe was pushed into the dark Middle Ages which lasted until the 
rise of the Holy Roman Empire in 962 AD.  The Holy Roman Empire replaced the Western Roman 
Empire.  The territories and dominion of the Holy Roman Empire in terms of present-day states comprised 
of Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and parts of Slovenia, significant parts of eastern France, northern Italy and western Poland.  
Although the Holy Roman Empire would nominally exist until 1806, its authority came to an end after 
1555 – with the signature of the Treaty of Augsburg.  In this regard see generally C Kelly The Roman 
Empire: a Very Short Introduction (2006).  The Byzantium Empire remained as the eastern position of the 
Roman Empire.  With regards to the Eastern Roman Empire see generally C Imber The Ottoman Empire, 
1300–1650: The Structure of Power (2002). Imber indicates that the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire 
endured until 1453 with the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks creating the Ottoman Empire.  
The territories of the Eastern Roman Empire in terms of present-day states includes Turkey, Egypt, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Serbia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Palestine, Algeria, Tunisia and Syria.  As 
indicated above the Holy Roman Empire replaced the Western Roman Empire that comprised of territories 
including amongst others Germany and parts of France, discussed in more detail in section 2.3 below. 
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have also conceded to other religions the right of open and free observance of their 
worship for the sake of the peace of our times, that each one may have the free 
opportunity to worship as he pleases; this regulation is made we that we may not seem to 
detract from any dignity or any religion.
10
 
 
From Constantine‘s reign to the Middle Ages the church and state were united in the 
Republica Christiana (a united Christendom).  Any onslaught on the Republica 
Christiana was met with force.  The authority of the Republica Christiana (Roman 
Catholic Church) was most evident in the wars it waged on Islam and Judaism during the 
period of the Crusades,
11
 as well as the Spanish Inquisition.
12
  These wars were in general 
aimed at maintaining the integrity of the Catholic faith.  This period of history endorsed 
the notion that a common religion is the foundation of a stable society.  Enforcement of 
religious uniformity was established as the order of the day.
13
 
 
During this period all laws were loosely associated with natural law, which was 
interpreted as divine law.
14
  The universal jurisdiction of the Republica Christiana was 
challenged during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by the Protestant 
Reformation.
15
 
                                                          
10
 University of Pennsylvania, Department of History ‗Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources 
of European history‘, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press (1897) Volume 4, Issue 1, 28-30.  The 
Edict was replaced in 380 by Emperor Theodosius who declared Trinitarian Christianity a state religion. 
11
 For a discussion of the Crusades, from the eleventh century to the fourteenth century, see generally S 
Runciman A History of the Crusades Volume One The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of 
Jerusalem (1962); see also S Runciman A History of the Crusades Volume Two The Kingdom Of Jerusalem 
and the Frankish East (1962); K Armstrong Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today‟s World 
(2001); DC Munro ‗The Popes and the Crusades‘ (1916) 55(5) Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 348. 
12
 See generally A Alcalá The Spanish Inquisition and the Inquisitorial Mind (1987). 
13
 Davis (note 8 above) 220. 
14
 A Eide ‗The Framework Convention in Historical and Global Perspective‘ in M Weller (ed) Oxford 
Commentaries on International Law The Rights of Minorities in Europe A Commentary of the European 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (2005) 25, 28. 
15
 Ibid. 
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2.3 The first phase of reluctant recognition: the Protestant Reformation (1517 – 
1648) 
 
The Protestant Reformation can broadly be defined as a religious and political movement 
in 16th-century Europe to reform the Roman Catholic Church.
16
  Hillerbrand explains 
that in this time humanist scholars questioned the authenticity of documents establishing 
papal supremacy.  In Germany, the Reformation was initiated by the teachings of Martin 
Luther, who in October 1517 launched the Protestant Reformation by posting his ninety 
five theses on the Castle Church door in Wittenberg.  Luther‘s theses rejected the 
Republica Christiana and the relationship between church and state in terms of which 
religious uniformity was demanded.  This stream of Protestant thought became known as 
Lutheranism.  Lutheranism generally progressed into the more vigorous Calvinist 
tradition, with its origins in the thought of John Calvin (1509-1564).
17
  In France, 
Calvinists known as Huguenots took issue with the Catholic faith.  Similarly in England 
various forms of Protestantism and Anglicanism came into disagreement with 
Catholicism. 
 
The name ‗Wars of Religion‘ has been given to a series of European wars following the 
onset of the Protestant Reformation.
18
  Although sometimes unconnected, all of these 
                                                          
16
 See generally HJ Hillerbrand The Protestant Reformation (2009).  The Protestant Reformation by means 
of the Peace of Augsburg brought about recognition of the Protestant faith.  Although the Peace of 
Augsburg was a step towards the leaving behind an Empire based on a common religion it did not 
wholeheartedly accept religious diversity but merely reluctantly recognised it as to ensure peace as will be 
more fully described in section 2.3.1 below. 
17
 Van't Spijker describes the life of John Calvin (1509 – 1564) briefly in the following terms. Calvin 
trained as a lawyer and become fascinated with Christian humanist scholarship which led him to the 
reformist ideology.  After fleeing France he went to Strasbourg, Basel and eventually Geneva where he 
established a reformist community after 1541.  See generally W Van't Spijker Calvin: a brief guide to his 
life and thought (2009).  For evangelical ideas put forward by Calvin, see generally J Calvin Institution of 
Christian Religion (1536). 
18
 Generally MD Evans ‗Historical Analysis of Religion or Belief as a Technique for Resolving Religious 
Conflict‘ in T Lindholm, CW Durham and BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: 
A Deskbook (2004) 1, 4. 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
wars were strongly influenced by the religious change of the period.  Within the scope of 
this study the ‗Wars of Religion‘ in Germany and France will be highlighted as these 
wars principally gave rise to agreements in terms of which protection for the right to 
freedom of religion was included. 
 
2.3.1 The Protestant Reformation in German territories:  The Peace of Augsburg 
(1555) 
 
Kelly describes that the region of the Holy Roman Empire, encircling present-day 
Germany, was a fragmented collection of semi-independent states with an elected Holy 
Roman Emperor as its head.  In the German territories, Protestant and Lutheran monarchs 
became progressively discouraged by the religious privileges conferred on Catholic 
monarchs.  The major Protestant and Lutheran monarchs were eager to secure legal 
recognition for the churches they had played a role in establishing.  However, the 
Catholic bishops, in particular, felt threatened by the Protestant allegiance and wished to 
preserve the status quo.
19
  The position of the Catholic bishops is delineated in the maxim 
ubi unus dominus ibi una sit religio,
20
 in terms of which political stability presupposed 
cultural and religious homogeneity, signifying adherence to the Catholic faith.  The 
conflict of interest between the Lutheran (Protestant) monarchs and their followers and 
the Roman Catholic monarchs and their supporters in the German territories, was a main 
causes of the war fought during the Protestant Reformation.  One of the first attempts to 
secure peace was in terms of the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555).
21
 
 
                                                          
19 In this regard see generally Kelly (note 8 above).  See also TA Brady, E Cameron and H Cohn ‗A 
Roundtable Discussion on The Politics of Religion: The Peace of Augsburg 1555‘ (2006) 24 (1) German 
History 85, 86. 
20
 Translated to read where there is one lord there shall be one religion, available at 
<http://2ndlook.wordpress.com/tag/war/> last accessed on 23 October 2010.  
21
 DW Cole ‗Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte 
Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 1, 7. 
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The Peace of Augsburg provided for recognition of the Protestant faith in the region 
according to the maxim cuius regio, eius religio.  In terms of this principle each monarch 
could determine the religion of his subjects, whether Lutheranism or Roman Catholicism.  
Although the Peace of Augsburg was a significant step towards the abandonment of an 
Empire based on a common religion it did not wholeheartedly accept religious diversity.  
The maxim cuius regio, eius religio simply granted Catholic or Lutheran adherents the 
right to move to a territory of their faith.
22
  Areas consequently would reflect the religious 
homogeneity of the ruler.  In addition the Peace of Augsburg did not grant equal 
recognition to Lutheranism alongside Catholicism, but rather reluctant recognition of the 
Protestant faith.
23
  The maxim cuius regio eius religio did not accept comprehensive 
religious freedom throughout the territory and the choice of religion was restricted to an 
option between Roman Catholicism and the Lutheran Confession.
24
  From the above 
discussion it is apparent that the Peace of Augsburg was severely flawed in so far that this 
Peace did not unequivocally recognise the existence of religious diversity and the right of 
all religious adherents to be able to freely practice their religion of choice.  Religiously 
motivated tension therefore remained latent within the region. 
 
Even with these shortcomings, the Peace of Augsburg undeniably prevented further 
religious and civil wars within the German territories for a considerable period of time 
that otherwise afflicted other territories, for example France.
25
  However the suppressed 
religiously motivated tension in seventeenth-century Germany was a major factor in the 
outbreak of the Thirty Years War (1618 – 1648)26 which was subsequently brought to an 
end through the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, discussed later.
27
 
 
                                                          
22
 MD Evans Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (1997) 48. 
23
 Brady, Cameron and Cohn (note 19 above) 86. 
24
 In this regard see Evans (note 18 above) 4. 
25
 Brady, Cameron and Cohn (note 19 above) 100. 
26
 In this regard see generally Evans (note 18 above) 5. 
27
 See section 2.3.3. 
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2.3.2 The Protestant Reformation in the French territories: The Edict of 
Toleration (1562) and the Edict of Nantes (1598) 
 
In France, religious conflict between Protestant Calvinists and Catholics prompted 
Catherine de' Medici,
28
 to issue the Edict of Toleration in January 1562 in an attempt to 
promote peace.  The Edict provided for limited legal recognition of Huguenots.  In terms 
of the Edict, the practice of Protestantism was no longer considered a crime, although it 
was restricted to preaching in open fields outside the towns and to the private estates of 
Huguenot nobles.  The Edict therefore allowed Huguenot nobles to organise and protect 
Huguenot congregations on their rural estates.
29
  This Edict was not well-received by 
many Catholics as illustrated by the massacre of Vassy where the killing of over eighty 
Huguenots were ordered Francois, the Duke of Guise in1562.  This began what was to be 
to be called the First French War of Religion. 
 
The religious wars in France which began with the Edict of Toleration in 1562 lasted 
until the Edict of Nantes in 1598, signed in an attempt to end the religious wars.  The 
Edict of Nantes granted Huguenots freedom of worship and civil rights for almost a 
century.
30
  The Edict of Nantes did recognise and enforce many Protestant rights; 
however, the general articles were still restrictive of religious freedom.  The right of 
French Catholics to congregate for the Catholic mass was respected in all places and 
consequently French Catholics enjoyed complete religious freedom.  Huguenots‘ 
                                                          
28
 Carroll describes that Catherine de' Medici married Henry, Duke of Orléans, the future Henry II of 
France, in Marseille in 1533.  All three their oldest sons, consecutively became king of France in an age of 
almost constant civil and religious war.  Francis II, was King of France in 1559.  When Francis II died in 
1560, she became regent on behalf of her ten-year-old son King Charles IX, King of France for the period 
1560 – 1574.  After Charles died in 1574, Henry III, became the King of France for the period 1574 – 1589.  
Catherine played a key role in the reign of her second King Charles IX and third son, Henry III.  See 
generally S Carroll Noble Power During the French Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the Catholic 
Cause in Normandy (2005); see also MP Holt The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629 (1995). 
29
 Holt (note 28 above) 47. 
30
 Révocation de l'Edit de Nantes in 1685.  King Louis XIV revoked the truce, forcing many Huguenots to 
emigrate to Holland, Germany and America. 
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however remained restricted to only congregate in cities and towns controlled by 
Huguenots in August 1597, as well as the private homes of Protestant nobles.  The Edict 
of Nantes accordingly regulated religion in France in terms of the maxim Une foi, un loi, 
un roi,
31
 merely allowing Protestants to exist as a heretical minority in a Catholic 
monarchy. 
 
It is argued that Edict of Nantes merely attempted to still religious conflict while at the 
same time protecting the dominance of the Roman Catholic faith.  The religious rights of 
Huguenots were only afforded restricted acknowledgement and therefore not treated 
equally in relation to the Catholic faith. 
 
2.3.3 The Thirty Years’ War (1618 – 1648) and the resulting Peace of Westphalia 
(1648) 
 
The Thirty Years‘ War (1618–1648) fought primarily in what is today known as 
Germany was one of the most destructive conflicts in European history.  The Peace of 
Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years‘ War recognised the modern state together with a 
new constitutional principle of limited freedom of religion.  The Peace of Westphalia 
consists of the two peace treaties of Osnabrück
32
 and Münster.
33
  The Peace of 
Westphalia in effect redrew the territorial map of Europe.  Parker confirms that generally 
negotiations at Westphalia were about choosing nationalism over Roman Catholic 
universalism.
34
 
 
                                                          
31
 Translated to mean ‗One faith, one law, one king‘.  Available at <http://www.lepg.org/wars.htm> last 
accessed on 23 October 2010. 
32
 Treaty of Osnabrück (Sweden and the Empire) (15 May 1648), 1 CTS 119, concluded between Sweden 
and the Empire. 
33
 Treaty of Münster (France and the Empire) (24 October 1648), 1 CTS 271, concluded between France 
and the Empire. 
34
 For further reading on the Thirty Year War and the Peace of Westphalia see generally G Parker The 
Thirty years‟ War (1997). 
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The Peace of Westphalia readjusted the religious and political affairs of Europe and 
extended the Peace of Augsburg‘s provisions for religious toleration to the Reformed 
Calvinists Church.
35
  As a result, the ruler of each territory still determined the official 
religion of the territory, but the religious liberty of Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinists 
whose religion differed from their ruler was protected.  Accordingly, the three religious 
communities, the Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist were now recognised.
36
  The 
protection of the right to freedom of religion of the new found states remained to be 
determined according to the maxim cuius regio, eius religio as incorporated in the Peace 
of Augsburg. 
 
The peacemakers in 1648 realised that religious issues had brought about the war within 
the Empire and needed to be resolved.  The treaties of Osnabrück and Münster 
respectively confirmed the recognition of religious diversity as contained for in the Peace 
of Augsburg, but amended it to allow for greater parity between Protestants and 
Catholics.  Calvinism was included and the ‗exact equality‘ of all three faiths was 
proclaimed.
37
 
 
Differences in belief continued to exist, but competing faiths were obliged to accept each 
other's existence.  Previously the majority Catholic Church merely endured the existence 
of the Protestants in terms of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) as well as after the 
promulgation of the Edict of Nantes (1598).  The Peace of Westphalia (1648) however 
determined that Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist reformed rulers of the Empire were able 
to determine the faith of their territories but had to respect the faith of others in their 
territories. 
 
                                                          
35
 In this regard see generally Evans (note 18 above) 7. 
36
 Z Machnyikova ‗Article 8‘ in M Weller (ed) Oxford Commentaries on International Law The Rights of 
Minorities in Europe A Commentary of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (2005) 225, 226. 
37
 Brady, Cameron and Cohn (note 19 above) 86. 
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The Peace of Westphalia is said to mark the break of religious medieval unity into a 
secular system of territorially-limited sovereign states.  The treaties initiated a new 
political order in central Europe, based upon the concept of a sovereign state governed by 
a sovereign.  The main tenets of the Peace of Westphalia were that all the parties would 
recognise the right to freedom of religion in terms of the Peace of Augsburg maxim cuius 
regio, eius religio.
38
 
 
Through the incorporation of the maxim of cuius regio, eius religio into the Peace of 
Westphalia, the Peace of Augsburg continued to furnish an example of how 
accommodation may be reached between opposing religious parties.  However, as 
fundamentalism grew rather than declined, much more human suffering was endured 
before a more durable solution was found.
39
 
 
2.4 The second phase: Protection of the rights of religious minorities in terms of 
the Minority Treaties of the Treaty of Berlin (1878)
40
 and the Paris Peace 
Conference (1919) 
 
The Peace of Westphalia codified confessional diversity, in the drawing of different 
states and in this way affirmed the Augsburg formulation of cuius regio eius religio.
41
  
Danchin argues convincingly that the formation of the state and the concept of 
nationalism were founded in the notion of group separation, rather than inclusivity.
42
  
This point of view is confirmed by Kennedy, when he states that religion is: 
                                                          
38
 Ibid 100. 
39
 See generally M Keating The new regionalism in Western Europe: territorial restructuring and political 
change (2000). 
40
 Minority Treaties of the Treaty of Berlin (1878).  Extract of the treaty can be studied at 
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1878berlin.html> last accessed on 23 November 2010. 
41
 D Nexon ‗Religion, European Identity, and Political Contention in Historical Perspective‘ in TA Byrnes 
and PJ Katzenstein (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe (2006) 256, 277. 
42
 PG Danchin ‗The Emergence and Structure of Religious Freedom in International Law Reconsidered‘ 
(2008) 23 Journal of Law & Religion 455, 488. 
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[W]hat we had before we had law, [and therefore] [i]nternational law understands its 
birth as a flooding forth from the darkness of religious strife, antidote to the passions of 
faith, on guard against their re-emergence as ideology.
43
 
 
For the entire period from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) until after World War I (1919), 
the protection offered to the right to freedom of religion was regulated in terms of the fact 
that competing faiths were obliged to accept each other's existence through the 
incorporation of protection of the rights of minorities.  Following the Peace of Westphalia 
the territorial boundaries of the nation states were, from time to time, revised as a result 
of the impact of expansionist nationalism.  Changes to the territorial boundaries in 
Europe were often coupled with the protection of minority rights through agreement.  
These minority treaties were attempts by the new states to prevent ethnic violence while 
at the same time ensuring peaceful state formation.
44
  Examples of these agreements 
include the Treaty of Vienna (1815),
45
 the Treaty of Berlin (1878)
46
 and the Treaty of 
Versailles (1919),
47
 discussed in more detail below. 
 
The Treaty of Vienna (1815) granted certain minorities the right to practice their religion 
and certain civil rights in terms of a non-discrimination provision, which stipulated that 
                                                          
43
 D Kennedy ‗Losing Faith in the Secular: Law, Religion and the Culture of International Governance‘ 
(1999) 313 Religion and International Law 115, 120. 
44
 Regarding the protection of minorities see generally See generally C Fink Defending the Rights of 
Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection (2004); see also M Mazower 
‗Minorities and the League of Nations in interwar Europe‘ (1997) 126 (2) Daedalus 126, 47. 
45
 The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 gave rise to a new form of international co-operation, known as a 
Holy Alliance between the Protestant Empire of Prussia, the Catholic Emperor of Austria, and the 
Orthodox Tsar of Russia.  The Treaty of Vienna (1815) was an attempt to recapture the essence of the 
republica Christiana, but headed under three different emperors, representing three different versions of 
Christianity.  In this regard see Eide (note 14 above) 46. 
46
 The agreement reached between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey at 
the Congress of Berlin (1878) in terms of which the independence of Montenegro, Serbia and Romania 
were recognised, outlined the protection of the rights of minorities, including the protection of the right to 
freedom of religion.  In this regard see Eide (note 14 above) 31. 
47
 Eide (note 14 above) 37. 
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no person would be excluded from the enjoyment of civil and political rights due to a 
difference in religious beliefs.
48
 
 
The Treaty of Berlin (1878) included the protection of minority rights in the following 
manner: 
[T]he difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against any 
person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights, admission to public employment, functions and honours, or the 
exercise of the various professions and industries in any location whatsoever.
49 
Religion could therefore not be a ground for discrimination in the exercise of rights. 
 
Franz-Willing describes that unrestrained state sovereignty led to a build up of tension 
following the Peace of Westphalia.  This tension gave rise to the Napoleonic wars as well 
as the outbreak of the First World War.  After World War I, the Paris Peace Conference 
attempted to settle past disputes through a number of peace treaties with the defeated 
states of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.  The conclusion of the Treaty 
of Versailles following the Paris Peace Conference once again redrew the map of Europe 
in light of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and the secession 
of the Tsarist Russian Empire to the Soviet Union.  The creation of new states followed 
that strived to identify the new states with specific ethnic, linguistic or religious lines.  
This desire for homogenous national states was however not realistic in that population 
distribution was not demarcated in this precise fashion.  Therefore provisions regulating 
the rights of minorities were subsequently incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles 
(1919).
50
 
 
The Polish Minority Treaty (1919), annexed to the Treaty of Versailles, was designed to 
protect the Jewish population in the new state of Poland and its applicability to other than 
                                                          
48
 For an overview of the history and origin of the Polish Minority Treaties see MD Evans ‗The Polish 
Minority Treaties‘ in Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (2009) 104. 
49
 Article 5 of the Treaty of Berlin (1878). 
50
 See generally G Franz-Willing „The Origins of the Second World War‘ (1986) 7(1) The Journal of 
Historical Review 95. 
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Jewish minority groups was merely coincidental.  Therefore it can be considered a 
misnomer to refer to this treaty as a minority treaty.
 51
  Article 2 of the Polish Minority 
Treaties provided that: 
Poland undertakes to assure the full and complete protection of the life and liberty of all 
inhabitants in Poland without distinction of birth, nationality language race or religion.  
All inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, 
of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with the public order 
or public morals. 
 
Lerner mentions that these guarantees for the protection of religious rights of minorities 
were the forerunner to the League of Nations protection system of minority rights.
52
  The 
League of Nations was also formed at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.
53
  In terms of 
article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the right to freedom of conscience 
and religion provided that participating States would seek to protect the national, ethnic, 
religious, cultural and linguistic minorities.
54
 
 
                                                          
51
 Evans (note 48 above) 104. 
52
 For a historical overview of the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations see MD Evans ‗The 
League of Nations: Drafting the Covenant‘ (2009) in Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe 
(2009) 83. 
53
 Townshend reports that during World War I several world leaders such as Woodrow Wilson, President of 
the USA, and Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of SA began advocating the need for an international 
organisation to preserve peace and settle disputes by arbitration. When peace negotiations began in October 
1918, Woodrow Wilson insisted on the formation of the League of Nations.  The constitution of the League 
of Nations was adopted at the Paris Peace Conference in April 1919. The Covenant of the League of 
Nations called for collective security and the peaceful settlement of disputes by arbitration.  It was decided 
that any country that resorted to war would be subjected to economic sanctions.  The League of Nations did 
not meet during World War II.  In 1946 the responsibilities of the League of Nations was handed over to 
the UN.  In this regard see C Townshend The League of Nations and the United Nations.  Available at 
 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/league_nations_01.shtml#three> last accessed on 5 May 
2010. 
54
 For further reading on minority treaties, see generally N Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination in 
International Law 2ed (2003). 
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Evans notes that these Minority Treaties were carried forward through the work of the 
League of Nations in a system in which ethnic, religious and cultural groups across 
Europe were able to preserve religion, culture and language, while at the same time 
participating in the political affairs of the state.  However, with the rise of Nazi-Germany 
and the beginning of World War II this success was short-lived.  While the Covenant of 
the League of Nations, emphasised state sovereignty coupled with the important 
qualification of equality and self-determination of the people, the harm caused to in 
particular Jewish minorities during World War II created a new awareness for the need to 
protect ethnic, cultural and religious minorities.
55
 
 
2.5 The third phase: The International protection of individual human rights 
 
The endeavour to protect individual human rights through international treaties began 
through the work of the League of Nations and expanded after World War II due to the 
role of the United Nations (UN).
56
  The international human rights regime was developed 
in response to the atrocities committed during World War II with the establishment of the 
UN.  The objectives of the UN as posed in its Charter are to maintain international peace 
and security,
57
 to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights,
58
 and to promote respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
59
  The first UN 
instrument to deal specifically with individual religious rights is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR),
60
 which subsequently influenced further 
                                                          
55
 In this regard see generally Evans (note 18 above). 
56
 Signature of the Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 
entered into force 24 October 1945 established the United Nations. 
57
 Article 1.1 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
58
 Article 1.2 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
59
 Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
60
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR).  Adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948.  UN Doc. A/3/810 (1949). 
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international instruments.
61
  With the adoption of the UDHR the emphasis of the 
protection of minority group rights shifted from the collective to the protection of the 
individual right to freedom of religion.
62
 
 
The necessity to protect the international protection of the individual right to freedom of 
religion was already acknowledged during the drafting of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations.  President Wilson of the United States of America (USA) campaigned for the 
inclusion of an article in the Covenant that read as follows: 
The High Contracting Parties agree that they will make no law prohibiting or interfering 
with the free exercise of religion, and that they will not in any way discriminate, either in 
law or in fact, against those who practise any particular creed, religion, or belief whose 
practices are not inconsistent with public order or public needs.
63
 
 
This proposal recognising a individual right to freedom of religion was a far-reaching 
departure from the League of Nations practice of protecting religious minorities in newly 
created or enlarged states.  Therefore this proposal was not included in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations.  This proposal was however later reflected in article 18 of the 
UDHR as adopted by the UN. 
 
The protection of human rights has been the aim of the UN, as can be read from the 
Charter of the UN as well as the UDHR.  The completion of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Covenant on Economic Social 
                                                          
61
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966) Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 2200 (XXII) of 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.  Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981 Declaration).  Proclaimed by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981. GA Resolution. 
62
 On the drafting of the UDHR see M Scheinin ‗Article 18‘ in A Eide and G Alfredsson (eds) The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999) 379, 389. 
63
 Supplementary Agreement 7, as subsequently modified.  This proposed inclusion relates to the First 
Amendment to the USA Constitution of 1791. 
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and Cultural Rights in December 1966 also provides evidence to this statement.  
Following the ratification of these covenants in 1976, the UN has seen the birth of 
various instruments aimed at enhancing the protection of specific rights.
64
  In all these 
seminal instruments the right to freedom of religion is entrenched as a core fundamental 
human right.
65
  Despite this advancement for the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion, religious discrimination has continued and still continues to play an important 
political role in present conflicts in various countries. 
 
2.6 Recent religious abuses 
 
Religion remains as a prominent ground for tension and conflict in numerous countries:  
For example, civil conflict remains present in many African countries such as Rwanda,
66
 
Sudan
67
 and Nigeria,
68
 and demands for political change persist in the Islamic world.
69
  
                                                          
64
 C Chinkin ‗International Law and Human Rights‘ in T Evans (ed) Human Rights fifty years on: a 
Reappraisal (1998) 105, 105. 
65
 For a further discussion on the protection of the right to freedom of religion in the international context 
see section 4.2,4.3 and 4.4. 
66
 See generally P Gourevitch We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our 
Families: Stories from Rwanda (1998) (describing the role of ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide).  The Rwanda genocide was mainly an ethnic conflict between the Hutu 
majority and the Tutsi minority. The religious split in the country (75% Christian, mostly Roman Catholic, 
and 25% indigenous) appeared to not have been a significant factor.  See also HM Hintjens 'Explaining the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda' (1999) 37 (2) The Journal of Modern African Studies 241. 
67
 The civil war in Sudan has a significant religious component among Muslims, Christians and Animists.  
However, inter-tribal warfare, racial and language conflicts also play a role.  See generally regarding the 
conflict in Sudan, M Basedau & A de Juan ‗The ―Ambivalence of the Sacred‖ in Africa:  The Impact of 
Religion on Peace and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa‘ (2008) GIGA Research Programme: Violence, 
Power and Security No. 70.  Available at <www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers> accessed on 10 May 
2010. 
68
 For an overview of the conflict between ‗indigenes‘ and ‗settlers‘ which in certain instances translates to 
the conflict between Christianity and Islam in Nigeria see generally AO Adesoji & A Akin ‗Indigeneship 
and Citizenship in Nigeria: myth and reality‘ (2009) 2 (9) The Journal of Pan-African Studies 151, 153; see 
also A Higazi 'Interpreting Religious Conflict in Nigeria' (2009) CRISE Internal Paper; Human Rights 
Watch They do not own this place: government discrimination against “non-indigenes” in Nigeria (2006); 
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The recent conflict between Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia;
70
 the 
contemporary dilemmas of a divided Israel,
71
 and the apparent resolved conflict in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
B Kraxberger ‗Strangers, Indigenes and Settlers: contested geographies of citizenship in Nigeria‘ (2005) 9 
(1) Space and Polity 9. 
69
 The tension between the Sunni and Shia in Iraq, and the Christian and Muslim in Indonesia has also 
yielded devastating consequences. 
70
 Powers recounts that seceding from the newly declared independent Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb nationalist leader Radovan Karadzic declared that Serbs would carve out 
their own nation.  War erupted in 1992.  Backed by Serbian Slobodan Milosevic, the Bosnian Serb Army 
had tremendous military victories.  At the heart of the Serbian effort was the policy of ‗ethnic cleansing‘ 
against Croats and Bosnian Muslims.  Entire regions of people were forced from their homes, women and 
children raped, victims buried alive and otherwise tortured, and civilian neighbourhoods shelled.  
Milosevic, aided by Bosnian-Serb leader Karadic, pursued a clear strategic aim to create a new Yugoslavia 
in name but a greater Serbia in reality.  In this regard see generally GF Powers ‗Religion, conflict and 
prospects for reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia‘ (1996) 50 (1) Journal of International 
Affairs 221, see also M Sells The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (1998) xiii-xiv 
asserting that the national religious mythology of Serbia played a crucial role in the conflicts across the 
Balkans during the 1990s. 
71
 Tessler recalls that the dilemma of the divided Israel is directly related to the withdrawal of Britain in the 
1940‘s, during which time Britain, which governed Palestine under mandates from the League of Nations 
and the UN, proposed partitioning as a solution to conflict between Jewish and Arab movements in 
Palestine.  However in time Britain became increasingly unable and unwilling to arbitrate the dispute 
between the Jews who were entering at an increasing rate and the Arab inhabitants who were afraid of 
being displaced.  Discouraged, it handed over the matter to the UN which set up a committee and upon its 
recommendation the second General Assembly on 29 November 1947 voted to partition Palestine into one 
state for the Jews and another one for the Arabs.  Concurrently, Britain announced that it would terminate 
its mandate over Palestine on 15 May 1948.  On 14 May 1948, the Jews announced the establishment of the 
State of Israel and on 15 May, armies of the surrounding Arab states invaded Palestine, intending to undo 
the November 1947 resolution.  Lands assigned to Palestine were taken up by Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.  
Since the establishment of a State of Israel various truces have been put in place and broken resulting in 
incessant clashes between Israel and Palestine, resulting in the death of many. Israel‘s blockade of Gaza 
and restrictions on movement to protect illegal West Bank settlements, along with Palestinian rocket 
attacks on Israeli towns and abuses by Fatah and Hamas against each other‘s supporters, all attribute to the 
human rights crisis in the Israeli-Occupied Palestinian territories.  In this regard see generally MA Tessler 
A History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1994); see also Israel and Palestine: A brief History- Part 1.  
Available at <http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm> last accessed on 23 August 2010. 
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Northern Ireland, between Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists during the time 
of ‗The Troubles‘,72 brought to a hesitant end through the signature of the Belfast 
Agreement in 1998,
73
 are all indicative of the persistent and political nature of religious 
conflict. 
 
Although research indicates that with the end of the Cold War
74
 there had been a 
noticeable decline in conflict between states,
75
 the Stockholm International Peace 
                                                          
72
 Ever since the division of Ireland under the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 into a mainly Protestant North 
and a Catholic Irish Free State, which in 1949 became the Republic of Ireland, the Protestants in the North 
had been determined to maintain their prominence.  See generally C Mitchell Religion, Identity and Politics 
in Northern Ireland (2005) 1-3 (discussing the prominent role that religion played in the Northern Ireland 
conflict). 
73
 The Belfast Agreement, also known as the Good Friday Agreement, an agreement between the British 
and Irish governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland was reached on 10 April 1998.  See 
generally J Stevenson ‗Peace in Northern Ireland: Why Now?‘ (1998) 112 Foreign Policy 41, 42.  
Stevenson indicates that the purpose of the agreement is to deal with relations between the two 
communities in Northern Ireland; relations between the two parts of Ireland; and between Ireland north and 
south and the other parts of the British Isles. All parties undertook to renounce violence and to use their 
influence to ensure that weapons were decommissioned.  The Good Friday Agreement avoids the instability 
of outright self-determination.  As an alternative, it calls for amendments to the Irish constitution to define 
Ireland's nationhood in terms of its people ‗in all the diversity of their identities and traditions‘ rather than 
in terms of physical territory.  Under the Agreement, Britain retains sovereign dominion over the province 
as long as its electoral majority so elects.  However, the Irish Republic has a permanent and potentially 
expanding role in Northern Irish government. 
74
 Gaddis describes that the term ‗Cold War‘ is the term used for the period from 1946 – 1991.  In 1946, 
after World War II, the temporary division of Germany into Soviet and Western occupation zones 
solidified Joseph Stalin‘s demands for reparations and American and British aspirations were at odds with 
each other.  The USSR by the same token refused free elections in the eastern European nations still 
occupied by its troops and subsequently these soon fell under the control of Communist and became 
isolated.  This ‗iron curtain‘ as the division was labelled by Winston Churchill, was drawn open again by a 
series of upheavals which took place between 1988 and 1991, amongst which the following dissolution of 
the Communist Party by a newly elected Soviet Parliament in 1991, followed by the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union itself, into eleven constituent republics, namely: the Baltic states occupied by Soviet troops 
during World War II which seceded; the Communist regimes established in eastern European nations in 
1945 which were overthrown, and the East Germans whom tore down the Berlin Wall in 1989.  East 
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Research Institute
76
 asserts that one of the most significant sources of present day conflict 
has been identified as violence carried out on the basis of culture, ethnicity and religion.  
In particular the issue of religion and conflict has received increased attention.
77
  
 
Recently many countries of the former Soviet bloc have taken measures to protect the 
traditional state religion against the influx of new religious movements in an attempt to 
rebuild a national identity in those states.
78
  Also noticeable is the increasing religious 
intolerance against Muslims since the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade 
Centre in New York City, coupled with concern towards fears of Muslim extremism.  
The prevalent conflicts that currently persist are all embedded in, or are aggravated by, 
tensions between ethnic, religious and cultural communities within states.
79
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Germany itself disappeared soon thereafter, and Germany was reunified after forty-five years.  In this 
regard see generally JL Gaddis The Cold War: a New History (2006).  See further J Rothschild & NM 
Wingfield Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II (2008); M 
Sells (note 70 above); The Reader's Companion to Military History (1996).  Available at 
 <http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy.uwc.ac.za/entry/rcmh/cold_war> last accessed on 3 August 
2010.  Stokes explains that the dismantling of the ‗iron curtain‘ forced an intersection of many ethnic and 
religious diverse groups which in return lead to conflict not only along ethnic lines but also between the 
religious diverse Protestants, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox believers as well as followers of the 
Islamic tradition.  The conflict discussed in the above events in Yugoslavia is illustrative of this point.  In 
this regard see generally G Stokes From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe 
since 1945 (1996). 
75
 University of British Columbia, Human Security Centre, Overview The Human Security Report 2005: 
War and Peace in the 21st Century (2005) 15.  
Available at <http://www.humansecurityreport.info> last accessed on 27 January 2010. 
76
 NJ Melvin ‗Islam, Conflict and Terrorism‘ (2006) SIPRI Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security 123, 124. 
77
 See generally L Reychler ‗Religion and Conflict‘ (1997) 2 (1) International Journal of Peace Studies 1. 
78
 A Sarkissian ‗Religious Reestablishment in Post-Communist Polities‘ (2009) 51(3) Journal of Church 
and State 472, 494. 
79
 RH Tuschl Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in the Southern Hemisphere EPU Research Papers Issue 03/06 
(2006) 23. Available at  <www.epu.ac.at/epu/research/rp_0306.pdf> last accessed on 23 October 2010. 
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In Europe, the debates regarding the reference to God in the preamble to the European 
Constitution,
80
 the Salman Rushdie controversy,
81
 the murder of Theo van Gogh in the 
Netherlands,
82
 the uproar over the Danish cartoons of Mohammed
83
 as well as the affaire 
du foulard
84
 in France
85
 all are indicative of the ongoing nature of religious 
discrimination and abuse. 
 
A Human Rights Watch World report of 2009, reflecting on the events of 2008, affirms 
the continuous nature of threats to the right to freedom of religion.
86
  At the 9
th
 World 
Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates in 2008 in Paris, former South African President F W 
                                                          
80
 See generally R McCrea ‗The Recognition of Religion within the Constitutional and Political Order of 
the European Union‘ (2009) 10 Europe in Questions Discussion Paper Series Available at  
<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPaper10.pdf> last accessed on 24 November 2010; 
see also AJ Menendez, ‗A pious Europe? Why Europe should not define itself as Christian‘ (2005) 30 (1) 
European Law Review 133. 
81
 T Modood ‗British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair‘ (1990) 61 Political Quarterly 143. 
82
 The murder of the film maker Theo van Gogh, in November 2004 was in reaction to a ten minute film 
called Submission, in which violence against women in Muslim societies was portrayed and four abused 
and naked women in see-through dresses with verses from the Qu'ran painted on their bodies were 
depicted. 
83
 T Modood ‗The liberal dilemma: integration or vilification?‘ (2006) 1.  Available at  
<www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/3249.pdf> last accessed on 23 October 2010.   
84
 The Affaire du Foulard, refers to the French relationship with the Islamic headscarf-hijab that 
commenced in the 1980 when two young girls were expelled from their school in Creil for wearing 
headscarves.  More recently culminating with the passing of the French Law of 2004 following the 
recommendations of the Stasis Commission as discussed in section 7.2.2.  In this regard see generally A 
Bradford The Affaire du Foulard: a new French identity? (2007). 
85
 See generally G Davie ‗Vicarious religion: A methodological challenge‘ in N Ammerman (ed) Everyday 
Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives (2007) 21. 
86
 Human Rights Watch World Report 2009 (Events of 2008) Available at <www.hrw.org> last accessed on 
27 January 2010.  For example in June 2008, the highest administrative court in France, the Conseil d‟Etat, 
denied citizenship to a Moroccan Muslim woman married to a French man on the grounds that her ‗radical‘ 
religious practices were incompatible with French values, in particular that of gender equality.  In Germany 
restrictions on wearing the headscarf, are persistently applied to teachers and other civil servants, despite 
concerns that the measures discriminate on the grounds of religion: courts in three states upheld headscarf 
bans for teachers since December 2007. 
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de Klerk confirmed that the continuing inability of some cultural, religious and ethnic 
communities to coexist represents a significant threat to the maintenance of peace and 
consequently called for action to address the problem of ethnic, cultural and religious 
conflict.
87
  De Klerk continued by identifying that ethnic, religious and cultural diversity 
is on the increase.  Approximately 70% of the countries of the world have ethnic, 
religious and cultural minorities that comprise more than 10% of their populations.  De 
Klerk also stipulated that across the world, once homogenous countries and cities are 
becoming increasingly multiethnic because of the influence of legal and illegal 
immigration and globalisation.
88
 
 
As previously indicated this study is concerned with the protection provided to the right 
of freedom of religion and belief in terms of international and other instruments.
89
  These 
international instruments are primarily entered upon in response to the perpetration of 
abuse of fundamental rights. Similarly various religious conflicts and the need to address 
these particular conflicts as well as to avoid similar conflicts in the future have ensured 
the entrenchment of the right to freedom of religion or belief in various international 
instruments.  For this reason the history of religious conflicts leading to the signature of 
these instruments during the pre-World War I and post-World War II periods have been 
dealt with. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
From the discussion above it is apparent that the international protection of the right to 
freedom of religion has evolved through three key phases.  The first phase was the 
protection in terms of the provisions of the Augsburg Treaty – the cuius regio, eius 
                                                          
87
 FW de Klerk to The 9th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates Paris, 11 December 2008.  Available at  
<http://www.givengain.com/cause_data/images/2137/Building_peace_and_the_world_without_violence.pd
f> last accessed on 27 January 2010. 
88
 Ibid. 
89
 See discussion in section 4.2, 4.2, 4.4, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10. 
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religio phase.  This maxim at first only allowed for the recognition of Lutheran adherents 
in a specific region.  Religious diversity was not embraced and only the territorial 
separation of Catholics and Protestants were established.  The maxim cuius regio eius 
religio did not recognise the equal status of the Protestant faith which was only afforded 
restricted acknowledgment.  Following the application of the cuius regio eius religio 
maxim, the next phase of the protection of the right to freedom of religion was in terms of 
the minority protection model as encapsulated in the Polish Minority Treaty and the 
operation of the League of Nations.  The minority protection model allowed for the equal 
protection of minority ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic groups.  The final phase in 
the protection of the right to freedom of religion was in terms of the international human 
rights model, incorporated in principle into the UDHR and the ICCPR in response to the 
atrocities committed during World War II. 
 
On the whole it was apparent that the right to freedom of religion at first received 
negligible protection.  The dominance of a specific religion, in casu the Roman Catholic 
religion, merely granted the other religion, specifically the Protestant religion reluctant 
recognition and toleration and not parity, as illustrated by the Peace of Augsburg, the 
Edict of Toleration as well as the Edict of Nantes.  Furthermore this minimal recognition 
was offered only after tremendous loss of human life and unending battles had been 
waged.  This reluctant recognition and consequential discrimination over time incited 
further conflict as seen through, for example, the onset of the Thirty Years War.  
Although the peace agreement allowed for greater parity between Protestants and 
Catholics, the prime concern of the Treaties of Westphalia was the concept of nationalism 
and the creation of national states along ethnic, cultural and linguistic lines.  Such a 
homogenous drawing of boundaries was however not practically achievable. 
 
Under the concept of nationalism, old empires were replaced with new states requiring a 
newly formed state to associate with ‗the people‘ or ‗nation‘ of the state.  In this manner 
the ‗old‘ divides of Catholic and Protestant were replaced by ‗new‘ divides of culture or 
language.  The supreme Catholic state was substituted by the imposition of a preferred 
language or a certain culture.  The minority groups in these new states therefore had to 
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rely on the provisions of minority treaties to provide reluctant recognition and toleration 
to their language, religion and culture. 
 
In these newly formed states the participation of minority groups was generally restricted.  
With the rise of fascism and Nazism, Europe was forced into the World War II.  The 
human suffering and abuse indicated the ineffectiveness of minority rights treaties under 
the auspice of the League of Nations. 
 
In response to this perpetration of abuse of fundamental human rights the UDHR was 
drafted, and to this day the Declaration together with the provisions of the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR still remains the most authoritative international text regarding the protection of 
the right to freedom of religion.  No specific convention relating to the right to freedom 
of religion explicitly exists and even a mere declaration, the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Religious Discrimination (1981), took almost 20 years in the 
making. 
 
An overall impression that emerges in relation to the right to freedom of religion is that 
for most part religious freedom has not been endorsed as an end in itself, but as a means 
of managing conflict or preserving peace.  Treaties, conventions and other instruments of 
protection have generally more readily extended protection to the right to freedom of 
religion or belief as a way of avoiding conflict, rather than as a means of facilitating 
equal recognition of diverse religious beliefs.  The underpinning of these instruments 
aimed at the protection of the right to freedom of religion originates from the religious 
wars, and in this regard it is apt to confirm that ‗[w]hen it comes to democracy, human 
rights and equality, God is a recent convert‘.90 
 
Notwithstanding these instruments aimed at the entrenchment of the right to freedom of 
religion, threats to the right to freedom of religion or belief are as evident in the present-
                                                          
90
 See contribution submitted by JB Fontelles, member of the convention: Let‟s Leave God Out of This 
Brussels, 22 January 2003, CONV 501/03 available at 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00501en03.pdf> accessed on 5 April 2008. 
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day as in times past.  Moreover the continuing inability of some cultural, religious and 
ethnic communities to coexist represents a global threat to the maintenance of peace and 
consequently urgent action is needed to address the problem of ethnic, cultural and 
religious conflict. 
 
The exercise of freedom of religion or belief can indeed bring about conflict with those 
who do not share a common belief.  For this reason, religious conflict is often approached 
not as a means of facilitating the right to freedom of religion, but more often by way of 
restricting the right to freedom of religion or belief.  This restriction is often imposed 
with the expectation that limiting the right to freedom of religion will help diffuse the 
conflict.  Such a limitation however does not attempt to accommodate the interests of all 
concerned.  Disregarding the religious adherents‘ inherent religious belief often gives rise 
to conflict. 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that religious conflict is prevalent in the present 
day as in the past.  On the whole, it is argued that development of a framework for the 
international protection of the right to freedom of religion has not been able to bring to an 
end disregard of the right to freedom of religion.  Despite the international instruments 
protecting the right to freedom of religion, as will be discussed in section 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 
there still is a glaring need to improve the protection afforded to religious groups from 
discrimination and other violations of the right to freedom of religion. 
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Chapter 3 
The relationship between the state and religion 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter examined the history of religious conflict and the subsequent 
development of the regulatory framework aimed at the protection of the right to freedom 
of religion and other associated rights.  The formation of the League of Nations as well as 
the United Nations (UN) and their respective roles in the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of religion were introduced as well.  The right to freedom of religion is 
however not only protected in terms of the UN instruments.  Regional groupings too, 
promote the protection of the right to freedom of religion.
1
  In addition, most countries 
offer more concrete protection in terms of their constitutional or national legal orders.  
The nature of the national protection is however fundamentally fashioned by the 
relationship between the state and religion,
2
 often termed the relationship between the 
state and church.
3
 
 
The relationship between state and religion may display the following configurations: the 
existence of religious states or states with an established or recognised religion.  
Countries may also display degrees of separation (often termed secularisation)
4
 between 
state and religion, which is known as so-called secular states.  None of these 
                                                          
1
 The international and regional mechanisms which provides for the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion will be explored in more detail in 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10. 
2
 The manner in which the protection of the right to freedom of religion is interpreted in a national context 
in light of the relationship between the state and religion will be more fully explored in section 3.7. 
3
 This study will predominantly refer to the relationship between the ‗state and religion‘, as arguably the 
terminology ‗state and church‘ depicts a particular point of view regarding religion, that of a Christian 
religion. 
4
 Secularism is defined as ‗the doctrine that morality should be based on regard for the well-being of 
mankind in the present life, to the exclusion of all other considerations drawn from a belief in God or a 
future state‘.  See generally the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1933), available at 
<http://www.endgametrust.co.uk/secularism.pdf>last  accessed on 17 November 2010. 
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arrangements are without difficulty in so far as the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion is concerned.  For example, states with an established religion may offer 
entrenched protection for the recognised religion in specific fields, for instance, in 
education and social service, such as prisons and child welfare.  Especially problematic 
are religious states that frequently condition their acceptance of international human 
rights obligations on the compatibility of these obligations with the states‘ religious 
beliefs, typically Islamic law (Sharia law).  Secular states too are not unproblematic; 
particularly in as far as the manifestation of religion in the public domain is concerned.  
A closer analysis of the relationship between state and religion is therefore necessary to 
determine the corresponding relationship between religion and law in national legal 
systems.
5
 
 
As the nature of the national protection of the right to freedom of religion is influenced 
by the relationship between the state and religion it is important to appreciate the various 
ways in which the structuring of this relationship can be influenced.  Similar to the 
development of the regulatory framework, in terms of which the right to freedom of 
religion is protected; the relationship between the state and religion too, in general, 
developed in response to certain religious conflicts.  These conflicts also influenced the 
manner in which this relationship further evolved.  For example, strict separation between 
state and religion may often have occurred in an attempt to deal with the excess of 
religion. 
 
It is important to understand the impact of these historical events in the process of 
separation, as the separation is generally in response to these events.  Therefore this 
chapter will first consider the process of separation and identify factors that may have had 
an impact on the separation process.  This will be followed by an overview of various 
manners in which the relationship between the state and religion may be structured.  The 
overview is aimed at illustrating the influence of the relationship between the state and 
religion on the protection of the right to freedom of religion.  In addition this overview 
                                                          
5
 The impact of the relationship between the state and religion on the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion will be evaluated in more detail in section 3.7. 
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forms the foundation for a critical evaluation of the relationship between the state and 
religion to determine which arrangement affords the right to freedom of religion the most 
extensive protection. 
 
3.2 Process of separation (secularisation) 
 
Modern societies are generally recognised as secular.
6
  The act of secularism, in terms of 
which laws based on religious scripture (such as the Torah
7
 and Sharia
8
 law) are replaced, 
is generally a foreign concept to contemporary Eastern societies.
9
  The emphasis will be 
on modern societies as one of the premises of this study is that some form of separation 
between state and religion is required to ensure the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion. 
 
The state historically was associated with a particular religion, this generally being 
Catholicism.  Over time this historical association declined.  Separation between state and 
                                                          
6
 See generally <http://www.secularnations.org/index.php?page=secularCountries> last accessed on 23 
November 2010. 
7
 Law regulating Judaism. 
8
 Islamic law. 
9
 Huntington identifies nine major contemporary civilizations, based largely on the predominant religious 
culture in each society: Western Christianity (a European culture that spread to North America, Australia 
and New Zealand), Muslim (including the Middle East, Northern Africa, and parts of South East Asia), 
Orthodox (Russian and Greek), Latin American (predominately Catholic), Sinic/ Confucian (China, South 
Korean, Vietnam and Korea), Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist (Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and 
Cambodia), and (possibly) Sub-Saharan Africa.  See generally SP Huntington The Clash of Civilizations 
and the Remaking of World Order (1996).  Furthermore within these civilizations variations are possible.  
For example, the Muslim world has, over the last two centuries, adopted four major positions with regard to 
the rise of Western modernism and secularism.  The first is a total adaptation of Western culture for 
example as displayed by Atatürk in Turkey; the second is outright rejection, the third is critical engagement 
with Western cultural values and the fourth position can be described as dialogue with the West while 
maintaining one's cultural tradition.  In this regard see generally T Asad Formations Of The Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity (2003); also IM Lapidus ‗The Separation of State and Religion in the 
Development of Early Islamic Society‘ (1975) 6 (4) International Journal of Middle East Studies 363. 
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religion generally incorporates three separate processes.
10
  Firstly, most secularisation 
theories presume an inevitable decline of the importance attached to religious beliefs and 
practices.
11
  Secondly, secularisation incorporates the theory of the inevitable 
privatisation of religion, in terms of which religion is relegated to being domain of the 
private.
12
  Lastly, secularisation includes the aspect of institutional separation between 
the state and religion.
13
  With regard to these three processes the following observations 
are put forward.  In the light of the prevalence of religious conflict in the past and present 
day as documented,
14
 it is questionable whether the importance of religion is on the 
decline.
15
  Further, the notion that privatisation of religion is inevitable is also contested.  
In actual fact this study is conducted on the premise that the theory of privatisation is in 
competition with the theory of de-privatisation of religion.
16
  This theory of de-
privatisation calls for the re-politicisation of the private and moral spheres, through the 
‗renormativization of the public, economic and political spheres‘.17  In accordance with 
this re-politicisation theory, it can be argued that the age of modernity does not 
necessarily imply a reduction in the level of religious belief or practice, nor the relegation 
                                                          
10
 V Bader ‗Religions and States. A new typology and a plea for Non-constitutional pluralism‘ (2003) 6 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 55, 56. 
11
 See generally F Nietzsche The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs (1974) 
translated with commentary by Walter Kaufmann Vintage Books which includes a story of a madman 
rushing into the town market place shouting ‗I am looking for God‘. Bystanders burst into laughter to 
which the man reacts with a torrent of questions, ‗Where has he gone?‘ to which he responds, ‗I will tell 
you.  We have killed him – you and I! We are all his murderers‘. Nietzsche‘s story of the madman‘s 
announcement of the death of God has often been interpreted as prophetic of the western history of 
religion. 
12
 J Casanova Public Religions in the Modern World (1994) 6. 
13
 Ibid 25. 
14
 See section 1.1 and 2.1. 
15
 In support of this point of view see also Marquand and Nettler who note that 100 years ago most secular 
progressives assumed that following the age of modernity, coupled with the political marginalisation of 
religion, secularisation would become universal.  This however has not occurred and the role played by 
religion remains significant.
 
  See generally D Marquand & RL Nettler Political Quarterly Religion and 
Democracy (2000) 1, and more specifically Casanova (note 12 above) 29 & 214. 
16
 Regarding the de-privatisation of religion see the discussion in section 5.2.2. 
17
 Casanova (note 12 above) 6. 
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of religion to the private sphere, but rather an affirmation of the public role of religion.
18
  
This argument will be explored in more detail in section 5.2.2. 
 
Therefore this chapter will discuss only the third process of secularisation, namely the 
development of institutional separation and the consequent secularisation of society 
through the separation of religion and state. 
 
3.3 Institutional separation 
 
The act of institutional separation may take on various forms.  This diversity in the 
manner in which institutional separation displays itself is generally caused by the 
interaction of various factors.  For example, the so-called catalysts to secularisation as 
well as the influence of other factors or ideologies during the secularisation process, all 
may have an impact on the manner in which secularisation ultimately reveal itself.  As a 
result it has been suggested that secularisation can best be analysed as a process in which 
‗[E]ach of these carriers developed different dynamics in different places and at different 
times‘.19 
 
Accordingly institutional secularisation will be discussed as follows: firstly, in relation to 
the so-called carriers
20
 of secularisation; secondly, the influence of other factors for 
example the influence of the dominant religion; and thirdly, ideologies that may have 
played a role during the secularisation process. 
 
3.3.1 Carriers of separation 
 
                                                          
18
 G Davie ‗Europe: The Exception that Proves the Rule?‘ in PL Berger (ed) The Desecularization of the 
World Resurgent Religion and World Politics (1999) 65, 78. 
19
 Casanova (note 12 above) 25. 
20
 See generally CG Brown & M Snape Secularisation in the Christian World (2010). 
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The relationship between religion and the state was mostly influenced as a result of the 
following carriers:
21
 the Reformation,
22
 the Revolution
23
 and the Renaissance,
24
 during 
which period rationalism gave birth to liberalism, which in return initiated the separation 
of the personal religious beliefs from social existence.
25
  Therefore, the current 
relationship between state and religion is only understandable in light of the historical 
                                                          
21
 For a further discussion of the various carriers of secularisation see generally O Tschannen ‗The 
Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization‘(1991) 30 (4) Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 395. 
22
 See section 2.3 for a more comprehensive discussion of the Reformation. This study does not explore the 
historical relationship between the church and the state during the period preceding the Protestant 
Reformation.  The emphasis is on the relationship that developed from the time of the Reformation until the 
contemporary age.  The reason for this limitation, as indicated in Chapter 2, is that the Protestant 
Reformation formed the basis for development of legal text relevant to the protection of the right to 
freedom of religion and belief.  For an overview of the relationship between the state and the church from 
the Second to the Eight century see R Hugo Church and State in Early Christianity (1961). 
23
 For a discussion on the role of the Revolution see generally A de Tocqueville The Old Regime and the 
Revolution (1998).  Berman suggests it took five great revolutions to separate secular law from religion.  
These included the Protestant Reformation in Germany in the sixteenth century, the English Revolutions 
between 1640 and 1689, the American and French Revolutions of 1776 and 1789 and the Russian 
Revolution of October 1917.  In this regard see generally HJ. Berman, Religious Foundations of Law in the 
West: An Historical Perspective‘ (1983)1 Journal of Law & Religion 3. 
24
 The emancipation of various realms from the control of religion may have transpired as a consequence 
of, for example, the dawn of natural and social sciences or the so-called scientific revolution, or as a result 
of the birth of Enlightenment philosophy.  In this regard see generally L Dupré The Enlightenment and the 
Intellectual Culture of Modernity (2004) 282–288. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represent a 
period of radical transformation in Western traditional understanding of religion.  Influential intellectuals 
such as Kant no longer believed that the universe was created by God, viewing them rather part of 
evolutionary development. Autonomy of man and scientific reason were placed central to all 
understanding.  In terms of Positivism and Kantian ethics, the conscience is declared autonomous and 
independent of God.  According to Kant, reason alone is the determiner of ‗oughtness‘.  In this regard see 
generally CL Firestone & S Palmquist Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion (2006). 
25
 R Rémond Religion and Society in Modern Europe (1999) 166.  See also JT Gunn ‗Religious Freedom 
and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States of America and France‘ (2004) Brigham Young University 
Law Review 419.  For further reading on the emergence of secularisation, see S Bruce Religion and 
Modernization (1992) and T Robbins and R Robertson (eds) Church-State Relations (1987). 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
context in which the relationship was formed.
26
  A case in point is, for example, 
appreciating the cause as well as the success or failure of the Reformation, or whether 
revolutions were acts which divided internally (like in France)
27
 or united against external 
influences (like the American revolt against England).
28
 
 
All these factors have an influence on the form of secularisation that results.  These 
intricate factors, as will be shown, still form part of the legacy of conflict that surrounds 
the right to freedom of religion to this day. 
 
3.3.2 Influence of the dominant religion on separation 
 
In addition to the above discussed carriers of separation, the emerging pattern of 
secularisation is also shaped by the character of the predominant religion in an applicable 
state, for example, whether Catholic or Protestant, or religious plural as well as the 
                                                          
26
 Rémond (note 25 above) 8. 
27
 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries emergent nation-states were united according to the 
principle of cuius regio, eius religio as discussed in section 2.3.  The notion of European nationalism 
emerged after the Treaties of Westphalia. Nationalism became the newfound civic religion. In this regard 
Anthony Marx has stated that in France, the ‗one thing‘ that potentially united people who would come to 
be known as French, was their Catholicism.
 
See AW Marx Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of 
Nationalism (2003) 46. The French Revolution merely replaced the Catholic universalism that developed in 
response to the Protestant Reformation with the universalism of the Rights of Man and Citizen. For a 
detailed reflection of the relationship between religion and the birth of the Rights of Man see generally DK 
van Kley The Religious Origins of the French Revolution From Calvin to the Civil Constitution 1560 – 
1791 (1996). 
28
 Berger et al maintains that the approach to separation between state and religion is fundamentally 
different in the United States of America (USA) from France and is best understood in relation to Europe. It 
has been said that the reaction to religion in Europe was so compelling as to drive people across the ocean 
as they sought to escape religious persecution in Europe.  In the USA separation between state and church 
occurred from the onset as there were simply too many churches for any to successfully dominate. While in 
Europe religion was closely identified with the state, disillusionment with the one, inevitably included the 
other.  Therefore, in Europe, the historical dominant church to this day remains the assumed model and 
religious minorities are inevitably treated differently.
 
  See P Berger, G Davie & E Fokas Religious America 
Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations (2008) 24. 
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degrees of religious pluralism.
29
  Bader distinguished between the following religious 
variables: A ‗total monopoly‘ irrespective of it being a religious or secular variety; a 
‗duopoly‘, for example as found in Protestant societies which contain considerable 
Catholic minorities (60% to 40%), such as Germany; a situation of qualified pluralism 
with competition between the established church and competitors such as found in 
England; and finally complete pluralism as personified in the position of the United 
States of America (USA).
30
 
 
In a monopoly the influence of the dominant power on the process of secularisation is 
most evident.  This influence is even more acute in the event of the display of any 
intolerance by the dominant religion towards other religions.  The degree of intolerance 
or even persecution will have a direct relationship to the degree of separation.
31
  For 
example, it has been noted that French modernity developed through the carriers of the 
Reformation and the Revolution and in conflict with the Catholic Church.
32
  The 
Reformation and Revolution sought to eliminate the intolerance displayed by Catholicism 
in the persecution of the Protestants.
33
 To this extent contemporary secularist culture has 
been attributed to religious conflict, in that: 
                                                          
29
 Bader (note 10 above) 57. See also Durham‘s support of this argument in that the protection afforded to 
religious liberty is dependent upon not only the traditional relationship between the state and religion but 
also on the degree of religious pluralism in the given state.  WC Durham ‗Perspectives on Religious 
Liberty: A Comparative Framework‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a 
Global Perspective Legal (1996) 1, 2. See also Mitra, who contends that the 'specific role attributed to 
religion at a given time and place depends primarily upon the status of religion in the constitutional frame-
work and the social meaning attached to it in SK Mitra 'Desecularising the State: Religion and Politics in 
India after Independence' (1991) 33(4) Comparative Studies in Society and History 755, 758. 
30
 Bader (note 10 above) 58. 
31
 Bader (note 10 above) 57. 
32
 J Baubérot ‗The Place of Religion in Public Life: The Lay Approach‘ in T Lindholm, WC Durham, BG 
Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 441, 442. 
33
 In this regard see Villa-Vicencio who with reference to liberalisation from the period of colonisation 
alerts that one must be mindful of the fact that liberation is an anarchical reaction against established 
authority. Villa-Vicencio indicates that in the passage from liberation to liberty lurks the greatest threat of 
liberty.  Therefore liberation does not per se become a new order where liberty reigns. It could become a 
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[T]he transition in question was not, or at least not chiefly, ideologically driven.  It was 
religious war and the destruction of social peace that made it necessary to abandon the 
old idea that public culture must be based on religious unity.
34 
 
From the above it is evident that the form of separation is not only influenced by the 
various carriers of separation, but also by the prominence of the role that the dominant 
religion plays. The transition to separation, however, may also be driven by other 
ideologies.  The role of these ideologies follows next. 
 
3.3.3 The influence of ideology on separation 
 
To the same extent that secularisation may take on several diverse and even contradictory 
forms, secularism (which is the support of secularisation) is equally varied in meaning, 
and the resultant secular society is also representative of this variety.
35
  Kuru draws 
                                                                                                                                                                             
new form of oppression.  Political independence at the end of the colonial period does not mean the death 
of the forces that had acted during the colonial period.  In this regard see generally the text of the Kampala 
Assembly of the All African conference of Churches during 1963, called Freedom and Unity in the Nation 
Liberty and Anarchy in the Colonial Era as mentioned in C Villa-Vicencio Between Christ and Caesar 
Classic and Contemporary Texts on Church and State (1986) 168.  See also Arendt who contends that the 
act of revolution creates its own dilemma of authority. H Arendt On Revolution (1963) 159 – 165. 
34
 Pannenberg further explains: ‗When in a number of countries no religious party could successfully 
impose its faith upon the entire society, the unity of the social order had to be based on a foundation other 
than religion. Moreover, religious conflict had proven to be destructive of social order. In the second half of 
the seventeenth century, therefore, thoughtful people decided that, if social peace was to be restored, 
religion and the controversies associated with religion would have to be bracketed.  In that decision was the 
birth of the modern secular culture. It would in time lead to secularism and a culture that is properly 
described as secularist
‘.
 See W Pannenberg ‗How to think about Secularism‘(1996) 64 First Things 27, 28 - 
9. See also Mitra, who contends that the 'specific role attributed to religion at a given time and place 
depends primarily upon the status of religion in the constitutional frame-work and the social meaning 
attached to it in Mitra (note 29 above) 758. 
35
 See also Bader (note 10 above) 59 in which he confirms that as a result of the interplay between these 
carriers of secularisation as well as the diversity of religious variables the resultant relationship between 
religion and the state is extremely diverse. 
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attention to the fact that France,
36
 the USA
37
 as well as Turkey,
38
 are all secular states. 
Yet they all have different policies towards, for example, the wearing of religious 
garments.
39
 In seeking clarification for these differences, he analyses the existing state 
policies at the time of the establishment of the nation states. 
 
In Kuru‘s analysis of state policies concerning political religious arrangements, the 
following three theories are employed:  First, the modernisation theory, second, the 
civilisational approach and third, the rational choice theory.
40
  Firstly, according to the 
modernisation theory, the modernisation of a state is mainly measured by the following 
three criteria of development: the gross domestic product per capita, the literacy rate and 
the life expectancy. It is contended that the level of modernisation has a direct impact on 
the development of a secular policy towards religion.
41
 
 
Secondly, the civilisational approach concentrates on religious text to explain the impact 
of religion on socio-political life.  In terms of this approach, Christianities‘ compatibility 
with secularism is measured according to the biblical prescription found in Luke, which 
                                                          
36
 Article 1 of the 1958 Constitution ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction 
of origin, race or religion. It ensures respect of all beliefs and declares that: ‗France is an indivisible, 
secular, democratic, and social Republic. She ensures equality before the law to all citizens without 
distinction based on origin, race or religion. She respects all beliefs‘. For a further discussion on the 
relationship between the state and religion in France see section 7.2.1. 
37
 The Constitution of the USA proclaims in the First Amendment: ‗Congress shall make no law respecting 
the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof‘. These provisions have been said to 
create ‗a wall of separation between state and church‘, which was referred to by Thomas Jefferson in his 
letter of 1 January 1802 to the Danbury Baptist Association. Letter of Thomas Jefferson‘s letter to Messers 
Nehemiah Dodge et al ‗A Communication of the Danbury Baptist Associations‘ (1 January 1802), 
available at <http://www.loc.gov/lcib/9806/danpost.html> last accessed on 10 May 2010. For a further 
discussion on the relationship between the state and religion in the USA see section 7.5.1. 
38
 As proclaimed in article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982). 
39
 AT Kuru ‗Passive and Assertive Secularism Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State 
Policies towards Religion‘ (2007) 59 World Politics 568, 569. 
40
 Ibid 572. 
41
 Ibid 573. 
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states ‗Render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar‘s, and unto God the 
things which be God‘s‘.42  Accordingly, in Christian civilisation God is distinguished 
from Caesar, and therefore religion is distinguished from the state.
43
  In contrast to the 
arrangement in Christianity, the position of the political in Islam
44
 is determined by the 
origin of eternal and divinely ordained rules and therefore no distinction exists between 
the state and Islam.
45
 
 
Thirdly, in contrast with the argument that secularism is determined by either economic 
considerations or religious text is the rational choice theory that claims that secularism is 
a choice.  The rational choice theory attaches importance to the following factors that 
could influence the formulation of state policy, namely: individual preferences, the 
rational calculation thereof,
46
 and the structural constraints within which preference is 
exercised.
47
  It is contended that the rational choice theory is most informative when 
analysing state policy towards religion.  The rational choice theory takes into 
                                                          
42
 The Bible (King James Version) Luke 20:25. 
43
 D Martin On Secularization Towards a Revised General Theory (2005) 3.  The Reformation produced a 
variety of models of probable relationships between the church and state. Dominant models where those of 
Martin Luther (1483-1546) and John Calvin (1509-1564), both of which underlined a doctrine of two 
kingdoms. 
44
 Hayne's explains that Islam is often seen as naturally theocratic in that: ‗It is often suggested that religion 
and politics are inseparable in Islam. It is said that the umma, the Islamic community, has traditionally seen 
itself as simultaneously both religious and political community that is the community of believers and the 
nation of Islam.‘  See J Haynes Religion in Global Politics (1998) 128. 
45
 Artz has clarified that in Islam no divide between the state and Islam exists as ‗Islam is religion and the 
State as held by the Islamic maxim al –Islam din wa dawla‟.  See DE Artz ‗The Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Islamic States‘ (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly 202, 203. 
46
 In this argument Kuru is supported by Calhoun, who claims that the main cause for secularism is need to 
balance religious diversity with national cohesion and the necessity therefore to reserve religion to the 
private realm. See C Calhoun ‗Secularism, Citizenship and the Public Sphere‘ (2008) 10 (3) Hedgehog 
Review 7, 7. 
47
 Kuru (note 39 above) 577. 
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consideration the importance of human agency, in that religious groups commonly align 
their political preferences with due regard to the prevailing socio-political conditions.
48
 
 
Kuru, however, takes the rational choice theory a step further by acknowledging the 
pertinent role that ideology plays in the exercise of these distinct preferences.
49
 The 
importance of a dominant ideology is used to explain diverse results in similar cases.  For 
example, the different policies of the USA and France.  These are two secular states, 
which are both similar in terms of economic development and civilisational identity, but 
different in terms of dominant ideology.
50
  In contrast, France and Turkey are different in 
terms of economic development and civilisational identity, but have similar ideological 
policies towards religion, as influenced by their similar dominant ideology.  France and 
Turkey both support an ideology in which the public domain has to be free from any 
religious influence.
51
 
 
Arguably Kuru, in identifying the importance of the dominant ideology, draws together 
the influence of the carrier to secularisation, as well the role of religion in the 
secularisation process.  This dominant ideology not only shapes the variation in the form 
of secularisation present in a state, but also continues to remain relevant in the current 
application of state policy towards religion.
52
 
                                                          
48
For example, the influential Islamic movement, Jamaat-i Islami, defends an Islamic state in Pakistan, 
where Muslims are the majority, while it supports the secular state in India, where Muslims are a minority. 
See generally PR Kumaraswamy ‗The Strangely Parallel Careers of Israel and Pakistan‘ (1997) IV(2) 
Middle East Quarterly 39. 
49
 Kuru (note 39 above) 578. 
50
 In relation to the difference between the USA and France, see generally Berger et al (note 28 above).  
Berger et al explores the reasons why two economically advanced groups of societies can be so different in 
terms of their religious dimensions. America is seen as a religious society and Europe as a secular society.  
The difference between the essentially French ideology of ‗freedom from believe‘ and the opposite thereof 
across the Atlantic, namely the ‗freedom to believe‘ in the USA is explored. 
51
 Kuru (note 39 above) 579. 
52
 In this opinion he is supported by Saktanber and Corbacıoglu who further contend that to understand 
these present ideological struggles, they need to be seen in their historical context.  See genrerally A 
Saktanber & G Corbacıoglu ‗Veiling and Headscarf-Skepticism in Turkey‘ (2008) Social Politics: 
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With the above overview of the process of separation, the carriers of separation, and the 
role of religion – as well as ideology – are all factors that generally play a role in the 
separation process that have been outlined.  These factors influence the possible 
variations in which the relationship between the state and religion will evolve. 
 
3.4 Variations of the relationship between state and religion 
 
The relationship between state and religion, ranging from a state religion on the one hand 
of the spectrum, to secularism in its diverse forms at the other end of the spectrum, is 
discussed next.  In light of the range of legal arrangements regulating the relationship 
between the state and religion, a coherent classification of the relationship between the 
state and religion is essential.  The formulation of well reasoned conclusions regarding to 
the impact of this relationship on the right to freedom of religion is dependent thereon.  
The following classifications have been suggested by several scholars: 
 
Mojzes distinguishes between religious absolutism, where one particular religion is given 
preferential treatment; religious toleration, where the state is benign to all religions but 
offers preferential treatment to a dominant religion; secular absolutism, where all 
religions are rejected in favour of a secular point of view; and pluralistic liberty, where 
the state is indifferent and neutral to religion and non-religion alike.
53
 
 
Shelton and Kiss, classify the relationship between the state and religion as, state control 
over religion, state neutrality towards religion, divisions of control between the state and 
religious spheres, and state hostility towards religion.
54
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
International Studies in Gender, State & Society 514.  The relevance of the historical context was also 
previously signified by Rémond, in this regard see generally Rémond (note 25 above).  Further appreciation 
of the continued relevance of the dominant ideology towards religion will be illustrated in section 3.3.3. 
53
 P Mojzes ‗Religious Human Rights in Post-Communist Balkan Countries‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte 
Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 263, 266-69. 
54
 D Shelton & A Kiss ‗A Draft Model Law on Freedom of Religion, with Commentary‘ in JD van der 
Vyver & J Witte Jr (ed) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspective (1996) 497, 
578. 
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Mitra, in a model most comparable with that of Mojzes, proposes the following four 
different categories of the possible relationships between religion and the state: 
theocratic; hegemonic, where one religion dominates, but other religions are tolerated; 
secular; and neutral, where government is even-handed in its approach to all religions.
55
 
 
In contrast with Mojzes and Mitra, Bader, however, maintains that the actual relationship 
between the state and religion cannot be framed in a simplistic dualist format.  Quite the 
opposite is suggested, in that he identifies that the relationship between state and religion 
is regulated in various dimensions, for example, constitutional, legal, administrative, 
political and cultural.
56
  Moreover, the aims of the state towards religion may vary 
considerably, ranging from tolerance to protection of all religions or neutrality towards 
religion or the granting of privileges to some religions.
57  
Arguably the composite nature 
of the relationship between state and religion is most accurately reflected in the 
classification of Durham.
58 
 
3.4.1 Durham’s dimensional approach 
 
When drawing distinctions between the various relationships between the state and 
religion, Durham identifies that the degree of religious liberty should be assessed along 
the following two dimensions: the dimension relating to religious liberty and, the 
relationship between the state and religion.
59
 Regarding religious liberty, the continuum 
ranges from total religious freedom, on the one end of the scale, to degrees of religious 
                                                          
55
 Mitra (note 29 above) 770. 
56
 Bader (note 10 above) 61. 
57
 Bader (note 10 above) 63, 64 where Bader indicates that this privilege may be further exacerbated in 
instances where state policies are not only applicable in the religious field but also in other fields, such as, 
education, employment, health and welfare. 
58
 Durham (note 29 above) 1 – 44. 
59
 Durham acknowledges that the model has to some extent been created with reference to the insights of a 
former student, see GR Ryskamp ‗The Spanish Experience in Church-State Relations: A Comparative 
Study of the Interrelationship between Church-State Identification and Religious Liberty‘ (1980) Brigham 
Young University Law Review 616, 616. 
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toleration, and the absence of religious freedom on the other end.  With regards to the 
relationship between the state and religion, the continuum places non-identification (or 
anti-religion or persecution) on the one end of the scale, followed by negative 
identification of religion, which precedes the separation of religion and the state. This 
followed by positive identification, and finally, complete identification (or theocracies) 
on the other end of the continuum, as shown in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1
60
 
 
 
Both strong negative identification as well as strong positive identification correlates with 
low levels of religious freedom.  For this reason Durham suggests that the relationship 
between the religion and the state continuum should be re-conceptualised as a loop rather 
than linear.  In this manner, both dimensions are reflected more accurately, as shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60
 Durham (note 29 above) 23. 
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Figure 2
61
 
The loop can be further refined to represent a more detailed series of the possible types of 
state religion regimes.  These possibilities can range from absolute theocracies to 
established churches, ranging from a monopoly in religious affairs to an established 
church that guarantees equal treatment for all other beliefs. It can also range from 
endorsed churches, where a particular church has a special position in the traditions of the 
country to cooperationist states, where the state continues to cooperate with churches in 
various ways.  Further ranging areas includes an accommodationist regime, where a 
separation is apparent, but benevolent neutrality towards religion is noticeable. It can also 
include separationist regimes which too may cover a broad variation. 
 
Durham‘s broad variation of separationist regimes may include the following 
alternatives:  Firstly, separationist regimes in that may be compared with 
accommodationist regimes, but with the qualification that any form of public support of a 
                                                          
61
 Durham (note 29 above) 18. 
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religion is deemed inappropriate.  Secondly, separationist regimes that apply more severe 
forms of separation or even display inadvertent insensitivity.  Thirdly, separationist 
regimes that follow a rigid separation between religion and the public sphere; and finally, 
those regimes in which hostility towards religion is prevalent or the possibility of 
persecution of religion exists, as shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3
62
 
 
In this chapter the loop continuum classification of Durham will be applied, as this 
classification arguably incorporates the proposals of Mojzes, Shelton and Kiss, as well as 
                                                          
62
 Durham (note 29 above) 23. 
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that of Mitra.  However, the loop continuum will be regrouped into three principal 
categories. 
 
3.5 Principal categories of the arrangement between state and religion 
 
The ‗Durham‘ classifications are regrouped in the following three categories: firstly 
states which display no separation between state and religion, so-called ‗confessional 
states‘; secondly, states which display some degree of identification and or some degree 
of separation between the state and religion ‗predominantly confessional states‘; and 
third, states which display separation between the state and religion, so-called ‗secular 
regimes‘.63  This arrangement is inclusive of all the regimes discussed by Durham, but is 
mindful that regimes may, from time to time, change.  For example, neutral separation 
between state and religion may shift towards an inadvertent insensitivity towards religion, 
which may even over time expand towards rigid insensitivity.  However, this transfer will 
generally only occur within the limits of the arrangement suggested above, namely states 
which display no separation between the state and religion, or states with some degree of 
identification or separation with religion and lastly, states in which religion is separated 
from the institutions of the state.  What follows next is a discussion of each component of 
this arrangement. 
 
3.5.1 No separation between the state and religion: confessional states  
 
Confessional states can be subdivided into absolute theocratic and hegemonic states.  A 
confessional state requires a dedicated relationship between religion and politics, as 
usually seen in Islamic countries.  The Islamic Republic of Iran
64
 and Saudi Arabia
65
 are 
                                                          
63
 CF Hallencreutz & DS Westerlund ‗Introduction: Anti-Secularist Policies of Religion‘ in DS Westerlund 
(ed) Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics (1996) 1, 23. 
64
 In compliance with article 4 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, all civil, criminal, 
financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political and other laws and regulations must be 
based on Islamic criteria. 
65
 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia(1992) determines that: 
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in the strict sense examples of confessional states and may even be considered 
theocracies, as these states have established religious laws and religious courts as the 
basis for their legal and judicial systems.
66
  Most Islamic states, however, do uphold in 
their constitutions the principle of religious freedom and non-discrimination.
67
 
 
The existence of a confessional state may stem from the civilisational approach
68
 or flow 
from the so-called ancien régime,
69
 where the state historically was associated with a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Article 1: ‗The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its religion; God's 
Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution, Arabic is 
its language and Riyadh is its capital.‘ 
Article 26 [Human Rights] ‗The state protects human rights in accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah‘. 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia(1992).  Available at 
<http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sa00000_.html> last accessed on 2 December 2010. 
66
 Kuru (note 39 above) 569. 
67
 Thomson explains that Sudan has two distinct major cultures: North Sudan defines the Sudanese identity 
in Arab and Islamic terms.  While Southern Sudan preedominantly practise traditional indigenous beliefs 
and Christianity.  A peace agreement in 2005 granted Southern Sudan autonomy for six years, to be 
followed by a referendum about independence.  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement has brought an 
interim system of Government for Sudan together with a separate Interim Constitution for Southern Sudan.   
In this regard see generally G Thomson Countries of the World & Their Leaders Yearbook 08, Volume 2 
(2007).  The Sudanese Constitution of 1998 (before the peace agreement) acknowledged religious freedom 
in the following manner: Constitution of the Republic of Sudan (1998) Article 24 - Right to Religion or 
Conscience: 
‗Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and religion and the right to manifest and disseminate his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice or observance. No one shall be coerced to profess a faith in which he 
does not believe or perform rituals or worship that he does not voluntarily accept. This right shall be 
exercised in a manner that does not harm public order or the feelings of others, and in accordance with 
law‘.  The Constitution of Sudan (1998)).  Available at:  
<http://www.sudan.net/government/constitution/compile.html> last accessed on 3 December 2010. 
68
 See section 2.3. 
69
 See section 2.3.  The ancien régime is a term indicative of the tenet in 16
th
 century Europe in terms of 
which the state was historically associated with a particular religion.  In France une foi, un loi, un roi,
 
(literally one faith, one law, one king as incorporated into the Edict of Nantes in 1598).  In Germany cuius 
regio, eius religio (literally ‗whose the region (or realm), his the religion‘ as incorporated into the 1555 
Treaty of Augsburg). Sovereigns therefore frequently did their utmost to lessen religious dissent through 
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particular religion, which generally was Catholicism.  The contrary, however, is true for 
modern day Catholicism where the Roman Catholic Church has recognised the 
legitimacy of the modern national state as expressed in Error 10, Relating to Modern 
Liberalism, as contained in the Syllabus of Errors:
70
 
That in the present day, it is no longer necessary that the Catholic religion be held as the 
only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other modes of worship: whence it has 
been wisely provided by the law, in some countries nominally Catholic, that persons 
coming to reside therein shall enjoy the free exercise of their own worship. … That the 
Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile him to, and agree with, progress, liberalism, 
and modern civilization. 
 
A hegemonic state indicates states with an established religion by means of the existence 
of an established church.
71
  The established church may display an enforced or strict 
monopoly toward religion, as was found in Spain at certain times in the past.
72
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
various means.  René Rémond includes numerous examples of forcible expulsion of non-Catholics. One 
such example is in Spain, where Catholic kings drove Jews and Muslims out, and in France, where Jews 
and later Protestants were expelled as well.  Great Britain is often thought of as an exception, as since 1707 
the Monarch was the head of the Church in England but not in Scotland.  Voltaire in his Lettres anglaises 
ou philosohiques (1732) praised the confessional plurality of Great Britain.  However, Rémond mentions 
that at a time when Voltaire was praising England‘s tolerance, England continued to practice discrimination 
according to denomination.  Political careers were restricted to members of the Established Church of 
England, access to universities such as Oxford and Cambridge too was restricted to members of the 
established church.  The ban on teaching by academics from other than the Anglican faith was only lifted in 
1871 with the abolition of the Test of Anglicanism.  In this regard see Rémond (note 25 above) 31. 
70
 The Syllabus of Errors (1864) as included in H Bettenson Documents of the Christian Church (1989) 
274. 
71
 Several European states operate variations of state religious establishments:  The United Kingdom – the 
Church of England and the Church of Scotland; Denmark – Lutheranism; Greece – Greek Orthodox 
Church; Sweden – Church of Sweden; Norway – Lutheranism; Finland – Lutheran Orthodox Church of 
Finland; Malta – Roman Catholicism and Bulgaria -Bulgarian Orthodox Church. 
72
 Kuru states that in two hundred years secularisation has made tremendous inroads, as there are hardly 
any confessional states left.
 
Examples of confessional states include Greece, and the Scandinavian 
democracies and England, where the heir to the throne,
 
Prince Charles, has revealed his intention to treat all 
religions on equal footing.  In this regard see Kuru (note 39 above) 570. 
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Alternatively the established church is dominant, but other religions are tolerated or 
afforded equal treatment, as found, for example, in Greece
73
 and in England.
74
 
 
A further category of hegemonic states are states where a particular church has a special 
position in the traditions of the country, a so-called endorsed church.
75
  The most 
important difference between hegemonic states and theocracies is that in hegemonic 
states, despite this establishment or endorsement of religion, the legislative and judicial 
processes are not fulfilled by religious leaders. 
 
Theocracies in particular, as well states with established churches with a strict monopoly 
over religious affairs do not allow for the right of religious freedom of non-believers or 
those belonging to a dissimilar faith.  Therefore the right to freedom of religion of these 
adherents is not protected.
76
  In addition, even adherents to the state religion may also 
                                                          
73
 The Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ is singled out as ‗the prevailing religion‘ in Greece – see article 3 
of the Constitution of Greece (1975). Other examples include: the Roman Catholic Church which is the 
established church in Argentina – see article 2 of the Constitution of the Argentine people (1994). In 
Norway, the King and the majority of the cabinet are required to be members of the state Lutheran church 
and Christianity is a mandatory subject in Norwegian public schools. Buddhism is the established religion 
in Sri Lanka – see article 9 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka; and 
Nepal has proclaimed itself a Hindu state – see article 4 of the Constitution of Nepal (1990). 
74
 See Act of Supremacy, 1 Elizabeth (1558).  Anthony Marx states that in England Catholicism was 
unchallenged until the early sixteenth century.  However, when the pope refused Henry VIII his request for 
a divorce, Henry broke with Catholic Church and established himself head of the Church of England in 
1532.  The Reformation in England was briefly interrupted by the reign of Queen Mary who sought to 
restore Catholicism.  Her efforts however had the opposite effect and bolstered anti-Catholicism 
sentiments.  Mary's successor, Elizabeth, at first more tolerant of Catholicism, later incited England 
towards Protestant conformity when Rome supported the invasion of Ireland and excommunicated her.  See 
Marx (note 27 above) 58 - 65. 
75
 For example in Panama, freedom to profess any religion is subject to ‗respect for Christian morality and 
public order‘ as per article 35 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Panama (1972). 
76
 Van der Vyver confirms this argument through reference to the position in Iran and Sudan. Articles 13 
and 14 of the Constitution of Iran and article 16 of the Constitution of Sudan expressly excludes non-
Muslims who are neither ‗People from the Book"‘ (Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christian) or non-Muslims who 
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suffer an infringement on their right to freedom of religion, particularly in those instances 
where it is not allowed to abandon the belief of the dominant religion.
77
  Hegemonic 
states, which positively identify with a dominant religion, also infringe on the right to 
freedom of religion, even in the event where such an endorsement does not significantly 
affect free choice, as this endorsement does amount to arbitrary promotion of the beliefs 
of the dominant religion.  From the above discussion it is clear that the establishment of a 
confessional state does not serve the interest of religious freedom in that the beliefs of the 
state religion are continually advanced. 
 
Religions other than the state or dominant religion are therefore not afforded equal 
treatment.  Adherents of these religions will at best feel like outsiders
78
 and at worst be 
subjected to severe limitations on their right to manifest their religious belief.  Therefore 
it is asserted that confessional states do not ensure the protection of the right to freedom 
of religion of religions other than the state religion. 
 
3.5.2 Some degree of identification or separation between the state and religion: 
predominantly confessional states 
 
In predominantly confessional states the endorsement of a particular religion may be even 
more subtle than in confessional states.  In these regimes some form of identification 
between religion and the state is prevalent.  However, the identification does not extend 
as far as the establishment of a confessional state.  These ‗predominantly confessional 
states‘ also cover a range of configurations. Included in this range are cooperationist 
regimes, where the state continues to cooperate with religion.  For example, allowing for 
the provision of state financial support to religious institutions, without the cooperation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
are neither adherents of other ‗heavenly faiths‘ from protection of their rights, see JD van der Vyver & J 
Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 33-34. 
77
 Abandoning Islam or converting to another religion is under Sharia law punishable by death. Iran, 
amongst other complies with this command, as conversion from Islam constitutes a capital crime in this 
country. 
78
 See section 3.3.3 and section 3.7. 
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extending to the establishment of a state religion. In Spain, Italy, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, state budgets continue to provide for certain religious denominations, while 
in Austria, Switzerland, Denmark Germany, Norway and Finland
79
 religious taxes exist.  
These cooperationist regimes, however, do not endorse any religion in particular and are 
committed to the equal treatment of all religions. 
 
This cooperation may even range to benevolent neutrality towards religion without the 
provision of financial support to religion, found in so-called accommodationist regimes.  
This system of passive accommodation is comparable to a regime of tolerance in which: 
[T]he state is not expressly committed or involved with the maintenance of religion, but 
allows for an affirmative climate in which the individual believers are not thwarted in any 
way and in which institutionalised religion can make efforts to preserve itself and to carry 
out religious activities.
80
 
 
It may even be contended that the benevolent neutrality of the accommodationist regime 
meets the requirements of a state in which religion is institutionally separated from the 
functioning of the state.  These accommodationist states may even be similar to states in 
which so-called benign separation between state and religion is evident. 
 
It is clear that confessional states do not allow for extensive protection of the right to 
freedom of religion, as was concluded in section 3.5.1 above. A similar conclusive 
finding is not per se possible regarding states that are predominantly confessional states.  
                                                          
79
 In considering the Finnish Report in terms of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, stressed that where public funding is 
automatically provided to selected churches only, particular attention must be paid to the situation of other 
religions, and called upon the government to review its national legislation.  See in general paragraph 29 of 
the Advisory Committee Opinion on Finland, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2000) 002, 2000.  However, the Finish 
government argued that the privileged position of the Evangelical Lutheran Churches and the Orthodox 
Church were justified in that they fulfilled important social duties.  
80
 J Temperman 'The Neutral State: Optional or Necessary? A Triangular Analysis of State-Religion 
Relationships, Democratisation and Human Rights Compliance‘ (2006) 1 Religion and Human Rights 269, 
279. 
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Quite the contrary is contended in that the ideology of the given state will ultimately 
influence the extent of the neutrality of the accommodation or tolerance displayed 
towards all religion or beliefs.  Dependant on this ideology, the benign neutrality towards 
religion in general may indeed allow for extensive protection of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief of all believers, in that all religions are valued.  However, the positive 
climate created by the state towards religion in general should not in any way favour one 
religion over another as this may impede on the right to freedom of religion of other 
religions.
81
  It is argued that an accommodationist regime or regime of tolerance that 
creates such an environment might serve the interests of religious freedom to the utmost. 
 
However, most countries demonstrate some fashion of separation between state and 
religion, so-called secular states.  These states generally defend the principle that 
secularism demands a neutral public domain in which religion is relegated to the private 
sphere.  The application of this division between the public and private sphere is 
problematic as the very nature of religion does not generally allow for a distinction 
between public and private.
82
  However this division is even more challenging for those 
religions that dictate the manifestation of religion in the public sphere, as for example the 
wearing of the Islamic headscarf-hijab dictates.  Evaluation of secular states therefore in 
particular warrants closer scrutiny. 
 
3.5.3 Separation between state and religion: secular states 
 
Separation between state and religion, or secularisation
83
 displays the following 
characteristics:
84
 legislative and judicial processes are free of religious control and no 
                                                          
81
 India may be classified as a neutral state in which the state does not symbolically endorse religion, or a 
particular religion.  In India fairness in allocation of public support to different religious groups is 
permitted.  The Constitution of India contains a guarantee of state ‗equidistance‘ from religions, which 
seems to stand for a guarantee of neutrality of effect.  In this regard see R Verma Secularism and 
Communal Violence in Indian Politics Thesis prospectus presented to the Department of Government, 
Harvard University (1992). 
82
 See discussion in section 5.2.2. 
83
 See the definition of secularisation in section 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
established religion exists.  Secularisation is therefore generally seen as the act of 
exclusion of a religious presence from the public domain and the limitation of the role of 
religion to the private sphere. 
 
Secular regimes too, display a wide-ranging variation.
85
  Distinctions may be drawn 
between secular regimes that differ very little from an accommodationist regime, but with 
the qualification of any form of public support of a religion is deemed inappropriate, on 
the one end of the spectrum.  To secular regimes in which hostility towards religion is 
prevalent or the possibility of persecution of religion exists, on the other extreme of the 
spectrum.
86
  In between these extremes the following classification are situated: 
separation, inadvertent insensitivity and rigid separation. 
 
The broad spectrum of secular regimes is the result of interplay between different 
factors
87
 such as: the carriers of the process of separation
88
 (whether the separation was 
the result of the Reformation, or a Revolution or the Renaissance); the role of the 
dominant religion;
89
 as well as the dominant ideology
90
 of the state when transforming.  
All of these may influence the manner in which separation manifests as well as the 
ultimate protection afforded to the right to freedom of religion.  For this reason a further 
evaluation of the possible variations of a secular state is needed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
84
 Kuru (note 39 above) 569. 
85
 As discussed in section 3.5.3 and 3.6. 
86
 The Soviet Union was the first regime in history to reject all forms of religious belief.  Inspired by 
Marxist theory state atheism was ordered by Lenin in 1918 through the decree of Separation of State and 
Church and lasted till Gorbachev, in 1988, symbolically invited the leading bishops of the Russian 
Orthodox Church to the Kremlin.  For a discussion the position in the previous Soviet Union see HJ 
Bergman ‗Religious Rights in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Transition: A Historical Theory‘ in JD van 
der Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 
289-293. 
87
 See section 3.3 
88
 See section 3.3.1. 
89
 See section 3.3.2. 
90
 See section 3.3.3. 
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3.6 An assessment of the possible variations in secular states 
 
As discussed above secular regimes reveal extreme variations.
91
 Secular regimes that are 
similar to an accommodationist regime generally allow for a more favourable protection 
of the right to freedom of religion when compared to a secular regime in which hostility 
towards religion exists.  It is important that the probable causes for these extreme 
variations in secular regimes are appreciated. 
 
3.6.1 Passive and assertive approaches towards secularism 
 
A possible cause for these extreme variations in secular states can be related to a 
distinction between the application of either a passive or an assertive approach towards 
secularism.
92
 It is argued that either passive or assertive secularism became the dominant 
approach during the historical period of secular state-building. This was the phase when 
the ancien régime
93
 was replaced with the secular state. This point of view is suitably 
illustrated with reference to France and the USA. In France the ancien regime was based 
upon the intimate relationship between the monarchy and the Catholic Church. The birth 
of the French Republic was conceived from the violent conflict with this regime.
94
 As a 
result of this conflict assertive secularism became the dominant ideology in France.
95
 On 
                                                          
91
 See section 3.6.1. 
92
 See Kuru (note 39 above) 587.  In support of Kuru, see Martin who identifies that perhaps the reason 
why secularisation was so penetrating in Western Europe is precisely for the reason that Christianity has 
been tangled with the structures of power.  See Martin (note 43 above) 23. 
93
 See section 3.5 above. 
94
 See discussion of historical conflict in section 2.3. 
95
 See Baubérot, who maintains that laïcité (laicism or secularism) may have ended the ‗conflict of two 
Frances‘ (the conflict between the Catholic and Protestant faiths) but it did not ease the tension over 
religion in France. While assertive secularists (termed laïcité de combat (combative secularism)) are 
dominant and seek to confine religion to the private sphere and to the individual‘s conscience, the passive 
secularists (termed laïcité plurielle (pluralistic secularism)) struggle to make a more public role available 
for religion. Baubérot (note 32 above) 445. 
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the other hand, in the USA,
96
 which was then a new country of immigrants, religion was 
neither seen as an ally or as a foe, and therefore the cause of passive secularism was 
generally supported.
97
 
 
Passive secularism requires that the state plays a passive role in avoiding the 
establishment of any religion, thereby maintaining state neutrality towards religion.  
Religion may therefore still be present in the public domain.  Assertive secularism, 
however, actively excludes religion from the public sphere.
98
  Therefore it can be argued 
that assertive secularism appears to be incompatible with religions that have public 
claims while passive secularism tolerates public visibility of religion.
99
 
 
In this regard the application of assertive secularism has caused considerable litigation, 
especially on the role of religion in schools, as religious groups are eager to have an 
influence on the world view of impressionable youths.
100
  These debates often focus on 
the role of prayers or pledges in schools, the format of religious instruction, the 
possibility for private religious education (and the availability of government funding for 
these schools) and the manner in which science, morality and human sexuality ought to 
                                                          
96
 This difference in application of secularism is also reflected in the respective declarations of rights of 
these countries, both drafted at the end of the eighteenth century. The American Declaration of 
Independence (1776) avers that ‗all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable Rights‘. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) on the other 
hand does not proclaim that God is the origin of the rights but sets the rights out as ‗rights of man‘.  The 
difference between France and the USA, with reference their respective declarations of rights, is discussed 
in Baubérot (note 32 above) 442 onwards. 
97
 See Kuru (note 39 above) 586.  Although it is maintained that the USA predominantly follows a passive 
ideology towards secularism, Kuru suggests that support for assertive secularism constitutes a marginal 
group within the USA.  See Kuru (note 39 above)  579-80. 
98
 Kuru (note 39 above) 571. 
99
 Kuru (note 39 above) 594. 
100
 SV Monsma and JC Soper The Challenge of Pluralism Church and State in Five Democracies (1997) 
571. 
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be taught.
101
  It has been argued that it is usually minorities and the powerless in societies 
that have fewer options and are dependent on government for services.  If government 
does not provide options in line with their values and faith commitments they have no 
alternatives than to make use of the government services that may not be as 
accommodating to their religious needs.
102
 
 
As a result minorities of the marginalised in society may be coerced into acting in 
conflict with the tenets of their religious belief.  The effect of this coercion on these 
vulnerable groups will be their right to manifest religious belief is at the best constrained 
and at the worst nullified.
103
 
 
In addition, the difference in approach towards secular state policies towards religion, 
whether assertive or passive can either be exclusionary or inclusionary.  For example, it 
can be said that the USA follows a more inclusionary approach towards religion while 
France and Turkey follow more exclusionary approaches.
104
  These distinct approaches 
are the consequence of the ‗ideological struggles‘ between ‗passive secularism‘ and 
‗assertive secularism‘ as identified above. 
 
Krishnaswami asserts that the mere existence of separation per se does not ensure non-
discrimination, and that it depends on the conduct of the state to appreciate which type of 
relationship leads to discrimination and which does not.
105
 
                                                          
101
 SG Scott The Seeds of Secularization Calvinism, Culture and Pluralism in America, 1870 – 1915 (1985) 
93.  Once again note support for assertive secularism constitutes a marginal group within the USA.  See 
Kuru (note 39 above) 579-80. 
102
 SV Monsma and JC Soper The Challenge of Pluralism Church and State in Five Democracies (1997) 
571. 
103
 As will be discussed in more detail in section 6.3. 
104
 Kuru (note 39 above) 571. 
105
 Report of Arcot Krishnaswami, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 12 U.N. ESCOR Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Agenda Item 5), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960) 
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3.6.2 Accommodationist, separationist and neutral interpretations of secularism  
 
In addition to the distinction between an assertive or passive approach towards 
secularism, in the USA, a debate exists between the proponents of the accommodationist 
and the separationist interpretation of secularism.
106
  Accomodationists do not view close 
state-religion interactions as incompatible with secularism, as long as the state-religion 
interaction does not establish a particular religion.
107
  This view claims that only the 
establishment of a state church or coercion towards religious participation violates the 
establishment clause.
108
 
 
Separationists, on the other hand, seek an impenetrable ‗wall of separation‘ between state 
and religion.
109
  This approach of seeking a ‗wall of separation‘ between the state and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
[hereinafter Krishnaswami Study]. ‗Krishnaswami Study‘ (1979) 11 New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics. 227. 
106
 Kuru (note 39 above) 579-80. 
107
 See generally See MW McConnell ‗Accommodation of Religion‘ (1985) 1 Supreme Court Review 1, 14 
who contends that the accommodationist approach calls for government support of religion. 
108
 In the USA, the First Amendment states that: ‗Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment 
of religion‘.  The First Amendment includes clauses prohibiting both governmental interference with the 
‗free exercise‘ of religion, and governmental ‗establishment‘ of religion. Together, the ‗free exercise 
clause‘ and ‗establishment clause‘ are considered to accomplish a ‗separation of church and state‘. E  
Chemerinsky ‗Why Church and State Should be Separate‘ (2008) 49 William and Mary Law Review 2215, 
2204 where Chemerinsky contends that the Supreme Court of the present day, which has not recently dealt 
with any establishment clause issues, consists of more accommodationist than strict separationist and hence 
the law regarding the establishment clause in the USA could witness some radical changes. This contention 
of Chemerinsky will not be pursued further as this chapter aims to understand the relationship between 
state and religion that would most effectively protect the right to freedom of religion and following there 
from the right to freely manifest ones religious beliefs within a diverse society. 
109
 See also generally A Gill The Political Origins of Religious Liberty (2007) for a discussion on the 
dynamics of secularism in state policies toward religion in the USA, France, and Turkey see AT Kuru, 
‗Globalization and Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases‘ (2005) (Summer) Political 
Science Quarterly 120. 
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religion has also been termed strict separation,
110
 between the state and religion in terms 
of which religion is relegated to the private sphere.
111
 
 
Between an accommodationist interpretation, on the one hand, and a separationist 
interpretation of secularism on the other, a third interpretation of the establishment clause 
has been suggested,
112
 which indicates that governments should be neutral with regard to 
religion.  This further approach has included the requirement that government should not 
symbolically endorse religion, or a particular religion, but should follow a neutral 
approach.
113
 
 
It is contended that this neutral approach will most likely ensure the most comprehensive 
protection of all religious adherents‘ right to freedom of religion as no religion will be 
favoured.  The same could be claimed for an accommodationist interpretation in so far as 
this interpretation is not hostile towards religion.  The influence of the dominant religion, 
nevertheless, may result in the favouring of the dominant religion to the detriment of 
marginalised religions.  These contentions are however evaluated in more detail in 
section 3.7. 
 
 
 
                                                          
110
 E Chemerinsky ‗Why Church and State Should be Separate‘ (2008) 49 William and Mary Law Review 
2193, 2196. 
111
 This point of view reflects Thomas Jefferson‘s ‗wall of separation between church and state‘.  See 
section 7.5. 
112
 E Chemerinsky ‗Why Church and State Should be Separate‘ (2008) 49 William and Mary Law Review 
2193, 2196. 
113
 Justice O‘Conner was the first to develop a test in terms of which the neutral approach of government 
should be determined. This test is known as the ‗endorsement test‘.  See Lynch v Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
691 (1984) (O‘Conner, J concurring).  In section 7.5.1 a more general overview of the jurisprudence of the 
court regarding the establishment clause will be provided. 
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3.6.3 Evaluation of the nature of the approach towards and the method of 
interpreting secularism 
 
As indicated previously,
114
 the ideology towards secularism encapsulates the influences 
of the carrier to secularisation, as well as the role of religion in the separation process.  
This ideology further manifests itself in the approach towards secularism, whether it is an 
assertive or passive approach.  The ultimate effect of secularism on the right to freedom 
of religion is therefore influenced by the ideology of a given state. 
 
A passive approach will most probably allow for more extensive protection of religious 
freedom than an assertive approach.  As too will an accommodationist or neutral 
approach towards the interpretation of separation.  The application of a passive approach 
and accommodationist interpretation allows for the inclusion of all religious adherents.  
However, in applying an assertive approach or separationist interpretation towards 
separation, the probability of exclusion of religious believers, as well as the infringement 
of the right to freedom of religion becomes more likely. 
 
The inclinations to follow an assertive approach towards secularism and to interpret 
secularism in a separationist manner are both suggestive of a possible infringement of the 
right to freedom of religion.  This tendency towards restricting the right to freedom of 
religion is particularly disconcerting, in light of the fact that the separation between state 
and religion is generally proclaimed to be the best approach towards ensuring religious 
freedom.  For this reason it is argued that secularism per se should be examined.  Further, 
it is important that the theory that secularism is the best approach towards ensuring the 
equal protection of the right to freedom of religion in a diverse society be challenged.  A 
critical assessment of secularism accordingly forms the basis for further discussion. 
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 See Kuru and his discussion on the importance of the dominant ideology as discussed in section 3.3.3. 
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3.7 Critique of secularism: freedom of religion or freedom from religion? 
 
Secularism is based on the foundation that equal protection of the right to freedom of 
religion of all believers is best ensured through a neutral state which does not display any 
favouritism towards any religion.  However, often this neutrality has resulted in the state 
preferring secular values over religious values, which in return has had the effect of 
supporting the notion of secularism to the detriment of religion.  As a result secularism 
applied in this manner does not ensure the equal protection of all religions, as it 
effectively ‗disestablishes‘ religion to establish a civil religion, that is to say 
secularism.
115
  For this reason the continued application of a single set of secular values 
in terms of which the public domain is predominantly regulated is challenged and the 
policy of strict secularism or laicism, as a traditional response to religious pluralism is 
questioned.
116
 
 
Not only does secularism disestablish religion but also in the event of the application of a 
passive approach towards the disestablishment of religion from the public domain, the 
influence of the dominant religion cannot be circumvented.  The impact on minority or 
marginalised religions becomes even more harmful if their religious claims are not 
permitted in the public discourse.  The impact of this exclusion on the right manifest 
religious belief in particular may be severe.  Presently the heterogeneity in the population 
of states is invariably composed of different racial, ethnic, cultural and religious groups, 
                                                          
115
 The term disestablish is used to indicate an end the official relationship between the state and a nation's 
established church or religion.  The term has also been used as part of the United States Supreme Court 
establishment jurisprudence. 
Regarding the establishment of a civil religion see generally LB Tremblay ‗The Bouchard-Taylor Report 
on Cultural and Religious Accommodation: Multiculturalism by Any Other Name?‘ 18 EUI Working Paper 
LAW (2009).  Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557594>last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
116
 T Lindholm ‗Philosophical and Religious Justification of Freedom of Religion or Belief‘ in T Lindholm, 
WC Durham, BG Tahzib-Lie Bahia (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook, (2004) 
19, 44-46. 
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which presents the world with more complex issues regarding religious freedom.
117
  
Consequently the continued effectiveness and applicability of secularism in the light of 
growing religious diversity is questioned. 
 
The critique of secularism is based on the following understandings of secularism.  First, 
secularisation, the civil religion of the present day, originated as a result of the impact of 
one or other carrier of separation.  It is argued that the impact of these carriers is no 
longer applicable in current day.  Second, the principle of secularism, which professes 
neutrality towards religion, has been shown to have a tendency towards exclusion of 
certain religions. In addition secularism may be incompatible with religions that have 
public claims, for example the display of the headscarf as required by the tenets of Islam.  
It is argued that this exclusion of certain religions does not adequately meet the needs of 
the diverse society of the present day.  This argument is supported by cultural pluralists 
who advocate that a single ‗civil religion‘ which defines and limits the public rights of 
others should not be forced upon religious communities.
118
  It is premised that in light of 
the above arguments a need for a new political philosophy which is devoid of the 
unrealistic claim to privatise religion must be established.
119
  Advocates of the principle 
of secularism should recognise that all morality, which includes both secularism and 
religious belief, evolves
120
 and that the principles of secularism need to be adapted to 
reflect this evolution. 
 
The adaption called for above appreciates that present day society continues to require a 
certain degree of actual de facto differentiation between state and religion.  However, the 
manner in which this separation presents itself should be assessed.
121
  It has been 
                                                          
117D Shelton & A Kiss ‗A Draft Model Law on Freedom of Religion, With Commentary‘ in Religious 
Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives JD van der Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) (1996) 559, 
p566. 
118
 D Smit & EM Conradie Essays in public theology: collected essays (2007) 103. 
119
 J Keane ‗Secularism?‘ in D Marquand & RL Nettler Political Quarterly Religion and Democracy 
(2000) 5, 17. 
120
 Keane (note 119 above)18. 
121
 Bader (note 10 above) 60. 
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suggested that de facto differentiation could present itself in different legal forms, which 
may extend from constitutional and legal non-establishment on the one hand, to some 
‗weak‘ establishment of one church on the other.122  However, any absolute constitutional 
or legal disestablishment must be questioned, in that: 
Constitutional and legal non-establishment is definitively not the same as ‗separation of 
state from religion‘ let alone of ‗nation from religion‘, neither historically nor 
structurally.
123
 
 
With the re-emergence of religion into the public discourse a sincere commitment to 
religious liberty necessitates a cultivation of religious pluralism.
124
 True religious 
pluralism requires the fostering and nurturing of difference and not merely the toleration 
thereof.  The challenge, however, is how to introduce these aspects in a neutral manner.  
One possible solution to the introduction of these aspects in a neutral manner is in the 
conceptualisation of a post secular ideology.
125
 In terms of this ideology the secular 
theory of the privatisation of religion is confronted with the theory of de-privatisation of 
religion, in terms of which private relations and moral spheres are re-politicised.
126
 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
                                                          
122
 Ibid. 
123
 Bader (note 10 above) 61. 
124
 MC Modak-Truran „Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part I): Toward A New Paradigm for Law and 
Religion‘ (2007) 27 Mississippi College Law Review 159, 177-186. 
125
 Habermas claims that secular citizens must learn to live in a post secular society, as religious citizens 
have already adapted to the ethical expectations of democratic citizenship, in so far as they have adopted 
towards their secular environment.  According to him conservative religious people are expected to be 
tolerant of forms of behaviour many of them find testing (for example explicit forms of sexuality or same-
sex unions), while secular liberalists refuse to tolerate religious manifestations.  Secular citizens in the point 
of view of Habermas should engage beyond mere tolerance but with a respect for the worldview of 
difference of the religious person.  In this regard see generally J Habermas ‗Religion in the public sphere‟  
(2006) 14 (1) European Journal of Philosophy, 1, 2. 
126
 See section 5.2.2. 
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In principle a separation between the state and religion is required to ensure the 
protection of the fundamental right to freedom of religion or belief.  However, the 
complete constitutional disestablishment of religion is criticised.  In particular, the 
interpretation and application of the principle of separation at the expense of the right to 
religious freedom, within the context of increased religious pluralism, is questioned.  
Therefore, the separation of state and religion ought not to result in ‗freedom from 
religion‘ where religion is actively excluded from the public sphere.  Quite the contrary 
should be strived for, in that the state should play a passive role in avoiding the 
establishment of any religion, thereby maintaining state neutrality towards religion, yet at 
the same time allowing for religion to be visible in the public domain. 
 
Religious communities should be allowed the space to represent their different views and 
should not be subjected to a single ‗civil religion‘.  Secular citizens should learn to live in 
a post secular society in which secularism means not merely the absence of religion but 
the capacity for discourse across the lines of religious difference.  Secularist citizens 
therefore have to overcome their secularist consciousness and engage with religion.  
Public life should represent ethnic, national, religious or cultural difference and religion 
should be allowed to re-emerge in the public discourse.  Therefore a new political 
philosophy which is devoid of the unrealistic claim to privatise religion should be 
pursued.  Parties should reach agreement on the limitations placed on their positive 
liberty to practice their own religion, while recognising the negative liberty of being 
spared the religious practices of others.  The manner in which this re-entry should occur 
will form the basis of research in a further chapter.
127
 
                                                          
127
 See section 5.2.2. 
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Chapter 4 
Legal context of the right to freedom of religion: 
International and regional level 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed previously,
1
 the earlier protection concerning the right to freedom of 
religion was in accordance with the Peace of Augsburg (1555).  The Peace of Augsburg 
established that those adhering to a religion other than the dominant religion were 
protected from state persecution according to the provision of the maxim cuius regio, eius 
religio.
2
  This provision was thereafter included in the Peace of Westphalia (1648).
3
  
Subsequently, the protection of the right to freedom of religion was incorporated into 
various models for the protection of the right to freedom of religion of minorities, in 
terms of so-called minority treaties.
4
  In these minority treaties, states, in addition to 
pledging to refrain from discrimination, undertook to recognise and respect diversity.
5
 
 
The undertaking to protect human rights by means of international treaties essentially 
only began in 1919 through the framework of the League of Nations.
6
  Knock emphasises 
that while the Covenant of the League of Nations emphasised state sovereignty coupled 
with the important qualification of equality and self-determination of people, the 
                                                          
1
 See discussion in section 2.2. 
2
 Literally translated as ‗whose the region (or realm), his the religion‘.  The war of religion following the 
Protestant Reformation in Germany was discussed in more detail in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 
3
 See section 2.3.3. 
4
 See section 2.4. 
5
 Before the advent of the League of Nations, Steiner et al writes: ‗Within Europe , religious issues became 
a strong concern since states often included more than one religious denomination, and abuse by the state 
of a religious minority could lead to intervention by other states where that religion was dominant.  Hence 
peace treaties sometimes included provisions on religious minorities.  Generally see HJ Steiner (et al) 
International Human Rights in Context Law Politics and Morals 3
rd
 ed (2007) 96. 
6
 See generally TJ Knock To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order 
(1992); see also EA. Korovin ‗The Second World War and International Law‘ (1946) 40 (4) The American 
Journal of International Law 742. 
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framework of the League of Nations proved ineffective in protecting national minorities 
in light of the atrocities perpetrated against minorities with the onset of World War II.  
Following their victory against Germany, the Allied countries agreed that a new 
international organisation would be needed to promote international peace and security, 
as well as for the protection of fundamental human rights.  Under the international human 
rights system the protection of the right to freedom of religion has been embraced with 
the concept of individual human rights.
7
  After World War II the attempt to further the 
protection of human rights was continued through the efforts of the United Nations (UN), 
as well as regional bodies, such as, the Council of Europe (CoE),
8
 the Organization of 
American States (OAS),
9
 and the Organization for African Unity (OAU),
10
 now known as 
the African Union (AU),
11
 all of which will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
4.2 The United Nations 
 
The UN was established in 1945 and the Charter of the UN
12
 is widely considered to be 
the constitution of the international community.
13
  The objectives of the Charter of the 
                                                          
7
 For an historical overview of the debates around the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights see MD Evans ‗The UN System‘ in MD Evans (ed) Religious Liberty and International Law In 
Europe (2009)172, 173. 
8
 The Statute of the Council of Europe CETS No 001.  Opened for signature in London on 5 May 1949. 
Entered into force on 3 August 1949.  The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 in the context of a post 
war movement aimed at promoting European Unity. This Statute was signed by the representatives of 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and 
Sweden. The number of member states has continually increased as democracy has spread throughout 
Europe. 
9
 Charter of the Organization of American States. Signed on 30 April 1948 at the Ninth Conference of the 
American States in Bogotá, Columbia and entered into force on 13 December 1951. 
10
 Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. Signed in the city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 May 
1963 and entered into force on 13 September 1963. 
11
 See generally R Murray Human Rights in Africa From the OAU to the African Union (2004). 
12
The Charter of the United Nations.  Signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, United States of America 
and entered into force on 24 October 1945.  
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UN include protecting future generations from the ‗scourge of war‘ and promoting 
‗fundamental human rights‘ and the ‗dignity and worth of the human person‘.14  The 
purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights, and to promote 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion.
15
 
 
Soon after the founding of the UN, and pursuant to the aims of the UN, a committee
16
 
tasked with the writing of an International Bill of Rights17 was established.  The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
18
 a set of recommended standards was 
produced by the committee.  Steiner contends that the UDHR is considered the 
foundational instrument to protect the right to freedom of religion in particular and other 
rights in general.  The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, in addition, 
features prominently in a wide range of other international human rights instruments, 
within the UN context, such as the comparable provisions in the International Covenant 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Available at <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cun/cun.html.> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
13
 In terms of its Charter, the United Nations System is composed, amongst others, of the following bodies, 
the Security Council, International Court of Justice, Economic and Social Council and General Assembly 
and Secretariat. 
14
 Preamble to the Charter of the UN. 
15
 Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
16
 In 1946 the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations established the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights tasked with formulating a document aimed at securing legal protection for 
fundamental human rights, similar to the historic French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen (1789) and the United States Bill of Rights (1791), but applicable to every human being. Its 
members included distinguished individuals such as René Cassin of France, Eleanor Roosevelt of the 
United States of America and Charles Malik of Lebanon. The Commission on Human Rights was the body 
responsible for choosing to proceed by means of a declaration instead of a convention. See generally J 
Morsink The UDHR of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent (1999). 
17
 See Steiner (note 5 above) 60. For an analysis see C Chinkin ‗International law and human rights‘ in T 
Evans (ed) Human rights fifty years on: a reappraisal (1998) 105-129. 
18
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948.  UN Doc. A/3/810 (1949). 
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on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, (ICESCR),
19
 as well as the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion.
20
 
 
One of the purposes of this chapter is to provide a detailed assessment of the fundamental 
elements of freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the manifestation of this 
freedom as developed in the international and regional arena.  Therefore the role, 
significance, impact and implementation as well as the status of these foundational 
instruments and the ancillary instruments protecting the right to freedom of religion 
within the international framework will be discussed next. 
 
4.2.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The third General Assembly of the UN adopted the UDHR
 
on 10 December 1948, three 
years after the end of World War II.  In their final comments, the delegates to that 
Assembly made it clear that the Declaration was brought into being out of the experience 
of the war that had just ended.
21
  It is significant that in the course of two years the 
                                                          
19
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (ICESCR) G.A. res. 2200A (XXI),21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49,  U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) and entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 
20
 Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief.  Proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 36/55 of 25 November 
1981. GA Resolution. 
21
 J Morsink ‗World War Two and the Universal Declaration‘ (1993) 15(2) Human Rights Quarterly 357, 
357.  Mr Malik, the representative from Lebanon, said that the document ‗was inspired by opposition to the 
barbarous doctrines of Nazism and fascism.‘ See U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 181 st-183rd plenary meeting at 
857, U.N. Docs. A/C.3/SR.181-183 (1948).  He recalled in later years that ‗it was impossible to brush aside 
the reflection that the proclamation of the Declaration in 1948 was really something of a miracle, so that if 
it were not proclaimed then, possibly we would still be working on it now.‘ C Malik ‗Report of the 8th 
Session of the Human Rights Commission (14 April-13 June 1952)‘ 13 U.N. Bulletin (Sept. 1952) 248. 
Malik was the rapporteur of all three sessions of the Human Rights Commission that drew up the 
Declaration and the president of the Third Committee in which ‗the great debates‘ took place. 
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international community was able to agree on a declaration, while the adoption of the 
subsequent covenants on civil and political rights as well as social and economic rights 
took over two decades.
22
 
 
The UDHR was proclaimed to be ‗a common standard of achievement for all peoples and 
all nations‘.23  The UDHR, as a General Assembly Resolution is not legally enforceable.  
Indeed the UDHR was the first significant international instrument aimed at promoting 
principles of religious liberty.
24
  It has however been noted that the UDHR expresses 
what in the fullness of time, ought to become general principles of law recognised and 
acted upon by state parties.
25
  Indeed, many of the rights enshrined in the UDHR are now 
considered to be general principles of law. Some even have the status of customary 
international law.
26
  In addition, the formulation of later binding treaties was fashioned on 
the provisions of the UDHR.
27
 
 
The first paragraph of the Preamble to the UDHR declares: 
                                                          
22
 M Nowak Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (2003) 75. 
23
 To reach agreement on what presents a common standard for all people is no simple feat. Morsink 
comments that as human rights can be characterised in two manners, as a positive and a negative, and as it 
is often impossible for persons of different philosophical persuasions or of different cultural backgrounds to 
agree on what belongs to the essence-of a human being, the positive human rights, agreement is more 
readily achieved through the negative path of non-discrimination, Morsink (note 21 above) 357, 365. See 
further MA Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (2001). 
24
 DH Davis ‗The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: Examining the Role of the 
1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief‘ (2002) Brigham Young University Law Review 217, 223. 
25
 Steiner (note 5 above) 147.  Regarding the drafting and value of the UDHR see generally Morsink (note 
16 above). 
26
 Steiner ibid 137. 
27
 The UDHR is a set of recommended standards which includes six groups of rights including security 
rights, due process rights, and liberty rights, rights of political participation, equality rights, and social 
rights. The right to the free exercise of religion was one of the four basic liberty rights or freedoms. 
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Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world... 
 
The recognition of this inherent dignity of free and equal human beings is affirmed in 
article 1 which reads: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
 
Steiner et al observes that the UDHR was far more influenced by a dignitarian approach 
than individualistic rights.
28
  Individualistic rights implicitly place the highest priority on 
individual freedom, are typically formulated without any explicit reference to limitations, 
and are usually not expressed in relation to other rights and responsibilities.  Dignitarian 
rights, place more emphasis on the fact that the bearer of rights is situated within a family 
and a community.  The limitations of the right in relation to other rights and 
responsibilities are clearly expressed, with greater attention given to the existence of 
duties in relation to the exercise of rights.
29
  In terms of the dignitarian influence of the 
UDHR everyone is considered a unique individual, but constituted by and through 
relationships with others.  Accordingly everyone is expected to act towards others ‗in a 
spirit of brotherhood‘ as determined in article 1. 
 
The aim of the UN was largely the eradication of discrimination.
30
  Article 2 specifically 
refers to religion in the quest for equality when it states that: 
Everyone is entitled to all rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
                                                          
28
 Steiner (note 5 above) 141.  The wording of article 1 of the UDHR shows some resemblance to the 
African concept of ubuntu, that means ‗constituted by and through relationships with others‘.  In this regard 
see the discussion on ubuntu in section 5.6. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Morsink (note 21 above) 405. 
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The substantive right to freedom of religion or belief is set out in article 18 of the UDHR.  
This article is mirrored by almost all other international, most regional and several 
national instruments.  Article 18 of the UDHR reads: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance.  
 
From this reading it is apparent that ‗[e]veryone‘ has the right to religious liberty by 
virtue of their very nature as human beings.  Furthermore, the right to freedom of religion 
is broadly defined partly because religion is inherently indefinable.  The meaning of the 
term is potentially limitless as definitions may unacceptably limit the application of the 
right.
31
  A particularly important aspect of the right to freedom of religion or belief is that 
it protects the communal dimension of manifesting ones belief in community with others.  
The manifestation of religion or belief is described in a list of activities that are 
representative of the right and include teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
 
In addition to the provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion in terms of article 
18, religious freedom is also protected in terms of other provisions in the UDHR.  
Equality before the law, particularly important for religious discrimination cases, in a 
separate equality and non-discrimination clause is contained in article 7.
32
  The right to 
education as a means of advancement throughout one‘s life is established in Article 26 
and is directed toward the full development of the human personality.  Moreover, 
education is tasked with promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship amongst all 
                                                          
31
 The UDHR made sure to include ‗whatever‘ before ‗belief‘ in the preamble and in article 1(1). This has 
been well received as it sends out a message that the Declaration protects agnosticism, atheism and 
rationalism. Davis (note 24 above) 217, 229. 
32
 Article 7 of the UDHR reads: ‗All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection without any discrimination against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination‘. 
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nations, racial and religious groups.
33
  The right of parents to choose the education that 
shall be given to their children is guaranteed in article 26(3)
34
 and the right to a religious 
cultural life is protected in terms of article 27.
35
 
 
After the creation of the UDHR, the Human Rights Commission
36
 continued to attempt to 
formulate treaties that would make the rights in the UDHR into binding norms of 
international law.  Almost twenty years after the UDHR, the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) finally approved the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
37
  These treaties 
embodying UDHR rights received sufficient ratifications to become operative in 1976 
and are at present the most important UN human rights treaties and together with the 
UDHR are referred to as the International Bill of Rights.
38
  This significance of the role 
played by the UDHR is encapsulated by the following phrase: 
To this day it retains symbolism, rhetorical force and significance in the human rights 
movement.  It is the parent document, the initial burst of idealism and enthusiasm, terser, 
                                                          
33Article 26(2) of the UDHR reads. ‗Education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the 
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace‘. 
34
 Article 24(3) of the UDHR reads:  ‗Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be 
given to their children‘. 
35
 Article 27(1) of the UDHR reads: ‗Everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the 
community...‘ 
36
 In 2006 the longstanding UN Human Rights Commission was replaced by a new Human Rights Council. 
37
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Adopted and opened for signature and 
accession by the UNGA, resolution 2200 ( XXI) of 16 December 1966.  Entered into force on 3 January 
1976.  With regards to the provisions of the ICESCR reference to religion is made in terms of article 2(2), 
which provides for non discrimination in the following terms: ‗The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status‘. 
38
 See generally Steiner (note 5 above); M Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: ICCPR 
Commentary 2
nd
 ed (2005); and Nowak (note 22 above). 
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more general and grander than the treaties, in some sense the continuation of the whole 
movement.
39
 
 
4.3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
The preamble to the ICCPR
40
 states that it takes into consideration the principles of the 
Charter of the UN, and affirms the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family.  Furthermore, the preamble acknowledges the UDHR and 
considers the obligation of states under the Charter to promote the universal observance 
of human rights and freedoms. 
 
The ICCPR has been ratified by more than three quarters of the states in the world and is 
one of the most significant treaties on human rights.  Unlike the values contained in the 
UDHR, the ICCPR binds states to observe its guarantees and imposes on state parties the 
obligation to implement the ICCPR through legislative and other means.
41
  In particular, 
the state agrees to ensure to all within its jurisdiction, without distinction, the rights 
guaranteed in the ICCPR.
42
  The ICCPR reaffirms the right to self-determination.
43
 
                                                          
39
 Steiner (note 5 above) 120. 
40
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR) Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by the UNGA, resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966.  Entered into force 
on 23 May 1976. 
41
 Article 2, Part II of the ICCPR reads: 
‗1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.‘  The obligations of state parties are established in Article 2(1) specifically 
mentions religion. Article 2(1) has been enhanced by requiring state parties in Articles 2(2) and 2(3) in 
relation to adopting legislative or other measures as maybe necessary to give effect to the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant.  Through imposing this obligation a remedy is provided for those whose rights as 
protected in the Covenant have been abused‘. 
42
 Article 2, Part II of the ICCPR. 
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Article 18 deals specifically with the right to freedom of religion and reads: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
44
 
3. Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of 
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education 
of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 
 
In addition the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is listed in article 
4(2) as a non-derogable right.
45
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
43
 Article 1, Part I of the ICCPR reads:  ‗All peoples have the right to self-determination.  By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development‘. 
44
 Articles 18(1) and 18(2) of the ICCPR are different from Article 18 of the UDHR in that the UDHR 
specifically protects the freedom to change one‘s religion or belief, whilst the ICCPR limits itself to 
protecting the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of one‘s choice as well as forbidding any 
coercion that would harm this freedom.  This change was introduced by the Muslim countries as through 
one of the understandings of Islamic Law it is a capital offence for a Muslim to denounce Islam or convert 
to another faith.  In this regard see B Dickson ‗The United Nations and Freedom of Religion‘ (1995) 44(2) 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 341, 342. 
45
 Article 4(1) of the ICCPR provides for the derogation from obligations under the ICCPR ‗in times of 
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed 
... provided that such measure are not inconsistent with [State Parties‘] other obligations under international 
law and do not involve discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or 
social origin‘. Article 4(2) states that ‗No derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8 (para 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 
may be made under this provision‘. 
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The implementation of the ICCPR is monitored by the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee,
46
 which issues General Comments,
47
 as interpretative guidelines of the 
provisions in the ICCPR
48
.  Regarding the right to freedom of religion, the ICCPR 
Human Rights Committee has issued General Comment 22.
49
  Therefore the discussion 
of the provisions of article 18 incorporates the interpretative guidelines of General 
Comment 22. 
 
Article 18 consists of four sections.  First, the guarantee to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion, described as the forum internum; second, aspects concerning 
coercion and proselyting. Third, the limitation of manifestation of religious freedom, or 
the so called forum externum and lastly, a special clause on the religious education of 
children and the religious rights of parents and guardians is included.
50
 
 
Regarding the forum internum, General Comment 22 signifies that the forum internum 
goes beyond religion alone.  Freedom of thought and conscience are entitled to equal 
protection.
51
  The ICCPR Human Rights Committee, although specifying that religion 
and belief should be widely construed has not provided a clear definition of the terms 
religion, thought or conscience.
52
  However, article 18 is not restricted to the protection 
                                                          
46
 The body of independent experts monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the ICCPR is 
known as the ICCPR Human Rights Committee (HRC).  For a further discussion on the role of the ICCPR 
Human Rights Committee see section 4.7.1. 
47
 Article 40(4) of the ICCPR provides that: ‗The Committee shall study the reports submitted but the State 
Parties to the present Covenant.  It shall transmit reports, such as general comments as it may consider 
appropriate to the State Parties...‘  These general comments may range for those which are authoritative 
interpretations of the relevant treaty norms, to others that are no more than mere advisory opinions. See 
generally Steiner (note 5 above) 837 and further. 
48
 Nowak (note 38 above) 80. 
49
 See UN ICCPR Human Rights Committee, 20 July 1993 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4): General Comment 
22, article 18, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/I/Rev. 1,35. 
50
 Article 18(4) of the ICCPR is similar to article 13(3) of ICESCR by creating interdependence between 
the two covenants. 
51
 ICCPR Human Rights Committee General Comment 22 paragraph 1. 
52
 ICCPR Human Rights Committee General Comment 22 paragraph 2. 
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of long established religions, as it covers theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs as 
well.  The internal freedom of religion includes the right to change religion.
53
  This 
internal freedom protects the rights of parents and guardians to ensure the religious 
upbringing of children in conformity with their own convictions.
54
 
 
4.3.1 The right to manifest religious belief 
 
It is in particular the right to manifest religious belief that calls for a more detailed 
discussion.
55
  Regarding the right to manifest religious belief, article 18(3) of the ICCPR 
provides for the regulation of the external freedom of the right to manifest religious 
belief. In terms of the external freedom, everyone has the right, either alone or in 
community with others, in public or private, to manifest his or her religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.
56
  Article 18 clearly contains a community 
aspect, namely ‗individually or in community with others‘.  Nevertheless, it remains an 
individual right, not a group right.
57
  Regarding the manifestation of religious belief, the 
ICCPR Human Rights Committee lists the following different forms of manifestation: 
The freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching 
encompasses a broad range of acts.  The concept of worship extends to ritual and 
ceremonial acts giving expression to belief, as well as various practices integral to such 
acts, including the building of places of worship and the use of ritual formulae and 
                                                          
53
 The ICCPR Human Rights Committee has observed that ―the freedom to ‗have or adopt a religion or 
belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including inter alia the right to replace 
one‘s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one‘s 
religion of belief.‖ -  ICCPR Human Rights Committee General Comment 22 paragraph 5. 
54
 Article 18(4) of the ICCPR. 
55
 For further reading on the protection of the right to freedom of religion and the right to manifest religious 
belief see N Lerner ‗The Nature and Minimum Standards of Freedom of Religion or Belief‘ in T Lindholm, 
WC Durham, BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 63 – 83. 
56
 Article 18(1) of the ICCPR. 
57
 The recognition of group rights is evident from the provisions of the African Charter, Article 27(2) 
provides for an indirect duty, in so far as it states that ‗the rights and freedoms of each individual shall be 
exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest‘. 
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objects, the display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest.  The 
observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but 
also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive 
clothing or headcoverings, participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life, 
and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group.
58
 
 
The external freedom, the manifestation of one‘s religion or belief, may only be subject 
to such limitations as a prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or moral or fundamental rights of others.
59
  The ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee accentuates that article 18(3) is to be ‗strictly interpreted‘60 and limitations 
may not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the right to freedom of religion.
61
  The 
grounds on which the right to freedom of religion may be limited also differs from others 
rights contained in the ICCPR,
62
 and are more limited than in other articles.
63
  Article 
18(3) is not inclusive of restrictions that are necessary for the protection of ‗public order 
(ordre public)‘ and ‗national security‘, and unlike other ICCPR provisions, restrictions 
under article 18 are only allowed if they are to protect the ‗fundamental‘ rights and 
freedoms of others‘.64  Consequently restrictions are not allowed on grounds not 
specified.  It is not clear whether ‗public‘ qualifies ‗order‘, ‗health‘ and ‗morals‘ even 
though the preferable point of view is that it should.
65
  Limitations may be applied for 
only those purposes for which they are prescribed and must be directly related and 
proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated.  Restrictions may not be 
imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner.
66
 
                                                          
58
 ICCPR Human Rights Committee General Comment 22 paragraph 4. 
59
 Article 18(3) of the ICCPR. 
60
 ICCPR Human Rights Committee General Comment 22 paragraph 8. 
61
 A Amor ‗Foreword By the United Nations Special Rapporteur of Religion or Belief‘ in T Lindholm, WC 
Durham, BG Tahzib-Lie (eds)  Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2001) xvi. 
62
 ED Malcolm ‗Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe‘ (1997) 223. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 TM Parker ‗Freedom to Manifest Religious beliefs; An Analysis of the Necessity Clauses of the ICCPR 
and the ECHR‘ (2007) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative & International law 91, 95. 
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When states, for example, seek to compel or prohibit the wearing of the Islamic 
headscarf-hijab the principles contained in article 18(3) will be central to the claim of the 
state.  Accordingly the state would have to show that the limitation is ‗prescribed by law‘ 
and is ‗necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others‘. In accordance with the interest rule any proposed 
limitation on religious liberty would have to meet a dual test: 
[T]he liberty limited would have to be uniformly limited with respect to all, or very 
nearly all, persons, regardless of faith, and the limitation would have to constitute ‗the 
least restrictive means‘ of achieving the interest.67 
Of particular relevance is the enquiry that the states‘ interest in preserving national 
security, order, health or some other value is not a manipulated as a mere ploy for the 
oppression of religious minorities.
68
  The limitation on the right to manifest religious 
belief through the wearing of the Islamic headscarf-hijab amongst other forms of 
manifestation will be discussed in more detail in section 6.2. 
 
In addition to the provisions protecting the right to freedom of religion in terms of article 
18, religious freedom is also protected in terms of other provisions in the ICCPR.  
Children‘s rights to religion are guaranteed under article 24,69 as well as in the non-
discrimination clause.
70
  The right to equal treatment and the prohibition of 
discrimination on the ground of religion is discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
                                                          
67
 A Nathan ‗A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious Liberty beyond the Border‘ (2000) 33(2) 
Cornell International Law Journal 47, 63. 
68
 Ibid 47, 63. 
69
 Article 24(1) of the ICCPR reads that: ‗Every child shall have, without discrimination as to race, color 
sex, language, religion, national and social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection 
as required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State‘. 
70
 Article 26 of the ICCPR. 
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4.3.2 The right to non-discrimination  
 
The right to non-discrimination in the ICCPR covers discrimination based on the ground 
of religion.
71
  Equality before the law, particularly important for religious discrimination 
cases, in a separate equality and non-discrimination guarantee is contained in article 26 
which states that: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
Religion is specifically mentioned as a ground for non-discrimination.  General Comment 
22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, places an emphasis on 
equality and non-discrimination.  Therefore, any limitation on the right to manifest 
religious belief is only permissible if it is not discriminatory.  The achievement of 
equality is often elusive as a result of the influence of the state or majority.  The dictates 
of equality towards religion and non religion alike requires that a particular viewpoint 
may not receive privileges or be valued as the official ideology in opposition to other 
religions or beliefs.  In practice actual neutrality vis-à-vis other religions is sparse
72
 and 
                                                          
71
 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR reads that: ‗Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status‘. 
72
 This is aptly illustrated by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Hoffmann v Austria 17 
EHRR 293 (1994) (ECtHR 255-C, 23 June 1993). This case clearly illustrates the prejudice of the Austrian 
Supreme Court against Jehovah‘s witnesses. Mrs. Hoffmann, originally of Roman Catholic belief, married 
to a Roman Catholic; subsequently joined the Jehovah‘s witnesses. Following the breakdown of her 
marriage, she left the matrimonial home, together with her two baptised Roman Catholic children. Both 
parents applied for custody. The Austrian Supreme Court reversed the lower courts grant of custody to the 
mother.  In motivation of this decision the Austrian Supreme Court referred to the religion of the mother 
and argued that in the event of her children in future needing a blood transfusion her total rejection of this 
treatment would not to be in the best interest of the children. The Austrian Supreme Court reached this 
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the elusive notions of state neutrality and uniformity are often indicative of a 
predisposition towards traditional religions. 
 
The effect of this predisposition is that the rights of adherents of non-traditional religions 
may be limited.  This limitation has a further consequence that the limitation is 
discriminatory on the basis of religion or belief in that the limitation only affects 
adherents of religious belief who are, for example, required to wear religious dress.  In 
addition the restriction could be discriminatory on the grounds of sex in that, for example 
in the case of religious dress only women are required to wear headscarves or only men 
are required to wear turbans. 
 
The right to non-discrimination is also entrenched in specific conventions such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
73
  In 
CEDAW gender equality is viewed in terms of substantive equality and not in terms of 
formal equality.
74
  Substantive equality is a departure of formal equality in terms of 
which likes are treated alike, while substantive equality is concerned that laws and 
practice do not diminish women‘s access to societal goods that in return may perpetuate 
discrimination.  It is contended that the application of substantive equality with regards to 
ensuring non-discrimination in relation to the right to manifest religious belief is 
particularly relevant. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
decision because of an event that may never occur.  The reasoning of the court appears to be favouring the 
dominant religion in Austria while at the same time discriminating against other religions, such as the 
Jehovah‘s witnesses.  Another area where state or majority religions regularly receive privileged treatment 
that may discriminate against members of other religions is the requirement of a public oath.  Similarly the 
refusal of minority religions the right to conscientious objection from military service may be indicative of 
the favouring of state or majority religions. 
73
 See section 4.5 above. 
74
 M Shivdas, &S Coleman Without Prejudice: CEDAW and the Determination of Women's Rights (2010) 5 
Regarding the different between substantive and formal equality see generally M Rosenfed ‗Substantive 
Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal‘ (1986) 74 California Law Review 1687. 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
The requirement for non-discrimination becomes even more precarious in light of the fact 
that states are influenced by the values of the dominant or majority religion and often 
may attempt to perpetuate these values and privileges even in the time of increasing 
religious diversity and multiculturalism.  It is further apparent that these permissible 
grounds of limitation may be deployed to give effect to other less legitimate concerns, 
such as for example the maintenance of privilege for the majority religion or the 
discrimination against religious minorities. 
 
4.3.3 The rights of religious minorities 
 
The right to freedom of religion in terms of the provisions contained in article 18 of the 
ICCPR provide solely for the protection of the individuals‘ right to freely belief and to 
manifest her religious belief.  As indicated previously
75
 it is premised that the right to 
freedom of religion, for many believers, does not only refer to their relationship with a 
religious deity, but that belief is central to all their activities as well as their capacity to 
relate in a meaningful manner to ‗their sense of themselves, their community and their 
universe‘.76  Therefore the individual makes sense of herself through her community; and 
the right to freedom of religion must also be appreciated in the light of the religious 
communities to which religious adherents belong.  The ICCPR does not provide for 
group rights but does make provision for the protection terms of the rights of religious 
minorities, as provided for in article 27of the ICCPR. 
 
In addition the ICCPR Human Rights Committee accepts the position that an official 
state religion is not per se a violation of article 18, but emphasises that such an official 
state religion ‗shall not result in the impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights 
under the ICCPR, including articles 18 and 27, nor in any discrimination against 
adherents to other religions or non-believers‘.77 
 
                                                          
75
 See section 3.7. 
76
 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) 36. 
77
 ICCPR Human Rights Committee General Comment 22 paragraph 9. 
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The rights of religious minorities are protected in terms of article 27 of the ICCPR which 
reads: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of 
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to 
use their own language. 
 
Article 27 determines that persons belonging to these minority groups shall not be 
deprived of their right to enjoy their own culture, acknowledge as well as practice their 
own religion, or use their own language.
78
  The actions of the majority indeed have the 
potential to negatively affect religious and ethno-religious groups.
79
  However, regardless 
of the protection entrenched in article 27 no successful claims have been brought by 
members of a minority under this provision.  This may be due to the narrow interpretation 
of what constitutes an ‗ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority‘ as well as the fact that 
minority rights may only be claimed in the collective context.
80
 
 
Regarding the rights of religious minorities, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has 
issued General Comment 23.  To this day article 27 of the ICCPR remains the only 
                                                          
78
 Dickson (note 44 above) 341, 341. 
79
 N Lerner ‗Proselytism, Change of Religion, and International Human Rights‘ (1998) 12 Emory 
International Law Review 477, 534. 
80
 B Meyler ‗Religion and Morality in The Public Square: The Limits Of Group Rights: Religious 
Institutions And Religious Minorities in International Law‘ (2007) 22 St. John's Journal of Legal 
Commentary 535,548.  Regarding the scrutiny of a limitation imposed on article 27 rights, see the Siracusa 
Principles (United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4 
(1985) Principle 10 lays down the following criteria to determine the ‗necessity‘ of a limitation on article 
27.  First, the limitation must be based on one of the grounds justifying limitations recognised by the 
relevant article of the ICCPR. Second, it must respond to a pressing public or social need. Thirdly, it must 
pursue a legitimate aim, and lastly must be proportionate to that aim.  In addition, Principle 11 requires that 
any assessment to determine the necessity of a limitation shall be made on objective considerations and in 
contemplation of the least restrictive means of achieving the purpose. 
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universally applicable norm concerning minority identity.  At the time of its drafting a 
cautious view of minority identity was taken, and it was formulated as a negative right in 
terms of which the state undertakes to refrain from interfering with the existence of 
minimum attributes of minority identity, namely to enjoy their own culture or to profess 
and practice their own religion. 
 
This minimalistic and negative approach to toleration of minorities has been adapted with 
a move from toleration to promotion of the rights of minorities.  The ICCPR Human 
Rights Committee, has considerable broadened the obligation contained in article 27: 
6.1 Although article 27 is expressed in negative terms, that article, nevertheless, does 
recognize the existence of a ‗right‘ and requires that it shall not be denied.  Consequently, 
a State party is under an obligation to ensure that the existence and the exercise of this 
right are protected against their denial or violation.  Positive measures of protection are, 
therefore required not only against the acts of the State party itself, whether through its 
legislative, judicial or administrative authorities, but also against the acts of other persons 
within the State Party. 
6.2 Although the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, they depend in 
turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture, language or religion.  
Accordingly, positive measures by States may also be necessary to protect the identity of 
a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language 
and to practice their religion, in community with other members of the group ...
81
 
 
In this manner the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has placed a proactive obligation on 
state parties to ensure the maintenance of religious identities.  What is required is a 
positive form of toleration in which the state is obligated to stimulate an environment in 
which believers may fully express their religious identities and the state is committed to 
proactively supporting their religious development.  This supportive environment 
                                                          
81
 ICCPR Human Rights Committee, ICCPR General Comment 23 paragraphs 1 and 6. 
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requires that religious believers may effectively and fully participate in the democratic 
decision making processes.
82
 
 
The adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
83
 has improved the recognition of the rights 
contained in article 27.
84
  This 1992 Declaration is one of the core guidelines with regard 
to the protection of the right of minorities
85
 and recognises the rights of minorities and 
includes the protection of their existence and identity as well the promotion of group 
religious identity.
86
 However, as the rights are only acknowledged in the form of a 
declaration, the unwillingness of the organised international community to recognise 
group rights is apparent.
87
 
 
It is contended that through complying with the above guidelines that require promotion 
of the group‘s religious identity, the state may create an environment in which believers 
may fully express their religious identity and in which the right to manifest religious 
belief is most extensively protected as will be shown in more detail in 8.4 and 8.5. 
 
 
 
                                                          
82M Weller ‗Article 15‘ in M Weller (ed) The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary of the European 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Oxford Commentaries on International 
Law) (2005) 429, 432. 
83
 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, Proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 47/135 of 18 December 
1992 (hereinafter the 1992 Minorities Declaration). 
84
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86
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4.4 Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981 Declaration) 
 
In addition to the International Bill of Rights, the 1981 Declaration
88
 is the only other 
international instrument focused exclusively on matters of religion or belief.  The 1981 
Declaration, although not binding, is currently the most important global instrument 
concerning the protection of the right to freedom of religion and consequently for the 
right to manifest religious belief, as this instrument creates an unquestionable moral 
obligation, provide practical guidance to states and lays down norms of conduct.
89
 
 
It is interesting to note that the controversial nature of the right to freedom of religion was 
apparent even before the adoption of the ICCPR. During 1960 the UNGA passed a 
resolution calling for the preparation of a draft declaration and a draft convention on the 
elimination of religious intolerance.
90
  At the same time a draft declaration
91
 and draft 
convention
92
 on the elimination of racial discrimination were advanced.  However, it took 
                                                          
88
 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief (1981) proclaimed by GA Res.36/55 of 25 November 1981, UN Doc. A/36/51 (1982). 
89
 For a comprehensive discussion of the 1981 Declaration, see N Lerner ‗Religious Human Rights under 
the United Nations‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global 
Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 114-127.  
90
 In 1960 Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities A Krishnaswami of India initiated work on a study relating to discrimination in the matter of 
religious rights and practices.  Following the Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and 
Practices, (E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1), the UNGA in 1962 adopted a resolution requesting the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) to require the Commission to prepare a draft declaration 
and a draft convention on the elimination of racial discrimination, as well as a draft declaration and a draft 
convention on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance. 
91
 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, proclaimed by the UNGA 
resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963. 
92
 International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) (New York, 21 
December 1965) entered into force on 4 January 1969, 660 UNTS 195. 
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19 years before the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination based on Religion could be adopted.
93
 
 
The 1981 Declaration acknowledges in particular the importance of religion or belief as 
one of the fundamental elements in the conception of a person‘s life and confirms the 
essential need to promote understanding, tolerance and respect in matters relating to 
freedom of religion and belief.  In addition, the preamble acknowledges the contribution 
that the right to freedom of religion should make in the elimination of ideologies or 
practices of colonialism and racial discrimination.  
Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration provides for the right to freedom of religion as follows: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  This 
right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion 
or belief of his choice.  
3. Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals 
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
 
This protection of the right to freedom of religion is similar to article 18 of the UDHR. 
However, the right to change a religion is not specifically provided for. The 1981 
Declaration follows the same approach as the ICCPR in drawing a distinction between 
the forum internum and forum externum rights.  The external manifestations include the 
worship, observance, practice and teaching.  The right to manifest religious belief too is 
similar to the limitations as provided for in article 18(3) of the ICCPR.  The right to 
freedom of religion may be limited if such limitations are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, as well as the fundamental 
rights of others. In particular the ambiguity of the concept ‗morals‘ and ‗fundamental 
rights of others‘ as a basis for limitation is yet again problematic due to the close nexus to 
                                                          
93
 N Lerner Religion, secular beliefs and human rights: 25 years after the 1981 Declaration (2006) 47. 
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freedom of religion or belief.
94
  Firstly, the limitation based on public morals may be 
exploited to confront the principles on which the 1981 Declaration is based through 
attacks on the expression of beliefs and practices that diverge from the norm or 
dominant.
95
  The limitation based on fundamental rights and freedoms of others is found 
to be problematic because the phrase ‗fundamental rights‘ appears only in paragraph 1(3) 
which arguably narrows the range of human rights that will serve as a legitimate bases for 
restrictions to include only those human rights considered to be ‗fundamental‘.96 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the term ‗fundamental‘ in implying a hierarchical 
relationship between fundamental rights and other rights can be deceptive.
97
  The terms 
‗fundamental rights‘ and ‗human rights‘ are also used interchangeably in both 
international and regional human rights instruments.
98
 
 
It has been suggested that certain manifestations of religion or belief are ‗so obviously 
contrary to morality, public order, or the general welfare that public authorities are 
always entitled to limit them or even to prohibit them altogether‘.99  Rituals such as self-
immolation, self mutilation, as well as human sacrifice, prostitution and slavery may be 
limited without amounting to discrimination as the offenders are ‗founded in the superior 
interests of society‘.100  Restriction of practices such as human sacrifice should be based 
upon the rights and freedom of others, rather than ‗superior interest of society‘ because, 
‗superior interest of society‘ wrongfully assumes that diverse groups in society follow 
one value system.
101
 
                                                          
94
 DJ Sullivan „Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination‘ (1988) 82 American Journal 
of International law 487, 496. 
95
 See generally N Lerner Religion, Secular beliefs and Human Rights: 25 years after the 1981 Declaration 
(2006). 
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 Sullivan (note 94 above) 487, 497. 
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The protection afforded to the right to freedom of religion in article 1 is enhanced by the 
provisions of article 2 dealing with non-discrimination.
102
  In addition to prohibiting 
discrimination based on the grounds of religion or belief, article 2 goes a step further to 
adopt the language of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD).
103
  In terms of CERD ‗intolerance and discrimination 
based on religion or belief‘ is generally defined as ‗any distinction, exclusion, restriction 
or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect 
nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis‘.104 This is said to include intentional or 
unintentional and public or private acts of discrimination.
105
  While article 2(2) speaks of 
both ‗intolerance and discrimination‘, article 4(2) alludes to of a difference between the 
two terms in the call for legislative action to proscribe discrimination while urging states 
to take all ‗appropriate measures‘ to fight intolerance.106  Intolerance is recognised as the 
attitudes that may motivate the violation of religious freedom or of discrimination, but is 
not a particular type of such violations.
107
 
 
The 1981 Declaration expressly broadens the duties of the state parties in a significant 
manner.
108
  When reading articles 2(1),
109
 articles 4
110
 and 7
111
 concurrently, it is evident 
                                                          
102
 Article 2 states that: ‗1. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of 
persons, or person on grounds of religion or other beliefs. 
2. For the purpose of the present Declaration, the expression ―intolerance and discrimination based on 
religion or belief‖, means any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on religion or belief 
and having as its purpose or effect the nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment ore 
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a equal basis‘. 
103
 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by 
UNGA resolution 2106 A (XX) of 21 December 1965 and entered into force on 4 January 1969.  Discussed 
in more detail in section 4.5. 
104
 Nathan (note 67 above) 47. 
105
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 Sullivan (note 94 above) 503. 
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 Ibid 505. 
108
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that national laws aimed at protecting an individual against religious discrimination even 
when practiced by another person must be enacted.
112
  This shows a bold move to ensure 
that countries prohibit discrimination not only the hands of the state but also from a 
private individuals as well.
113
  This step was not taken in either CERD or CEDAW.
114
 
 
In addition in States that have both accepted the 1981 Declaration and have ratified the 
ICCPR, the Declaration has a binding effect as article 3 of the Declaration reads that 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity 
and a disavowal of the principles of the UN Charter, UDHR, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR.
115
 
 
4.5 Other international instruments 
 
Notwithstanding these seminal instruments, the right to freedom of religion is further 
protected in terms of the provisions of other international instruments, which although 
directed towards the protection of other specific rights, refer to religious rights.  To list 
                                                                                                                                                                             
109
 Article 2(1) of the 1981 Declaration states that: ‗No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, 
institution, group of persons or person on the grounds of religion or belief‘. 
110
 Article 4(1) and (2) of the 1981 Declaration states that: ‗(1) All States shall take effective measures to 
prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in recognition, exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and 
cultural life. 
(2) All States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such 
discrimination, and to take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or 
other beliefs in this matter‘. 
111
 Article 7 of the 1981 Declaration states that: ‗The rights and freedoms set forth in the present 
Declaration shall be accorded in national legislation in such a manner that everyone shall be able to avail 
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112
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113
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114
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but a few:  The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
116
 which 
defines genocide as prohibited conduct committed with ‗the intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such‘.117  CERD refers to 
discrimination based on ethnic origin in article 1(1) and defines racial discrimination 
inclusive of discrimination based on ethnic origin, which can include a religious 
element.
118
  The interrelation between religion and ethnicity was also drawn in section 
1.3.  Though most texts on race made no specific mention to specific religious rights, 
CERD provides guidelines to the rules on discrimination with religion being inclusive as 
a ground on which discrimination is prohibited.
119
  Article 4 deals with the prohibition of 
racial discrimination, incitement and hatred and has gone a step further than article 20(2) 
of the ICCPR to prohibit incitement to discrimination, hostility or hatred on religious 
grounds.
120
 
 
As mentioned previously, important for women are the provisions of CEDAW and its 
Optional Protocol.
121
  The Optional Protocol allows individuals whose countries are party 
to CEDAW and the protocol, who claim their rights under CEDAW have been violated, 
and who have exhausted all local remedies, to submit written communications to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to enforce 
their rights. 
 
                                                          
116
 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, approved and proposed for signature, 
ratification or accession by UNGA, resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948.  Entered into force on 12 
January 1951. 
117
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Significant for children and their religious upbringing is the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child
122
 (CRC)
 
which considers that the child should be fully prepared to life and 
individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the 
Charter of the UN, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, 
equality and solidarity.
123
 
 
For the purposes of the CRC a child means every human being below the age of eighteen 
years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.
124
  
Importantly article 2 guarantees non-discrimination on a list of grounds, including non-
discrimination on the ground of religious freedom.
125
  The right to freedom of religion is 
guaranteed in article 14.
126
  The article provides that ‗states shall respect the right of the 
child to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as the rights and duties of 
the parents or legal guardians to provide protection to the child in the exercise of his or 
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 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted for signature, ratification and accession by UNGA 
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123
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capacities of the child. 
(3) Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or beliefs may be subject to only such limitations as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary to protect the public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others‘. 
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her rights‘.127  However, the right of the parent to provide direction is curtailed in relation 
to the recognition of this right in other instruments in that the CRC appears to recognise 
to a greater extent the ability of the child to make his or her own fundamental decisions 
and choices.
128
  Regarding the religious rights of minority children, article 30 provides 
for the protection of the ethnic, religious or linguistic child or a child of an indigenous 
origin to enjoy in community with other his or her own culture, to profess his or her own 
religion, or to use his or her own language. In addition to the above rights, children have 
a right to education as well in terms of article 28.
129
  This right to education includes the 
right of adults to educate their children in accordance with the dictates of their belief
130
 as 
well as the rights of the child to enjoy her own culture, to profess and practise her own 
religion, or to use her own language.
131
 
 
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families
132
 is inspired by the provisions of article 27 of the ICCPR.
133
  
Persons belonging to minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture and ‗to profess 
                                                          
127
 Lerner (note 79 above) 537. 
128
 Article 12 of the CRC. 
129
 The CRC has been ratified by all states but for the United States of America and Somalia. The 
foundation of the CRC is that the ‗best interest‘ of the child should be the ‗primary consideration‘ in all 
matters concerning a child. In June 2004, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UN Doc 
CRC/C/15/Add 240 paragraph 25-26 (30 June 2004)) specifically discussed the French restriction on the 
headscarf -hijab in terms of the French Law of 2004, observing the concern as follows: ‗However, in the 
light of Article 14 and 29 of the Convention, the Committee is concerned by the alleged rise in 
discrimination, including that based on religion. The Committee is also concerned that the new legislation 
(Law No 2004 – 228 of 15 March 2004) on wearing religious symbols and clothing in public schools may 
be counterproductive, be neglecting the principle of the best interest of the child and the right of the child to 
access to education, and not achieve the expected results‘. 
130
 Article 18(4) of the ICCPR. 
131
 Article 27 of the ICCPR. 
132
 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
G.A. Res. 158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (1990). The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities is also inspired by the provisions of article 27 
133
 Article 27 of the ICCPR reads that: ‗Everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits‘. 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
and practice their own religion … ‗without interference or any form of discrimination‘ as 
provided for in article 2.  This Convention contains a non-discrimination provision
134
 
which specifically mentions ‗religion or conviction‘ as one of the possible grounds for 
discrimination. 
 
The right to freedom of religion as provided for in article 12 reads as follows: 
(1) Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.  This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of their choice and freedom either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private to manifest their religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching. 
(2) Migrant workers and members of their families shall not be subject to coercion that 
would impair their freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of their choice. 
 
This article also mentions the issue regarding the limitation on the right to freedom of 
religion by stating that the freedom ‗may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, and the rights of parents to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions‘.135 
 
The above discussion constitutes a brief overview of other international instruments 
directed towards the protection of other specific rights and vulnerable groups that may 
indirectly have an impact on the right to freedom of religion.  It is argued that in the light 
of the fact that these instruments are directed towards other specific rights they merely 
serve as an indication of the interrelated nature of human rights in general and the right to 
freedom of religion in particular.  The protection afforded in terms of the core legal text, 
the ICCPR, regarding the protection of the right to manifest religious belief, remains the 
most effective.  For this reason the above brief overview of other international 
                                                          
134
 Article 7 of the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families. 
135
 Lerner (note 79 above) 477, 535. 
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instruments, which may have an impact on the right to freedom of religion is considered 
adequate. 
 
4.6 Other UN resolutions and related activities  
 
The core legal instruments aimed at the protection of the right to freedom of religion (the 
ICCPR, and the 1981 Declaration) have not been able to bring to an end the harm caused 
to humankind as a result of the disregard of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief, as clearly shown previously.
136
  Therefore the UN continues to 
emphasise the need to ensure comprehensive protection for the right to freedom of 
religion through various activities as illustrated by the discussion below. 
 
The continued inability to eliminate religious intolerance was confirmed in the 
condemnation expressed by the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights
137
 in 
response to the alarming report of Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance Angelo 
Vidal d‘ Almeida Riberio.138  Following this call to governments to take measures to 
comply with their international obligations to counter intolerance based on religion or 
belief, the UNGA adopted a Resolution on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious 
Intolerance.
139
  This Resolution affirms the fact that the existing principles of non-
                                                          
136
 See section 1.1. 
137
 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights 
in Vienna on 25 June 1993 states in paragraph 5 that: ‗All human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interrelated.... While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural 
and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of the states, regardless of their political, 
economical or cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms‘. While 
paragraph 22 calls upon governments to take measure to comply with their international obligations to 
counter intolerance based on religion or belief. 
138
 The Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance for the period 1986 – 1993. The title of the Special 
Rapporteur is as from 2000 the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief.  The role of the 
Special Rapporteur is discussed in more detail in section 4.7.2 below. 
139
 ‗Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance‘ A/RES/48/128, December 1993.  
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discrimination and equality as well as the entrenched right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion or belief have not resulted in the extensive protection of the right to 
freedom of religion.  The Resolution is a further effort to promote and protect the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief and to eliminate all forms of hatred 
and intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief. 
 
This continued inability to reduce religious intolerance and eradicate discrimination was 
once again the focus of attention in September 2001, when the international community 
met in Durban, South Africa for the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.  The Durban Declaration and 
Programme of Action
140
 dealt with racism in many forms, but included sections on 
religious intolerance.  The importance of religion, spirituality and belief was 
acknowledged and the contribution of religion to the inherent dignity of individuals 
affirmed in the declaration that: 
We recognize that religion, spirituality and belief play a central role in the lives of 
millions of women and men, and in the way they live and treat other persons. Religion, 
spirituality and belief may and can contribute to the promotion of the inherent dignity and 
worth of the human person and to the eradication of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance. 
 
The continued existence of political and legal structures that do not incorporate multi-
ethnic, pluricultural and plurilingual characteristics was questioned.
141
  Religious 
intolerance, and in particular the existence anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, were 
recognised.
142
  Attempts to restrict the expression of religious identity amongst women of 
                                                          
140
 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban, SA, from 31 August to 8 September 
2001 (Hereinafter called the Durban Declaration). 
141
 Paragraph 22 of the Durban Declaration reads: ‗We express our concern that in some States political and 
legal structures or institutions, some of which were inherited and persist today, do not correspond to the 
multi-ethnic, pluricultural and plurilingual characteristics of the population and, in many cases, constitute 
an important factor of discrimination in the exclusion of indigenous peoples‘. 
142
 Paragraphs 59, 60 and 61 of the Durban Declaration. 
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certain faiths was condemned
143
 and states were urged to ‗promote respect for the values 
of diversity, pluralism, tolerance, mutual respect, cultural sensitivity, integration and 
inclusiveness‘144 and to develop multiracial and multicultural societies in which people of 
different socially constructed races, colours, descent, national or ethnic origins, religions 
and languages may live together harmoniously.
145
 
 
In the follow-up to the Durban Declaration the UNGA adopted Resolution 61/149
146
 in 
2006 in which the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, acknowledged 
yet again the increase in anti-Semitism, Christianophobia and Islamophobia in various 
parts of the world. 
 
The call to acknowledge diversity and nurture tolerance, allowing for people of different 
religions to life together in harmony was once again accentuated at the 64th UNGA 
meeting.
147
  At this UNGA meeting the then Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 
or Belief, Asma Jahangir, expressed concern that, on the one hand, many believers are 
prevented from identifying themselves through the display of religious symbols (such as 
head coverings) and, on the other, that people in different countries are required to 
publicly display those religious symbols.  She noted that some restrictions and violations 
were more prevalent in particular regions or countries, and that among them were 
restrictions posed on different forms of religious expression. 
 
                                                          
143
 Paragraph 71 of the Durban Declaration reads: ‗We deplore attempts to oblige women belonging to 
certain faiths and religious minorities to forego their cultural and religious identity, or to restrict their 
legitimate expression, or to discriminate against them with regard to opportunities for education and 
employment‘. 
144
 Paragraph 126 of the Durban Declaration. 
145
 Paragraph 171 of the Durban Declaration. 
146
 Resolution 61/149 Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia 
and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration 
and Programme of Action A/RES/61/149 - 81st plenary meeting - 19 December 2006. 
147
 64
th
 UNGA Third Committee 26th & 27th Meetings (AM & PM) Third Committee hears Presentations 
23 October 2009 UNGA GA/SHC/3958. 
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In light of the above concerns it is apparent that the right to freedom of religion is 
constantly threatened by incidences of discrimination and intolerance.  This 
discrimination and intolerance is particularly visible when it comes to limiting or 
prohibition of the right to manifest religious belief through the display of religious dress, 
such as the Islamic headscarf-hijab.  Therefore an examination of the monitoring 
mechanisms of the international legal instruments is warranted and will be discussed 
next. 
 
4.7 Monitoring mechanisms 
 
4.7.1 The ICCPR Human Rights Committee  
 
A common method of treaty monitoring within the UN is the creation of a standing 
committee or so-called treaty body
148
 to monitor states parties‘ performance, and to 
which state parties are required to submit periodic reports on compliance.  The ICCPR 
Human Rights Committee
149
 is an independent body charged with monitoring the 
implementation of the ICCPR. 
 
                                                          
148
 The UN human rights monitoring arrangement consists of charter based bodies, whose creation is 
mandated by the Charter of the UN, such as the Human Rights Council (formerly the Commission on 
Human Rights). For a general overview of the charter based bodies see Steiner (note 5 above) 737 onwards. 
It can be said that the most important contribution of the charter-based bodies, has been the ever increasing 
body of standards designed to flesh out the meaning of the norms encapsulated in the UDHR. In addition to 
the so-called charter based bodies, are also treaty bodies, such as the ICCPR Human Rights Committee 
founded under the ICCPR. 
149
 The ICCPR Human Rights Committee is established in terms of article 28. The ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee is one of several treaty bodies functioning under the various UN human rights treaties. The 
other bodies include amongst others: The Committee against Torture; the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights; the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Committee on the Rights of the Child; and the Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
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One of the tasks of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee is to accept individual 
communications in terms of the Optional Protocol.
150
  The Optional Protocol on the 
ICCPR allows individuals from countries which are party to the ICCPR and the protocol 
who claim that their rights have been violated, and who have exhausted all local 
remedies, to submit written communication to the ICCPR Human Rights Committee.  
The ICCPR Human Rights Committee may then investigate, and mediate these 
complaints.
151
  These individual communications are aimed at establishing whether States 
Parties have breached its treaty obligations and is not aimed at providing relief to 
individuals.  The possibility for individual complaints at international level therefore does 
in no way mirror a judicial process or remedy under domestic legal systems. 
 
Another important role of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee is the examination of 
state reports as set out in article 40 of the ICCPR.  States have a mandatory obligation to 
submit reports on the measures they have adopted to give effect to the rights contained in 
the ICCPR within one year of their ratification of the ICCPR and thereafter whenever the 
Committee so requests.  Since 1992 the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has made 
available collective opinions through concluding observations, which may include 
recommendations on the review of domestic legislation.  This process requires countries 
to consult with the ICCPR Human Rights Committee and have their human rights 
                                                          
150
  Danchin reports that in the period from 1976 to 1995 there were fourteen communications alleging 
violations of article 18, coming from the following five states: Finland, the Netherlands, Canada, Germany 
and Colombia. The ICCPR Human Rights Committee declared nine of these inadmissible and in none of 
the remaining five did the Committee find a violation of article 18.  Danchin therefore concludes that the 
ICCPR Human Rights Committee‘s interpretation of article 18 has been restrictive.   However since 1995 
the position has changed in that there has been a marked increase in communications.  These and other 
communications will be discussed in more detail in section 6.2.  See generally PG Danchin ‗US 
Unilateralism and International Protection of Religious Freedom:  The Multilateral Alternative‘ (2002 -
2003) 41Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 33, 93 onwards. 
151
 As at 1 June 2010, 113 of the 165 states adhering to the ICCPR had ratified this optional provision.  The 
goals of the procedure are said to (a) enable the Committee to identify steps that States should take to 
comply with their international legal obligations in the context of concrete individual situations; (b) to offer 
individual relief to victims of human right violations; and (c) to stimulate general legal, policy and 
programme change. 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
problems exposed.  The reporting procedure may be useful in encouraging countries to 
identify their problems and to devise methods of dealing with these.  It must be 
mentioned that states have a tendency to provide the best available account of the 
situation of their country.  In addition, a state may simply assert that cited domestic 
legislation meets its obligations.  The ICCPR Rights Committee has emphasised that 
states should focus on the ‗practical application‘ of the ICCPR within their jurisdiction.152  
In addition the ICCPR Human Rights Committee may provide interpretative comments 
on provisions in the ICCPR.
153
  At the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, where an 
emphasis is placed on fact finding and reporting, clearly fulfils an important supervisory 
role over the compliance by individual states of the provisions of the ICCPR.  However, 
in light of states reluctance to draw attention to their shortcomings the role of the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief is called for. 
 
4.7.2 The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 
 
The then Commission on Human Rights (now called the Human Rights Council)
154
 has 
since its inception been actively involved in efforts to promote and protect the right to 
freedom of religion or belief.  At first the Commission was involved in the formulation of 
the text of what was to become article 18 of the ICCPR, which was followed by the 
elaboration of this right in the adoption of the 1981 Declaration.  Of particular 
importance was the decision of the Commission in 1986
155
 to appoint a Special 
                                                          
152
 The full text of amended guidelines for state reports (which are not binding) is included in UN Doc. 
A/56/40 vol.1 (2001), Annex.IIIA. 
153
 Regarding the protection of the right to freedom of religion the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has 
issued General Comment 22.  See discussion on General Comment 22 in section 4.3 above. 
154
 In 2006 the longstanding UN Human Rights Commission was replaced by a new Human Rights 
Council.  The Human Rights Council consists of 47 members, elected directly and individually by the 
UNGA with membership based on equitable geographic distribution. Council members serve terms of three 
years, with a limitation of no more than two consecutive terms.  See generally O Hoehne ‗Special 
Procedures for the New Human Rights Council – A Need for Strategic Positioning‘ (2007) 4 (1) Essex 
Human Rights Review 48. 
155
 By way of Resolution 1986/20 of 10 March 1986. 
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Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, now referred to as the Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief.
156
 Special Rapporteurs are tasked primarily at examining 
either particular themes or the activities of particular states.
157
  The Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief is
 
tasked with reporting annually on the mandate to 
implement the 1981 Declaration.  The Human Rights Council meets annually to hear 
reports from the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and to make 
recommendations if necessary to implement the 1981 Declaration. 
 
The task of the Special Rapporteur is to ‗examine incidents and governmental action 
inconsistent with the provisions of the 1981 Declaration, and to recommend remedial 
measures for such situations‘.158  The responses of the states concerned, together with the 
communications are included in the annual reports submitted to the Human Rights 
Council. Another practice of the Special Rapporteur is the so called in situ visits with the 
consent of the state concerned, which has been in practice since 1994.
159
  In addition 
                                                          
156
 In March – April 2001, by Resolution 2000/33, the Commission on Human Rights changed the title of 
the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion and Belief that came into effect on 20 April 2000.  Since 1986 the Commission has heard annual 
reports by three Special Rapporteurs: Mr Angelo d‘Almeida Ribeiro (Portugal) for 1986–93; Mr 
Abdelfattah Amor (Tunisia) from 1993-2004 and Ms Asma Jahangir (Pakistan) from 2004 till June 2010.  
As from 1 August 2010 Mr. Heiner Bielefeldt assumed the responsibility of Special Rapporteur. 
157
 For a discussion of Special Rapporteurs and their relationship with the Commission on Human Rights 
see T van Boven, 'The United Nations Commission on Human Rights and Freedom of Religion or Belief' in 
T Lindholm WC Durham, BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief. A Deskbook 
(2004) 173, 174-5, 177-9 and 183-5. 
158
 CHR Res. 1986/20, 42 UN ESCOR (no2) at 66, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/65 (1986). 
159
 The following state visits have taken place: China (November 1994), Pakistan (June 1995), Iran 
(December 1995), Greece (June 1996), Sudan (September 1996), India (December 1996), Australia 
(February 1997), Germany (September 1997), USA (January 1998), Vietnam (October 1998), Turkey 
(December 1999), Bangladesh (May 2000), Argentina (April 2001), Algeria (September 2002), Georgia 
(August/September 2003), Romania (September 2003), Nigeria (February/March 2005), Sri Lanka (May 
2005), France (September 2005), Azerbaijan (February/March 2006), Maldives (August 2006), Tajikistan 
(February/March 2007), United Kingdom (June 2007), Angola (November 2007), Israel and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (January 2008), India (March 2008), Turkmenistan (September 2008), The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (April 2009), the Republic of Serbia, including a visit to Kosovo 
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countries who have received in situ visits should be encouraged to comment in more 
detail on the reports following such visits.
160
  Since 1994 the Special Rapporteur has also 
been tasked with submitting interim reports to the UNGA.  It is contended that the limited 
accountability of states to the Special Rapporteur results in the function of the Special 
Rapporteur being limited to dialogue with countries under enquiry. 
 
The role of the Special Rapporteur is crucial for the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief, is so far as this person may deal with issues relating to freedom of 
religion and non-discrimination, even in states which have not ratified the relevant 
treaties.
161
  It has been suggested that the role of the Special Rapporteur ought to be 
enhanced and that the Human Rights Council should pay more consideration to the 
reports of the Special Rapporteur at its session.
162
 
 
The previous Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir, in 
her last report to the Human Rights Council
163
 emphasised that prevention is the key for 
creating an atmosphere of religious tolerance.  The structure of the state, its method of 
governance and commitment to fundamental human rights are central in creating 
religious harmony. In the 21
st
 century, an increase of intolerance and discrimination on 
grounds of religion or belief is stimulating a search to find solutions to these problems.  
However, until freedom of religion achieves treaty-based convention status this solution 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(April/May 2009) and Lao People‘s Democratic Republic (November 2009).  Available from 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/religion/visits.htm> last accessed on 5 May 2010 
160
 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report by the Working Group on 
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights, 16 February 2000, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/112, 56
th
 Session, paragraph, 30 (2000). 
161
 T van Boven (see note 157) 187. 
162
 Ibid 173, 187. 
163
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir A/HRC/13/40 - 
General Assembly 21 December 2009. 
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will be elusive within the international domain and the UN human rights system will be 
incomplete.
164
 
 
Consequently the protection of the right to manifest religious belief is reliant upon other 
systems as well.  Other than being party to one of the aforementioned international 
human right instruments, states may be party to a number of regional human right 
instruments.
165
  Regional arrangements supplement the UN system by promoting and 
protecting human rights on specific continents that have been acceded to.  Regional 
human rights instruments, in some cases, are a bridge between international and national 
human rights instruments on freedom of religion or belief. 
 
4.8 Regional level 
 
Regional measures compliment the UN system by promoting and protecting human rights 
in particular parts of the world.  In this section the three principal regions, Europe, the 
Americas, and Africa, which have their own declarations and conventions for the 
protection of human rights will be discussed. 
 
                                                          
164
 The past and present controversy around religion made the reaching of a specific UN Convention 
pertaining to the protection of the right to freedom of religion unattainable. Consequently the UNGA 
adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on 
Religion or Belief. Implementation of the 1981 Declaration is reviewed by the Special Rapporteur. For 
further suggestions on the strengthening of the role of the Special Rapporteur see C Evans ‗Strengthening 
the Role of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief‘ (2006) 1 Religion and Human Rights 
75-96. 
165
 The 28
th
 Report to the Commission to study the Organization of Peace as referred to in Steiner (note 5 
above) 925, lists the following advantages of regional human rights regime in favour of the international 
regime: (1) the existence of geographical, historical and cultural bonds, (2) the regional organisation may 
often be met by less resistance than an international body, (3) publicity of human rights may be wider and 
more effective , and (4) a general compromise is less probable. 
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The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights ensure the promotion and protection of human rights in 
Europe, the Americas and Africa, respectively.  This chapter also examines the regional 
integration of the European Union, and studies the initiatives of the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), regarding the protection of the right to 
freedom of religion.  These regional systems and the respective provisions protecting the 
right to freedom of religion in terms of these regional instruments will be dealt with next. 
 
4.8.1 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms  
 
In 1950, the then newly formed Council of Europe
166
 created the ECHR
167
 including 
standard civil and political rights similar to those contained in the UDHR.  Over the 
years, the ECHR has been supplemented by a series of protocols that serve as 
amendments to the ECHR for members who are signatories to each protocol.  Social 
                                                          
166
 The Council of Europe was established in 1949 by a group of ten states, primarily to promote 
democracy, the rule of law and greater unity among the nations of Western Europe.  Until 1990 the Council 
of Europe had 23 members and today has 47 members, namely: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The 
Former Yugoslav Republic, Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.  Available 
at <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10458.htm>  
last accessed on 08 May 2010. 
167
 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was adopted 
by the Council of Europe on 4 November 1950 in Rome, and entered into force on 3 September 1953.  
Regarding the implementation of the ECHR see generally C Ovey & RCA White The European 
Convention on Human Rights (2002); P van Dijk & GJH van Hoof Theory and practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, (1998); M Boyle, DJ Harris & C Warbrick Law of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (1995). 
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rights, however, were excluded and addressed in a separate document, called the 
European Social Charter.
168
  The ECHR provides for legally enforceable rights via the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Both individual petitions
169
 and interstate 
complaints are provided for. 
 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is recognised in article 9 of the 
ECHR which reads: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, this right 
included the right to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.  
 
Article 14 enshrines the principle of equality and prohibits discrimination based on 
religious grounds.
170
  The right of parents to choose the religious or ideological 
orientation of their children‘s education is protected in article 2 of the 1st Optional 
Protocol.
171
 
                                                          
168
 The European Social Charter was adopted by the Council of Europe on 18 October 1961, in Turin, Italy 
and entered into force on 26 February 1965. The European Social Charter reflects the socio-economic 
rights of those state parties of the Council of Europe which have ratified the European Social Charter. 
169
 Article 34 of the ECHR. 
170
 Article 14 of the ECHR ensures that ‗the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status‘. 
171
 When the ECHR was adopted in 1950 there were several proposals on which final agreement could not 
be reached.  It was therefore agreed to adopt Protocols containing additional provisions.  To date fifteen 
protocols have been opened for signature. 
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The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on matters pertaining to the right to freedom of religion 
is underdeveloped.
172
  It was only with the historical case of Kokkinakis v Greece
173
 in 
which the ECtHR held that a state‘s conduct violated article 9. 
Within the European framework, the practice of the ECtHR as well as the former 
European Commission on Human Rights provides the structure for evaluating European 
standards in terms of the ECHR.  In 1998, the Commission was abolished and the role of 
the Court expanded.
174
  Citizens from the participating countries with human rights 
                                                          
172
 The first matter to be brought to the ECtHR relating to religious freedom was in 1993. In the following 
ten years the ECtHR declared only four admissible cases relating to article 9 challenges in which only two 
cases were found to violate article 9. In this regard see J Gunn ‗Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under 
the European Convention on Human Rights‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human 
Rights in a Global Perspective (1996) 305, 309- 310. 
173
 Kokkinakis v Greece 17 EHRR 397 (1994) (ECtHR 260 A, 25 May 1993). The case involved the 
criminal conviction of a Jehovah ‘s Witness for proselytism. 
174Van Dijk and van Hoof  described that the ECtHR acts as a ‗constitutional court‘ interpreting the ECHR 
and is located in Strasbourg, France where it began its activities in 1952. Since 1 November 1998 
individuals have the right of direct access to the court. Before 1998, individuals were permitted to file an 
application before the European Commission of Human Rights, alleging an infringement. The Commission 
decided on the issue of admissibility of the complaint to the European Court. Since the abolishment of the 
European Commission of Human Rights in 1998 in terms of Protocol 11, the European Commission no 
longer acts as a filter, deciding which cases deserved an examination by the ECtHR and the court may 
receive applications from individual/s. The ECtHR assumed the European Commission‘s previous function 
in determining issues of admissibility and merit. Furthermore the new ECtHR assumed the European 
Commission‘s earlier function of providing advisory opinions as well as the Commission‘s role of 
amicably settling claims. In addition, the function to make binding decisions relating to the issue of 
substantive breach of Convention provisions, which was held by the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe, was abolished. The European Court now determines issues of admissibility and merit through 
Committees comprising of three judges. Each application is examined by a committee of three judges and 
by unanimous vote the committee may declare an application ‗manifestly ill-founded‘. If a matter is found 
‗admissible‘ by court a chamber of seven judges will decide on admissibility, as well as the merits of the 
case.  If court does not reach a unanimous decision regarding admissibility, the question of admissibility 
will be decided through chambers. Moreover chambers determine separately the merits of the claim. The 
Grand Chambers hear serious issues of interpretation and acts as an ultimate forum of appeal in exceptional 
circumstances.  In this regard see generally P van Dijk & GJH van Hoof Theory and practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, (1998) 
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complaints who are unable to find a remedy in their national courts may petition the 
ECtHR.  Complaints by governments about human rights violations in another 
participating country are also permitted.  The individual petitions system is extremely 
widely used and has resulted in fundamental reforms within the contracting states.  
However, the success of the ECtHR presently also poses the biggest challenge to the 
court in that an ever creasing workload may in due course result in its downfall.
175
  
 
The procedures of the ECtHR are not considered further.  However the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR regarding the right to manifest religious belief will be fully explored in the 
following chapter.  The ECHR is only but one manifestation of how European state 
parties strive for cooperation amongst themselves.  Another example of cooperation is the 
European Union (EU). 
 
4.8.2 The European Union  
 
Even though the founders of the EU had a vision of an integrated Europe, the modest 
beginning of the EU was primarily focused on the achievement of peace.
176
  Overtime the 
                                                          
175
 Originally, the individual petition mechanism was optional and not widely used.  All complaints were 
first considered by the European Commission, which then expressed its opinion on the merits of the case, 
and in the event of the contracting state having accepted the individual petitioning mechanism the 
Commission would refer the matter to the ECtHR. With its enlargement major reforms were required. The 
entire system was streamlined by Protocol No. 11. The right of individual petitioning has become 
compulsory and the Commission has ceased to exist, and individuals have direct access to the ECtHR.  For 
an overview of the potential challenges posed by this overwhelming caseload see Steiner (note 5 above) 
1001 onwards.  Regarding the procedures followed by the ECtHR see generally Steiner (note 5 above) 943 
onwards. 
176
 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty or Paris Treaty (1950) aimed to de-arm 
Germany by internationalising its military and military-industrial complex. The ECSC signed by the six 
founding members (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy and West Germany) became 
operational in 1951 and signified the reconciliation between France and Germany, two countries which had 
been at war or preparing for war from 1870.  In this regard see generally PP Craig & G De Búrca European 
Union law: text, cases, and materials (2008). 
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integration among the member states of the EU expanded to economic cooperation
177
 
which further evolved into political cooperation.
178
  The EU presently consists of 27 
member states.
179
  Craig and De Búrca describe that economic and political integration of 
the EU brought about legal integration as well.  The legal Europeanisation is embodied in 
the body of law, the acquis communautaire that European institutions have created since 
1957.  The acquis is the result of legislative decisions, legal rulings, and political 
practices. 
4.8.2.1 The role of religion in EU law (acquis communautaire) 
 
The original intent of the EU was not primarily focused on individual human rights and 
especially not on the protection of religious freedom.  However, following the movement 
towards the establishment of an internal market - one of the fundamental freedoms - the 
freedom of movement of people, in the field of labour law resulted in the passing of non-
discrimination directives by the EU institutions.  The incorporation of a social dimension 
within the framework of the EU occurred much more recently, with the inclusion of a 
Social Chapter in the Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU).
180
  The Social 
Chapter refers to those parts of the treaty which deal with the equal treatment of men and 
                                                          
177
 Following the reconciliation of France and Germany through the ECSC, the next step towards 
integration was taken in 1952, with an unsuccessful attempt to create a European Defence Community 
(EDC). In 1957 impetus towards integration was once again successful in the establishment of the 
European Economic Community (EEC).  With the completion of the internal market the EEC simply 
became the European Community (EC).  See generally Craig &De Búrca (note 176 above). 
178
 The provisions of the Treaty of the European Union (1992) (TEU) established a European Citizenship.  
See generally Craig &De Búrca (note 176 above). 
179
 The original six member states (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) 
were joined in 1972 by Britain, Denmark, and Ireland.  The second round of the EEC‘s enlargement 
occurred in Southern Europe in the 1980s, with the entry of Greece in 1981 and of Spain and Portugal in 
1986. A third round of European enlargement came in the 1990s with the EU accession of Sweden, 
Finland, and Austria.  The fourth and largest round was the EU‘s enlargement toward the East, 
accomplished in 2004 with the joining of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. The most recent enlargement was with the joining of Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007.  See generally Craig &De Búrca (note 176 above). 
180
 Also known as the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty was signed on 7 February 1992. 
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women in provisions such as article 141 of the TEU
181
 and the regulation of working time 
under the Working Time Directive as well as the regulating of discrimination in terms of 
anti-discrimination directives.
182
 
 
The TEU has been substantially amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam,
183
 and further 
amended by the Treaty of Nice,
184
 that has been replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon.
185
  The 
Treaty of Lisbon, in addition to the Social Chapter of the EU, recognises the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights
186
 and makes the 
Charter legally binding.  In addition the Lisbon Treaty provided for the accession of the 
EU to the ECHR.
187
  It can therefore be said that economic Europe (the EU) has now 
joined human rights Europe (the ECHR). 
                                                          
181
 Now contained in Article 157 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL:EN:PDF> 
last accessed on 5 November 2010. 
182
 The anti-discrimination directives, applicable in the field of employment and occupation as well as the 
area of the provision of goods and services in the public and private sector. For example, directive 
2000/43/EC concerns the equal treatment and non-discrimination of people of ethnic or racial origin. 
Directive 2000/78/EC is concerned with the establishment of a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, prohibiting discrimination with respect to age, disability, orientation and 
religion. In addition, regarding another fundamental freedom, the freedom of movement of goods, several 
instruments on foodstuffs deal with ‗legislative or administrative decisions or customs‘ of member states 
‗relating to … religious rites‘ as referred to in the Preamble of Directive 2001/88/EC. 
183
 Signed on 2 October 1997, and entered into force on 1 May 1999. 
184
 Signed on 26 February 2001 and came into force on 1 February 2003. 
185
 Signed on 13 December 2007, and entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
186
 There are some reservations to the application of the Charter by the United Kingdom and Poland.  See 
Protocol No. 7 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the UK and Poland available at 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00002re01en.pdf> last accessed on 5 November 
2010. 
187
  For an in-depth discussion of the role and place of the Charter in the EU as well as the EU accession to 
the European Convention on Human Rights see P Ingolf ‗Integrating the Charter of Fundamental Right into 
the Constitution of the European Union: Practical and Theoretical Propositions‘ (2003 – 2004) 10(5) 
Columbia Journal of European Law 48.  See also P Alston & JH Weiler ‗An Ever Closer Union in Need of 
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4.8.2.2 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000 
 
The preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights refers to spiritual heritage in the 
following manner: 
Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, 
universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity.  
 
The protection of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is provided for in Charter 
of Fundamental Rights in the same manner as in article 9 of the ECHR.  Article 10 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights reads as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right 
includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
2. The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws 
governing the exercise of this right.  
 
In addition to the specific provision relating to the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion, the Charter of Fundamental Rights refers to freedom of religion and the right to 
human dignity in several places.  Article 1 of the Charter determines that ‗human dignity 
is inviolable. It must be respected and protected‘. The Charter therefore imposes an active 
obligation for dignity to be protected.  Article 22 states that ‗the Union shall respect 
cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity‘. In the interpretation of article 22 references 
must be made to article 1 on dignity as well as to articles 20 and 21 on equality and non 
discrimination.  Article 20, states that ‗everyone is equal before law‘, while the article 21 
on non discrimination, provides that ‗any discrimination based on any ground such as 
sex, race colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or any other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited‘.  The right of parents to ensure that education is in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights (1999) Jean Monnet Working Paper 99/1 
25.  Available at <www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/990101.rtf/ > last accessed on 10 May 2010>. 
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conformity with their religious convictions, together with the principle on non-
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief
188
 and further calls for respect for religious 
diversity.
189
  Moreover, all the provisions in the Charter enjoy the same legal value as the 
treaties in terms of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that, the fundamental principles of European law pertaining to 
religion include the acceptance of regionalism, neutrality and equality, and in this manner 
the virtues of unity and diversity are sought.
190
  As the legal status of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has only recently been secured, with the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty on 1 December 2009 any discussion regarding the impact of the Charter on the 
right to freedom of religion will be merely speculative. 
 
4.8.2.3 The Lisbon Treaty 
 
The manner in which and whether reference should be made to a deity in the Lisbon 
Treaty was the cause of tremendous disagreement amongst member states of the EU.  
                                                          
188
 Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights reads: ‗Any discrimination based on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation, shall be 
prohibited‘.  
189
 Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Equal Opportunities Programme seeks to facilitate 
and celebrate diversity, and highlights ‗the positive contribution that people, irrespective of religion or 
belief, can make to society as a whole‘. Directive 2004/83/EC, article 10(b). The 7th Framework 
Programme directive, in the context of European citizenship, recognises that ‗religions‘, along with cultural 
heritage, institutions and legal systems, history, language and values, are a ‗building element‘ of European 
multicultural identity and heritage. 
190
 In this regard see generally N Doe ‗Towards a ―Common Law‖ on Religion in the European Union‘ 
(2009) 37(1/2) Religion, State & Society, 14 – 166, as well as D Philpott & TS Shah ‗Faith, freedom, and 
federation: the role of religious ideas and institutions in European political convergence‘ in TA Byrnes & 
PJ Katzenstein (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe (2006) 34. 
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The importance attached to religion differs largely amongst the 27 member states.
191
  In 
the end a compromise resulted which was included in the preamble to the Lisbon Treaty 
as follows: 
Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from 
which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the 
human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.  
 
The preamble, in contrast to strictly secular public orders of many of the member states 
of the EU, affords recognition of a religious element in the constitutional values and 
public morality of the EU, while at the same time balancing this recognition by including 
a reference to cultural and humanist influences.
192
  This approach is indicative of a so-
called ‗value pluralism‘ approach in which differing approaches are resolved through 
balancing rather than hierarchically according priority to one norm over another.
193
  The 
EU became a party to the ECHR with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, as article 
2 of the Lisbon Treaty provides that: 
                                                          
191
 The relationships between state and religion that exist amongst the member states of the EU, ranges 
from a strict form of separatism or laïcité, like in France, to the existence of an endorsed state religion, like 
in Poland. 
192
 See generally C Taylor A Secular Age (2007).  In contrast with Taylor, Weiler argues that the failure to 
mention God or Christianity in the preamble imposes an ‗EU-enforced laicité on European public life‘. 
According to Weiler this enforced laicité endorses the right to freedom from religion which he considers a 
less desirable approach than freedom of religion. In this regard see the discussion in AJ Menendez ‗Review 
of a Christian Europe‘ (2005) 30(1) European Law Review 133. 
193
 J Bengoetxea, N MacCormick and L Moral Soriano ‗Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of 
the European Court of Justice‘ in G de Burca and JH Weiler (eds) The European Court of Justice (2001) 
64, 65. In this instance the authors were discussing the clash between the goals of market freedoms and 
environmental protection.  However, in reflecting this choice, the EU does implicitly associate itself with 
only certain traditions, the religious and secular influences in Europe.  In this manner member states are 
restricted to use their legal systems to reflect religious and moral perspectives in a way which is 
inconsistent with notions of equality and individual autonomy.  For example Romania and Turkey were 
required by the EU not to criminalise homosexuality and adultery respectively as conditions of 
membership.  In this regard see R McCrea ‗Limitations on Religion in a Liberal Democratic Polity: 
Christianity and Islam and the Partial Secularity of the European Union‘ (2008) Yearbook of European Law 
195. 
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The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.  Such accession shall not affect the Union‘s competencies as 
defined in the Treaties. 
 
The provisions of the EU regarding religious freedom referred to above must however be 
distinguished from the provisions of the ECHR.  The provisions of EU law are supreme 
and for this reason member states of the EU have to comply with these provisions within 
their national legal system.  Conflict between municipal law of member states and the 
provisions of EU law will not be tolerated.
194
  Each member state has the duty to bring its 
municipal law into conformity with the provisions of EU law.  On the other hand, 
provisions of the ECHR have been interpreted by the ECtHR in accordance with a 
‗margin of appreciation‘195 which allows for differing levels of protection in the various 
individual European signatory states.  The ECtHR has indicated that restrictions on 
religious freedom ‗call for very strict scrutiny by the court‘.196  Once again it is important 
to be mindful that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights has only recently become 
applicable and the impact thereof has not yet been tested by the courts.  Therefore the 
ECtHR at present plays a more active role in the protection of fundamental rights. 
 
4.8.2.4 Interrelation between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
 
The Luxembourg-based ECJ is an EU institution, whereas the Strasbourg-based ECtHR 
is an ECHR institution and these institutions function differently.  The main purpose of 
                                                          
194
 Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ), Judgment of 5 February 1963, N. V. Algemene 
Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos/Nederlandse administratie der belastingen 
(Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration), Case 26/62, in Reports of Cases before the Court. 1963, S. 1. 
195
 So as to ‗balance general societal interests against the interests of the individuals or group adversely 
affected by the State‘s action‘, the ECtHR standard of review is guided by its ‗margin of appreciation‘ 
principle. Under this principle, national governments are given some freedom in the manner in that they 
implement ECHR rights. The more essential the right the more strict the scrutiny of review applied by the 
ECtHR. In this regard see generally Parker (note 66 above) 95. 
196
 Parker (note 66 above) 100. 
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the ECtHR is to verify if a violation of the provisions of the ECHR has occurred.  The 
ECtHR accordingly, may only be approached if the remedies provided by a national court 
have been exhausted. Therefore every time the ECtHR sanctions a state, the ECtHR in 
effect is rejecting the national court‘s decision while at the same time relying upon the 
national court to apply the decision and the provisions of the ECHR. 
 
The ECJ on the other hand, provides for direct individual access to the ECJ and national 
courts can, and sometimes must, follow the preliminary ruling procedure.  This procedure 
provides that the national courts may refer a matter to the ECJ for advice on the 
interpretation or validity of EU law.  Therefore this procedure allows for a more coherent 
application of EU law.  In addition the ECJ can assist national courts in cases that may be 
politically too sensitive to be decided by the national courts alone. 
 
As pointed out above,
197
 the provisions of European law are supreme over national law
198
 
and supreme over national constitutions.
199
  The provision of direct effect and supremacy 
requires that the European legal order respects the fundamental human rights of citizens 
as provided for in the national legal order.  Therefore, the ECJ has progressively become 
a protector of fundamental human rights.
200
 
 
                                                          
197
 See section 4.8.2.1. 
198
 As decided in the matter of Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ), Judgment of 16 July 
1964, Flaminio Costa v ENEL, Case 6/64, in Reports of Cases before the Court. 1964, S. 585. 
199
 See Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ), Judgment of 17 December 1970, 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 
11/70, in Reports of Cases before the Court. 1970. 
200
 See discussion in section 4.8.8.2 above. Provisions on fundamental rights have been inserted into 
various EU treaties. For example, article 6(2) of the TEU states that ‗the Union shall respect fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the member states, as general principles of EU law‘.  In addition, the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and directives related to non-discrimination have been issued. 
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The provisions of the ECHR are interpreted in accordance with a ‗margin of 
appreciation‘ in terms of which the ECtHR allows for deference to a state party.  The 
ECtHR is therefore willing to permit derogations by a state party from the rights 
contained in the ECHR ‗in accordance with a State Party‘s own scale of values and in the 
form selected by it‘.201 
 
From the above discussion it is apparent that both the ECJ and the ECtHR belong to 
distinct organisational frameworks: the ECJ original assignment is to uphold economic 
integration between member states, while the mission of the ECtHR is to protect human 
rights within participatory states.
202
  However, through cooperation both these above 
national institutions have been paving the way for ‗economic Europe‘ to accede to 
‗human rights Europe‘.203 
 
This process of accession has been brought to fulfilment with the incorporation of the 
provisions of the EU‘s Charter of Fundamental Rights into European law in the Lisbon 
Treaty which further allows for the accession of the EU to the ECHR as referred to in the 
ECHR‘s new protocol 14.204  Accession to the ECHR will subject the EU to similar 
external control as has been exercised over the state parties by the ECtHR.  It is not 
foreseen that either court will replace the other, but rather that the courts through 
                                                          
201
 As stated by Advocate General Van Gerven in Grogan (Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of 
Unborn Children Ireland Ltd (SPUC) v Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685 para Judgment of the Court of 4 
October 1991.  Regarding the application of the ‗margin of appreciation‘ see generally generally TA 
O'Donnell ‗The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights.‘ (1982) 4 (4) Human Rights Quarterly, 474. 
202
 See discussion in section 4.8.2 and 4.8.1 respectively. 
203
 L Scheeck ‗Solving Europe‘s Binary Human Rights Puzzle. The Interaction between Supranational 
Courts as a Parameter of European Governance‘ (2005) 15 Questions de recherche / Research in question 
1, 9.  Available at <http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/publica/qdr.htm> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
204
 The Lisbon Treaty provides for accession whereas the previous treaties, the Amsterdam and the Nice 
treaties ignored the question of accession to the ECHR based on the ECJ opinion 2/94 which deemed that 
the Community does not have the competence to accede to the ECHR. 
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‗respecting and referring to each other‘s work … uphold their own and the other court‘s 
position within their overlapping and enlarging organisations‘.205 
 
The procedures of the ECJ are not considered in any further detail.  The impact of the 
European Charter on Fundamental Rights has not to date resulted in any jurisprudence 
and the existing jurisprudence of the ECJ mainly focuses on non-discrimination in the 
workplace.  The limited jurisprudence regarding the right to manifest religious belief will 
be analysed in the following chapter. 
 
4.8.3 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
 
Other than cooperation regarding the protecting of fundamental human rights in terms of 
the ECHR and participation in the EU, another manifestation of how European states 
strive for cooperation amongst themselves is the OSCE.  OSCE is a political body, which 
prior to 1 January 1995, was named the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE)
206
 and is instrumental in broadening regional co-operation in Europe.
207
 
In terms of the founding document of OSCE (the Helsinki Final Act)
208
 the participating 
states agreed to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom 
                                                          
205
 Scheeck (note 203 above) 39. 
206
 This study will use the term OSCE to refer to both the prior and the current body.  OSCE is the world's 
largest regional security organisation.  It brings cooperative security to a region of 56 states drawn from 
Europe, Central Asia, Canada and America. The OSCE conducts a wide range of activities related to all 
three dimensions of security, namely the human, politico-military and economic-environmental 
dimensions.  Available at <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/osce.pdf> last 
accessed on 08 May 2010. 
207
 The work of OSCE is distinguishable from the Council of Europe as well as the European Union, in that 
the standards of OSCE are all non-binding.  In addition, the membership of OSCE is far broader than either 
of the latter two institutions. 
Available at <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/osce.pdf> last accessed on 08 
May 2010. 
208
 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki Accord), 1 Aug 1975, reprinted 
in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) (hereinafter Helsinki Final Act).  This agreement is also sometimes called the 
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of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, and 
language or religion.  Protection of the right to freedom of religion was originally 
included in the ten Guiding Principles of the Helsinki Final Act under Principle VII titled 
‗Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief‘.  These rights are affirmed in the first and third 
paragraphs which states that:
209
 
The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
210
  Within the framework the 
participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess 
and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance 
with the dictates of his own.
211
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Helsinki Accords.  The Helsinki Final Act is the concluding document of a two year intergovernmental 
meeting that comprised the initial Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Not a legally binding 
document, the Helsinki Final Act was a statement by the participating states of principles and the intent to 
cooperate. Although it was heralded as a European Conference, the Western group insisted that all the 
‗North Atlantic Treaty Organisation‘ (NATO) countries be involved because of the nature of the European 
security system. Thus Canada and the USA have participated throughout, together with all the countries of 
Europe. The formation of OSCE followed continued calls made by the Soviet Union to promote peace and 
security in Europe and, in particular, the desire to seek ratification of the post-war borders, following the 
conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.  The Western states, 
on the other hand, recognised that this request could be turned into an opportunity to seek protection of 
fundamental human rights.  See generally A Bloed ‗The CSCE Process from Helsinki to Vienna: An 
Introduction‘ in A Bloed (ed) From Helsinki To Vienna: Basic Documents Of The Helsinki Process (1990) 
1. 
209
 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Final Act),1 August 1975, 
IIM 14 (1975), 1292,1295. 
210
 The Soviet Union was opposed to religion being extended to other forms of conviction rather than 
religious ones, and tried to use translation as a means of escape.  The word conviction was translated in 
Russian with the word vera which only means ‗faith‘ which was a variance of the title of the Principle, 
where conviction was correctly translated as ubezhdeniye.  See generally H Hazewinkel ‗Religious freedom 
in the CSCE/OSCE Process‘ (1998) 9 Helsinki Monitor 9, 10. 
211
 This third paragraph was introduced as a result of a proposal by the Holy See.  Regarding the protection 
of the right to freedom of religion in OSCE prior to the introduction of the High Commission for National 
Minorities see generally HJ Hazewinkel ‗Religious freedom in the CSCE/OSCE process‘ Helsinki Monitor 
(1998) 9.  Regarding the furthering of the ‗human dimension‘ and therefore the right to freedom of religion 
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The OSCE has since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act made some impact on the 
protection of the right to freedom of religion and more recently regarding the protection 
of minority human rights.  The most extensive protection of religious freedom is found in 
the 1989 Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of OSCE (the Vienna 
Document), which details a list of commitments securing the freedom to profess and 
practice religion, and also secures the rights associated with the manifestation of 
religion.
212
 
 
Principles 16(1) and (2) of the Vienna Concluding Document (VCD) warrant detailed 
attention.  Principle 16(1) of the VCD requires states to take effective measures to 
prevent and eliminate discrimination on the ground of religion and to ensure effective 
equality between believers and non-believers, while principle 16(2) of the VCD requires 
the state to foster a climate of mutual tolerance between these two groups.
 213
  Principle 
16 further refers to a limited range of manifestations, mostly associated with acts of 
worship.  At the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
CSCE (now OSCE) in 1990 these provisions were reaffirmed and brought into line with 
the provisions of article 9 of the ECHR in that: 
[E]veryone will have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right 
includes freedom to change one's religion or belief and freedom to manifest one's religion 
                                                                                                                                                                             
at present, OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in addition to 
monitoring elections, provides information on human rights implementation issues for the annual review of 
human dimension commitment. 
212
 In addition to the protection of the right to freedom of religion OSCE actively supports its participating 
states in combating all forms of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and discrimination. Cooperating and 
coordinating its activities in this field with other European and UN organisations such as the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 
and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. OSCE institutions promoting 
tolerance and non-discrimination include the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR). ODIHR collects and distributes information on hate crimes; promotes best practices in 
the fight against intolerance and discrimination; provides assistance in drafting and reviewing legislation on 
crimes fuelled by intolerance and discrimination.   
Available at <http://www.osce.org/activities/13539.html> last accessed on 8 October 2010. 
213
 Vienna Concluding Document, 19 January 1989, ILM 28 (1989), 527, 534. 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
or belief, either alone or in community with others, in public or in private, through 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. The exercise of these rights may be subject 
only to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are consistent with international 
standards.
214
 
 
The Vienna Document encourages respect for religious differences among various 
religious communities.
215
  Van Boven claims that provisions contained in the Vienna 
Document were influenced by Krishnaswami‘s work.216  Krishnaswami was well aware 
that the standard requirements of equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination 
would not have the desired effect in matters concerning freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion.  To ensure equal treatment of all religions a different approach was needed, 
as the application of formal equality would not necessarily ensure equal treatment 
between adherents of different religions.  In this regard Krishnaswami noted that: 
[S]ince each religion or belief makes different demands on its followers, a mechanical 
application of the principle of equality which does not take into account the various 
demands will often lead to injustice and in some cases even to discrimination.
217
 
Krishnaswami observes that as the demands of various religions are different, even state 
neutrality does not exclude inequality between different religions.
218
  Krishnaswami 
further appreciated that these different demands could include the wear of special 
religiously motivated dress in which event he stated that: 
[I]t is desirable that persons whose faith prescribes such apparel should not be 
unreasonable prevented from wearing it.
219
 
                                                          
214
 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE 
(1990), Section II (9.4), ILM 29 (1990), 1305,1311. 
215
 Davis (note 24 above) 227.  
216
 T van Boven ‗Advances and Obstacles in Building Understanding and Respect between People of 
Diverse Religions and Beliefs‘ (1991) 13(4) Human Rights Quarterly 437, 439. 
217
 A Krishnaswami ‗Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices: Report of 
Arcot Krishnaswami, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities‘ (1979) 11 New York University Journal on International Law and Politics 227, 
230.  (Krishnaswami Study). 
218
 Ibid 263. 
219
 Ibid 248. 
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Furthermore each case must be considered on its own merits, and that a rule of general 
application would not ensure equal treatment and non-discrimination. 
 
Paragraph 36 of the OSCE‘s Copenhagen Document (1990) states that: 
Every participating State will promote in a climate of mutual respect, understanding, co-operation 
and solidarity among all persons living on its territory, without distinction as to ethnic or national 
origin or religion, and will encourage the solution of problems through dialogue based on the 
principles of the rule of law.  
From the above paragraph it is clear that protection of the right to freedom of religion and 
therefore the right to manifest religious belief is also provided for in terms of the equality 
provisions of the Copenhagen Document. 
 
The Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990),
220
 celebrates the historical changes taking 
place in Europe after the reunification between Eastern and Western Europe.  The 
restructuring of the former Eastern Europe led to a rise in inter-ethnic conflict and 
accordingly concerns regarding minority issues became more pronounced.  A post for a 
High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) was created in 1992.
221
 Many 
aspects of the HCNM‘s mandate are problematic. In particular the need for a definition of 
the term ‗national minorities‘ has been challenging.  The OSCE has never defined the 
term ‗national minority‘.  The HCNM has suggested that a national minority has the 
following characteristics: ‗a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics which 
distinguish it from the majority … which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity 
but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity‘.222  The characteristic of a 
                                                          
220
 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 21 Nov. 1990. 
221
 The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) mandate was established at the Helsinki 
Summit Meeting in 1992. 
222
 Keynote address to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Human Dimension 
Seminar on National Minorities, reprinted in 1 Official. Democratic Institutions Human. Rights. Bulletin. 
22 (1993). 
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national minority may also be defined in relation to the provisions of article 27 of the 
ICCPR.
223
 
 
The use of the term ‗national minorities‘ to refer only to citizens of a given state may be 
problematic as immigrants without citizen status may be in need of protection as well.  
However, the HCNM has indicated that the preferred meaning is that the term is used to 
denote a non-dominant population (ethnic, religious or linguistic group) that is a 
numerical minority.
224
 
 
Of particular importance regarding the religious rights of minorities is the following 
provision of the Copenhagen Document:  
Persons belonging to national minorities have the right, inter alia, to use their own 
language, to maintain their own educational and religious institutions, to practice their 
own religion … 225 
The Copenhagen Document furthermore added the rights to change one‘s religion or 
belief,
226
 and in particular, freedom of religion took its place among other rights of 
persons belonging to national minorities.
227
 
 
The Helsinki Final Act, the Copenhagen Document as well as most of OSCE documents 
are only politically binding.  Although not legally binding they have been used as 
                                                          
223
 Article 27 of the ICCPR states that: ‗In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their 
own language‘. 
224
 See generally ICCPR Human Rights Committee General Comment 23 (50), 911 5.1-5.2, Hum. Rts. 
Com., 15th Sess., UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, (1994). 
225
 Copenhagen Document at 32 See generally Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, 29 June 1990, 9 9 30-
40.7, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1318-20 (1990). 
226
 Principle 9(4) of the 1990 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting referring to the freedom to change 
one‘s religion or belief. 
227
 Regarding the protection of the rights of minorities in the OSCE framework see generally J Wright ‗The 
OSCE and the Protection of Minority Rights‘ (1996) 18(1) Human Rights Quarterly 190. 
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guidelines for interpretation of national laws and practices.
228
  Despite the non-binding 
nature of the OSCE documents it is important to remember that the OSCE is not a human 
rights organisation but an interstate process.  On a regional level, in contrast with OSCE, 
the ECHR system has been much more successful in the protection of individual human 
rights through the individual complaint procedure.  On the international level, the UN too 
has played a more prominent role through for example the accessibility of the human 
rights bodies to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
 
However, although OSCE does not create legal obligations and enforcement is sketchy, 
one should not dismiss the impact that OSCE has had in Europe.
229
  The OSCE has been 
instrumental in numerous fields, the role of the OSCE regarding the protection of 
minorities is of particular importance.  The commitments on minorities in the 
Copenhagen Document
230
 are still considered to be more advanced than provisions on 
minorities made by the UN and Council of Europe.  In this regard the following comment 
serves as a valuable caveat: 
The issue of Religious Freedom and Tolerance must be a priority issue of first rank 
within OSCE activities.  Neglect of religious human rights results in fostering tensions 
which are all prone to ignite overt conflict.
231
 
 
Not only does OSCE play an important role regarding the protection of minorities, but it 
has in addition generated detailed recommendations.  Of these include the Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life of 
                                                          
228
 For a comprehensive overview of the operation of OSCE see generally R Brett ‗Human Rights and the 
OSCE‘ (1996) 18(3) Human Rights Quarterly 668. 
229
 In this regard see KE Birnbaum The Politics Of East-West Communication In Europe (1979) 76-77.  
Birnbaum reflects on the cynicism of USA‘s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and associates in 1975, 
whom indicated that the full implementation of OSCR would in their opinion ‗imply nothing less than a 
total transformation of the prevailing political and social conditions in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe‘. 
230
 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension, 29 June 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1318-20 (1990). 
231
 In ODIHR Background reports on the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, November 
12-28, 1997 (ODIHR/GAL/13/97  24 October 1997). 
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1999, which have also been helpful in realising the full proactive participation of 
minorities through the constitutional design of the state, electoral representation and the 
establishment of institutions and practices aimed at ensuring diverse input.
232
  With the 
above discussion the protection of the right to manifest religious belief is brought to a 
close.  The American regional system follows below. 
 
4.9 The Inter-American System 
 
The Organisation of American States (OAS) is the oldest regional organisation. In 1948, 
21 states signed the OAS Charter, establishing the regional organisation and affirming 
their commitment to representative democracy, liberty, and equality before the law.
233
  
The Inter-American system consists of two key documents, the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948
234
 and the American Convention on Human Rights 
of 1969 (Pact of San José),
235
 which are monitored by two main treaty bodies, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. 
 
4.9.1 American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José)  
 
                                                          
232
 Weller (note 82 above) 434. 
233
 Annual Report of the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights of 1994, 347. 
234
 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration) (OAS 1948) was 
approved by the OAS even before the adoption of Universal Declaration.  The American Declaration 
encompasses the entire range of human rights and duties. 
235
 The relationship between the two documents is comparable to the UDHR and the two International 
Covenants.  For a more detailed discussion of the Inter-American System see generally Steiner (note 5 
above) 1020 onwards. 
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The Pact of San José
236
 protects civil and political rights, and requires states to adopt 
legislative or other measures necessary to give effect to these rights.
237
  However, the 
Convention does not cover social rights. Those are found in the Protocol of San Salvador 
(1988).
238
 
 
The right to freedom of conscience and religion is protected in terms of article 12 of the 
Pact of San José.
239
  It repeats the four paragraphs of article 18 of the ICCPR, and 
provides that ‗everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and religion.  This right 
includes freedom to maintain or change one‘s religion, and freedom to profess or 
disseminate one‘s religion or belief, either individually or together with others, in public 
or in private‘.  The provision is also subject to restrictions on manifestations as contained 
in the ICCPR which are similar to those under the European Convention. 
 
                                                          
236
 The Pact of San José was adopted by the OAS on 22 November 1969 in San José, Costa Rica and 
entered into force on 18 July 1978. To date, 25 of the 35 OAS state parties have adopted the Pact of San 
José. 
237
 Article 1 of the Pact of San José stipulates the obligation to respect rights: ‗1.1…Ensure the free and full 
exercise of those rights and freedoms without any discrimination for reason of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social 
condition‘. 
238
 The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) in 
the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  in article 14(1)(a) recognises the rights of everyone to 
take part in a cultural life. The Protocol of San Salvador was adopted by the OAS on 17 November 1988 in 
San Salvador, El Salvador and entered into force on 16 November 1999. 
239
 Article 12 of the Pact of San José reads: ‗12.1 Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of 
religion. This right included freedom to maintain or to change one‘s religion or beliefs, and freedom to 
professor disseminate one‘s religion or beliefs, either individually or together with others, in public or in 
private. 
12.2 No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to maintain of change his religion 
or beliefs. 
12.3 Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or beliefs may be subject only to the limitations prescribed by law 
that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the right or freedom of others. 
12.4 Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide for the religious and moral 
education of their children or wards that is in accord with their own convictions‘. 
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4.9.2 Supervisory bodies: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
 
Although the Inter-American System adopted a human rights declaration before the 
adoption of either the UDHR or the ECHR, the development of a supervisory structure 
was to take substantially longer.
240
  The IACHR was established in 1959 and conducted 
its first investigation in 1961.
241
  The IACHR‘s main functions include investigating 
individual complaints and preparing reports on countries with severe human rights 
problems.
242
  In addition, the IACHR may submit cases to, or request advisory opinions 
from, the IACtHR.  Provisions are made for persons, groups or NGOs legally recognised 
by a member of the OAS to submit complaints to the IACHR.  Nonetheless, state parties 
can reserve the right not to cooperate with IACHR investigations.
243
 
 
In 1979 the OAS adopted the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
officially creating the IACtHR and authorised it to interpret and enforce the American 
Convention.
244
  The IACtHRs jurisdiction is limited to cases submitted by States Parties 
                                                          
240
 Steiner (note 5 above) 1021. 
241
 The IACHR is the first of two permanent bodies for promoting and protecting human rights in the 
Americas and consists of seven members elected by the OAS General Assembly who serve in their 
personal capacities.   
242
 To this end the IACHR is authorised to: receive and investigate individual petitions regarding human 
rights violations; publish reports regarding human rights situations in state parties; visit state parties and 
investigate general human rights conditions or particular problem areas; publish studies on specific subject 
areas, such as indigenous rights and women's rights; and make human rights recommendations to state 
parties.  Available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm.> last accessed on 08 May 2010. 
243
 Nathan (note 67 above) 47, 55. 
244
 The IACtHR is composed of seven judges who serve a six year term in their individual capacity. Due to 
the fact that judges serve in their individual capacity, the statute of the court explicitly prohibits them from 
holding positions that are incompatible with a judicial position, namely, positions in the executive branch 
of government, or as officials of international organisations.  See Statute of The Inter-American Court Of 
Human Rights  
Available at <http://www.oas.org/xxxivga/english/reference_docs/Estatuto_CorteIDH.pdf> last accessed 
on 08 May 2010. 
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and the IACHR involving the interpretation or application of the Pact of San José.
245
  The 
IACtHR issued its first decision in 1980.  The Commission resolves only a small fraction 
of the matters before it each year.  In 2007 the Commission published 74 reports, 65 of 
which dealt with admissibility alone, and submitted 14 cases to the Court.
246
  It has been 
stated the IACHR and the IACtHR represent a ‗weaker central adjudicative and 
legislative mechanism which hampers compliance with its provisions‘.247  In addition 
Latin America‘s poor record of respect for human rights adds more questions to the 
possibility of enforcement of the Pact of San José.
248
  The professed religious liberties 
contained in the Pact of San José remain untried.
249
  The procedures of the IACtHR are 
not dealt with further.  In light of an evaluation of the jurisprudence of the IACtHR it is 
apparent that the right to freedom of religion and to manifest such religious belief have 
not yet been interpreted by the IACtHR. 
 
4.10 The African System: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
 
The latest regional system is the African system.  The preamble to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR)250 considers the Charter of the Organisation of 
                                                          
245
 The USA signed the Pact of San José but did not proceed with ratification.  Available at 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
246
 See generally JL Cavallaro and SE Brewer ‗Re-evaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation In The 
Twenty-First Century: The Case Of The Inter-American Court‘ (2008) 102 The American Journal Of 
International Law 768, 779. 
247
 A Nathan (note 67 above) 55. 
248
 Ibid. 
249
 Nathan (note 67 above) 57. 
250
 The African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity 
at the 18th Conference of Heads of State and Government on 27 June 1981, in Nairobi, Kenya and entered 
into force on 21 October 1986. For further reading on the ACHPR see generally C Heyns (ed) Human 
Rights Law in Africa (2004);  F Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights: A 
comprehensive agenda for human rights (2003); and M Evans and R Murray (eds) The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights (2002). 
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African Unity (OAU),
251
 obligates ratifying countries to recognise the rights and duties 
listed and to adopt legislation or measures to bring them into effect.
252
  The civil and 
political rights entrenched in the ACHPR are generally similar to those recognised in 
other international instruments.  The enjoyment of the rights contained in the ACHPR is 
guaranteed without distinction of any kind, including religion.
253
 
 
The ACHPR is divided into two parts. The first part sets out rights and duties
254
 and the 
second part establishes safeguards for these rights and duties.  Furthermore, the ACHPR 
                                                          
251
 The Charter of the OAU was signed on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and entered into force 
on 13 September 1963. It is established as a regional body for African states, inspired by the anti-colonial 
resistance of the late 1950‘s. The Charter of the OAU states in its preamble that it acknowledges the 
freedom, equality, justice and dignity of the African peoples and is determined to promote brotherhood and 
solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences, affirms the struggle against neo-
colonialism in all its forms.  In 2002 the OAU was replaced by the African Union (AU) with 53 of the 54 
African states as members of the AU.  The Constitutive Act of the AU reaffirmed Africa's determination ‗to 
promote and protect human and peoples' rights.‘  The AU's objectives include the promotion and protection 
of human rights in accordance with the ACHPR and ‗other relevant human rights instruments‘.  The 
Constitutive Act of the AU reaffirmed Africa's determination ‗to promote and protect human and peoples' 
rights.‘  The AU's objectives include the promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with the 
African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights and ‗other relevant human rights instruments‘. See article 4 
of the AU Charter in this regard. Regarding the functioning of the African regional system see generally C 
Heyns ‗The African Regional Human Rights System:  The African Charter‘ (2004) 108(3) Penn State Law 
Review 679. 
252
 Article 1 of the ACHPR states that: ‗The state parties of the Organization of African Unity parties to the 
present Charter shall recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake 
to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them‘. 
253
 Article 2 of the ACHPR states that: ‗Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, 
ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, 
fortune, birth or other status‘. 
254
 Like the Pact of San José, the ACHPR does not simply identify rights but also explicitly imposes duties 
upon individuals (articles 27-29).  These individual duties include provisions to counter claims that human 
rights promote excessive individualism, consist of duties to family, society, state, and the international 
community. 
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specifically includes the rights of peoples as group rights.
255
  From these inclusions it is 
clear that the ACHPR provides for an alternative approach to Western liberal rights 
theory, in terms of which rights are not only seen as individual rights.  Rights are 
considered to not only impose a duty on a state not to infringe but to also impose duties 
on the individual as well.
256
  Article 27 of the ACHPR refers to duties towards one‘s 
family and society, and the state and other legally recognised communities, such as the 
international community.  The ACHPR clearly provides for two types of duties, being 
direct and indirect, respectively.  Article 29(4) provides for a direct duty to preserve and 
strengthen social and national solidarity.  Article 27(2) provides for an indirect duty, in so 
far as it states that ‗the rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due 
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest‘.  In 
terms of African tradition the individual is considered a moral being, endowed with rights 
but also bounded by duties, uniting his/ her needs with the needs of others.
257
 
 
Article 8 provides for freedom of religion in the following manner: 
Freedom of conscience the profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed.  
No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise 
of these freedoms.  
 
Respect and tolerance is promoted in article 28 in that: 
[E]very individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without 
discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and 
reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.  
 
Limitations of the rights may be problematic as no general limitation clause is contained 
in the provisions of the ACHPR.  Specific limitation provisions are contained with regard 
                                                          
255
 Examples of such rights include the right of a group to freely dispose of its natural resources in the 
exclusive interest of its members (article 21), and the right of a colonised or oppressed group to free them 
from domination (article 20). 
256
 M Mutua ‗The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of 
duties‘ (1995) 25 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 339, 334. 
257
 Ibid 339, 334. 
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to specific rights.  The right to freedom of religion contains such a specific limitation in 
that the right may only be limited in the interest of ‗law and order‘.  In interpreting the 
provisions of the ACHPR the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (The 
Commission) has made extensive reference to international law.  Therefore the 
Commission has understood that limitations must comply with international human rights 
standards.
258
 
 
The right to education and the importance of cultural life are recognised in article 17.  In 
addition to the ACHPR the AU adopted further instruments, of particular relevance are 
the instruments specifically addressing the rights of women
259
 and children, 
respectively.
260
 
 
4.10.1 Supervisory bodies:  The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Commission
261
 was created to ensure the protection of human and peoples‘ 
rights in Africa.  It is established in terms of article 30, and deals with communications 
from both States Parties and individuals. Individual communications can be considered 
where there is a ‗serious or massive violation‘ at stake.  The Commission has dealt with 
                                                          
258
 See Media Rights Agenda & Others v Nigeria Communication 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96 at 66: 
‗To allow national law to have precedence over the international law of the Charter would defeat the 
purpose of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter.  International human rights standards must 
always prevail over contradicting national law‘. 
259
 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2005. 
260
 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adopted in 1990 and entered into force 
during 1999. 
261
 The Commission meets twice a year and consists of 11 commissioners who serve six year terms in their 
personal capacities. The functions of the Commission are the promotion of human rights, the protection of 
these rights, interpretation of the ACHPR, and the performance of ‗any other tasks‘ requested by the AU 
(article 45).  Furthermore, states are required to submit regular reports to the Commission on their human 
rights problems and efforts to address them (article 62). 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
most violations if the admissibility criteria had been met.
262
  To date only five matters 
concerning the right to freedom of conscience has been received, against the then Zaire, 
Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. The matter against South Africa related to the 
right to manifest religious belief.
263
  The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights establishes an African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights,264 to date 
the African Court is not yet functional. 
 
In addition to communications addressed to the Commission, States Parties are obliged
265
 
to submit reports every two years on compliance with the provisions of the Charter.  The 
Commission may adopt resolutions and has appointed special rapporteurs.  Relevant is 
the appointment of the Working Group of Experts on Indigenous People of 
Communities.
266
 
4.11 Conclusion 
 
From the analysis of the international
 
and regional instruments
 
regulating the right to 
freedom of religion it is evident that ‗everyone‘ has the right to religious liberty.  
Furthermore the right is broadly defined, in part because the concept religion is inherently 
indefinable.  In addition the use of definitions per se may limit the application of the 
                                                          
262
 Heyns (note 251 above) 679, 694. 
263
 Garreth Anver Prince / South Africa 255/2002 EC.CL/167 (VI)  Regarding the effectiveness of the 
Commission in ensuring state compliance with the decisions it has made see generally F Viljoen & L Louw 
‗State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: 
1994-2004‘ (2007) 101(1) The American Journal of International Law 1. 
264
 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights was adopted in 1998 and entered into force on 1 January 2004. At the 
time of writing the process was underway to establish the Court. The AU Summit has taken a decision in 
July 2004 to merge the African Human Rights Court with the African Court of Justice. Only states and the 
Commission will be able to approach the Court. NGOs and individuals will have a right of ‗direct‘ access 
to the Court where the state has made a special declaration. 
265
 Reporting however has been slow and half of the States Parties have not submitted reports. 
266
 Heyns (note 251 above) 697. 
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right.  Therefore the right is defined as the right to ‗freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion‘ in all the UN documents and the European and Inter-American regional 
systems, while the African Charter provides for freedom of conscience and free practice 
of religion. 
 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the so called forum internum, 
goes beyond long established religions, as it covers theistic, non-theistic and atheistic 
beliefs as well.  Freedom of thought and conscience are entitled to equal protection.  The 
individual and communal nature, as well as the private and public dimension of the right 
to manifest one‘s religion is acknowledged in all the international instruments and the 
European and Inter-American regional systems. 
 
Included in the forum internum is the right to manifest religion or belief in community 
with other in worship, observance, practice and teaching, the so called forum externum.  
The ICCPR Human Rights Committee in General Comment 22(4) has defined the forum 
externum, to ‗encompass a broad range of acts‘.  The right to manifest religious belief 
may only be limited if the limitation is ‗prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.‘  
The ECHR however adds a further requirement in that the limitation must be necessary in 
a democratic society.  The ACHPR prescribes that a limitation must be subject to law and 
order. 
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Chapter 5 
A postmodern (post secular) framework to enhance protection of the right to 
manifest religious belief in a diverse society 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As shown previously,
1
 religious conflict persists and the right to freedom of religion 
and is often vulnerable.  The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
manner in which the right is currently protected.  To this end the appropriateness of 
the principle frameworks in terms of which the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion is secured will be examined and suitable suggestions put forward as to how 
the effectiveness of these frameworks may be enhanced.  The arrangement of the 
relationship between the state and religion will be critiqued first.  This will be 
followed by an evaluation of the configuration of the international human rights 
regime. 
 
Regarding the different constitutional arrangements structuring the relationship 
between the state and religion, one ought to be mindful that this configuration did not 
occur in abstract, but in response to some form of domination.
2
  The relationship 
therefore reflects this history and presents itself in various ways.  For instance, the 
state arrangement may reveal strong identification with religion or some degree of 
identification with religion, or present itself as a secular state with either a passive or 
an assertive approach towards religion, or even as a laic state on the other end of the 
spectrum.
3
 
 
                                                          
1
 See section 1.1. 
2
 A Sachs Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (1990) 41. 
3
 See section 3.5. 
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For example, in France, the Law on the Separation of Church and State of 1905 ended 
the rule of the Roman Catholic Church and centuries of violent conflict.
4
  In the 
United States of America (USA), the First Amendment managed the diversity of a 
new nation by reinforcing separation between religion and the state.  In South Africa 
(SA), the Constitution strives to inspire the various religious denominations into 
reconciliation and the building of a united nation.
5
  All of these approaches may have 
been suitable at the time of their implementation, but it cannot be assumed that they 
will remain appropriate in light of new challenges.
6
 
 
This chapter proceeds from the understanding that the relationship between the state 
and religion ought to represent a certain degree of de facto differentiation.
7
  As 
concluded in section 3.8, separation between the state and religion is necessary to 
ensure the protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief.  However, as 
indicated previously,
8
 strict separation between state and religion does not per se 
ensure the greatest protection of the right to freedom of religion.  This is particularly 
true in states in which separation represents ‗freedom from religion‘.9  Therefore, 
suggestions are put forward regarding the manner in which this separation should be 
arranged, so as to best facilitate the right to manifest religious belief.  It is contends 
that religious diversity needs to be managed in ways other than secularism and 
privatisation.
10
 
                                                          
4
 See section 7.2.1.1 above. 
5
 D Chidester Global Citizenship, Cultural Citizenship and World Religions in Religion Education 
(2002) 15-16.  See also section 8.4 above. 
6
 These new challenges may include the impact of globalisation, immigration and the new world order.  
In this regard see also Chidester ibid. 
7
 See section 3.6. 
8
 See discussion in section 3.7. 
9
 See section 4.8. 
10
 In this regard see generally RIJ Hackett ‗Rethinking the Role of Religion in Changing Public 
Spheres: Some Comparative Perspectives (2005) Brigham Young Law Review 659; R Audi & N 
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In addition to proposals being put forward regarding the reconceptualisation of 
secularism, this chapter further evaluates the manner in which the individual human 
rights regime is constructed in the international legal context.  Here too, it is evident 
that the international framework in terms of which the right to freedom of religion is 
regulated was formulated in response to historical conflict and abuse of human rights.  
The international framework for that reason emphasises the individual nature of 
fundamental rights.
11
  This too may have appeared suitable at the time of 
implementation, but it cannot be assumed that this approach will remain appropriate in 
light of new challenges, such as increasing ethnic diversity. 
 
It is evident that the largely homogenous societies of the past, for example France, are 
becoming increasingly diverse.
12
  This diversity is coupled with a rising identity 
consciousness,
13
 which requires representation in a state that may display an existing 
dominant culture, a common language, a national identity and a dominant religion.
14
  
                                                                                                                                                                       
Wolterstorff Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate 
(1997). 
11
 K Engle The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy (2010) 101. 
12
 Immigrants in France make up roughly 10 percent of the total population.  United Nations 
Department of Economics and Social Affairs ‗International Migration 2006‘ United Nations 
Department of Economics and Social Affairs, available at  
<http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006_Migration_Chart/> last accessed on 5 June 2009. 
13
 SA Dersso Perspectives on the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Africa (2010) 10. 
14
 Dersso (note 13 above) 9.  This is confirmed by the statement of Parkipuny to the United Nations 
(UN) Working Group of Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP) in which he states that in post-colonial 
Africa, the ‗state monopoly of national identities‘ opened the door for prejudice and infringements of 
the rights of peoples with cultures that are different from those of the dominant national population.  In 
this regard see M. Parkipuny ‗The indigenous peoples‘ rights question in Africa‘, statement to the 6th 
session of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva, Switzerland, on 3 
August 1989, available at <http://cwis.org/fwdp/Africa/parkipuny.txt> last accessed on 22 May 2010. as 
included in KN. Bojosi ‗The African commission working group of experts on the rights of indigenous 
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Often the institutional dominant culture may suppress the minority cultures and 
minority members within the diverse community may face discrimination.  This 
discrimination brings new challenges to the manner in which human rights are 
protected. 
 
The principle of secularism and the individual nature of human rights are generally 
relics of the age of modernity.
15
  It is argued that a postmodern approach will best 
respond to the demands of present day society in which globalisation has drawn 
attention to difference and diversity. 
 
5.1.1 Postmodern approach 
 
Suggestions regarding the structuring of the relationship between the state and 
religion, as well as the manner in which the right to freedom of religion ought to be 
interpreted will be in framed in terms of the postmodern approach.  It is argued that 
this approach will facilitate the enhanced protection of the right to manifest religious 
belief. 
 
The main reason for this premise is that postmodernity tends to emphasise the local 
rather than the general, the excluded rather than the included and the distinctive rather 
than the general.
16
  In doing so, postmodern theory acknowledges diversity of 
religious beliefs and opinions and considers phrasing secularist humanism to be but 
one of these diverse beliefs and accordingly not the overarching approach in terms of 
which religious diversity ought to be dealt with.  Postmodern theory aims to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
communities/populations: some reflections on its work so far‘ in SA Dersso Perspectives on the Rights 
of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Africa (2010) 98. 
15
 In this regard see the discussion in section 3.2. 
16
 R Gill Moral leadership in a postmodern age (1997) 155. 
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reconceptualise a form of pluralistic justice which takes into account the excluded and 
marginalised ‗other‘.17 
 
It must be noted that ‗[t]he expression ―postmodern‖ has however developed into a 
container concept‘18 in terms of which different content can be put forward dependant 
on the aim of the sender.  The concept postmodernism is therefore used here in 
contrast with the concept modernism to illustrate the accommodation of religious and 
cultural values in the pursuit of enhanced protection of the fundamental right to 
freedom of religion. 
 
It is argued for the reconceptualisation of the modern state and the relationship 
between the state and religion.  This reconceptualisation recognises that the state does 
not consist of individuals but includes a community of communities.
19
  It is further 
argued for the re-interpretation of the individual nature of human rights in terms of 
which the collective nature of human rights is also acknowledged.  However, it ought 
to be borne in mind that every multicultural society will need to devise its own 
appropriate structure to suit history, cultural traditions, range and depth of diversity.
20
 
 
The reconceptualisation cannot begin without questioning the impact of the dominant 
theory of secularism and the assumption of a single and universally valid model for 
statehood and fundamental human rights.
21
  This chapter therefore proceeds by putting 
                                                          
17
 Z Arslan ‗Taking Rights Less Seriously: Postmodernism and Human Rights‘ (1999) 5 Res Publica 
195, 207. 
18
 W Günther ‗Postmodernism‘ (1997) 86 International Review of Mission 343, 425. 
19
 P Bhikhu Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 2
nd
 ed (2006) 185. 
20
 In SA explicit recognition of religious and cultural minorities and the celebration of the country‘s 
diverse heritage has been successful to an extent in accommodating religious and cultural diversity.  In 
this regard see generally JW de Gruchy & S Martin Religion and the Reconstruction of Civil Society 
(1995); D Chidester Religion in Public Education: Options for a New South Africa (1994). 
21
 Bhikhu (note 19 above) 195. 
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forward various normative arguments, both philosophical and constitutional, that 
argue for the advanced protection of the right to freedom of religion.  Key arguments 
against religious based discrimination include respect for equality and dignity.  
Ultimately, this chapter concludes that respect for dignity and diversity provides the 
strongest argument against religious discrimination and prejudice.  A brief critique of 
the theory of secularism is presented next. 
 
5.2 The inherent difficulty with the concept of secularism 
 
The foundational principle of secularism is that the state is to remain neutral among 
religions and therefore the public sphere should be neutral towards religion.
22
  A 
neutral state is premised to be the best approach at ensuring the equal protection of 
difference.  Every person is deemed entitled to all the rights and freedoms as well as 
equal protection of the law without distinction of any kind, including religion.  The 
argument can therefore be made that human rights should be ‗religiously impartial‘.23  
However, the concept of secularism is interpreted in many ways
24
 and may even at 
times not reflect religious neutrally, but rather domination. 
 
5.2.1 Critique of secularism  
 
The manner in which secularism has been structured, as shown previously, is 
generally rooted in the patriarchal structure of Christianity.
25
  As a result, the concept 
of secularism too complies with the Aquinas dictum ‗[t]hings known are in the knower 
                                                          
22
 The concept of secularism was discussed in section 3.2. 
23
 D Little ‗Studying ―Religious Human Rights‖ Methodological Foundations‘ in JD van der Vyver & J 
Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 45 -77 at p 
55. 
24
 See discussion in section 3.4. 
25
 See section 3.3.2. 
 
 
 
 
163 
 
according to the mode of the knower‘.26  Therefore, the notion of public morality or 
public interest in a secular state may resemble a particular point of view of public 
morality or public interest.  For example, arguments against prohibiting ‗immoral‘ 
sexual behaviour, like prostitution and same-sex sexual acts are indicative of a 
particular mode of knowing.  It is therefore essential that existing legal rules are 
scrutinised for ethnocentric and religious bias, to determine if they are acceptable in a 
pluralistic society.
27
 
 
The value of secularism in ensuring equal protection of diverse interests is 
consequently questionable.  In this regard, Bader argues that: 
Something is inherently wrong with the conception of a melting pot that tries to 
achieve a new public, political culture by ignoring strong ethnic and national cultures 
and identities or relegating them to the "private" realm. Formal "color-blindness" does 
not work and cannot work.
28
 
 
This ineptness of secularism as a means of ensuring neutrality and the equal protection 
of difference is further emphasised, for example, in light of past intolerance against the 
public manifestations of religion.
29
  Adhar and Leigh talk about a ‗mirage of perfect 
neutrality‘30 and argue that there always is an ‗establishment of state orthodoxy‘.31  
                                                          
26
 PR Eddy ‗Religious Pluralism and the Divine: Another Look at John Hick's Neo-Kantian Proposal‘ 
(1994) Religious Studies 30 (4) 467, 474.  This point of view is supported by discourse ethics which 
views ‗the moral point of view as embodied in an intersubjective practice of argumentation which 
enjoins those involved to an idealizing enlargement of their interpretive perspectives‘.  In this regard 
see J Habermas ‗Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political 
Liberalism‘ (1995) 92 (3) The Journal of Philosophy 109, 117. 
27
 Habermas (note 26 above) 120. 
28
 V Bader ‗The Cultural Conditions of Transnational Citizenship: On the Interpenetration of Political 
and Ethnic Cultures Source‘ (1997) 25 (6) Political Theory 771, 776. 
29
 See Section 6.3. 
30
 R Adhar & I Leigh Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2005) 7. 
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From this point of view, it appears as if secularism has replaced the hegemony of 
religion with hegemony of anti-religion.  Therefore secularism has not ensured the 
existence of a neutral public sphere. 
 
The question is therefore posed whether religious diversity can be accommodated 
through the principle of secularism and the separation of religion from the realm of the 
political.  It is premised that religious diversity cannot be accommodated through this 
separation and that religious voices ought to be audible in the public domain.
32
  The 
need for religious voices to be heard is aptly shown when the collective nature of 
religion is fully appreciated.  The collective nature of religion is discussed next. 
 
5.2.1.1 The collective nature of religion 
 
Smith‘s interpretation of religion is helpful in understanding the collective nature of 
religion.  He suggests that every religion is a combination of two components: a 
historical ‗cumulative tradition‘ and the personal ‗faith‘ of those within that 
tradition.
33
  It is suggested that when appreciating this composite nature of religion a 
reconceptual understanding of religion is possible.  In terms of this understanding, a 
strict divide between public and private as dictated by some interpretations of 
secularism is not possible.  The composite nature of religion is aware of the fact that 
religion displays an individual interest.  Religion however also has a communal aspect 
in terms of which an individual‘s religion forms part of the broader social context of 
culture and ethnicity to which the individual belongs.
34
  In applying this communal 
                                                                                                                                                                       
31
 Ibid. 
32
 See generally SL Carter The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize 
Religious Devotion (1994). 
33
 WC Smith The Meaning and End of Religion: a New Approach to the Religious Traditions of 
Mankind (1964) 137. 
34
 Ibid 140. 
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consideration, the harm of discrimination is suffered not only by the individual but 
also by the specific community to which that religious individual belongs. Therefore, 
religious voices have to be endorsed in the public domain. 
 
In response to this claim that religious voices should not be excluded from the public 
domain it may be argued that the accommodation of religion threatens the separation 
between state and religion.  This doctrine protects our institutions from religious 
domination and religion from government oppression.  For that reason, it remains 
important that a balance be struck between freedom of religion, on the one hand, and 
the need to guard institutions from religious dominance, on the other hand.  The basis 
of this balance cannot be the demand that adherents to religious faiths are required to 
divide themselves into a private and public self.  The diverse state needs to find ways 
in which the separation is maintained, while simultaneously treating collective 
religious beliefs with respect.  This balance will be representative of the fact that the 
principle task of separation between state and religion is to secure religious liberty and 
not to protect the secular world from religious influence.
35
 
 
5.2.1.2 Impact on marginalised religions 
 
As indicated above, the harm of discrimination is suffered not only by the individual 
but also by the community as well, due to the collective nature of religion.  This harm 
is even more significant in marginalised or vulnerable communities.  Therefore, to 
relegate religion to the private domain has the most severe negative effect on 
unpopular or outsider religions.  For example, in the USA, when Native Americans 
objected to the Forest Service plans to allow logging and road building in a national 
forest traditionally used for by the tribes for sacred rituals, the Supreme Court held 
that ‗Government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen‘s 
                                                          
35
 Carter (note 32 above) 107. 
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religious needs and desires‘.36  The right to manifest religious belief through the 
adherence of sacred rituals are consequently without meaning for this outsider 
religion.37 
 
Sachs J aptly captures the impact on marginalised religions in the following quotation 
in the Prince v President, Cape Law Society case: 
[W]hat we are bold to call neutrality means in practice that big religions win and small 
religions lose . . . [T]he cathedral is not safe [from having a road built across its land] 
because it is a religious building – it is safe because it is a building valued by a 
politically powerful constituent group … Neutrality is a blueprint for the accidental 
destruction of religions that lack power.
 38
 
 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that the claim that secularism neither favours 
nor discriminates is fictitious.  Quite the opposite is clear: that neutrality in general has 
contributed to the perpetuation of the imposition of a colonial view on many other 
cultures and that neutrality is only a disguised imposition of majority preferences.
39
  
The influence of power reminds us of the role of colonialism and other forms of 
exploitation of the weak.
40
  A so-called secular and neutral approach is therefore not 
                                                          
36
 Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U S 439 (1988) at 452. 
37
 L Carter ‗Religious Freedom as if Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice Brennan‘ (1999) 87 
California Law Review 1059, 1063. 
38
 Prince v President, Cape Law Society, and Others 2001 (2) SA 388 (CC); 2001 (2) BCLR 133 (CC) 
(Prince) 158. 
39
 V Sacks ‗Multiculturism, Constitutionalism and The South African Constitution‘ (1997) Winter 
South African Public Law 627, 675.  
40
 See generally TF Driver ‗The case for pluralism‘ in J Hick & PF Knitter The myth of Christian 
uniqueness: toward a pluralistic theology of religions (1987).  See also DJ Louw ‗Towards a 
decolonized assessment of the religious other‘ (1990) 18 (4) South African Journal of Philosophy 390. 
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neutral in relation to cultural identities because of the power relations in the particular 
state.
41
 
 
Kuitert is of the opinion that given the diversity of religious beliefs and cultures it is 
impossible to find one normative authority that is equitable for all.
42
  In an attempt to 
elevate a universal morality through adherence to the principle of secularism, the 
enlightenment recedes back to the pre-enlightenment where the authority is once again 
vested in the hands of the state or church.
43 
 
The following interpretation of secularism as put forward in the judgment of 
McKenzie J in the unanimous decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the 
matter of Chamberlain v Surrey School Board, encapsulates the concept of secularism 
aptly as such:  
In my opinion, ―strictly secular‖ in the School Act can only mean pluralist in the sense 
that moral positions are to be accorded standing in the public square irrespective of 
whether the position flows out of a conscience that is religiously informed or not.  
That meaning of strictly secular is thus pluralist or inclusive in the widest sense.
44  
 
Here too, the necessity for religious voices to be heard in the public domain is 
considered part of a secular approach.  It is argued that this interpretation of the 
concept of secularism is the most suited to ensuring the protection of the right to 
freedom of religion and in particular the right to manifest religious belief in a diverse 
                                                          
41
 In this regard see generally W Kymlicka, The Rights of Minority Cultures (1995) 10. 
42
 In this regard see HM Kuitert ‗Een moral van het jaar nul? Ethiek-beoefening onderweg naar 2000‘ 
in: Zijn de dagen van God geteld?  Feestbundel voor Ton van der Worp (1995) 11, 53-54, as quoted in 
NN Koopman Dade of Deugde? Implikasies vir die Suid-Afrikaanse kerke van ŉ moderne postmoderne 
debat or moraliteit PhD Thesis University of the Western Cape (2000) 49. 
43
 In this regard see Koopman (note 42 above) 49. 
44
 Chamberlain v Surrey School Board (2000), 80 BCLR (3d) 181 (C.A.) reversing (1998), 60 BCLR 
(3d) 311 (S.C.) per McKenzie JA 33. 
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society.  For these reasons it has been suggested that secularism must be 
reconceptualised not as a principle of absolute separation between the state and 
religion, but as a principle of even-handed treatment by the state of all religions.
45
  It is 
from this postmodern approach, that the principle of secularism is viewed next. 
 
5.2.2 Postmodern response to secularism: The return of religion to the public 
sphere 
 
The ethnic diverse community brings new challenges to the traditional manner in 
which the relationship between the state and religion is structured and the protection 
afforded to fundamental human rights in general and the right to freedom of religion.  
It has been argued that the very nature of religion takes no notice of the public-private 
divide.  Religious people often see life as a whole and aspire to manifest their beliefs 
in their private and public lives.  In addition, the separation of the secular state too is a 
product of history and reflective of this historical domination.
46
  In this regard, 
feminists and critical race theorists have emphasised the patriarchal bias of liberal 
culture and called for its reassessment.
47
  A similar appeal is made on behalf of 
religious and cultural groups regarding the reassessment of the secular state and the 
strict separation between the public and the private sphere.
48
 
 
                                                          
45
 C Laborde ‗Secular Philosophy & Muslim Headscarves In Schools‘ (2005) 13(3) The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 305, 329. 
46
 See discussion in section 8.2. 
47
 See generally N Bohler-Muller Developing a New Jurisprudence of Gender Equality in South Africa 
LLD thesis, University of Pretoria (2005); see also L Sanford ‗Religious Language and the Public 
Square, Reviewed work: Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics by 
Michael J Perry‘ (1992) Harvard Law Review 2061, 2601. 
48
 In this regard see generally PL Berger & PS Huntington, Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in 
the Contemporary World (2002). 
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In response to the claims of silencing and exclusion from religious believers, 
Habermas states that ‗[t]he boundaries between the private and public autonomy of 
citizens are in flux‘.49  Habermas therefore argues that although secular society is 
grounded in democratic legitimisation, the political realm should nevertheless not 
ignore the realm of the religious.
50
  Secularists are mistaken when they ask believers to 
leave their religion at the door before entering into the public square.  Rieffer too 
argues that religion should not be barred from the public square, as the right to 
freedom of religion is a social freedom and includes the right to influence the policies 
and laws by which a free people will be governed.
51
  It is premised that for many 
believers religion is not an ‗extra‘ component but the ‗base‘ component of their 
identity.  In light of this concept, it is generally implausible for a believer to pronounce 
a secular reason as religious belief will influence her opinion on state policy on 
welfare and abortion for example.
52
  Political dialogue should therefore not exclude 
arguments from religious believers but rather welcome them so that the political realm 
may reclaim the confidence of a diverse nation.
53
 
 
Religion therefore should be reintroduced to the public discourse so that it may play a 
role in decision-making processes.  Habermas argues that citizens are required to 
                                                          
49
 Habermas (note 26 above) 128. 
50
 J Habermas ‗Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State‘ in J Habermas & J 
Ratzinger (eds)The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (2006) 19, 42. 
51
 BA Rieffer ‗Religion, Politics and Human Rights Understanding the Role of Christianity in the 
Promotion of Human Rights‘ (2006) 6 Human Rights and Human Welfare 31, 32.  See also H Arendt 
The Human Condition (1958).  Arendt defines the public space as a world inhabited by humans and 
therefore reflective of the social status of human nature. 
52
 N Wolterstorff ‗Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920)‘ in J Witte Jr. & FS Alexander (eds) The Teachings of 
Modern Christianity on Law, Politics, and Human Nature (2006) 295-96, 309. 
53
 W Galston ‗Defending Liberalism‘ (1982) 76 (3) The American Political Science Review, 621, 629. 
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translate their religious based claims into secular reasons.
54
  Rawls uses the notion of 
translation to describe the ways in which rational arguments of religious people are 
made accessible to a secular audience.
55
  This demand for accessibility is critiqued in 
the following manner: 
[O]nly citizens committed to religious beliefs are required to split up their identities, 
as it were, into their public and private elements. They are the ones who have to 
translate their religious beliefs into a secular language before their arguments have 
any chance of gaining majority support.
56
 
 
Calhoun claims that bridging the distance between religious and non-religious 
arguments cannot be achieved through translation alone.
57
    He suggests that 
translation should be seen as a metaphor for the process of becoming able to 
understand the arguments of another.  Calhoun continues by stating that we are indeed 
more able to understand the arguments of others when we understand more of the 
intellectual and personal commitments and cultural frames.  Habermas refers to this as 
a ‗complimentary learning process‘.58  Calhoun continues in acknowledging that often 
mutual understanding cannot be achieved without change in the parties, individually 
as well as collectively in that ‗mutual engagement across the national or cultural or 
religious frontiers changes the pre-existing nations, cultures and religions‘.59 
 
In contrast with Rawls and, to a lesser extent Habermas, it is argued that the approach 
of Carter is preferable in that he maintains that: 
                                                          
54
 See generally Habermas (note 26 above); J Habermas ‗Religion in the Public Sphere‘(2006) 14 (1) 
European Journal of Philosophy 1. 
55
 J Rawls Political Liberalism (1993) 212. 
56
 J Habermas The Future of Human Nature (2003) 109. 
57
 C Calhoun ‗Secularism, Citizenship and the Public Sphere‘ (2008) 7 Hedgehog Review 1118. 
58
 J Habermas, ‗Die Dialektik der Säkularisering,‘ Bläter für deutsche und international Politik, 
available at< http://blaetter.de/artikel.php?p=2802> last accessed on 11 December 2010. 
59
 Calhoun (note 57 above) 18. 
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[A] requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of dialogue that liberalism 
accepts, but that liberalism develops a politics that accepts whatever form of dialogue 
a member of the public offers. ... What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen, not 
because the speaker has the right voice but because the speaker has the right to 
speak.
60
 
For these reasons it is argued that public policy ought to be influenced by more than 
just so-called public reason and that religious voices also have a role to play in the 
crafting of public policy.
61
  This argument is supported by Cooke who claims that to 
do otherwise builds an inequality into the system that weakens the bonds of solidarity 
between all citizens.
62
 
 
One way in which voice of religious diversity can be accommodated in the public 
realm is through following an approach similar to the approach suggested by Brems.
63
  
She argues for inclusive universality in terms of which cultural claims can be brought 
into the realm of human rights law.  This argument is supported by the fact that 
examples of inclusive universality can be found in existing international human rights 
context.  For example, the margin of appreciation doctrine as applied by the European 
Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) is an example of the recognition of national 
difference.  In addition, reference to progressive realisation as contained in the 
                                                          
60
 Carter (note 32 above) 230. 
61
 FJ Mootz III ‗Faith and Politics in the Post-Secular Age: The Promise of President Obama‘ (2009) 
Research Paper 10-05, 32, available at:< http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433545> last accessed on 19 May 
2010. 
62
 M Cooke ‗A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? Postmetaphysical Political Theory and the Place 
of Religion‘ (2007) 14 (2) Constellations 224, 233.  See also generally M. Cooke, ‗Five Arguments for 
Deliberative Democracy‘ (2000) 45 (5) Political Studies 947; Audi & Wolterstorff (note 10 above) 
108–9. 
63
 In this regard see generally E Brems  ‗Reconciling Universality and Diversity in International Human 
Rights: A Theoretical and Methodological Framework and Its Application in the Context of Islam‘ 
(2004) 5 Human Rights Review 5, 12. 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in terms 
of which an obligation to ‗take steps‘ toward the realisation of full human rights 
protection also serves as a case in point.
64
  It is suggested that just as these differences 
have been accepted the voice of religious and cultural difference can be accepted in 
the public domain. 
 
Other examples of how dialogue between the cultural claims of diverse societies and 
the international human rights regime have altered both these societies,
65
 include the 
recognition of the collective nature of human rights and the acknowledgment of the 
aspect that human rights does not just recognise rights, but that all rights are also 
infused with obligations as well.
66
  Both these examples of altered appreciation of the 
role of human rights are relevant in relation to the right to freedom of religion as 
shown. 
 
The notion of the acceptability of religious dialogue is also defended by Hicks who 
states that this possibility of a pluralistic approach towards religion is possible in light 
of the fact that ‗religious allegiance depends in the great majority of cases on the 
accident of birth‘.67  He explains the impact of cumulative tradition on individual faith 
as follows: 
If I had been born in India I would probably be a Hindu; if in Egypt, probably a 
Muslim; if in Ceylon, probably a Buddhist; but I was born in England and am, 
predictably, a Christian.
68
 
                                                          
64
 ICESCR article 2 as commented on in terms of Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment Number 3, E/1991/23. 
65
 Brems (note 63 above) 13. 
66
 Brems (note 63 above) 15. 
66
Brems Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (2001) 431. 
67
 J Hick An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcedent (1989) 231-32. 
68
 Ibid.  It is in relation to different ways of being human, developed within civilisation and cultures of 
the earth, that the ‗Real‘, apprehended through the concept of God, is experienced specifically as the 
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Therefore our being born in a particular part of the world per se is the only basis for 
the privilege of knowing the only religious truth.
69
  Through awareness of this 
knowledge it is possible that we may become more appreciative of the fact that there is 
consequently no single universal human experience but rather a range of possible 
different ways of living a human life.
70
 
 
It is suggested that a suitable forum for religious dialogue is in the sphere of 
citizenship. The religious meaning of being human in all its diversity should be 
allowed into the political domain creating dynamics of inclusion.
71
  Public 
participation ought to allow for the appreciation of issues from the point of view of 
those with differing religious convictions and cultural backgrounds.
72
  Public 
participation is generally facilitated through the role of citizenship.  It is argued that 
this process of facilitation as well as the role of citizenship should be reconceptualised 
to adapt to social and cultural diversity. 
 
In the past citizenship has been based on a divide between the public and private 
spheres.  The postmodern democratic state should be based on a concept of citizenship 
that incorporates difference.  Citizenship can no longer be based exclusively on the 
foundation of shared identity but should rather be based on principles of human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                       
God of Israel, or as the Holy Trinity, or as Shiva, or as Allah, or as Vishnu.  See Hick (note 67 above) 
245. 
69
 J Hick ‗The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism‘ (1997) 14 Faith and Philosophy 277, 
287; see also generally W Alston ‗Religious Diversity and the Perceptual Knowledge of God‘ (1988) 5 
Faith and Philosophy 433.  See also HH The Dalai Lama Towards the true kinship of faith.  How the 
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that do not impose a particular dominant culture on minorities.  Habermas has referred 
to this as the culture of ‗constitutional patriotism‘.73  Constitutional patriotism can 
however only emerge when the dominant culture has been dissolved.
74
  One way of 
allowing religious voices into the public domain is through a comprehensive 
understanding of the principles of democratic citizenship. 
 
5.2.2.1 Democratic citizenship 
 
From the inception of the concept of the nation state following the Peace of 
Westphalia,
75
 the concept of citizenship has shared on aspect: that the framework for 
citizenship is the sovereign state that provides a distinct source of identity.  
Immigration and globalisation have however altered the homogeneous nature and 
identity of the sovereign state.
76
  As a result, the concept of citizenship must adapt to 
this changed reality.  The majority culture can no longer serve as the foundation of a 
shared identity.  The concept of a shared identity must be replaced by principles of 
human rights agreed upon by all and not imposed by a particular majority culture on 
minorities.  Young envisages a model of differentiated citizenship in which citizens 
partake from their own ‗situated positions‘ and attempt to construct a dialogue across 
difference.
77
 
 
                                                          
73
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Macpherson has explained that democracy is not only about electing leaders but that 
‗the egalitarian principle inherent in democracy requires not only ‗one man, one vote,‘ 
[but also] one man, one equal right to live as fully humanly as he may wish‘.78  The 
way in which democracy is structured therefore needs to be revisited so that 
individuals are able to form part of the decisions that affect their lives.  In addition, the 
ability of the marginalised to influence the democratic processes needs to be addressed 
to ensure that the less powerful are not subjected to domination.  Glendon maintains 
that all citizens should be encouraged to be part of public dialogue.  This participation 
can be by way of for example partaking in constitutional litigation or involvement in 
civil society debates.
79
  Other advocates for political recognition for differently-
situated group identities within democratic societies include Phillips,
80
 Mouffe and 
Young.
81
  These advocates of a ‗politics of difference‘ concur that groups do not only 
wish to be recognised in an equal manner to all others in society, they strive for 
recognition as a person of a particular sort, with a particular kind of identity.
82
  The 
approach of Mouffe forms the basis of the discussion below. 
 
Mouffe calls for a deepening of democracy through a radicalisation of the modern 
democratic tradition.  She argues that modern democratic societies must be held 
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accountable to the ideals that all human beings are free and equal.
83
  Accordingly, 
democracy must be extended and the importance of the community needs to be given 
emphasis, as a citizen cannot be viewed independent from her position in a political 
community.
84
  The concept of citizenship does not only exist in homogenous societies.  
On the contrary, citizenship is to be found in societies consisting of different ethnic 
and cultural identities.
85
  While it is important to allow for pluralism in areas such as 
culture, religion and morality, it must be acknowledged that citizenship requires 
commitment to the principals of modern democracy and that one‘s identity as a citizen 
exists independent from one‘s ethnic, religious or racial identity.86 
 
This inclusive politics, in which all citizens engage, should encapsulate the 
Macpherson maxim ‗one man, one equal right to live as fully humanly as he may 
wish‘ as discussed above.87  To achieve this egalitarian understanding of public 
participation the process of participation should be reconceptualised to adapt to social 
and cultural diversity.  One way in which participation is generally enhanced is 
through the process of deliberative democracy. 
 
                                                          
83
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84
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5.2.2.2 Deliberative democracy through value pluralism
88
 
 
Democratic politics is linked to the existence of a social space where people act 
collectively as citizens to democratically resolve issues concerning their life in the 
political community.  Democracy requires that people come together, as citizens, to 
determine the affairs of the community.
89
  This process is never complete and is a 
process of constant renegotiation in which citizens defend and articulate competing 
conceptions of political legitimacy.
90
  The indeterminate nature of this constant 
renegotiation is well captured in the following confirmation: 
Living with contradictions in our postmodern world is not a fate.  It is rather an 
opportunity to appreciate the contrasts that constitute the full picture of the reality we 
experience, in other words, and aesthetic mode of coping with the dilemma of 
contradiction.
91 
 
However, democracy does not seek to transform private virtues into public virtues.  
Democratic citizenship requires that citizens relate towards one another in mutual 
respect, seeking achievement of the principles of ‗positive liberty‘, democracy and 
                                                          
88
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self-government, and not simply the principles of ‗negative liberty‘ or non-
interference.
92
 
 
However, the opening of the democratic discourse to interact with religious and 
cultural difference requires the application of democratic models in which such 
interaction can occur, for example is deliberative democracy.
93
  The model of 
deliberative democracy can be made use of as a means to facilitate such interaction.  
The main object of deliberative democracy is that decisions should be reached through 
a process of deliberation amongst free and equal citizens.  The more equal, impartial 
and open the process, the less likely the participants will be coerced.  Benhabib 
describes the process in the following way: 
According to the deliberative model of democracy, it is a necessary condition for 
attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decision making 
processes in a polity, that the institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is 
considered in the common interest of all results from processes of collective 
deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals.
94
 
 
However, deliberative democracy in a secular society generally renounces religious, 
moral or philosophical views.  Secularism maintains that as separation exists between 
                                                          
92
 M Dietz ‗Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenhip‘ in C Mouffe (ed) Dimensions of 
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the realm of the private, where plurality of ideas coexists, and the realm of the public, 
and that consensus can only be established in the realm of the public. 
 
Mouffe states that through the privatisation of life, social stability has not resulted.
95
  
In fact, extreme forms of individualism have become more prevalent.  She claims that 
the increase in various religious, moral and ethnic fundamentalisms is a direct 
consequence of the democratic deficit, which characterises most liberal democratic 
societies.
96
  Mediating conflicting interests through privatisation leaves aside the role 
played by collective forms of identification.  Traditional deliberative democracy tends 
to overlook the inherent tension that exists between democracy and liberalism.
97
 
 
In response, value pluralism is committed to affirming the heterogeneity of values and 
places no hierarchical ranking to this diversity of values.
98
  The public space is 
restructured in a way which welcomes all citizens despite their diverse identities, 
allowing those who were left outside to enter, bringing with them their particularities. 
A reconceptualised deliberative democracy necessitates an appreciation that social 
relations are tantamount to power relations, and what is needed is an approach that 
places the question of power as the focal point.
99
  The very nature of these power 
relations are that they exclude in that: 
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There is always something that has been excluded, so there is no consensus without 
exclusion. There is no possibility of complete inclusion, because in order to create a 
hegemonic order, there is always something that needs to be oppressed.
100 
 
This exclusion actually leads to more destruction, as peoples‘ need for collective 
identity will never disappear since it is integral part of human existence.
101
  Collective 
identification by its very nature supposes the existence of ‗we‘ which likewise 
presupposes a ‗they‘.102  Democratic citizenship should therefore be appreciative of 
the importance of the collective identity
103
 as well as the fact that the adversarial 
relationship between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ is a necessary component of a well functioning 
political realm.
104
  This distinction between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ is particularly pronounced 
in the case of religion as the commitment to religion per se is exclusive in that: 
A person ascribes to one religion at a time and doing so entails rejecting fundamental 
elements of other religions. I cannot say, for instance, that I am a Jew but believe that 
Christ is the Messiah.
105 
 
Mouffe declares that a tension exists between the principle of individual rights and 
democratic self-government that cannot be eradicated.
106
  She argues for the 
negotiation of this tension through solutions, which are never fixed.  Mouffe however 
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does not argue for acceptance of total pluralism, but rather calls for an 
acknowledgment of the political nature of the limits placed on liberalism.  This is 
preferable to these limits being presented as rational.
107
  Her main critique is that this 
‗rationality‘ relies on a separation of the realm of the public, where consensus can be 
established through a shared conception of justice, and the realm of the private, where 
a plurality of different and irreconcilable views exists.
108
  It impossible to circumscribe 
a domain that would not be subject to a pluralism of values and where consensus 
without exclusion could exist.  It is submitted that Mouffe is correct in her point of 
view.  Mouffe further claims that the main task for democracy is not to avoid different 
views but to convert antagonism into agonism, enemies into adversaries, fighting into 
critical engagement.
109
 
 
Gardbaum supports Mouffe in that he maintains that: 
[I]t is expected that autonomous citizens will affirm different and incompatible ... 
conceptions of the public and private good. Such divergence should be viewed as the 
desired and characteristic result of a vibrant democratic society in which people 
pursue their own ideas and ways of life.  Accordingly, the fact of reasonable pluralism 
is not so much a "problem" in need of accommodation or regulation ... as it is the 
characteristic symptom and result of a genuinely free society. ... In short, liberalism 
does not merely accommodate or tolerate difference, but embraces and celebrates it.
110 
 
The conditions required to enable the development of one‘s identity, include the 
existence of a truly pluralist democratic society, which is usually seen as a society in 
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where divergent values and identities are able to coexist in a peaceful manner.
111
  
Accordingly, ‗value pluralism‘112 is conducive to an environment in which respect and 
tolerance coupled with dialogue assists in the shaping of the social and political 
design. 
 
5.3 The flawed theoretical foundation of human rights as individual negative 
rights 
 
Douzinas argues convincingly that the creation of natural rights was the result of an 
act of rebellion against priests and rulers.
113
  At first, these natural rights were 
inalienable, independent of government and expressed as the eternal rights of the 
universal ‗man‘.114  Soon this was altered and the origin of these rights were no longer 
found in nature and man, but located within the ‗nation-state‘.115  The historical 
legislator of the French and American nation attached the rights of man to the source 
of sovereignty of the state and the holder of rights to the ‗citizen‘.116  In addition the 
holder of the `rights of man' was: 
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[A] man all too man - a well-off, heterosexual, white male - who condensed the 
abstract dignity of humanity and the real prerogatives of belonging to the community 
of the powerful.
117
 
 
Douzinas states that despite the origin of human rights being in response to 
domination and that in as much as human rights were designed to liberate people from 
oppression the opposite is often achieved in that: 
[R]ights are highly artificial constructs, a historical accident of the European 
intellectual and political history.  The concept of rights belongs to the symbolic order 
of language and law, which determines their scope and reach.
118
 
 
In this regard, the applicability of human rights is determined through conflict and the 
battlefield is the manner in which words, such as ‗difference‘ and ‗equality‘ or 
‗similarity‘ and ‗freedom‘ are interpreted.  These encounters fundamentally affect 
peoples‘ lives.119  Klare supports this point of view when he emphasises that choices 
have to be made when limiting human rights and these choices bear social and 
political consequences as the rights discourse does not provide for neutral decisions.
120
 
 
The historical origin of human rights is not only applicable in France and the USA but 
has applicability everywhere.  Regarding the application in SA, Davis, in a similar 
vein, has acknowledged the impact of political reasoning when interpreting the rights 
contained in the Constitution as follows: 
[C]onstitutionalism is about moral and political reasoning.  When judges go about the 
business of constitutional adjudication, they are involved in a form of politics.  The 
very material with which they work is uncontested.  Indeed, the meaning to be given 
                                                          
117
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to the content of the Constitution is part of a continuous process of construction.  
Meaning is shaped by a system of social, political and ideological relations within 
which it is formed, so that meaning is always in being and becoming.
121
 
 
Langa J identifies with Davis and Douzinas in that he recognises that the interpretation 
of the fundamental rights in the Constitution involves the making of value 
judgments.
122  
These judgments occur in the light of the values which underlie the 
Constitution
 
in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and 
must be reflective of the values we find inherent in, or worthy of, pursuing in this 
society.
123
  The duty imposed in section 39(1) (a)
124
 and 7(1)
125
 compel the courts to 
make value choices and to make those values explicit through clear and transparent 
articulation.
126
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In light of the above it is important that the right to freedom of religion is not only 
construed as an individual right, but that the collective nature of the right is also 
appreciated.  In addition, the right should be reconceptualised in that the right does not 
only impose a negative duty on the state not to infringe but that the state has a positive 
duty to also promote and protect the right. 
 
5.3.1 Postmodern response: positive obligation to promote the collective right 
 
Kymlicka claims that in most states a distinction is drawn between the political and 
cultural community, with the political community usually consisting of individuals 
with individual rights.
127
  Liberalism places great emphasis on individual autonomy 
and the concept that each should be able to devise her own plan of a good life.
128
  
Habermas is appreciative of the emphasis liberalism places on individual autonomy in 
selecting the good life.  However he claims that in selecting one‘s own life, one 
morally ought to grant others with all their idiosyncrasies the same choice, and should 
not insist on universalising one‘s own identity.129  However, in selecting this good life 
one selects from a range of options often determined by cultural heritage.  Therefore, 
each individual‘s identity is bound to the cultural community in which she finds 
herself.
130
  Rawlsian
131
 and Dworkinian
132
 conceptions of justice are based on the 
notion that each individual‘s interest in the political community matters equally.133  
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Kymlicka however argues that Rawls and Dworkin do not discuss cultural 
membership because they assume cultural homogeneity, which regards the political 
and cultural as coextensive.
134
  While Kymlicka argues that some groups may need 
special protection, in that: 
The world today is increasingly multicultural and pluralistic. The focus of rights is 
shifting from the individual to the group. Groups are increasingly demanding 
recognition of their own interests, which they assert as pluralistic values that the 
democratic state must protect. Such groups define the pluralism of the state and act as 
a counterbalance to the developing power of the modem state. The individual's right to 
belong to the group is increasingly being challenged as a right of conscience.
135
 
 
Advances have been made in acknowledging the importance of culture and the 
collective nature of rights, as well as the duty to promote these collective rights.  The 
collective nature of the right to religion was affirmed in the decision of MEC for 
Education, KwaZulu-Natal & Others v Pillay in the following manner by O‘Regan J: 
[T]hat when a group of people share a religious belief, that group may also share 
associative practices that have meaning for the individuals within that religious group. 
Where one is dealing with associative practices, therefore, it seems that religion and 
culture should be treated similarly.
 136 
 
The Constitutional Court of SA acknowledged the intersection between culture and 
religion, and that wearing a nose stud may indeed be both an expression of culture and 
of religion: 
[P]articularly so in this case where the evidence suggests that the borders between 
culture and religion are malleable and that religious belief informs cultural practice 
and cultural practice attains religious significance. As noted above, that will not 
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always be the case: culture and religion remain very different forms of human 
association and individual identity, and often inform peoples‘ lives in very different 
ways. But in this matter, culture and religion sing with the same voice and it is 
necessary to understand the nose stud in that light – as an expression of both religion 
and culture.
137
 
 
Through interpreting the right as both an individual and a cultural right, or collective 
right, the protection afforded to the right to manifest belief was indeed enhanced.  In 
addition, the positive duty to accommodate through the adoption of special measures 
further entrenches the protection of the right.  It is suggested that the above 
interpretation truly enhances the right to manifest belief. 
 
5.4 The inequitable notion of toleration  
 
The initial phase of the protection of the right to freedom of religion was in terms of 
the concept of toleration.
138
  Later, toleration and promotion of the right to freedom of 
religion were incorporated into models of minority protection of the right to freedom 
of religion.
139
  In addition to pledging to refrain from discrimination, states undertook 
to recognise and respect diversity, as incorporated in the so-called minority treaties.
140
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The introduction of toleration can be compared to toleration in the narrow sense, from 
the Latin tolerantia, meaning to endure or bear.
141
  Generally toleration refers to the 
conditional acceptance with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers being 
wrong but still ‗tolerable‘ to the extent that they should not be prohibited or 
constrained.  Toleration therefore refers to the act of leaving someone alone, a so-
called ‗non-act‘ of moral disapproval.142  This disapproval is aptly captured in the 
following statement that ‗[o]ne cannot tolerate something one likes‘.143 
 
The distinction between tolerance and intolerance may at times be vague.  Danchin 
ascribes the tradition of religious intolerance to the existence of an intricate web of 
social, ethnic, cultural, political and economic factors.  Often pivotal is the 
unwillingness to accept the right of others to be different, which is also indicative of a 
lack of respect for the beliefs of others as well as a sense of superiority.
144
  Toleration 
at its core requires the individual to put up with the beliefs of others, and in doing so 
lessens the need to respect others.  Lockean toleration
145
 does not require parties 
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differing in religious ideologies to foster and sustain mutual respect and cooperation 
amongst themselves.
146
 
 
This Lockean concept of toleration as disapproval has developed into the concept of 
toleration in the broader sense.  This refers to a form of acceptance of the other‘s right 
to existence that incorporates a sense of respect.
147
  The tolerating parties respect one 
another in a reciprocal sense, despite their differences in their beliefs about the good 
way of life.
148
  This broader, Kymlickean approach towards toleration is supported.  
The reciprocal basis of this broader notion of toleration further incorporates aspects of 
equality.  Toleration includes both the notion of toleration as disapproval and the 
notion of toleration as respect.  Similarly the concept of respect toleration incorporates 
different notions of equality, both formal equality and qualitative equality.  Formal 
equality operates on a strict separation between the political and the private realm, in 
                                                          
146
 T Lindholm ‗Philosophical and Religious Justifications of Freedom of Religion or Belief‘ in 
Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook in T Lindholm, WC Durham & BG Tahzib-Lie 
(eds) (2004) 45. 
147
 See generally M Walzer On Toleration (1997); see also M Minnow ‗Putting Up and Putting Down: 
Tolerance Reconsidered‘ (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 441.  This definition of tolerance as 
respect is also supported by Declaration of Principles on Tolerance Proclaimed and signed by the 
Member States of UNESCO on 16 November 1995,  
available at <http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/tolerance.pdf> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
The meaning of tolerance is defined in Article 1.1 in the Declaration to indicate: ‗Tolerance is respect, 
acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and 
ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, and freedom of thought, 
conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference.  It is not only a moral duty, it is also a 
political and legal requirement.  Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the 
replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace‘. 
148
 For a discussion on toleration see generally AR Murphy ‗Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal 
Tradition‘ (1997) 29 (4) Polity 593; J Newman ‗The Idea of Religious Tolerance‘ (1978) 15 (3) 
American Philosophical Quarterly 187; J Habermas ‗Religious Tolerance—The Pacemaker for Cultural 
Rights‘ (2004) 79 Philosophy 5. 
 
 
 
 
190 
 
terms of which religious difference is confined to the private realm.  Qualitative 
equality acknowledges that formal equality favours religions which accommodate a 
public/private divide.  This broader, qualitative approach towards toleration as 
encapsulated in qualitative respect toleration is supported. 
 
5.4.1 The development of the notion of toleration  
 
A discussion of the development of the concept of toleration follows next.  First the 
Lockean model of toleration as disapproval is briefly discussed.  This is followed with 
an overview of respect toleration and qualitative respect toleration. 
 
From toleration (disapproval) to respect toleration 
 
In diverse societies, toleration is one way in which peace can be maintained.  Locke 
states with regards to political stability and religious diversity that: 
[H]ow much greater will the security of the government, where all subjects, of 
whatever church they be, without any distinction upon account of religion, enjoying 
the same favour of the prince, and the same benefit of the laws, shall become the 
common support and guard of it; and where none will have any occasion to fear the 
severity of laws, but those who do injuries to their neighbours, and offend against the 
civil peace.
149
 
 
According to Locke, regimes that respect divergent beliefs will win the support from 
those it respects, resulting in greater stability than when favouring a dominant group.  
John Stuart Mill extends the application of toleration to all forms of difference, 
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including cultural difference.
150
  A limitation on the scope of rights is to be found in 
Mill‘s harm principle: 
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant.  He cannot rightfully be compelled 
to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him 
happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right…..151 
 
The harm principle by its very nature implicates conceptions of good, thereby 
legitimising some central moral values, requiring a decision on which activities should 
be categorised as harm.  Therefore, harm as a normative concept has a specific 
meaning.
152
  The normative concept of harm is unmistakably illustrated in the 1957 
British parliamentary inquiry on the illegality of homosexual offences and prostitution 
in Britain, conducted under the chairmanship of Sir John Wolfenden.  In making 
recommendations the Wolfenden Committee took as its guiding principle Mill‘s harm 
principle, examined homosexuality and prostitution in terms of whether they cause 
harm to others and only if they did cause harm to others was the legislation justified.  
Accordingly the Wolfenden Committee declared that the law should not involve itself 
in questions of private morality.
153
 
 
Lord Devlin fiercely disagreed with the Wolfenden Committee‘s recommendations 
and maintained that immoral acts should be illegal, as society is based on a common 
morality and if one aspect of society‘s morality is endangered then the whole of 
society is threatened.  Lord Devlin argued that ‗[t]here is disintegration when no 
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common morality is observed and history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is 
often the first stage of disintegration‘.154 
 
The content of Lord Devlin‘s common morality is the morality of the reasonable man, 
which he described as follows: 
He is not to be confused with the rational man.  He is not expected to reason about 
anything and his judgement may largely be a matter of feeling.  It is the viewpoint of 
the man in the street… the man in the Clapham omnibus.  He might also be called the 
right-minded man.  For my purpose I should like to call him the man in the jury box, 
for the moral judgement of society must be something about which any twelve men or 
women drawn at random might after discussion be expected to be unanimous.
155
 
 
Lord Devlin‘s common morality raises concerns as to how minorities, who may be at 
odds with society‘s common morality, will be protected. 
 
Current philosophical thought on toleration, as put forward by amongst others 
Kymlicka, suggest that toleration as respect is more appropriate.  In terms of this 
understanding, each individual has the autonomy to choose her own conception of the 
good life.
156
  Derrida puts forward the notion of ‗unconditional hospitality‘ which 
means to let the other in, without judging them, as friends.
157
  The notion of 
acknowledgment through respect is more in line with emphasis on non-discrimination 
and deliberative democracy‘s accent on mutual recognition. 
 
From respect toleration to promotion 
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The approach towards toleration has further evolved, with a move from toleration to 
promotion.  When a state is composed of people of different cultural, linguistic and 
religious origin the issue of minorities arises.
158
  The ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee has considerably broadened the obligation regarding minorities as 
contained in article 27 of the ICCPR
159
 in the following manner: 
6.1 Although Article 27 is expressed in negative terms, that article, nevertheless, does 
recognize the existence of a ‗right‘ and requires that it shall not be denied.  
Consequently, a State party is under an obligation to ensure that the existence and the 
exercise of this right are protected against their denial or violation.  Positive measures 
of protection are therefore required not only against the acts of the State party itself, 
whether through its legislative, judicial or administrative authorities, but also against 
the acts of other persons within the State Party. 
6.2 Although the rights protected under Article 27 are individual rights, they depend 
in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its culture, language or 
religion.  Accordingly, positive measures by States may also be necessary to protect 
the identity of a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their 
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culture and language and to practice their religion, in community with other members 
of the group.
160
 
 
The ICCPR Human Rights Committee has placed a proactive obligation on state 
parties to ensure the maintenance of, amongst others, religious identities.  This 
proactive obligation supports the reconceptualisation of individual human rights as 
positive rights as discussed above.
161
  What is required is a positive form of toleration 
in which the state is obligated to stimulate an environment in which believers may 
fully express their religious identities and the state is committed to proactively 
supporting their religious development.  A pluralistic democracy has to permit the 
coexistence of a variety of cultures and viewpoints in that: 
Minority group identity requires not only tolerance, but also a positive attitude 
towards cultural pluralism on the part of the State and the larger society.  Not only 
acceptance, but also respect for the distinctive characteristics and contribution of 
minorities in the life of the national society as a whole, is required.  Protection of their 
identity means not only that the State should abstain from policies which have the 
purpose or effect of assimilating minorities into the dominant culture, but also that it 
should protect them against activities by third parties which have an assimilatory 
effect.
162
 
 
The protection of fundamental rights is therefore in principle of particular relevance to 
minorities.  The reason therefore is most appropriately captured by the following 
statement of Yacoob: 
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[C]onstitutions are designed to protect minority rights; that the constitutional 
provisions of freedom of religion are there to protect minority religions because 
majority religions protect themselves.
163
 
 
The fundamental message of state neutrality is one of religious equality.  Toleration 
merely allows someone to exist.  Furthermore tolerance without respect is simply a 
message of one being put up with, which may even be withdrawn.  Toleration is 
therefore not treating someone equally.  However to truly ensure non-discrimination 
and to accommodate diversity, it is important that norms are formulated that not only 
to protect, but also to promote and celebrate diversity.
164
  In this regard, the approach 
of the South African Constitutional Court has truly been exemplary as discussed in the 
matter of Pillay
165
 in which the court held that diversity needed to be celebrated 
 
5.4.2 Postmodern response to toleration: Celebration – one step further 
 
Toleration is indicative of what is permitted by the powerful, whereas diversity 
requires the recognition of each and everyone‘s uniqueness and dignity.166  The voice 
of difference, be it the voice of for example, indigenous people, cultural minorities, 
gays and lesbians, share one commonality, and that is their resistance to the claim that 
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there is only one acceptable approach to the recognition of rights.
167
  Their demand is 
for more than toleration; their claim is for affirmation, acceptance and respect. 
 
On an international level the individual right to freedom of religion or belief (article 
18 of the ICCPR) as well as the communal right of religious persons to enjoy their 
own culture (article 27 of the ICCPR) requires the proactive participation of all 
religious communities in political, social and economic processes as well.
168
  This 
proactive participation is enhanced in the Preamble to the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities.
169
  The Preamble expresses the political 
intentions of the Framework and with regard to pluralist societies, categorically claims 
that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of minorities should not only 
be respected, but that appropriate conditions, enabling them to express, preserve and 
develop this identity should be created.
170
  In addition, the Preamble
171
 calls for the 
creation of a climate of toleration and dialogue in terms of which social diversity is a 
source of enrichment and not a force of division in each society.  This Framework 
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Convention for the Protection of National Minorities indeed enhances the protection of 
the right to manifest religious belief and it is stated that similar protection on other 
regional and national levels would advance the protection of the right even more. 
 
This could be achieved through, for example, the formulation of norms that not only 
protect against discrimination, but also promote and even celebrate diversity through 
the adoption of differential measures.
172
  It is claimed that equal treatment does not 
exclude special treatment when such special treatment may ensure substantive 
equality.
173
  In this regard, Habermas refers to the line of reasoning in recent 
jurisprudence in terms of which the right of Sikhs to wear kirpans and Muslim women 
and girls to keep their headscarves were treated as a matter of exception to general 
laws.  Habermas argues that: 
[I]nterpreting these rulings as exceptions to rules misleadingly suggests a dialectic in 
the idea of equality. In fact, these decisions are only drawing out the consequences 
from the fact that Sikhs, Muslims, and Jews enjoy the same religious freedom as the 
Christian majority population.
174
 
 
The view of Habermas of substantive equality is supported.  Substantive equality is 
part of the essential elements in the protection of the rights of religious minorities.  
Other important elements in protecting the rights of religious minorities are the right to 
dignity and identity.
175
  Before proceeding to a discussion of the importance of dignity 
and identity, the concept of substantive equality is discussed next. 
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5.5 Traditional approach towards discrimination: formal equality versus the 
postmodern response: substantive equality 
 
To appreciate the principle of substantive equality it needs to be compared with formal 
equality.  Formal equality dictates that likes should be treated alike.
176
  Substantive 
equality appreciates difference that may necessitate differential treatment in order to 
reach full equality,
177
 in terms of which ‗unalike should be treated unalike‘ to the 
extent of their unlikeness.
178
  Therefore, equality not only requires that similar 
situations be treated in the same way, but also that different situations should be 
treated differently.  The application of human rights in an equal manner to all human 
beings, must take into account specific circumstances relevant to the lives of these 
human beings.
179
 
 
Equality arguments are used to justify the removal of any form of discrimination.  
However, equality is also not without complexity.  In this regard, Fredman has 
proposed that ‗the more closely we examine [equality] the more its meaning shifts‘.180  
Fredman identifies three possible meanings of equality:  the first meaning is the 
meaning of formal equality, based on the notion of fairness that requires like to be 
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treated alike.  The application of equality is therefore reduced to an equation that only 
likes qualify for equal treatment. 
 
The second meaning of equality is the equality of results, which requires an even-
handed distribution of benefits.  Equality of results aims at neutralising the effects of 
formal equal treatment which nevertheless still has a negative effect on the individual.  
Equality of results also considers the fact that the absence of a group from the negative 
impact may create a presumption of discrimination, unless non–discriminatory reasons 
can explain this absence.
181
 
 
The third meaning of equality is equality of opportunity, in terms of which equality 
presupposes that people should be similarly treated if they are sufficiently alike.  
Therefore, a disfavoured group must show itself comparable to the favoured group.  In 
this manner, equality of opportunity reinforces existing norms.  The existence of a 
‗universal individual‘ to which a disfavoured must compare it, gives rise to conformist 
pressures.
182
  For this reason, amongst others, equality has even been described as an 
‗empty vessel‘.183 
 
These concerns are addressed in general by the approach of Dworkin who claims that 
people should be treated equally in the sense that they are entitled to the state‘s equal 
concern and respect.
184
  A fundamental difference between equal treatment and 
treatment as equals lies in the fact that equal treatment requires an evaluation of 
whether two people are sufficiently ‗the same‘ that they justify similar treatment.  
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Treatment as equals implies a more definite view of equality.  Treatment as equals is 
not concerned with the enquiry as to whether difference in treatment is permitted, but 
it is concerned with ‗what reasons for deviation are consistent with equal concern and 
respect‘.185 
 
Kymlicka argues that equal respect for people may at times require the recognition of 
different conceptions of the good life and collective rights,
186
 as different people hold 
different conceptions of the good.
187
  The meaning, importance and applicability of 
values also differ from society to society.  For example, respect for human life is a 
universal value, but different societies have different views on when life begins, when 
it ends and what respect for life entails.
188
  Therefore, what must be equally respected 
is each individual‘s capacity for choice. 
 
The need for special treatment is even more acute in the light of the fact that 
minorities in general are part of the vulnerable and marginalised in society and 
therefore in general unable to employ the traditional democratic processes to ensure 
protection for their special needs.  The need to protect the rights of the vulnerable and 
marginalised is acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in SA in Prince the 
following manner: 
The Rastafari community is not a powerful one. It is a vulnerable group. It deserves 
the protection of the law precisely because it is a vulnerable minority.
189
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Substantive equality includes the appreciation of indirect discrimination in instances in 
which equal treatment still has a negative effect on the individual.  In these instances 
the need for positive measures, such as affirmative action to address the consequences 
of discrimination, may be needed.  Each will be discussed in turn. 
 
5.5.1 Substantive equality and indirect discrimination 
 
Substantive equality incorporates appreciation of indirect discrimination - that even an 
apparently neutral norm may impose intolerable obligations on a differently situated 
individual.
190
  The emphasis in indirect discrimination is on remedying the effect, 
rather than focusing on the intention.  Acknowledging that a seemingly neutral rule 
may affect some members of society in a disproportionate manner and prohibiting 
such indirect discrimination contributes to the accommodation of diversity.  This 
accommodation of diversity was suitably illustrated in the decision of the South 
African Constitutional Court in the matter of Pillay as discussed in section 8.7.1.1.  In 
stark contrast with this accommodation of diversity is the decision on the United 
States Supreme Court in the matter of Smith
191
 as discussed in section 7.5.2.  In 
contrasting these two contradicting decisions the positive results in the 
accommodation of diversity is clearly illustrated.  In both cases, a seemingly neutral 
rule was not neutral at all, but perpetuated the view of the dominant culture.  However, 
only in the matter of Pillay did the court question the disproportionate effect on a 
member of a marginalised group.
192
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The protection of the right to freedom of religion can indeed be enhanced through 
acknowledging the adverse effects of neutral measures on certain categories of people.  
Both the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD 
Committee)
193
 and the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW Committee)
194
 have acknowledged the impact of indirect 
discrimination.  It is argued that the same line of reasoning should be applied in 
matters concerning religious discrimination. 
 
Racial discrimination has been defined as inclusive of indirect discrimination in the 
following manner: 
In seeking to determine whether an action has an effect contrary to the Convention, it will 
look to see whether that action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group 
distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.
195
 
Reference to the term ‗effect‘ clearly includes indirect discrimination.  This inclusion 
is more prevalent in Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) which expressly refers to indirect discrimination in article 
1.
196
 
 
The provisions of the CERD Committee is applicable to religious discrimination per 
se in that the Committee clearly acknowledges that there can be an overlap between 
‗race‘ and ‗religion‘ and that race and religion may intersect, so that it is often not easy 
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to tell whether differentiations on the basis of religion amount to direct or indirect 
racial discrimination.
197
 
 
Included amongst the elements of substantive equality is acceptance of the duty to 
promote equality and to adopt positive measures to ensure substantive equality.  
Furthermore it is important to remember that the duty to promote the rights of 
minorities is not only incumbent on the dominant state, but states further have a duty 
to adopt positive measures of protection in the horizontal relations between private 
parties.
198
  One such positive measure is affirmative action. 
 
5.5.2 Substantive equality and affirmative action 
 
The duty to promote equal treatment can be equated to the obligation to adopt 
affirmative measures as required by the ICCPR Human Rights Committee‘s General 
Comment 18: 
The principle of equality sometimes requires states parties to take affirmative action in 
order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate 
discrimination prohibited by the covenant.
199
 
 
The CEDAW Committee too emphasises the need for affirmative action measures in 
article 4(1) to be included as follows: 
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State parties should clearly distinguish between temporary special measures taken 
under article 4, paragraph 1 to accelerate the achievement of a concrete goal for 
women of de facto or substantive equality, and other general social policies adopted to 
improve the situation of women and the girl child. Not all measures that potentially 
are, or will be, favourable to women are temporary special measures. The provision of 
general conditions in order to guarantee the civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights of women and the child, designed to ensure for them a life of dignity 
and non-discrimination, cannot be called temporary special measures.
200
 
 
It is asserted that the right to freedom of religion and in particular the right to manifest 
religious belief requires the treatment of adherents to religious beliefs as equals 
deserving of equal concern and respect.  The treatment of adherents of different 
religions with equal concern and respect may at times necessitate differential treatment 
and at other times may even require special measures.  However, such differential 
treatment as well as the existence of special measures will greatly enhance the respect 
for the right to freedom of religion and the right to manifest religious belief as 
illustrated in the decision of the South African Constitutional Court in Pillay.
201
 
 
The above discussion brings to a close the postmodern responses to the inherent 
difficulty with the concept of secularism, the flawed theoretical foundation of 
individual negative human rights, the inequitable notion of toleration and the conflict 
inculcated by formal equality.  What follows next is a discussion of the role of ubuntu 
an aspect of African cultural heritage that has been used by the South African 
Constitutional Court to enhance the right to be different. 
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5.6 The concept of ubuntu in South African jurisprudence 
 
The approach of the South African Constitutional Court‘s to synchronise the 
jurisprudence of the court with the African concept of ubuntu as discussed in section 
8.8.2 and 8.8.3, has further advanced the transformative nature of the court‘s 
jurisprudence.  The right to be different, in particular, has been enhanced through the 
concept of ubuntu.  It can be reasoned that ubuntu may find some correlation with the 
concept of solidarity or brotherhood as embodied in the UDHR and for that reason 
may even enjoy a broader application.  A discussion of the role of the concept of 
ubuntu and the relevance thereof for the protection of the right to manifest cultural and 
religious belief follows next. 
 
The expression of John Mbiti ‗I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I 
am‘202 more or less summarises the traditional African viewpoint of being human.  
This realises that one cannot fully be human without being part of a community.  This 
point of view is in contrast with the nature of liberal thought in terms of which: 
[I]ndividualism causes the human person first to be seen first of all as an individual 
who comes together with other individuals to create a community.  Community, then, 
becomes something that a group of individuals creates by appropriately organizing 
human activities.
203 
 
The distinction and division between African points of view and western liberal 
though, such as individualism, also prevailed in SA.  As the Constitutional Court said 
in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers ‗[t]he spirit of ubuntu, part of the 
deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, … combines individual rights 
                                                          
202
 As quoted in N Richardson ‗Community in Christian Ethics and African Culture‘ (1997) Scriptura 
373, 385.  See also J Mbiti ‗Autonomous Nature of Human Beings‘ (1970) African Religions and 
Philosophy 141. 
203
 S Fowler ‗Communities, Organizations and People‘ (1993) (21) 4 Pro Rege 20, 26. 
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with a communitarian philosophy‘.204  During apartheid cultures were not only 
separated, but the African culture was suppressed and Western culture was accepted as 
the benchmark for ‗civilization‘.205  The enactment of the South African Constitution 
did not erase the separateness and division between ethnic, cultural, and racial 
communities, cultivated by colonialism and later apartheid.
206
  Indeed the Postamble 
to the Interim Constitution acknowledges this division in that it confirms: 
The constitution provides a bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on 
human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities 
for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.
207 
 
One approach in acknowledging the diversity of the South African community is 
through the concept of ubuntu.  The concept of ubuntu is central to African 
jurisprudence but received wider recognition in legal circles since the 1990s as the 
Interim Constitution of SA acknowledged the role of ubuntu in assisting with the 
reparation of the country in the following manner: 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South 
Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross 
violations of human rights, the transgressions of humanitarian principles in violent 
conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.  These can now be addressed 
                                                          
204
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers: 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 
(CC), paragraph 37. 
205
 See generally BJ van der Walt. ‗When Africa and Western Cultures meet: From Confrontation to 
Appreciation‘ (2006) Institute for Contemporary Christianity 158. 
206
 Y Mokgoro ‗The Protection of Cultural Identity in The Constitution and the Creation of National 
Unity in South Africa: A Contradiction in Terms?‘ (1997) 52 Southern Methodist University Law 
Review 1549, 1558. 
207
 Postamble to the Interim Constitution of 1993. 
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on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for 
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimization.
 208
 
 
Mokgoro J has defined ubuntu as follows: 
In an attempt to define it, ubuntu as a concept has generally been described as a 
world-view of African societies and a determining factor in the formation of 
perceptions which influence social conduct.  It has also been described as a 
philosophy of life, which in its most fundamental sense represents personhood, 
humanity, humaneness, and morality; a metaphor that describes group solidarity 
where such group solidarity is central to the survival of communities with a scarcity of 
resources.  It is a fundamental belief that Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu/motho ke motho 
ka batho bangwe, which, literally translated means 'a human being is a human being 
because of other human beings,' and represents a philosophy of life which views the 
individual's existence and well-being relative to that group of which he or she is a 
part.
 209
 
 
Although the concept of ubuntu was not carried forward into the 1996 Constitution, 
there can be no doubt as to the support it continues to receive.  Mokgoro J refers to 
ubuntu as ‗one shared value that runs like a golden thread across cultural lines‘.210  
Mokgoro J equates ubuntu to humanity and to menswaardigheid, and argues that it 
embraces the right to human dignity.  For Sebidi the emphasis is on the collective 
value of ubuntu.
211
 
                                                          
208
 The positive value of reparation is also aptly captured in David Dikoko v Thupi Zacharia Mokhatla 
2006 (6) SA 235 (CC); 2007 (1) BCLR (CC) as per Mokgoro J paragraph 68. 
209
  S v Makwanyane, 3 SA 391 (CC 1995) paragraph 308. 
210
 Ibid 308.  See also Mokgoro (note 206 above) 1558-59. 
211
 LJ Sebidi‘ Towards a Definition of Ubuntu as African Humanism‘in MG Khabela & Z Mzoneli 
(eds) Perspectives on 'Ubuntu': A Tribute to Fedsen (1998) 63.  See also D Cornell ‗A call for a 
nuanced constitutional jurisprudence: Ubuntu, dignity, and reconciliation‘ (2004) 19 South African 
Public Law 667. 
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This bridge-building capacity of ubuntu is also affirmed in the matter of Crossley and 
Others v National Commissioner of South African Police Service and Others
212
 and 
further acknowledged in the notion of interpreting the Constitution as a memorial to 
the injustice of the past as identified by du Plessis.
213
 
 
In pursuit of the ideals of dignity, equality, and ubuntu, the transformative 
constitutional jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court has celebrated 
difference.  This celebration has ensured that the right to freedom of religion and in 
particular the right to manifest religious belief has been afforded prominent levels of 
protection.  It is premised that in following this approach the protection afforded to the 
right to freedom of religion has been enhanced.  It is fervently suggested that a more 
universal application of such an approach could only have favourable results on the 
right to manifest religious or cultural belief. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In reconceptualising the manner in which the right to freedom of religion and in 
particular the right to manifest religious belief should be protected the following 
inferences are made. 
 
The protection of the right to manifest religious belief interacts between the following 
main protagonists: the religious individual, the community of which this individual is 
a member and the state.  All three these players have specific needs and objectives that 
have to be taken into consideration in ensuring the most comprehensive protection of 
                                                          
212
 Crossley and Others v National Commissioner of South African Police Service and Others [2004] 3 
All SA 436 (T) discussed in section 8.8.3  
213
 Du Plessis (note 91 above) 189 and discussed in section 8.8.3. 
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the right to manifest religious belief.  The needs and objectives of each of these 
players follow. 
 
With regards to the role of the state, the following suggestions are made.  First, it 
remains important that a balance be struck between freedom of religion, on the one 
hand, and the need to guard institutions from religious dominance, on the other hand.  
For this reason it is important that the state is neutral towards religion in general.  In 
particular it is important that the state avoids any action that may create the impression 
that the state is favouring one religion above another.  A true egalitarian democracy 
requires that all the voices are heard and not only the dominant ones 
Second, the basis of this neutrality however cannot be the demand that adherents to 
religious faiths are required to divide themselves into a private and public self in an 
attempt to create a public space that is void of religious influence.  Religious people 
often see life as a whole and aspire to manifest their beliefs in their private and public 
lives.  In this regard, it is important to be mindful of the fact that it is not possible to 
require that the public space is void of gender and race attributes, as the individual 
cannot be separated from her gender or race.  Likewise, it should not be expected of 
the religious adherent to divide herself into a private and public self and that the state 
should be able to accommodate pluralistic religious adherents in the public square. 
 
Third, as far as the neutral disposition of the state requires that it does not favour one 
religion over another, the following considerations must be taken into account.  Just as 
the state is required to treat all citizens equal, such equal treatment should take into 
consideration the negative effect of seemingly neutral rules that disproportionately 
negatively affect particular individuals or groups.  In the event of such an occurrence, 
the state has a duty to treat this individual or group, who has been discriminated 
against, in line with the requirements of substantive equality.  Substantive equality 
requires that people should be treated equally in the sense that they are entitled to the 
state‘s equal concern and respect. 
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This obligation is in line with the claim that the purpose of state neutrality is one of 
religious equality.  Not merely accommodation is required to ensure non-
discrimination in a diverse society.  In fact, a positive form of accommodation is 
essential.  This positive form of accommodation requires that the state is obligated to 
stimulate an environment in which believers may fully express their religious 
identities.  Therefore, the state should be committed to proactively supporting all 
inhabitants‘ religious development.  Such a positive environment should not be 
perceived as being in conflict with the requirement of state neutrality.  Just as the 
endorsement of affirmative action measures are seen as ensuring the attainment of true 
equality, the proactive support of an environment in which religious adherents can 
achieve full religious recognition is not in conflict with the requirement of state 
neutrality.  Such proactive support is aimed at fulfilling the ethos of transformative 
constitutionalism and addresses the negative impact of dominant and patriarchal 
religious structures. 
 
The existence of proactive support is also in line with the requirements as imposed in 
terms of agreements aimed at eradicating racial and gender inequality as contained in 
CERD and CEDAW.  This proactive support is further in line with the obligation 
imposed in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as 
well as the provisions entrenched in the South African Constitution.  These provisions 
stipulate that the state not only has a duty to protect fundamental human rights, but 
also has the duty to promote and fulfil these rights. 
 
With regards to the role of the individual adherent and the community that the 
religious believer forms part of, the following suggestions are put forward:  First, the 
right to freedom of religion is intrinsically linked to the individual sense of self-worth 
and identity as religion defines the very essence of a person‘s being.  The sense of 
self-worth is further enhanced in the individual‘s sense of belonging.  For this reason 
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the right to freedom of religion and the right to manifest religious belief are 
encapsulated in the individuals‘ sense of belonging to a religious community.  The 
cultural significance of the right to freedom of religion is therefore an integral part of 
the right to freedom of religion and should be acknowledged as such.  In this regard, it 
is important to be mindful that the individual is constituted within the context of a 
specific community. 
 
Second, the centrality of religious and cultural practices to human dignity must be 
recognised and any infringement or limitation imposed on the right to manifest 
religious belief must be appreciated in light of the importance of the right for the 
individual, her sense of self-worth and identity.  In this respect, one can be mindful of 
the UDHR that was far more influenced by a dignitarian approach than individualistic 
rights.
214
  Individualistic rights implicitly place the highest priority on individual 
freedom, while dignitarian rights place more emphasis on the fact that the bearer of 
rights is situated within a family and a community. 
 
The interrelation between the individual and the community must also be borne in 
mind.  In this regard, the application of pluralistic viewpoints, such as the African 
viewpoint of ubuntu may be more valuable in allowing for an enhanced recognition of 
the diversity of a nation and may allow that diversity is indeed celebrated and not 
merely tolerated.  For it is only when difference is celebrated that each individual is 
free of life a live of choice.  A life in which the unique identity and value of the 
individual is fully appreciated and acknowledged. 
 
The above suggestions to reconceptualise the manner in which the right to manifest 
religious freedom is protected, are all made subject to the following caveat.  They all 
make provision for the religious individuals and communities to represent themselves 
                                                          
214
 As discussed in section 4.2.1. 
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and to participate in the public sphere.  However this participation and representation 
must be managed so that it does not lead to new forms of domination and separatism 
of the religious other.  In addition, these suggestions are made mindful of the fact that 
every multicultural society will need to devise its own appropriate structure to suits its 
history, cultural traditions, and range and depth of diversity.  There can be no single 
solution to ensuring the extensive protection of the right to freedom of religion and in 
particular the right to manifest religious belief. 
 
It is to the application of the limitation of the right to freely manifest one‘s religious 
belief that this analysis proceeds to next. 
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Chapter 6 
Application of the right to manifest religious belief in the international legal 
context 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In a previous chapter the international legal context in terms of which the protection of 
the right to freedom of religion is regulated was examined.  As indicated previously, 
the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, consists of an 
internal (forum internum) and an external (forum externum) component as recognised 
in international law.
1
  The internal component is expressed through the external 
                                                          
1
 In this regard see article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which was dopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948.  UN Doc. 
A/3/810 (1949) as discussed in section 4.2.1 and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 2200 (XXII) of 16 December 1966,  999 UNTS 171 as 
discussed in section 4.3, and Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981 Declaration), proclaimed by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981, as discussed in 
section 4.4. See also the Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Religion (article 18), paragraph 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 
30, 1993).  Document (hereinafter General Comment 22).  See also article 9 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) which was 
adopted by the Council of Europe on 4 November 1950 in Rome and entered into force 3 September 
1953 as discussed in section 4.9; also article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of 
San José) adopted by the Organization of American States on 22 November 1969, San José, Costa Rica 
entered into force on 18 July 1978 as was discussed in section 4.9 and article 8 of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter) adopted by the Organization of African Unity at the 
18th Conference of Heads of State and Government on 27 June 1981 in Nairobi, Kenya and that entered 
into force on 21 October 1986 as discussed in section 4.10. 
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component, namely the right to manifest one‘s religious belief.  This right relates to 
honouring the prescriptions of one‘s faith in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching.  The wearing of distinctive clothing has long been practiced by persons 
adhering to certain religions or beliefs
2
 and therefore is considered to represent part of 
the external freedom to manifest religious belief.
3
 
 
The right to manifest religious belief is entrenched as an individual right, a collective 
right as well as institutional right that is often associated with the public nature of the 
right to freedom of religion.  The public nature of the right to manifest religious belief 
in ‗teaching, practice, worship and observance‘ is also acknowledged in international 
law and express provision for the manifestation to occur ‗in community with others‘ is 
provided for.
4
 
 
These international norms as shown previously in section 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 are intended 
to accommodate diverse religious circumstances and further do not prescribe the 
existence of any specific juridical relationship between a state and religion.
5
  
Therefore the right to religious freedom and the right to manifest religious belief can 
                                                          
2
 See BG Tahzib-Lie ‗Dissenting Women, Religion or Belief and the State‘ in T Lindholm, WC 
Durham & BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 455, 
473. 
3
 See paragraph 4 of General Comment 22. 
4
 Article 18 of the UDHR states that: ‗Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance.‘ 
5
 This is confirmed in Paragraph. 9 of General Comment 22 that states that : ‗The fact that a religion is 
recognized as a State religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers 
comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of 
the rights under the Covenant, including articles 18 and 27, nor in any discrimination against adherents 
to other religions or non-believers‘. 
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be realised in diverse domestic constitutional settings that regulate the relationship 
between state and religion. 
 
These international norms further confirm that everyone has the right to manifest 
religious belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  These terms describe, 
in a general way, types of conduct associated with religious activity and should be 
viewed as representative of types of conduct.
6
  From an analysis of international 
jurisprudence it is apparent that the manifestation of religion through worship and 
teaching has been less fraught with interpretational difficulties, while the 
manifestation of religion through practice and observance has been more 
controversial.
7
 
 
It is contended that this controversy can be related to the argument that the terms 
‗practice‘ and ‗observance‘ allow the religious believer to act in accordance with the 
dictates and prohibitions of her own belief, irrespective of whether these practices 
strictly originate from institutional religion or whether these practices originate from a 
personal understanding of the belief. 
 
Freedom of religion under the ECHR ‗excludes any discretion on the part of the State 
to determine whether religious belief or the means used to express such beliefs are 
legitimate‘.8  Therefore Islamic dress, in all its various forms, may be considered a 
manifestation of religious belief.  Other examples of religious motivated dress include 
                                                          
6
 C Evans Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (2001), 105 quoting 
Krishnaswami (1960) Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices UN 
Document E/Cn 4/ Sub 2 /200/ Rev 1. 
7
 For a general discussion on the differences between belief and practice see G Moens 'The Action-
Belief Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion' (1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 195. 
8
 Manoussakis and Others v Greece, Judgment of 26 September 1996, (1996) 23 EHRR 387, 47. 
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Jews wearing yarmulkes, Christians wearing crucifixes, Hindus displaying a bindi or 
nose-ring
9
 and Sikhs wearing a turban or kirpan.
10
 
 
Observances may include, for example, the right to observe religious personal and 
family law, the right to undertake religious pilgrimages, the right to observe religious 
days
11
 and the right to display religious symbols.
12
  Observances may also include the 
right to observe religious rites,
13
 dietary practices or the right to cultivate a religious 
                                                          
9
 The wearing of a nose-ring is a time-honoured family tradition; a young woman would get her nose 
pierced upon her physical maturity (the onset of her menstrual cycle) as an indication that she is now 
eligible for marriage and to honour daughters as responsible young adults and affirms her value as a 
woman in society.  After their 16th
 
birthday, the grandmother replaces the gold stud with a diamond. 
This forms part of a religious ritual to honour and bless young women. It is also a way in which the 
elders of the household bestow possessions, including other pieces of jewellery, upon young women. 
This serves not only to indicate that they value their daughters, but, in keeping with Indian tradition, 
that their daughters are the Luxmi (goddess of prosperity) and light of the house.  In this regard see 
generally BN Banerjee Hindu culture, custom, and ceremony (1978). 
10
 The kirpan is a curved ceremonial dagger with a blunt tip and is generally worn underneath clothing 
and is symbolic of the fight against evil.  In this regard see generally HS Dilagira Who are the Sikhs? 
(2000). 
11
 This study will not provide a comprehensive overview of these components of the right to freedom of 
religion.  In this regards see G van der Schyff The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (2001) 
LLM Thesis Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, 133 onwards. 
12
 Regarding the display of religious symbols in public locations, for example, a crucifix in classrooms. 
The Italian government (joined by 10 other European states) has requested to the Grand Chamber 
against the November 2009 ruling of the ECtHR in which the display of the crucifix in public schools in 
Italy was banned.  Lautsi v Italy - 30814/06.  Available at  
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=857725&portal=hbkm&source
=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649> 
last accessed 6 December 2010. 
13
 Moreover, the 1981 Declaration further specifies the freedom to: ‗make, acquire and use to an 
adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to rites or customs of a religion or belief.‘ 
See article 6(c) of the 1981 Declaration. 
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appearance as prescribed by a particular religion, for example adhering to a dress 
code
14
 or by growing beard or fashioning the hair in a particular manner, for example 
Rastafarians wearing dreadlocks.
15
  Within the general limitation of this study on the 
right to manifest religious belief in observance, the emphasis is further placed on the 
right to observe religious rites as well as the right to cultivate a religious appearance 
which has recently been the subject of much debate and controversy.
16
 
 
Some states have prohibited the wearing of religious clothing (or symbols) generally 
in public primary and secondary schools,
17
 as well as in the universities.
18
  The 
                                                          
14
 General Comment No 22 elaborates that ‗The observance or practice may include not only 
ceremonial acts but also such customs as … the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings‘.  See 
paragraph 4 General Comment No. 22. 
15
 Rastafarians are obligated not to cut their hair which results in dreadlocks, as according to the King 
James version of the Bible Numbers chapter 6 1:6.  In terms of the Nazarite vow, only foods in their 
natural state may be eaten, alcohol may not be consumed and Rastafarians may not cut their hair.  See 
generally ZF Hooey The Nazarite Vow (2008). 
16
 A comparative analysis shows regulation or prohibitions on wearing religious symbols in more than 
25 countries in the world.  See the comparative table on prohibitions of wearing religious symbols.  
Available at <http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/kopftuch/ReligiousSymbols.pdf.> last accessed on 9 
September 2010. 
17
 For example, in France, the French Parliament enacted the law on secularity and conspicuous 
religious symbols in schools (Act of 15 March 2004 - 2004-228 of 15 March 2004) which came into 
effect on 2 September 2004.  See Journal Official de la Republique Francaise [J.O.] 17 March 2004 at 
5190) (The Law of 2004).  The Law of 2004 inserted a new article L. 141-5-1 in the Education Code, 
which provides: ‗In State primary and secondary schools, the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils 
overtly manifest a religious affiliation is prohibited. The school rules shall state that the institution of 
disciplinary proceedings shall be preceded by dialogue with the pupil‘. 
18
 Azerbaijan, Albania, Turkey and Uzbekistan all regulate the wearing of the Islamic dress at the 
university level. 
Available at <http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr/kopftuch/ReligiousSymbols.pdf> last accessed on 9 
September 2010. 
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justifiability of this prohibition has formed the focus in several cases.
19
  This 
prohibition on Islamic dress also creates an intersection of restrictions on a number of 
international human rights provisions.  These rights can include the right to freedom of 
religion, racial and gender discrimination, minority rights as well as the right to 
education.
20
  For example in France, the ban imposed on the Islamic headscarf in 
public schools raises the following questions regarding the right to education. First, 
does the ban interfere with the right of the female student, who wishes not to remove 
the Islamic headscarf, right of access to public education? Second, at the level of 
primary and secondary education, does the ban adequately respect the rights of parents 
to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their 
own convictions? 
 
As indicated above the manifestation of religion through worship and teaching is not 
as controversial as the manifestation of religion through practice and observance.  
Therefore this study is limited to an analysis of the right to manifest religious belief in 
practice and observance in general.  In evaluating the permissibility of the limitation 
on the right to manifest religious belief in practice and observance, a previous chapter 
laid the foundation of the relevant textual provisions of the ICCPR, ECHR, Pact of 
                                                          
19
 See, e.g. ICCPR Human Rights Committee Raihon Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan, Communication 
No. 931/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (2004) (Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan).  This case 
dealt with an application from a student whose wearing of the headscarf at university led to her 
harassment by university authorities.  See also Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Rahime Kayhan v Turkey, Communication No 8/2005, CEDAW/C/34/D/8/2005 (2006) 
(Kayhan v Turkey); Leyla Sahin v Turkey Application No 44774/98, Grand Chambers, Judgment of 10 
November 2005, 19 BHCR 590, [2006] ELR 73 Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr last accessed 
on 10 August 2010.  (Sahin v Turkey, Grand Chamber decision).  Prior to the decision of the Grand 
Chamber is the decision of the Chamber in Sahin v Turkey, Fourth Section, Application No 44774/98, 
Judgement of 29 June 2004.  (Sahin v Turkey, Chamber decision). 
20
 For an extensive discussion of this intersection see D McGoldrick Human Rights and Religion: The 
Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (2006) 237-287. 
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San José and the African Charter, including commentary interpreting those texts as 
well as general principles of law developed by the ICCPR Human Rights Committee 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
21
 in deciding cases under the 
respective instruments. 
 
What follows next is an analysis of certain of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee 
and ECtHR case law.  The emphasis is on the development of principles in terms of 
which the justifiability of legislation restricting the right to manifest religious belief is 
assessed.  This chapter will also analyse the approach followed within the international 
legal context when the permissibility of a limitation imposed on the right to manifest 
religion through observing religious rites as well as the right to cultivate a religious 
appearance is scrutinised.  This analysis will be conducted to indicate similarities and 
differences in the approaches of the various international systems so as to draw best 
practices.  This analysis will however not include the following aspects of the right to 
freedom of religion for the reasons specified below. 
 
6.1.1 Further limits to the study 
 
The following distinctions are possible regarding the manifestation of religion through 
the display of religious appearance.  On the one hand, there is the right of individuals 
to identify themselves through the display of religious appearance, a so-called positive 
freedom of religion, and on the other hand, there is the compulsion upon people to 
identify themselves through the display of religious appearance, including religious 
dress in public, a so-called negative freedom of religion.
22
  It is important to appreciate 
                                                          
21
 See discussion in section 4.9.1. 
22
 This distinction was drawn by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Asma 
Jahangir in her annual report (2006) in which she commented on the thematic issue of the question of 
religious symbols.  In this regard, see Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Religious 
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that the prescribed wearing of religious dress by a majority religion or state religion in 
certain states
23
 is not considered to form part of the right to freedom of religion and 
the right to manifest religious belief.  This is a direct infringement of the religious 
freedom of individuals who do not adhere to the majority or state religion and its 
specific tenets and accordingly falls outside the scope of this study.  This study 
examines the positive freedom to manifest religion through observing and cultivating a 
religious appearance. 
 
In evaluating the right to manifest religious belief through the display of religious 
dress and in particular the Islamic headscarf-hijab the focus is on the right of religious 
women who make a cognisant, informed and uncoerced decision to wear the Islamic 
headscarf.  There are of course competing claims based on equality and provisions of 
non-discrimination which are advanced in support of arguments that restrict the right 
of religious women to wear the Islamic headscarf.  It is further acknowledged that 
gender discriminatory religious norms and practices exist and that these practices do 
indeed violate the human rights of women and do indeed discriminate against women.  
Religious norms, for example may discriminate against women in the field of 
marriage, divorce, custody of children,
24
 abortion,
25
 contraception,
26
 property rights 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Intolerance:  See the report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir 
E/CN.4/2006/5. 
23
 For example as instructed in Afghanistan in this regard see S Mittra & B Kumar Encyclopaedia of 
Women in South Asia: Afghanistan (2004) 248. 
24
 In this regard see the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma 
Jahangir dated 16 February 2010 regarding the application of Sharia law in Afghanistan 
A/HRC/13/40/Add.1 p4. 
25
 See generally R Copelon & R Petschesky ‗Toward an Interdependent Approach to Reproductive and 
Sexual Rights as Human Rights: Reflections on the ICPD and Beyond‘ in MA Schuler (ed) From Basic 
Needs to Basic Rights: Women‟s Claims to Human Rights (1995) 343. 
26
 Ibid. 
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and inheritance.  In this instance these religious norms may be in direct conflict with a 
range of human rights.
27
 
 
Care should however be taken not to solely place emphasis upon the equality related 
rights against which these religious practices can be viewed.  For example, the 
limitation of the right of religious women to wear the Islamic headscarf-hijab is often 
defended on the grounds of gender equality as this restrictive practice is only imposed 
on women and not on men.
28
  However, this argument is contested inside and outside 
of the Islamic faith.
29
  Also, reasons for wearing the Islamic headscarf are varied.  For 
some, the veil may be a symbol of living in a western society without relinquishing 
one‘s Islamic identity, while for other it may express solidarity.  In light of these 
diverse meanings a singular critique of the Islamic headscarf is not credible.
30
 
 
                                                          
27
 In this regard see generally J Sheen ‗Women‘s Rights to Freedom of Religion or Belief‘ in T 
Lindholm, WC Durham, BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook 
(2004) 513 – 521; also AS Sardar Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law:  Equal 
Before Allah, Unequal before Man (2000); U King ‗Hinduism and Women: Uses and Abuses of 
Religious Freedom‘ in T Lindholm, WC Durham, BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of 
Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 423 – 543; and KE Børresen ‗Religion Confronting Women‘s 
Human Rights: The Case of Roman Catholicism‘ in T Lindholm, WC Durham, BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) 
Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 545 – 559. 
28
 In this regard see generally K Bennoune ‗Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of 
Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women‘s Equality Under International Law‘ (2007) 45 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 366.  Bennoune argues that secularism is vital for the 
implementation and protection of women‘s human rights and claims that the limitations imposed on the 
right to manifest religious belief through display of the Islamic headscarf generally enhances gender 
equality. 
29
 See NC Moruzzi ‗A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social 
Identity‘ (1994) 22 Political Theory 653, 663. 
30
 See C Kilian ‗The Other side of the Veil: North African Women in France Respond to the Headscarf 
Affair‘ (2003) 17 Gender & Society 567, 575. 
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The struggle for equality should not be given more emphasis than the right to religious 
freedom.
31
  A considerable deference therefore should be shown to the nuanced and 
contested arguments within the religious communities themselves when deciding what 
the demands of substantive equality ought to be.  The dictates of the majority state or 
secular liberal academics should not be the only normative argument.
32
  In addition, 
the plurality of values should not be dominated by one value.  There should rather be a 
discussion regarding the conflicts that exist between equality norms and collective 
religious identities.
33
  The right of women to manifest their religious belief should not 
per se be limited in an attempt to ensure their equal treatment. 
 
This evaluation is limited to an analysis of restrictions imposed upon cognisant, 
informed and uncoerced positive decisions to wear religious garments.  This limitation 
however does not deny the fact that competing claims may exist between the right to 
manifest religious belief and equality norms. 
 
6.2 Criteria for justifying a limitation on the right to manifest religious belief 
in the international legal context 
 
                                                          
31
 Børresen (note 27 above) 555. 
32
 For a discussion of these competing claims see P Danchin ‗Who is the ―Human‖ in Human Rights? 
The Claims of Culture and Religion‘ (2009) 24 Maryland Journal of International Law 99, 114.  
Danchin rejoices in the existence of conflict and contestation that these value plural debates may bring 
about.  An example of this is evident in the SA Law Reform experience related to the recognition of 
Muslim Marriages.  Danchin emphasises the role played by the religious particularists‘ conception and 
that of the secular absolutist in this contestation.  In his demand that considerable deference must be 
made to the arguments of the religious communities themselves.  Danchin is in contrast with the point 
of Bennoune who in relation to the question of the Islamic headscarf unmistakably prescribes that the 
dictates of the secular absolutist should be followed. 
33
 Danchin (note 32 above) 117. 
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In contrast to the right to freedom of conscience, religion or belief which is considered 
as an absolute freedom,
34
 all the international legal instruments protecting the right to 
manifest one‘s religious belief allow for limitations to be imposed on the forum 
externum.  The right to manifest religious belief may be limited in accordance with the 
specific limitation provision included in the fundamental right itself.
 35 
 
Article 18(3) of the ICCPR,
36
 article 1(3) of the 1981 Declaration,
37
 article 9(2) of the 
ECHR,
38
 article 12(3) of the Pact of San José
 39
 and article 8 of the African Charter
40
 
                                                          
34
 The limitation provisions (article 18(3) of the ICCPR, article 9(2) of the ECHR, and article 12(3) of 
the Pact of San José) all are not applicable to the forum internum.  In addition, non derogation is also 
not permitted in terms of article 4(2) of the ICCPR and article 12(3) of the Pact of San José.  The right 
to freedom of conscience, religion or belief also includes the right not to be subjected to coercive 
indoctrination.  This right to be free from coercion may however be affected by other believers right to 
proselytise.  The extent of the protection from coercion as well as the right to proselytise will ultimately 
be determined through an act of balancing of these rights.  In addition, some believers, such as, 
adherents to the Islamic faith are of the opinion that the right to freedom of religion does not include the 
right to convert from Islam to another religion.  For a more comprehensive discussion of these and other 
issues related to the forum internum see M Nowak & T Vospernik ‗Permissible Restrictions on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief‘ in T Lindholm, WC Durham, BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 146 – 172. 
35
 See section 4.3.1, section 4.4, section 4.9.1 section 4.10.1 and section 4.11. 
36
 Article 18(3) ICCPR states: ‗Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or beliefs may be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others‘. 
37
 Article 1(3) of the 1981 Declaration states: ‗Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or belief may be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others‘. 
38
 Article 9(2) of the ECHR states that: ‗Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interest of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others‘. 
39
 Article 12 of the Pact of San José repeats Article 18 of the ICCPR. 
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respectively provide for the grounds on which the right to manifest religious belief 
may be limited. 
 
In general the international and regional instruments all predominantly structure the 
grounds of justification of a limitation in a similar fashion.  Limitations on the right to 
manifest religious belief are consequently justified in the UN framework as well as in 
the European and Inter-American regional contexts if the following requirements are 
met:  First, the limitation must be prescribed by law of general application and may 
not discriminatory.
41
  Second, the limitation must be necessary to protect a public 
interest.  In this regard the limitation must be ‗directly related and proportionate to the 
specific need on which they are predicated‘ and ‗may not be imposed for 
discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner‘.42  In addition, the 
ECHR requires that the limitation must be necessary in a democratic society.
43
  This 
requirement has been interpreted to denote that the limitation must be proportional to a 
‗pressing social need‘.44  Third, the limitation must serve one of the following public 
interest objectives: public safety; public order; health; morals or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.
45
  Within the African regional context the limitation 
must be in terms of law and order.  The limitations imposed on the right to manifest 
                                                                                                                                                                       
40
 Article 8 of the African Charter states that: ‗Freedom of conscience the profession and free practice 
of religion shall be guaranteed.  No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures 
restricting the exercise of these freedoms‘. 
41
 See General Comment 22 paragraph 8. 
42
 General Comment 22 at paragraph 8. 
43
 The only international text to make reference to a democratic society is in terms of article 9 (2) of the 
ECHR. 
44
 PM Taylor Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice(2005) 308. 
45
 General Comment 22 paragraph 4. 
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one‘s religious belief freely may however never impair the core aspect of the right46 
and no derogation of the right to freedom of religion is permitted.
47
 
 
The requirements for the justification of a limitation on the right to manifest religious 
belief are in principle similar in the international and regional instruments.  Each of 
these requirements have been interpreted by the various international and regional 
monitoring bodies, such as the communications of the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee,
48
 the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the more limited jurisprudence of 
the Inter American System
49
 and the African Commission
50
 will be evaluated next. 
                                                          
46
 As emphasised by article 30 of the UDHR, which states that: ‗Nothing in this Declaration may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform 
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein‘. 
47
 Article 4(1) of the ICCPR provides for the derogation from obligations under the Covenant ‗in times 
of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed ... provided that such measure are not inconsistent with [State Parties‘] other obligations 
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin‘.  Article 4(2) states: ‗No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 
1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.‘ 
48
 The jurisprudence of the ICCPR Committee under article 18 of the ICCPR is sparse as individual 
complaints may only be accepted if states have consented to Optional Protocol 1.  The United Kingdom 
(UK) and the United States of America (USA), for example, have not ratified the First Optional 
Protocol and hence individual applications from these countries are not possible. 
49
 As discussed in HJ Steiner & P Alston International Human Rights in Context (2007) 1028, the Inter-
American system is based on similar normative provisions and institutional structures as the ECHR.  
However, the conditions under which these two systems have developed are radically different.  The 
European system has rarely had to deal with unresponsive governments while in Latin America, large 
scale practices involving torture, disappearances and executions have not been uncommon.  The 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American system relates mainly to these issues. 
50
 As discussed in section 4.11.1.  From an evaluation of the jurisprudence of the African Commission it 
appears the right to manifest religious belief in particular has only on one occasion been interpreted by 
the Commission in the matter of Prince (Decision of African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ 
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6.2.1 Prescribed by law of general application 
 
A law of general application must prescribe limitations.  Therefore, only a limitation 
prescribed by law can validly limit the right to manifest religious belief.  The ECtHR 
has held that the following requirements stem from the expression ‗prescribed by law‘.  
First, the limitation must have its basis in law that is accessible to the individual 
enabling him to regulate his conduct accordingly.  The Grand Chamber in Leyla Sahin 
clarified the requirement as follows: 
[T]he expression "prescribed by law" requires firstly that the impugned measure 
should have a basis in domestic law. It also refers to the quality of the law in question, 
requiring that it be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable them--if need be, with appropriate advice—to foresee, to a degree 
that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail and to regulate their conduct.
51
 
 
The law may originate from different sources and at different levels, ranging from 
constitutional provisions, national legislation, directives of regional authorities to the 
rules of public and private institutions.  This requirement is not usually a contentious 
issue.
52
  Second, the limitation must be in terms of a law of general application.  This 
requirement relates to a basic principle of the rule of law that the law must be general 
in its application – it must apply to all equally and not be aimed at the conduct of a 
particular group of people.
53
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Rights; Prince v South Africa African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, Comm No 
255/2002; (2004) AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004). 
51
 Sahin v Turkey Grand Chamber decision (note 19 above) 84. 
52
 The word ‗law‘ has been held to include statute law, unwritten law, subordinate legislation and royal 
decrees in Klass v Federal Republic of Germany (1979) 2 EHRR 214. 
53
 Sahin v Turkey Grand Chamber decision (note 19 above) 65. 
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6.2.2 Necessary to protect a public interest or the fundamental rights of others 
 
The limitation must be necessary to protect a public interest or the fundamental rights 
of others.  In contrast to the relative simplicity of the first requirement, this 
requirement is more problematic in so far as the restriction must be necessary in the 
pursuit of a public interest; such as public safety, order, health, morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
 
In this regard General Comment 22 emphasises that article 18(3) of the ICCPR should 
be strictly interpreted and that: 
[R]estrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even if they would be 
allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant, such as national 
security. Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were 
prescribed and must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on 
which they are predicated. Restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory 
purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner.54 
 
The necessity of the limitation can be evaluated in various ways.
55
  One approach is to 
evaluate the proportionality of the limitation in relation to the state interest served.
56
  
The principle of proportionality contains the following three requirements: suitability, 
necessity, and proportionality.  According to the requirement of suitability, a state has 
                                                          
54
 Paragraph 8 General Comment 22. 
55
 TM Parker ‗Freedom to Manifest Religious Belief: An Analysis of the Necessity Clauses of the 
ICCPR and ECHT‘ (2006) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 91, 94. 
56
 On the requirement of proportionality see T Lindholm The Strasbourg Court Dealing with Turkey 
and the Human Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Critical Assessment in the Lights of Recent 
Case Law (Leyla Sahin v Turkey) (2004) available at 
< http://www.strasbourgconference.org/papers/Lindhol%20Strasbourg.pdf > last accessed on 10 
September 2010. 
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to pursue a legitimate end, and the means must be suitable to achieve or at least to 
promote such end.  The requirement of necessity implies that no alternative means 
should exist, which infringes the right less, but promotes the end in a similar manner.  
Finally, proportionality requires rational balancing.  Proportionality is not a free-
standing requirement
57
 and it has at times been subsumed into the overall analysis of 
reasonableness. 
 
The final requirement under article 9(2) is that the limitation on religious rights should 
be ‗necessary‘.  Regarding the necessity of a limitation the European Commission of 
Human Rights has concluded that:  
[T]he 'necessity' test cannot be applied in absolute terms, but required the assessment 
of various factors. Such factors include the nature of the right involved, the degree of 
interference, i.e. whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, the nature 
of the public interest and the degree to which it requires protection in the 
circumstances of the case.
58
 
 
Regarding the requirement of necessity Witte states that: 
The requirement of necessity implies that any such limitation on the manifestation of 
religion must be proportionate to its aim to protect any of the listed state interests. 
Such limitations must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights 
guaranteed in Article 18 … [a] law burdening the exercise of religion must be in the 
service of a compelling state interest and use the least restrictive alternative to achieve 
that interest.
59
 
 
The state interest served is of particular relevance in state or otherwise controlled 
settings, such as prisons, the military, medical or educational facilities, as well as 
                                                          
57
 As for example required by the South African Constitutional Court.  In this regard see generally D 
Brand & CH Heyns Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2005). 
58
 X and the Church of Scientology v Sweden, No. 7805/77, 16 DR 68 (Dec. 1979) 73. 
59
 J Witte Jr Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment (2005) 237. 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
certain places of employment.  In these controlled settings the individual‘s right to 
manifest religious belief may be subject to restrictions which are necessitated by the 
need to maintain control or demonstrate state neutrality towards religion.  For example 
uniform dress codes and grooming policies may prohibit the wearing of religious 
garments or may dictate that men shave their beards or cut their hair.  These 
prohibitions and requirements may be in violation of sincerely held religious belief.  
Some religious believers may be forced to work on religious days or be denied time 
for prayers and other religious rituals and dietary regimes adhered to may not conform 
to specific religious norms.  An attempt to secure these rights for the religious believer 
would require certain measures of adaption within the controlled institutional setting. 
 
The above mentioned condition of uniformity should be approached in a similar 
manner as the condition of neutrality when limitations on the right to manifest 
religious belief are justified in a secular state.
60
  The condition of uniformity may 
appear religiously neutral at first glance; however, these neutral requirements often 
reflect the religious practices of larger and better understood faiths and may not 
always reflect the practices of minority religions.  This bias may result in unequal 
treatment and discrimination amongst different religions. 
 
In addition to the requirement that the limitation must be necessary to serve the 
purpose of protecting the public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedom of others, the ECHR further requires that the law should be 
‗necessary in a democratic society‘.61  Despite this apparent strict necessity test, the 
degree of oversight by the ECtHR may be lessened in accordance with the doctrine of 
the ‗margin of appreciation‘.  The margin of appreciation acknowledges that different 
countries may apply varying interpretations to balance the right to freedom of religion 
                                                          
60
 See discussion in Section 6.3.4. 
61
 See article 9 (2) of the ECHR. 
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with the need to protect a public interest.  These variations are set in motion by 
different national legal contexts, political philosophies and shared histories.  The 
requirement that a limitation must be necessary to protect a public interest is therefore 
determined in terms of the different factors.  The application of the doctrine of the 
‗margin of appreciation‘ is discussed next. 
 
6.2.2.1 Level of scrutiny – doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
 
The ECtHR allows for a certain degree of deference to the national perspective on the 
public interest served.  This deference is illustrated by the so-called margin of 
appreciation.
62
  A variety of factors may influence the actual scope of applicability of 
the margin of appreciation.
63
  The ECtHR is guided by its margin of appreciation 
doctrine when scrutinising a limitation. 
                                                          
62
 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation was first explained by the ECtHR in the Handyside v UK 
ECtHR 24 –A, 7 December 1976, paragraphs 48-9 (Handyside v UK).  While the court acknowledged 
its task of ensuring compatibility with the provisions in the ECHR, the court is aware of diversity and 
has emphasised that generally the state is in the best position to assess the needs of a particular society.  
The ECtHR specifically, presume that there is a ‗margin of appreciation‘ that allows, (to some extent) 
states to enact laws and implement policies that may differ from each other with regard to different 
histories and cultures.  While this margin of appreciation should be respected, it should not be 
interpreted with such flexibility that would permit the undermining of the essence of human rights 
values.  While laws of different States do not need to be identical, and there should be allowed some 
flexibility, this flexibility should all the same respect the important underlying rights.  See generally G 
Steven The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2000).  See also TA O'Donnell ‗The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights‘ (1982) 4(4) Human Rights Quarterly 474; and 
O Bakircioglu ‗The Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in Freedom of Expression and 
Public Morality Cases‘ (2007) 8 (7) German Law Journal 711. 
63
 See DL Donoho ‗Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a 
Jurisprudence of Diversity within Universal Human Rights‘ (2001) 15 Emory International Law Review 
391, 446. 
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The doctrine briefly entails that when scrutinising a limitation on freedom to manifest 
religious belief, a reasonable margin of appreciation is allowed.  In terms of this 
doctrine the national authorities are considered to be in a better position to evaluate the 
necessity of the restrictive measures adopted.  In this manner some measure of 
sovereignty of the state is acknowledged and states are permitted to enact laws and 
implement policies that may differ from each other with regard to different histories 
and cultures.  This doctrine is used by the ECtHR and is suited to reconcile the 
diversity in the national states.
64
  For example, the importance of the individual 
interest may not be fully accepted. 
 
The need for consensus may therefore allow for a broader margin and more lenient 
scrutiny.
65
  The margin of appreciation should however not be applied in a manner that 
allows for the domestic jurisdiction to escape supervision, and it is important that the 
ECtHR should proceed to scrutinise the justification of the infringement.  The 
application of the margin of appreciation is therefore limited and must be reconciled 
with the decisions and interpretation of the ECtHR.  Therefore this flexibility should 
not undermine the essence of human rights values. 
 
In addition to the relativity that the margin of appreciation allows, states further 
interpret and apply the criteria that the limitation must be necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others in 
different ways.  The evaluation of the necessity of interference in fulfilling a 
legitimate aim has developed into one of the areas in which the margin of appreciation 
                                                          
64
 E Brems ‗Diversity in the Classroom: The Headscarf Controversy in European Schools‘ (2006) 31 
Peace & Change 117, 128. 
65
See generally Tahzib-Lie (note 2 above) 465. 
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is most frequently used.
66
  Therefore the particular interest pursued incorporates a 
measure of relativity that may differ from state to state.  As a result it is often difficult 
to determine the particular interest pursued as the relativity of the justification is 
intensified. 
 
6.2.3 Public interest protected 
 
The limitation of the right to manifest religious belief must be necessary to protect a 
public interest.  In identifying the public interest pursued, the jurisprudence of both the 
ICCPR Human Rights Committee and the ECtHR is not always clear in identifying 
that the restriction must be in the pursuit of a legitimate public interest.  As will be 
shown below, these bodies often in particular interchange the public interest 
requirements of public safety, public order, or the fundamental rights of others with 
each other.  For example, justification on the ground that the restriction protects the 
rights and freedoms of others is sometimes associated with another ground such as 
public safety or health.
67
 
 
For this reason the following discussion attempts to classify the matters related to the 
limitation of the right in accordance with the public interest pursued while 
simultaneously issuing a caveat that a watertight classification is not always 
achievable.  Mindful of this caveat the restrictions on the ground of public health and 
public morality are discussed first, followed by the limitations in accordance with 
public safety, the fundamental rights of others and lastly limitations on the ground of 
public order. 
                                                          
66
 E Brems ‗The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights‘ Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1996) 240, 243, 
available at< http://www.zaoerv.de> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
67
 Ibid 261. 
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6.2.3.1 Restriction on the grounds of public health and public morality 
 
Limitations on the ground of public health are aimed at preventing epidemic or other 
diseases.  For example, a duty to vaccinate against certain dreaded diseases, such a 
small pox, may impose a limitation on a religious adherent‘s belief to not voluntary 
harm the body in the interest of public health.
68
  The question further arises if a state 
may justifiably limit an individual‘s right in seeking to protect such individual‘s own 
health.  For example, if a Jehovah‘s Witness, in accordance with the tenets of her faith, 
refuses a blood transfusion, may the state intervene and restrict her right on the ground 
that the limitation is in pursuit of the interest of her own health.  It is evident that the 
right to intervene, if the adherent is a minor, should be justified under the ground to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others.
69
  It is suggested that there should be no 
reason to intervene in the event of the capable adult adherent making such a decision 
on the basis of her faith.
70
 
 
Limitations of the right to manifest religious belief are also permitted on the ground of 
public morality.  This requirement is inherently obscure as morals are rules of conduct 
based on the conscience of the individual and may have a private and public nature.
71
  
                                                          
68
 See generally A Davids ‗The Revolt of the Malays: A Study of the Reactions of the Cape Muslims to 
the Smallpox Epidemics of the Nineteenth Century Cape Town‘ (1983) 5 Studies in the History of Cape 
Town 55. 
69
 See Hoffmann v Austria, 17 EHRR 293 (1994) (ECtHR 255 –C, 23 June 1993).  The Austrian 
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the lower court in which custody was granted to a mother who 
had subsequently become an adherent to the Jehovah Witness faith. 
70
 For a comprehensive discussion of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses refusal to undergo blood transfusions see 
in general Nowak & Vospernik (note 34 above) 163 onwards. 
71
 C Kukathas ‗Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference‘ (1998) 26 (5) Political 
Theory, 686, 689. 
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Religion is part of the collections of values that constitute a person and cannot be 
attributed only to the private sphere; in addition it is not always possible to draw a 
distinction between religious and non-religious values.  Also referred to as ethics, 
morals signify to an individual how to act in accordance with the ultimate meaning of 
life.
72
  Therefore, morals mean different things to different people.  Religious values 
ordinarily constitute the most important moral guidelines for religious adherents.  
Consequently, it is often challenging to identify a more privileged universal norm that 
may be invoked to justify a restriction on religious manifestations.  For this reason, 
states characterised by diversity often have a challenging task of defining limits to the 
manifestation of a religion or belief based on morality. 
 
From the above it is clear that restriction on the ground of public morality is certainly 
the most problematic of all the grounds for justification.  Public morals have never 
been mentioned by the Commission or the ECtHR in applications based on article 9.
73
  
The ICCPR Human Rights Committee has emphasised in General Comment 22 that: 
[T]he concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious 
traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest religion or belief for 
the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively 
from a single tradition.
74
 
 
Therefore the need to limit the right to freedom to manifest religion should not be 
based on a claim aimed at protecting morals derived solely from one tradition.
75
  
Morals are fluid in that they differ from time to time and society to society
76
 and are 
                                                          
72
 R Dworkin A Matter of Principle (1985) 191. 
73
 J Martínez-Torrón ‗The European Convention on Human Rights‘ (2008) 3(2) Global Jurist Advances 
17. 
74
 Paragraph 8 General Comment 22. 
75
 Ibid. 
76
 Handyside v UK (see note 52 above) 22. 
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derived from many social, philosophical and religious traditions.
77
  For example the 
Austrian Constitutional Court has held that Jewish and Islamic tradition of sacrificing 
and slaughtering of sheep should enjoy priority over the value of protecting animals 
from unnecessary suffering.
78
  Questions on Muslim and African cultural polygamy 
too will require the balancing of religious values with other values, such as equality.  
Certain manifestations of belief are ‗so obviously contrary to morality, public order, or 
the general welfare that public authorities are always entitled to limit them or even to 
prohibit them altogether‘.79  Rituals involving self-mutilation, as well others, such as 
human sacrifice, prostitution and slavery may be limited without amounting to 
discrimination as the offenders are ‗founded in the superior interests of society‘.80 
 
6.2.3.2 Restrictions for the protection of public safety 
 
The right to manifest religious belief, through the observance of religious rites and the 
display of religious dress, may be limited on the ground of public safety.  The 
objective is to allow for restrictions when a danger arises threatening the safety of 
people.  Nonetheless, in most instances the clause, just as the requirement to protect 
the public health,
81
 has been evoked to protect the individual safety of the religious 
adherent herself. 
                                                          
77
 Paragraph 8 General Comment 22. 
78
 Judgement of the Austrian Constitutional Court of 17 December 1998 ( Case No B 3028/97)  See 
discussion in M Vašek ―Ritual slaughter and freedom of religion‘ (2009) 3 Constitutional Law 
developments in Austria 228. 
79
 DJ Sullivan „Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination‘ (1988) 82 American 
Journal of International law 487, 511. 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 As discussed in section 6.2.3.1 some religious traditions prohibit the intentional harming of the body 
and accordingly, vaccination.  However, in times of an epidemic the compulsory vaccination of 
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In the matter of Singh Binder v Canada,
82
 the ICCPR Human Rights Committee held 
the dismissal by the Canadian National Railways of a Sikh employee whom had 
insisted on wearing a turban instead of safety headgear while at work was justified 
under article 18(3) of the ICCPR.  The ICCPR Human Rights Committee held that the 
requirement for Sikhs to wear safety headgear during work was justified on the ground 
of public safety.  The ICCPR Human Rights Committee treated this matter as a matter 
of manifestation, consistent with the stipulations of General Comment 22.  However 
the Committee found no violation and held that: 
[T]he legislation requiring that workers in federal employment be protected from 
injury and electric shock by the wearing of hard hats is to be regarded as reasonable 
and directed towards objective purposes that are compatible with the Covenant.
83
 
 
Justification of this limitation on the ground of public safety has rightly been 
criticised
84
 as the risk is confined to Mr Singh.  It is suggested that a distinction should 
be drawn between manifestations that endanger the safety of others (public safety) and 
those that relate to the safety of the person in question.
85
  In the event of the 
manifestation endangering the safety of the person in question only, then the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
religious adherents could be considered to be a necessary limitation of the right to freedom of religion.  
In such instances the interpretation of the limitation is clear, particularly when the aim of the limitation 
is to protect of the rights of others.  Protecting an individual‘s own health from her own religious 
convictions is clearly more problematic than when the limitation is aimed at protecting the rights of 
others. 
82
 Singh Binder v Canada, Comm No 208/ 1986 (UN Human Rights Committee, 9 November 1989) UN 
Doc A/45/40 (Vol II) Annex IX, SE (1990). 
83
 Ibid 6.2. 
84
 BG Tahzib Freedom of Religion and Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (1996) 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 296. 
85
 Ibid. 
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individual right to freedom of religion should be allowed to supersede the individuals 
safety if the individual so chooses.
86
 
 
Taylor argues that the conceptual distinction between restrictions on manifestations of 
belief (the wearing of religious headdress) and the obligatory wearing of safety 
equipment contrary to religious mandate (coercion) is a complex distinction.
87
  The 
preference of the European institutions has been to decide such issues of coercion on 
the basis of manifestation of religious belief.  A more recognisable case of coercion, 
rather than manifestation, is evident in the case concerning the forced removal of 
beard by a Muslim prisoner.
88
  In the matter of Clement Boodoo v Trinidad and 
Tobago
89
 the ICCPR Human Rights Committee however found a violation of article 
18 as the claimant claimed that: 
                                                          
86
 This line of reasoning is similar to the argument put forward in Section 6.2.3.1 in terms of which 
adults adhering to the Jehovah witness faith should be allowed to refuse to consent to blood transfusions 
as a form of medical treatment. 
87
 Taylor (see note 44 above) 133.  For a comprehensive discussion of the coercion or the freedom from 
performing acts incompatible with the prescriptions of a religion, such as taking the oath, conscientious 
objection to military service, participation in religious or civic ceremonies contrary to the adherents 
faith see, compulsory prevention or treatment of disease see Study of Discrimination in the Matter of 
Religious Rights and Practices: Report of Mr. Arcot Krishnaswami, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 12 U.N. ESCOR Sub-
Comm on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Agenda Item 5), U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960) (1979) 11 New York University Journal of International Law & 
Politics 227, 257.  (Krishnaswami Study). 
88
 General Comment 22 has expounded the content of observance and practice of religion or belief to 
include not only ceremonial acts but also customs and conduct related to religious conviction such as 
the observance of special dietary regulations, and the wearing of religious dress, distinctive clothing or 
head coverings as well as grooming customs such as the cutting of beards.  See paragraph 4 of General 
Comment 22. 
89
 Clement Boodoo v Trinidad and Tobago Comm No 721/1996 (UN Human Rights Committee, 2 April 
2002). 
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[H]e had been forbidden from wearing a beard and from worshipping at religious 
services, and that his prayer books were taken from him, the Committee reaffirms that 
the freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching encompasses a broad range of acts and that the concept of worship extends to 
ritual and ceremonial acts giving expression to belief, as well as various practices 
integral to such acts.  In the absence of any explanation from the State party 
concerning the author‘s allegations in paragraph 2.3 – 2.6, the Committee concludes 
that there has been a violation of article 18 of the Covenant.
90
 
 
Taylor alleges that the forced beard shaving in these matters is not religiously neutral 
since it requires the individual to sacrifice his religious belief and in place thereof 
exhibit practices inconsistent therewith.
91
  Taylor maintains that there are several 
incidents where issues of coercion and manifestation may coincide. 
 
The interpreting bodies at times construe restrictions on the ground of protecting 
public safety to intersect with public order.  For example, governments have regularly 
limited the manifestation of religious belief on the ground of public order when 
restricting the right to freedom of religion of prisoners.  The European Commission on 
Human Rights has considered the right of a Buddhist prisoner to grow a beard
92
 and 
the right of a Sikh prisoner to wear special clothing
93
 under the restrictions provided 
for in pursuit of public order.  Both these matters were found inadmissible and the 
limitation was consequently not further scrutinised.  Through finding the applications 
inadmissible to European Commission did not conduct an enquiry into the question as 
to if the restriction was necessary to protect a public interest.  Nor did the Commission 
scrutinise if the restriction was narrowly tailored to serve the public interest.  In 
                                                          
90
 Clement Boodoo v Trinidad and Tobago (note 89 above) 6.6. 
91
 Taylor (note 44 above) 135. 
92
 X v Austria App No 1753 /63 (EComHR, 15 February 1965) inadmissibility decision, Yb 8, 174 
93
 X v United Kingdom App No 8231/78(EComHR, 28 Decisions and Reports 5, 28, 6 March 1982) 
inadmissibility decision. (X v United Kingdom) 
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following this approach the European Commission does not afford the right to 
manifest religious belief adequate protection. 
 
6.2.3.3 Restrictions for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
 
In addition to the limitation of the right to manifest religious belief in the interest of 
protecting public interests as discussed above the right to manifest religious belief may 
also be limited in the interest of protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others.  For example, the right to manifest religion through teachings (proselytism) 
may be restricted to protect the fundamental rights of others.  In this regard, the aim of 
the restriction of actions of improper proselytism is to protect the freedom of religion 
of other religious groups against conversion as a result the right to manifest religion 
through missionary activities may be limited in order to protect the religious freedom 
of others not to be converted. 
 
The ECtHR for the first time in the matter of Kokkinakis v Greece
94
 decided on a 
question related to the individual‘s right to freedom of conscience.95  Proselytism was 
the central issue in this decision and the ECtHR held that article 9 includes the right of 
individuals and religious groups to disseminate their doctrines and to gain new 
followers through proselytism, provided that they do not use abusive, fraudulent or 
violent means. 
 
                                                          
94
 Kokkinakis v Greece 17 EHRR 397 [1994] ECtHR 260 A, 25 May 1993] 399 (Kokkinakis). 
95
 Article 9 of the ECHR drew its inspiration from article 18 of the UDHR to reduce the risk of articles 
that were at anomalous with the UN instruments.  Article 9 consists of an absolute right to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to change religion; a right to manifest such a 
belief; and a number of qualifications to the right to manifest religious belief.  The limitation of the 
right to manifest one‘s religious belief contained in article 9(2) of the ECHR is in essence very similar 
to the qualification contained in article 18(3) of the ICCPR. 
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In Kokkinakis the ECtHR held that article 9 of the ECHR included the right of 
individuals to share their dogma through proselytism, provided that they do not do so 
in an ‗improper‘ fashion.96  Mr Kokkinakis, a follower of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, 
was arrested under a Greek law that declared proselytism a crime.
97
  The ECtHR did 
not declare the Greek law incompatible with the ECHR, as it may be interpreted to 
protect the rights of others.  However, the ECtHR did hold that they right to 
disseminate religious information is integral to the right to freedom of religion and that 
the Greek prohibition was only applicable to ‗improper proselytism‘.98  As the Greek 
government had not provided evidence that Mr Kokkinakis engaged in improper 
proselytism his conviction was an infringement of the ECHR.  The ECtHR held that 
the statute which allowed for prosecution of proselytisers was not ‗narrowly drawn to 
define and punish specific conduct‘, but was subject to prosecutorial discretion.99 
 
The ECtHR in the matter of Kokkinakis reaffirmed the value of freedom of religion in 
a democratic society and held that: 
[F]reedom of thought, conscience, and religion is one of the foundations of a 
‗democratic society‘ within the meaning of the Convention.  It is, in its religious 
dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers 
and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, 
                                                          
96
 Regarding the action of proselytism see generally PM Taylor ‗The Questionable Grounds of 
Objections to Proselytism and Certain Other Forms of Religious Expression‘ (2006) Brigham Young 
University Law Review 811, 836. 
97
 Proselytism is criminalised in Greece by virtue of section 4 of Law no. 1363/1938 (as amended) and 
is defined as meaning: ‗in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religion or beliefs 
of a person of a different religious persuasion, with the aim of undermining those beliefs, either by any 
kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or material assistance, or by 
fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety‘. 
98
 Regarding the action of proselytism see generally Taylor (note 96 above) 836. 
99
 Kokkinakis (note 94 above) 311. 
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sceptics and the unconcerned.  The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, 
which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.
100
 
The affirmation of the right to freedom of religion as put forward in the Kokkinakis 
case causes one to believe that this affirmation will necessitate a strict scrutiny of any 
limitation imposed on the right to freedom of religion.  However the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR reveals quite the opposite.  The requirement that a limiting provision must 
be narrowly drawn to serve the protection of the specific public interest has not been 
constantly applied.  The European Commission, for example, failed to appreciate the 
value of the right to freedom of religion and consequently accepted less narrowly 
drawn limiting provisions.  Of particular concern has been the approach of the 
European Commission to declare that a religious adherent could possibly waive his 
right to manifest religious belief through voluntarily agreeing to certain duties that are 
in conflict with his religious belief. 
 
In the application of Ahmad v United Kingdom the European Commission denied the 
admissibility of a claim of a Muslim school teacher.
101
  The claim of Mr Ahmad‘s 
application followed a refusal by the school authorities to extend his lunch hour to 
enable him to attend the Friday prayer.
102
  In deciding on the admissibility, the 
decision of the European Commission may be criticised for the following reasons: 
firstly, it failed to analyse the school code; secondly, it failed to require a narrowly 
tailored restriction aimed at serving a compelling state interest; and thirdly, it failed to 
                                                          
100
 Ibid 53. 
101
 Before 1998, individuals filed an application before the European Commission of Human Rights, 
alleging an infringement.  The Commission then decided on the issue of admissibility of the complaint 
to the ECtHR acting as a filter to decide which cases deserved and examination by the ECtHR.  See 
discussion in section 4.9.1. 
102
 See Ahmad v United Kingdom App No 8160/78, 4 Eur Comm‘n H R 126 (1981).  The 
inadmissibility decision of Ahmad follows a similar previous application to the European Commission 
in which the Commission held that there was no interference with the right to manifest religious belief.  
See Dec. Adm. 8160/78, 22 Decision and Reports 27. See X v United Kingdom (note 93 above). 
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conduct an enquiry to ascertain if the school could have accommodated the request 
without compromising the needs of the students or school.  The European 
Commission merely held that the right to conscience was not violated because the 
teacher himself had made the decision to apply and accept the teaching position.  The 
European Commission in following this approach assumed that the right to conscience 
is not infringed as long as the option of resignation remains and the acceptance of the 
conditions of employment are voluntary. 
 
The voluntary nature of employment was also relied upon by the European 
Commission in the matter X v United Kingdom.
103
  In this matter a Muslim school 
teacher accepted the terms of employment which required full time attendance without 
mentioning his religious Friday afternoon prayers requirements.  Subsequently, he was 
refused by the school authorities to take time off for prayer.  The Commission found 
that this refusal did not violate the right to freedom of religion and therefore held that 
the application was inadmissible. 
 
The above reasoning by the European Commission that the right to freedom of 
religion was not infringed if the nature of employment is voluntary, is criticised.  It is 
contended that the European Commission, when relying upon the fact that an applicant 
has a choice to resign or continue with employment, does not adequately scrutinise the 
limiting provision.  The necessity to limit the adherents‘ right in seeking to achieve a 
certain public interest is not adequately balanced.  This need to balance conflicting 
interests is even more significant where the employer requires an employee to act 
contrary to his beliefs.  For example, in the matter of Stedman v United Kingdom
104
 
the voluntary nature of employment was emphasised by the European Commission, 
when the applicant claimed religious reasons for not being able to work on a Sunday, 
                                                          
103
 X. v United Kingdom (note 93 above) 33. 
104
 Stedman v United Kingdom App. No.29107/95, 89 – A (1997) D&R 104, 107-8. 
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even though the change to work on a Sunday was unilaterally imposed by the 
employer.  The Commission regarded her complaint as an issue of contractual 
liability, holding that she had been dismissed as a result of her failure to work certain 
hours rather than for her religious belief as such, and that she was free to resign from 
her employment. 
 
The ECtHR has further held that a limitation is justified not only in the event of 
voluntary employment, but also when the limitation is sporadic in nature.  In the 
matter of Mann Singh v France,
105
 the applicant, a practicing Sikh, supplied photos 
showing him wearing a turban to the licensing department.  Upon which the licensing 
department refused twice to issue a duplicate driving license.  Subsequent to this, the 
Minister of Transport, Public Works, Tourism and the Sea sent a circular in December 
2005.  The circular stipulated that identity photographs for use on driving licenses or 
duplicate licenses had to be accompanied by a photograph showing the person 
‗bareheaded and facing forward‘.  This was designed to minimise the risk of fraud or 
falsification of driving licenses, by enabling the holder to be identified with the 
maximum degree of certainty.  The ECtHR ruled that the limitation of the tenets and 
rites of the Sikh religion were sporadic and were not disproportionate to the aim 
pursued.  Therefore, the limitation was justified in principle and proportionate to the 
aim pursued and the complaint was manifestly ill- founded. 
 
In contrast with the reasoning of the European Commission that the voluntary nature 
of employment negates a claim and the reasoning of the ECtHR that a sporadic 
infringement may be justified, is the reasoning of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
in Luxembourg
106
 in the matter of Prais v EC Council.
107
  In the matter of Prais a 
complaint by a Jewish teacher who was unable to hold examinations on Saturdays 
                                                          
105
 Mann Singh v France (No 24479/07). 
106
 See section 4.9.2.4. 
107
 Prais v EC Council (Case 130/75) 1976 ECR 1589, 2 CMLR 708. 
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because of his religious convictions was successfully protected in terms of the non-
discrimination provisions of European Community Law. 
 
From the above discussion it is evident that the monitoring mechanisms of the ECHR 
have mostly been more inclined to find that there has been no infringement or that the 
infringement is justified. 
 
6.2.3.4 Restrictions for the protection of public order 
 
In the event of the limitation being based on a state‘s need to protect the public order, 
it has been said that the term public order must be interpreted in the narrow sense of 
the word, to mean the prevention of public disorder.
108
  This narrow interpretation of 
public disorder incorporates those restrictions that are essential for the coexistence of 
human beings.
109
  The concept public order therefore should be distinguished from the 
French expression l‟ordre public, which relates to the policies of an orderly society.110  
In light of the above definition of public order it is suggested that dress regulations, 
such as the prohibition of Islamic headscarf-hijab and turbans for Sikh men should not 
per se be justified on the ground of public order, as it can hardly be contested that 
wearing of a headscarf or turban leads to public disorder. 
 
However, case law suggests that the courts have been eager to interpret the provision 
of public order in a more general sense.  For example, in the application of 
                                                          
108
 Principle 22 of the Siracusa Principles incorrectly states: ‗The expression ‗public order‘ (ordre 
public) as used in the Covenant may be defined as the sum total of rules which ensure the functioning of 
society or the set of fundamental principles on which society is founded.  Respect for human rights is 
part of the public order‘. 
109
 See in general Nowak & Vospernik (note 34 above) 152. 
110
 See generally R de Lange ‗The European Public Order, Constitutional Principles And Fundamental 
Rights‘ (2007) 1 (1) Erasmus Law Review 3. 
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Karaduman v Turkey
111
 the applicant refused to remove her headscarf when taking a 
photo for degree certificate purposes.  As a result, the Turkish state university refused 
to issue her with a degree certificate.  The European Commission on Human Rights in 
Karaduman decided that the act, although motivated by religious belief, was not a 
manifestation of that belief since: 
The purpose of the photograph affixed to a degree certificate is to identify the person 
concerned.  It cannot be used by that person to manifest his religious belief.
112
 
 
This approach indicates a very restrictive view of what counts as a religious 'practice'.  
For this reason, the Commission failed to acknowledge that the university‘s action 
might have infringed on the applicant‘s right to manifest her religious belief.  
Similarly, in the application of Bulut v Turkey
113
 the European Commission denied 
that the refusal of the Turkish state university to issue diplomas in which the 
photographs submitted by the applicants pictured the applicants wearing headscarves, 
did not pose an infringement on the right to manifest religious belief.  Both 
applications were declared inadmissible by the Commission.  The Commission 
accepted the arguments of the Turkish government that within the particular legal and 
social circumstances a display of a headscarf could create conflict and place other 
students under pressure.  In the interest of public order the limitation was therefore 
justified. 
 
The European Commission‘s reasoning in the matters of Karaduman and Bulut, in 
terms of which secular universities are able to limit the manifestation of religious 
symbols when the limitation is aimed at ensuring harmonious coexistence between 
                                                          
111
 Karaduman v Turkey, App. No. 16278/90 (EComHR, 74, DR 93, 3 May 1993) inadmissibility 
decision. 
112
 Ibid 109. 
113
 Bulut v Turkey Dec. Adm. 18783/91. (EComHR, 74, Decisions and Reports 93, 3 May 1993) 
inadmissibility decision. 
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students of various faiths and protecting public order and the beliefs of others, has 
been carried forward in decisions of the ECtHR. 
 
In the matter of Kurtulmus v Turkey
114
 the applicant, a professor at the Istanbul 
University, was subject to a disciplinary investigation by the University for wearing an 
Islamic headscarf-hijab.  Following the disciplinary proceedings, a law was enacted, 
granting amnesty to civil servants who had been subject to disciplinary measures for 
wearing the Islamic headscarf and allowing for their reinstatement.  The applicant did 
not apply for reinstatement but made an application to the ECtHR claiming that her 
right to manifest religious belief had been infringed.
115
  The ECtHR found the 
application manifestly ill founded.  The ECtHR stressed that the applicant had chosen 
to become a civil servant and so had to accept the consequences in terms of her 
employment. The grounds for the decision was that the limitation was proportionate to 
the pursuit of the legitimate interest of a democratic state in that the dress code applied 
without distinction to all members of civil society and was aimed at upholding the 
principles of secularism and neutrality.  Given the margin of appreciation, the ECtHR 
held that interference was justified and proportionate particularly in light of the 
voluntary nature of the employment, in that the applicant had chosen to become a civil 
servant.
116
 
 
The point of view of the ECtHR in Kurtulmus once again incorrectly relies on the 
voluntary nature of employment as criticised above in the matter of Ahmad v United 
Kingdom and X v United Kingdom. 
 
                                                          
114
 Kurtulmus v Turkey (No 65500/01). 
115
 The case Kurtulmus v Turkey is not available in English therefore the above summary of the case is 
drawn from the following N Sundkvist The Wearing of Religious Symbols at the Workplace in Sweden 
Master Thesis Faculty of Law University of Lund (2010). 
116
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In opposition to the decisions in of the ECHR institutions in Karaduman, Bulut and 
Kurtulmus is the communication of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee in the 
matter of Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan.
117
  In the matter of Hudoyberganova, an 
Uzbek University suspended a female Muslim student for allegedly wearing an 
Islamic headscarf.  The majority
118
 of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee concluded 
that there had been a general violation of article 18(2) of the ICCPR.  This conclusion 
must however be seen in light of the fact that the Uzbekistan government failed to 
argue why the limitation should be permissible.  Therefore, the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee did not address the question of possible grounds on which the limitation 
could be justified.  The ICCPR Human Rights Committee further confirmed that ‗the 
freedom to manifest one‘s religion encompasses the right to wear clothes or attire in 
public which is in conformity with the individual‘s faith or religion‘.119 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that the monitoring mechanisms of the ECHR 
have mostly been more inclined to find that there is no infringement or that the 
infringement is justified on the ground of protecting the public order.  The right to 
protect the public order on the one hand directly impacts on the restricted approach of 
the ECHR bodies in protecting the right to manifest religious belief.  The application 
of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in terms of which the countries are driven 
by different national and political policies on the other hand impacts on the varying 
interpretations of the right to manifest religious belief.  In contrast with the approach 
of the ECHR bodies there is some indication that the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee may more readily find an infringement and is therefore more moderate in 
guaranteeing the protection of the right to manifest religious belief. 
                                                          
117
 Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan (note 19 above). 
118
 Three Committee members, decided to append individual opinions, referring to the uncertain state of 
the record and to more complex causes for Ms. Hudoyberganova‘s exclusion from the institute, based 
on her own statements. 
119
 Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan (note 19 above) 6.2. 
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In addition to limitations imposed on the right to manifest religious belief for the 
protection of public order as provided for in the ICCPR and the ECHR and discussed 
above, some states, such as Switzerland, Turkey and France have justified limitations 
of the right to manifest religious belief, based on the principle of secularism.  The 
restriction of the public display of religious symbols is seen as infringing on the 
requirement of state neutrality as required by a secular state.  An evaluation of the 
relevance of the principle of secularism as a ground of justification for the right to 
manifest religious belief follows next. 
 
6.3 Evaluation of the principle of secularism / public neutrality as an 
analogous ground of justification 
 
The discussion below evaluates the claim that secular states may limit the right to 
manifest religious belief based on the principle of secularism.  In general, the 
justification of states in limiting the right to manifest religious belief based on the 
principle of secularism is founded on the following three concepts:  First, the aim of 
the limitation is to protect the rights of others against conversion or religious pressure.  
Second, the aim of the limitation is to protect the public order through creating a 
neutral public space.  Finally, the aim of the limitation is to ensure gender equality and 
to protect women from patriarchal and discriminatory religious practices.
120
 
 
The applicability of these three concepts will be evaluated in relation to the following 
two areas in which the right to manifest religious belief through the display of the 
                                                          
120
 For an overview of secularism in Europe and the application thereof by the ECtHR see C Evans and 
CA Thomas ‗Church-State Relations in the European Court of Human Rights‘ (2006) Brigham Young 
University Law Review 699. 
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Islamic headscarf-hijab has been limited in states on the basis of secularism:  Firstly, 
limiting the right of public employees, such as teachers in state schools.  Secondly, 
limitations imposed on the rights of private individuals, namely students at tertiary 
institutions, scholars at primary and secondary schools and other private individuals in 
the public domain.  After this evaluation, a critique of the employment of the principle 
of secularism, as a possible ground for the justification of a limitation on the right to 
manifest religious belief is offered. 
 
6.3.1 Public employees - teachers at public schools wearing the Islamic 
headscarf-hijab: the matter of Dahlab v Switzerland  
 
The matter of Dahlab v Switzerland
121
 raises the issue of the right of a teacher, 
employed in a public primary school, to manifest her religious belief.  The application 
was declared inadmissible by the ECtHR.  The ECtHR recognised that prohibiting a 
teacher to wear the headscarf while teaching was an infringement of her right to 
religious freedom, after which the ECtHR proceeded to scrutinise the possible 
justification of the infringement on the right to manifest religious belief. 
 
Despite agreeing that the prohibition was an infringement on the right to freedom of 
religion, the ECtHR did not directly acknowledge that the display of the Islamic 
                                                          
121
 Dahlab v Switzerland, application No. 42393/98, ECtHR decision of 15 February 2001 (cf. ECHR 
2001-V Eur Court HR 449 (Dahlab).  The background to the case, in brief is as follows:  In September 
1990, Ms Dahlab was appointed as a primary-school teacher with responsibility for pupils aged between 
four and eight.  In March 1991, she converted to Islam and began wearing the Islamic headscarf at 
school.  In May 1995 the district schools inspector informed the primary education department that the 
applicant had regularly worn a headscarf at school without attracting any comment from pupils or 
parents.  The department requested the applicant to stop and subsequently issued a ban on Muslim 
employees wearing headscarves, on the ground that this was unacceptable in a public secular education 
system. 
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headscarf forms part of the practice of religion.  This hesitation on the side of the 
ECtHR, to expressly state that the display of the Islamic headscarf forms part of the 
practice of religious belief, could be indicative of a general reluctance to acknowledge 
the value of religious practices outside of Christianity.
122
  The ECtHR further 
commented that some leeway must be allowed in circumstances where the conduct 
'would be regarded by the average citizen as being of minor importance'.
123
  In 
contrast to this hesitance displayed by the ECtHR the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee unambiguous confirmed each individual‘s right to wear clothes in the 
public that conforms to the individual‘s religion. 124 
 
The ECtHR, although finding a limitation of the right to manifest religious belief, held 
that within the margin of appreciation the Swiss authorities had acted reasonably as 
the prohibition the headscarf was a measure necessary for the protection of public 
order, public safety, and the rights and freedom of others.  In addition the ECtHR 
emphasised that as young students may be more easily influenced, extreme care was 
called for.  As a result, the ECtHR upheld the Swiss Federal Courts‘ interpretation of 
the neutrality principle that was required to preserve the 'religious harmony' in the 
community.
125
 
 
                                                          
122
 For a discussion of this point and others pertaining to the Sahin v Turkey judgment see C Evans ‗The 
―Islamic scarf‖ in the European court of human rights‘ (2006) 7 (1) Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 52, 65.  For a further illustration of the ECtHR bias towards Christian values see the decision in 
ECtHR, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, Judgment of 13 February 2003, 132 in 
which the Grand Chamber concurred with the view of the Chamber that ‗Sharia (Islamic law primarily 
derived from Quran [the Islamic holy book] and Sunnah [sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad, 
the prophet of Islam]) is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the 
ECHR. 
123
 Dahlab (note 121 above) 453. 
124
 Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan (note 19 above) 6.2. 
125
 Dahlab (note 121 above) 12. 
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The ECtHR illustrates three elements to its reasoning in finding the application 
inadmissible.  First, that wearing the headscarf might have a proselytising effect; 
second, that wearing the headscarf is incompatible with gender equality, and third, that 
it is incompatible with tolerance and respect for others.  The reasoning of the ECtHR 
is expressed as follows: 
The Court accepts that it is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external 
symbol such as wearing a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and 
religion of very young children. The applicant's pupils were aged between four and 
eight, an age at which children wonder about many things and are more easily 
influenced than older pupils. In those circumstances, it cannot be denied outright that 
the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising effect, seeing that it 
appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and 
which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender 
equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf 
with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils.
126
 
 
The national authorities were of the opinion that the Islamic headscarf is a ‗powerful 
external symbol‘ within the context of a primary school teacher‘s ability to 
influence.127  The ECtHR concurred with the Swiss Federal Court that the prohibition 
was justified in that the headscarf may pose a threat as in that: 
Teachers must ... endorse both the objectives of the State school system and the 
obligations incumbent on the education authorities, including the strict obligation of 
denominational neutrality....
128
 
 
It is contended that the ECtHR‘s argument regarding proselytism is weak.  In the case 
of Kokkinakis the court distinguished between permissible and unacceptable forms of 
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proselytism and found the practice of Mr Kokkinakis not to be improper and therefore 
permissible.  It is contended that Ms Dahlab was definitely not involved in any 
improper proselytism.  At worst her actions could be described as a covert in that she 
was being true to her religion in her behaviour. It is difficult to understand how this 
amounts to improper proselytism on children in religious matters. 
 
Regarding the issue of gender inequality, the ECtHR simply makes the assertion that 
wearing the veil is incompatible with gender equality, in that the requirement to veil 
'appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran'.
129
  
The approach of the ECtHR appears to be founded on the view that the Koran and 
Islam are oppressive to women.  The ECtHR failed to appreciate that this was the 
behaviour of an educated and strong-minded women who refused to be oppressed by 
what she considered to be an illegitimate regulation of her clothing.
130
  In addition this 
decision of the ECtHR fails to acknowledge that the headscarf‘s functions and social 
significance are varied.
131
 
 
                                                          
129
 Dahlab (note 121 above) 463. 
130
 This argument however does not deny that in certain instances the choice of women may be taken 
away by the government, the family or her cultural environment.  However, a blanket acceptance that 
all women who wear the veil are forced to do so in unfounded.  This paternalism of the ECtHR is also 
criticised in the dissenting judgment of Tulkens J in Sahin v Turkey, Grand Chamber decision as 
discussed in Section 6.3.2 below. 
131
 S Poulter 'Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and France' 
(1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43, 71.  The Quebec Human Rights Committee confirms this 
point of view in the following manner, 'one should presume that hijab-wearers are expressing their 
religious convictions and the hijab should only be banned when it is demonstrated-and not just 
presumed that public order or sexual equality is in danger': as cited in CD Baines, 'L 'Affaire des 
Foulards Discrimination or the Price of a Secular Public Education System?' (1996) 29 The Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 303, 324. 
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It is further apparent that the ECtHR is contradicting itself in its own reasoning.  On 
the one hand, Ms Dahlab represents a victim of gender inequality, oppressed, 
submissive, a victim of patriarchy, and on the other hand, Ms Dahlab is seen as a 
forceful proselyte, who threatens the rights of innocent children.  The ECtHR in this 
line of reasoning views Ms Dahlab simultaneously as an aggressor and as victim in 
need of protection from cultural and religious domination. 
 
In the course of this contradicting reasoning the ECtHR does not succeed in showing 
how the proselytising and discriminatory effect of the headscarf is rendered 
incompatible with tolerance and respect for others required in a democratic society.132  
It is argued that the ECtHR did not adequately weigh up the competing interests, the 
importance of the right to manifest religious belief and the impact of the limitation of 
the right on the individual vis-a-vis the fundamental rights of others.
133
 
 
It is further contended that the ECtHR erred in deferring too much to the states margin 
of appreciation.  The 'religious peace' of the school did not appear to have suffered any 
serious threat in the lengthy period the applicant wore the Islamic headscarf before 
being prohibited from doing so.  In this period there was no complaint from either the 
students or their parents.
134
  Moreover, the display of the Islamic headscarf in an 
environment of mutual respect could be more consistent with the dictates of neutrality 
and evidence of the reality of religious pluralism. 
 
It is suggested that the one-sided argument that the display of religious symbols by Ms 
Dahlab may raise concerns of coercion and that harm to others does not in any manner 
indicate that the display of these symbols, in a different context, may indeed give rise 
                                                          
132
 Dahlab (note 121 above) 463. 
133
 An example of a more rigorous weighing of the competing values, is illustrated by Tahzib-Lie (note 
2 above) 473-83. 
134
 Dahlab (note 121 above) 467. 
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to questions pertaining to neutrality.  For example, questions related to the actor as 
well as the place of action could raise questions of endorsement or entanglement with 
religion.  However, if the actor is a member of a religious minority then the argument 
of endorsement or entanglement becomes less persuasive.  It is argued that these 
concerns regarding state neutrality are however even less persuasive if the actor is a 
private individual and not a representative of the state.  In contrast with Dahlab the 
following three matters were all concerned with the limitation of the rights of private 
citizens in their private capacity to manifest their religious beliefs. 
 
However, following the reasoning of the ECtHR in Dahlab, the ECtHR once again 
relied upon the margin of appreciation to determine the best interests of a secular state 
in protecting the public order and the rights of others, in the following matters of: 
Sahin v Turkey,
135
 Atkas v France
136
 and Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey.
137
 
 
6.3.2 Private individuals and the display of the Islamic headscarf-hijab or other 
religious motivated dress  
 
6.3.2.1 Students at public universities: Sahin v Turkey 
 
In the case of Sahin v Turkey, Ms Sahin lodged a complaint alleging that the Turkish 
state university's regulations banning the Islamic headscarf violated her rights under 
the ECHR.
138
  The ECtHR Chamber upheld the prohibition on the wearing of a 
                                                          
135
 Sahin v Turkey, Grand Chamber decision (note 19 above). 
136
 Atkas v France (No. 43563/08). 
137
 Ahmet Arslan v Turkey (ECtHR, App. No. 41135/98) 23 February 2010. 
138
 Article 8 (private life), Article 9 (religion), article 10 (expression) and article14 (non-discrimination) 
of the ECHR and article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (unjustified interference with the right to education). 
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headscarf at a Turkish university and held that the prohibition was justified on the 
grounds of protecting the rights and interests of others and protecting public order 
through protecting secularism in a majority Islamic state.  The ECtHR Chamber 
stated: 
Where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are at stake, 
on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonable differ widely, the role of the 
national-decision making body must be given special importance…. In such cases, it 
is necessary to have regard to the fair balance that must be struck between the various 
interests at stake: the rights and freedoms of others, avoiding civil unrest, the demands 
of the public order and pluralism.
139 
 
The ECtHR Chamber further held that: 
[W]hen examining the question of the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish context, there 
had to be borne in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, which was 
presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who chose 
not to wear it.
140
 
 
Ms Sahin held that her religious belief did not challenge the principle of secularism, 
nor did she wear the veil in an ostentatious manner intended to create religious 
pressure.  In addition, she held that the headscarf did not challenge the rights of others, 
as the Islamic headscarf is not in itself incompatible with secularism and neutrality in 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR states that: ‗No person shall be denied the right to education. In the 
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall 
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious 
and philosophical convictions‘.  In the Chamber and subsequent Grand Chamber judgments, the ECtHR 
focused on both article 9 and article 2 of Protocol No. 1.  On the right to education of children see 
generally M Nowak ‗The Right to Education‘ in A Eide et al. (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook (2001) 268, 271. 
139
 Sahin v Turkey, Chamber decision (note 19 above) 101. 
140
 Sahin v Turkey, Chamber decision (note 19 above) 108 
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education.
141
  She advised that in plural societies, the eradication of difference was not 
advisable.  Furthermore, she indicated that the assurance of tolerance between 
competing groups needs was preferable.
142
  In addition, as the religious needs of 
women adhering to the Islamic faith were different, they had to be treated 
differently.
143
  As the wearing of yarmulkes by Jewish students was allowed, this 
implied discrimination between adherents of these different faiths. 
 
The Turkish government held that the neutrality of the public services was a 
prerequisite for a liberal, pluralist democracy and of particular importance in Turkey.  
The ECtHR Chamber held that in a secular state were the majority of the population 
belongs to a particular religion these measures were necessary.  These measures 
prevent pressure on students who do not belong to the majority religion and therefore 
are justified as they protect the peaceful coexistence of students and protect the public 
order.
144
  The margin of appreciation left it to the states to regulate the peaceful 
coexistence and the protection of the rights of others. 
 
Following the judgment of the Chamber, Sahin requested reconsideration before the 
Grand Chamber.
145
  The Grand Chamber confirmed that the restriction was justified.  
They contended that the limitation protects the state interests and the rights and 
freedoms of others and by maintains public order through promoting the principle of 
secularism.
146
 
                                                          
141
 Sahin v Turkey, Chamber decision (note 19 above) 87. 
142
 Sahin v Turkey, Chamber decision (note 19 above) 88. 
143
 Ibid. 
144
 Sahin v Turkey, Chamber decision (note 19 above) 108. 
145
 Sahin Grand Chamber decision (note 19 above). 
146
 Sahin Grand Chamber decision (note 19 above) 99.  For a comprehensive overview of the history 
and facts of the Sahin case see M Ssenyonjo ‗The Islamic veil and freedom of religion, the rights to 
education and work: a survey of recent international and national cases‘ (2008) 58 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 653. 
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The Grand Chamber acknowledged that in a democratic society, opinions on the state-
religion relationship may reasonably differ widely.  In such a context it is considered 
that ‗the role of the national decision making body must be given special 
importance‘.147  The court emphasised that what was important in determining the 
margin of appreciation was the following factors:  The need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others; the preservation of public order; and the securing of true religious 
pluralism.
148
 
 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR expressed the duty of states in plural communities 
as follows: 
The Court has frequently emphasised the State's role as the neutral and impartial 
organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this 
role is conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic 
society. It also considers that the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality is 
incompatible with any power on the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious 
belief or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed and that it requires the State to 
ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups.
149
 
 
It is evident from the decision in Sahin that the ECtHR will generally allow for a 
limitation of the display of religious dress in a secular community if the argument is 
put forward that the limitation is aimed at the protection of the public order in a 
secular community.  Accordingly, secularity is often perceived as the most suitable 
approach to ensure the above referred to equal treatment of all religions.  This 
perception, however must be criticised, as it does not take into consideration that the 
very origin of secularism is inherently tainted with conflict in that the origin of 
secularism was found during the: 
                                                          
147
 Sahin Grand Chamber decision (note 19 above) 109. 
148
 Sahin Grand Chamber decision (note 19 above) 110. 
149
 Sahin Grand Chamber decision (see note 19 above) 107. 
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[P]eriods of confrontation, of intolerance, and often of violence against those who 
held dissenting beliefs. Moreover, in current controversies involving religion and the 
state, where the doctrines are cited for the ostensible purpose of resolving conflicts, 
they continue to be applied in ways that divide citizens on the basis of their beliefs 
and that belittle those whose beliefs do not conform to popular preferences.
150
 
 
The narrow interpretation of public order as originally applied in the matter of Dahlab 
and now further entrenched in the matter of Sahin is not justified and indeed poses an 
unwarranted infringement on the right to freely manifest religious belief.  The dissent 
of Tulkens J, discussed below, provides a more suitable approach to balancing the 
need to protect the public against disorder on the one hand, and the right to manifest 
religious belief freely, on the other hand. 
 
Dissenting judgment in Sahin 
 
Regarding the issues of justification of the infringements, on the right to education and 
the right to freedom of religion in the matter of Sahin, a dissenting judgment was put 
forward by Tulkens J.  Only the concerns relating to the right to manifest religious 
belief are explored. 
 
When scrutinising the limitation on the right to manifest religious belief, Tulkens J 
ascribes to the principle of secularism but disagrees with the manner in which it was 
applied by the majority.  She argues that secularism must not be weighed against 
equality and liberty, but that an approach of harmonising these principles must be 
sought.  In this regard General Comments to article 18 of the ICCPR require that states 
display a disposition of ‗equality and non-discrimination‘ toward all religions.151 
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 JT Gunn 'Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States and France' (2004) 
Brigham Young University Law Review 419, 422. 
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 Paragraph 8 of General Comment 22. 
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These provisions may be interpreted to indicate that the duty of the state is to foster 
religious diversity in that an ‗indissociable‘ union exists between democratic society 
and religious diversity.  Religious pluralism necessitates the full and equal rights of 
adherents to all faiths to choose their own way of a good life, as long as their choice 
does not interfere with the rights of others.
152
 
 
This obligation to religious pluralism therefore requires that states should tolerate 
diverse religious point of views.  For that reason, a state‘s ability to restrict religious 
freedom on the ground that a public manifestation of religious ideas or practice is 
‗necessary‘ to protect public society and the state must be scrutinised.  This scrutiny 
requires that the state is able to show that a true, identifiable ground is necessary to 
justify the restriction.
153
 
 
Tulkens J further argues that in this investigation only ‗indisputable facts and reasons 
whose legitimacy is beyond doubt‘ are able to justify interference with a right 
guaranteed by the ECHR.
154
  The importance that Tulkens J places on the right to 
manifest religious belief and the level of scrutiny she proposes is significant.  It is 
clear that she appreciates the importance of the right and requires that any limitation of 
the right to be subject to strict scrutiny of the existence of indisputable facts, which are 
beyond doubt. 
 
For the majority it was a simple question of whether the wearing of the Islamic 
headscarf contravened the principle of secularism.  For Tulkens J, the significant 
question was to identify the relationship between wearing the Islamic headscarf and 
the principle of secularism.  In appreciating this relationship the following issues had 
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to be assessed; firstly, does the wearer call into doubt the principle of secularism, and 
secondly, did the wearer contravene the principle of secularism through her actions.
155
  
Tulkens J draws a clear distinction between public servants, pupils and students.  Her 
point of view is that the rights of students and pupils to manifest their religious belief 
should not inevitably be limited in a secular state.  The views expressed by Tulkens J 
are supported by Boyle, who has argued that secularism and democracy are not 
threatened by respecting the choice of an adult woman to wear religious garb.
156
 
 
The approach followed by Tulkens J is strongly advocated.  That is to say, secularism 
per se, should not constitute sufficient ground to justify a limitation on the rights of 
individuals outside of the public sector.  Indeed, the claim that secularism may 
constitute a justifiable ground for limiting the right to manifest religious belief within 
the public sector is questioned.
157
  This point of view is underscored by the following 
enquiry.  If neutrality in the public sector requires the removal of all visible signs of 
religious orientation, how can gender and race neutrality be enforced?  It is argued that 
the state cannot remove all visible signs of any possible predisposition, and that 
religious manifestations therefore should not be singled out in this quest for a neutral 
state. 
 
It is therefore contended that the association between the preservation of a secular 
state as a permissible justification for imposing a limitation on the right to manifest 
religious belief on the grounds of public order and state neutrality must be challenged. 
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 Sahin Grand Chamber decision (see note 19 above) 7. 
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 See ‗Interview with Professor Boyle‘ in ‗Leyla Sahin v Turkey‟. 
Available at <http://www.saman.com> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
157
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6.3.2.2  Scholars in public schools: Atkas v France 
 
The decision in Atkas followed the expulsion of Muslim girls for wearing headscarves 
and Sikh young men for wearing a keski or under-turban while attending a public 
school.
158
  The headmasters considered these headdresses in breach of a French Act of 
15 March 2004
159
 in terms of which the wear of all conspicuous signs of religious faith 
while attending public school is prohibited.  The pupils challenged their expulsions 
before the French administrative courts.  The administrative courts dismissed their 
applications at first instance and on appeal.  The ECtHR found the matters 
inadmissible under article 9 of the ECHR in that the restriction was in accordance with 
the law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others 
                                                          
158
 In France, before 2004, the French Conseil d'Etat can be regarded as having generally supported 
‗open‘ neutrality in terms of which the manifestation of all religions in the public sphere was generally 
permitted.  As noted by the Board of Experts of the International Religious Liberty Association (IRLA): 
‗Between 1989 and 2004, the French Conseil d'Etat determined, in approximately fifty decisions and 
judgments, that Muslim school girls had a right to wear headscarves in state schools provided that they 
did not display the headscarves in a proselytizing manner and that they did not disrupt schools. The 
Conseil d'Etat made these judgments based upon its interpretation of the French Constitution, 
international human rights law, and the French concept of laïcité‘.  See Board of Experts of the 
International Religious Liberty Association (IRLA), Guiding Principles Regarding Student Rights to 
wear or Display Religious Symbols (Siguenza, 15 November 2005) paragraph. 9, available at 
<www.irla.org/documents/reports/symbols.html> last accessed on 10 September 2010. 
159
 In 2003 President Jacques Chirac of France formed the Stasi Commission, in terms of Decree No. 
2003-607 of 3 July 2003, to conduct ‗an analysis of the application or the principle of laïcité in the 
Republic‘..  Following a report of the Stasi Commission, the French Parliament, enacted the law on 
secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools (Act of 15 March 2004 - 2004-228 of 15 March 
2004)which came into effect on 2 September 2004.  Law of 2004 (note 17 above).  This Act banned 
students from wearing ‗conspicuous‘ or ‗ostensible‘ religious symbols in French public primary and 
secondary schools. 
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and public order.  In these circumstances, and having regard to the margin of 
appreciation, the expulsions were justified and proportionate to the aim pursued.
160
 
 
It is reasoned that this decision, similarly to the decisions in Dahlab and Sahin, 
illustrate the fact that the ECtHR will in general find that there is no infringement on 
the right to manifest religious belief, if the infringement is in terms of a law that is 
aimed at protecting the secular nature of the state.  This approach of the ECtHR does 
not allow for any scrutiny into determining the necessity of the public interest sought 
as well as the precise nature of the restriction in achieving the public interest.  The 
proportionality of the infringement is never considered.  In finding that there is no 
infringement the ECtHR did not precede to the second stage of the investigation and in 
doing so does not ensure the adequate protection of the right to manifest religious 
belief.  It is contended that this approach of the ECtHR does therefore not ensure the 
optimal protection of the right to manifest religious belief. 
 
6.3.2.3 Private individuals in the public domain: the matter of Ahmet Arslan and 
Others v Turkey 
 
Evidence of more nuanced approach is visible in the reasoning of the ECtHR in the 
matter of Ahmet Arslan and Others v Turkey.  The applicants, members of a religious 
group, believed that their religion required them to wear a turban.  The applicants were 
convicted under legislation prohibiting the wearing of certain forms of clothing in 
public areas. 
                                                          
160
 Prior to the enactment of the Law of 2004, the ECtHR in the matters of Dogru v France (No 
27058/05) and Kervanci v France (No 31645/04) found that the expulsion of two female pupils from a 
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The ECtHR held that as their dress was religiously motivated their conviction fell 
within the ambit of article 9.  The ECtHR further held that as far as the limitation of 
religiously motivated dress was to ensure respect for secular and democratic 
principles, it pursued a number of legitimate aims.  However, the applicants were 
ordinary citizens and wore the clothes in a public area.  The ECtHR therefore held that 
regulations on the wearing of religious symbols in public establishments, where 
religious neutrality might take precedence over the right to manifest one‘s religion, 
were not applicable.  Furthermore, the applicants did not present a threat to public 
order, nor did they exercise pressure on others.  The limitation of the applicants‘ 
freedom to manifest their beliefs was not based on sufficient reason for the purpose of 
article 9 and therefore the applicants‘ rights were violated. 
 
It is submitted that this decision of the ECtHR is illustrative of a more appropriate 
interpretation of the notion that respect for secular principles does not per se require 
the removal of religious symbols from the public domain.  In this judgment, the 
ECtHR distinguished between displays by ordinary citizens in general public areas 
from the display by state employees in public establishments.  This distinction is 
welcomed.  However, as asserted previously in the discussion of Dahlab, it is 
contended that even representatives of the state engaged in public service, a display of 
public expression of religious belief does not per se indicate that the state endorses a 
particular religion.  The court ought to scrutinise the actor as well as the place of 
action in determining the effect of the religious display on the neutrality of the state. 
 
6.3.4 Critique of the application of the principle of secularism 
 
It is apparent from the above discussion that the right to manifest religious belief 
through the display of religious dress and in particular the Islamic headscarf-hijab is 
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often justified on the ground that the limitation protects the so-called public order in a 
secular state.  The achievement of neutrality stands central to secular states.  
Restrictions on the right to manifest religious belief in the field of public employment 
therefore have often been supported by claims that the limitation is necessitated by the 
secular nature and religious neutrality of the state.  The state may, for example, reason 
that the headscarf is a visible token of a particular religion and therefore not 
acceptable in the neutral public domain.  The achievement of perfect neutrality 
however is difficult in theory and impossible in practice. 
 
The approach of the ECtHR in the above decisions indicates the difficulty in striking a 
balance between the right to manifest religious belief on the one hand, and the duty of 
governments to protect public interests, and in particular the public order and state 
neutrality, on the other hand.  This difficulty is compounded in the blanket acceptance 
of restrictions in the interest of secularism for the following reasons set out below. 
 
6.3.4.1 Different interpretations of the dictates of secularism 
 
The relativity of achieving a balance is increased in that states apply different 
interpretations of the dictates of the principle of secularism.  Some states may interpret 
the principle of secularism as an analogous ground for state neutrality and public 
order.  For example, in France the debate on the headscarf is more relevant with 
regards to primary and secondary state schools.  The debate on the headscarf has 
however particular relevance to students at state universities in Turkey.  While in other 
states, which do not adhere to a secular relationship between the state and religion, 
such as Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom,
161
 both 
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scholars and students are permitted to wear the headscarf.  The German Constitutional 
Court has even ruled that teachers are entitled to wear the headscarf.
162
 
 
6.3.4.2 Secularism is not a listed public interest ground 
 
The methodology of the ECtHR towards interpreting secularism, as ground for 
restriction the freedom to manifest religious belief, is problematic in that neither the 
ICCPR nor the ECHR lists the principle of secularism as a ground upon which the 
right to manifest religious belief may be limited.  In addition, as shown below, the 
necessity clause must be construed as an exhaustive list of possible justifications.
163
  
Therefore the mere secular nature of a state is not a sufficient reason to limit religious 
freedom.  The state will have to indicate that the restricted behaviour indeed is a threat 
to one of the listed public interests. 
 
5.3.4.3 Secularism aimed at equal treatment of all religions 
 
The ICCPR and the ECHR endorse the notion that the principle of secularism should 
be interpreted in a manner that allows that diverse arrays of religions to prosper, as 
long as this approach does not violate the provisions of the limitations provisions 
contained in these instruments.  It is argued that to the extent that Turkey and France 
rely on the principle of secularism, to shield government and other citizens from the 
impact of committed adherents they are in breach of the principles of democratic 
society.
164
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 Koptuch-Urteil [Headscarf Decision] (September 2003) Bundesverfassunggericht [BVerGE] 
108,208 (F R G) 
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Justification of the limitation in accordance with the principle of secularism, in which 
a state claims that it has a legitimate interest in protecting the secular character of the 
government, as a display of religion may give the appearance of an endorsement or 
establishment of religion is not persuasive.  The terms establishment and endorsement 
of religion, although frequently employed by the United States Supreme Court, are not 
only to be associated with American jurisprudence.  These terms also form part of the 
vocabulary of the relationship between the state and religion as discussed in section 
3.6.  It is within this context that these terms are used.  In addition, as discussed 
previously, the ICCPR does not prohibit the existence of an established religion so 
long as that establishment does not discriminate against other religions or restrict the 
religious freedom of members who do not subscribe to the state religion.
165
 
 
This position of the ICCPR may be interpreted to support an interpretation of 
secularism that requires a more accommodationist approach towards religion in which 
religion is neither favoured nor opposed or a even a more cooperationist approach 
where the state is actively committed to equal treatment of all religions.
166
  Even the 
existence of an established church is not excluded as long as the existence of the 
established church does not discriminate against other religions.
167
 
 
6.3.4.4 Limitations need to be necessary  
 
In addition a limitation on the right to manifest religious belief would need to be 
necessary, which has been interpreted to mean serving a ‗pressing social need‘.168  
Accordingly an outright ban on the display of religious symbols cannot possibly be 
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justified under a strict scrutiny regime.  The state would have to show the ‗pressing 
social need‘ and the ban would have to be proportionate to the need. 
 
Regarding the application of the Law of 2004, as discussed in more detail in section 
6.3.2.2 and section 7.2.2, France would have to show that causing another to feel 
disrespected is an infringement of another‘s fundamental human right, or that the 
disrespect caused a threat to the public order in the narrow sense the word, which 
would be very challenging. 
 
6.3.4.5 The requirement of state neutrality 
 
The ECtHR agreed that in a secular community the principle of laïcité indeed may 
impose restrictions on civil servants rights to manifest their religion, especially in the 
education environment where students are easily influenced and ‗religious peace‘ must 
be protected with tremendous care.
169
  This interpretation of the principle of laïcité by 
the ECtHR regarding the limitation of civil servants is challenged.  It is suggested that 
the need for teachers to conduct themselves in a professional, independent, impartial 
and neutral manner can be regulated in terms of effective workplace regulations and 
codes of conduct and not only in terms of religious dress limitations that are enforced 
under the guise of adherence to the principle of laïcité. 
 
Similarly the argument related to neutrality raised in section 6.3.2.1 can be voiced here 
too.  That is, if neutrality is said to require the removal of all visible signs of religious 
orientation, it would not be possible to enforce gender and race neutrality.  From this 
line of reasoning it is clear that the state cannot remove all visible signs of any 
possible predisposition. 
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In addition it is contended that the absence of religious dress in the public domain may 
indeed not be neutral at all, but could in reality signal the endorsement of other 
religious values such as Christian values or even agnostic or atheistic values.  The so-
called neutrality of the state may further be brought into question if the limiting policy 
is not uniformly enforced against all religiously motivated garments, irrespective if 
such a symbol is ostentatious or discrete, such as the crucifix, the ceremonial dagger 
(kirpan) or even the Hindu bindi. 
 
In this regard the pursuit of neutrality appears to have imposed a secular point of view 
that has resulted in the devaluation of religious convictions and manifestations in the 
public domain.  In this way support for religious pluralism has been abandoned in 
favour of the notion of secularism or non-religion.  The fact that a women is allowed 
to wear a headscarf may more readily indicate that a state is tolerant and respecting of 
all diverse religious belief.  This tolerance may be more reflective of a truly neutral 
state in which all religious adherents are tolerated.  It is further suggested that 
removing all displays of religious dress from the public domain may as a substitute for 
neutrality more accurately signify a fictional absence of religion from the public 
domain. 
 
This fictional representation of neutrality may further impose a more onerous burden 
on some religions in relation to other religions, as the display of religious dress may be 
optional in some religions and obligatory in others.  For example, it is obligatory for 
Sikhs to wear turbans while the display of dreadlocks by Rastafarians, as well as the 
crucifix by Christians has been considered optional.  Therefore it is argued that in 
certain states the limitation of the Islamic headscarf is not proportional to protecting 
the public objectives of public safety, public health, public order and morals.  For 
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example in Turkey women who consider veiling part to be a religious obligation
170
 are 
excluded from the entire public sector.
171
  This exclusion deprives women of a 
university education and their ability to be productive members of society through 
education and employment. 
 
6.3.4.6 Expression of bias 
 
In addition to the critique of the fictional representation of neutrality, the ECtHR 
persists in expressing a moral value judgment regarding the wearing of the headscarf 
and declared that that the Islamic veil: 
[S]eems to be imposed to women by koranic prescription which ... is difficult to 
reconcile with the principle of equality of sexes.
172
 
 
This moral value judgment expressed by the ECtHR may also be illustrative of the 
ECtHR bias in favour of certain predominantly traditional Christian religions and 
consequent prejudice towards those religions that do not conform to these traditional 
values.
173
  This bias may further indicate a certain prejudice in the imposition of a 
                                                          
170
 The manifestation of religious practices may be differentiated in that a distinction can be drawn 
between those who feel ‗obligated‘ to partake in a particular observation or rite and those who are 
merely ‗encouraged‘ to do so.  For a further discussion of this distinction see generally van der Schyff 
(note 11 above) 177.  
171
 D Özlem ‗The Head-Cover Controversy in Contemporary Turkey‘ in T Lindholm, WC Durham, BG 
Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 497, 503. 
172
 Translation as provided in J Martínez-Torrón & R Navarro-Valls ‗The Protection of Religious 
Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe‘ in T Lindholm, WC Durham, BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) 
Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 209, 227. 
173
 The ECtHR has often justified interference by states to protect the cultural/religious sensitiveness of 
the Christian majority.  See for example the case of Müller and Others v Switzerland App. No. 
10737/84, 133 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 212 (1988) in which the ECtHR upheld restrictive measures 
taken in reaction to the controversial nature of certain paintings displayed at an exhibition in Fribourg.  
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limitation as well as the continued application of such a limitation on these non-
conforming religions. 
 
It is argued that any limitation of the right to manifest a religious belief, that is 
imposed on for example, scholars, students or teachers to wear the Islamic headscarf, 
should be justified on a case-by-case basis. This analysis should take into account the 
human rights of those wearing Islamic dress as a religious practice, as well as the 
rights of others.  If equal treatment of Muslim women forms the basis for imposing 
such a limitation, it must be appreciated that a general ban of the Islamic headscarf 
dress does not assure an environment in which autonomous and meaningful choices 
can be made.  It is suggested that the social, cultural, economic and political 
environment in which women make these unequal decisions must be challenged which 
is not achieved by merely banning the display of religious symbols by scholars, 
students or teachers. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
In Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 295-A Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 34 (1994), the 
ECtHR found that the seizure and subsequent forfeiture of the film Das Liebeskonzil justified.  In 
Wingrove v United Kingdom App. No. 17419/90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996), the ECtHR upheld the refusal of 
the British authorities to grant a certificate for the video work, Visions of Ecstasy.  This predisposition 
towards traditional religions is also evident in the jurisprudence of other international bodies.  A case in 
point is the matter of Assembly of the Church of the Universe v Canada  - MAB, WAT and J AYT v 
Canada Comm No 570/1993 ICCPR  Human Rights Committee, 8 April 1994) inadmissibility decision.  
In this case the ICCPR Human Rights Committee held claim of adherents to the Assembly of the 
Church of the Universe who as a result of their religious practices, which involved the cultivation, 
possession, distribution and worship of marijuana, were subjected to criminal prosecutions under the 
Canadian Narcotic Control Act, inadmissible.  The ICCPR Human Rights Committee held that such a 
belief could scarcely be brought under the provisions of article 18 in that the worship of marijuana 
hardly could be considered to represent a religious belief. 
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6.4 Some further relevant developments in other legal instruments 
 
The enactment of the Law of 2004 which banned students from wearing ‗conspicuous‘ 
or ‗ostensible‘ religious symbols in French public primary and secondary schools has 
negatively affected, in particular, Muslim girls from wearing the Islamic headscarf.  
The law has forced Muslim families to remove girls from the state educational system, 
infringing on the right of the child to freely manifest her religious belief
174
 as 
entrenched in the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC).
175
  The right of the 
child to education is also negatively implicated.
176
  To this end the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child noted that the Act ‗may be counterproductive, by neglecting the 
principle of the best interests of the child and the right of the child to access to 
education, and not achieve the expected results‘.177 
 
                                                          
174
 Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).  This Convention was adopted for 
signature, ratification and accession by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 
1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990.  (CRC) G.A. Res. 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 
(1989). 
175
 Article 14 of the CRC provides that:  
‘14 (1) States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  
14 (2) States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal 
guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with 
the evolving capacities of the child. 3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or 
morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.‘ 
176
 Article 28 of the CRC provides for the right to education of the child. 
177
 CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: France, CRC/C/15/Add.240 (30 June 2004), paragraph. 
25. 
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The Law of 2004 also impacts on the non-discrimination provisions.  In this regard the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee)
 178
 
recommended that France: 
[S]hould continue to monitor the implementation of the Act of 15 March 2004 closely, 
to ensure that it has no discriminatory effects and that the procedures followed in its 
implementation always place emphasis on dialogue, to prevent it from denying any 
pupil the right to education and to ensure that everyone can always exercise that 
right.
179
 
 
The Law of 2004 also impacts negatively on women in particular.  To this end the 
objective of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)
 180
 is described in General Recommendation 25 as aimed at eliminating de 
facto and de jure discrimination.  This Recommendation grants de facto equality and 
substantive equality the same meaning in that both are strategies seeking to achieve 
‗equality of results‘.181  In this regard, the CEDAW Committee received a complaint 
about a headscarf ban in the matter of Rahime Kayhan v Turkey.
182
  The complaint 
concerned a Turkish teacher who was dismissed for wearing a headscarf.  She argued 
that this was a violation of article 11 CEDAW, which guarantees the prohibition of 
gender-based discrimination in employment.  The complaint was held inadmissible, as 
the complainant had not exhausted domestic remedies. 
                                                          
178
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, proclaimed by 
GA Res. 1904 ( XVIII) of 20 November 1963. 
179
 CERD Committee, Concluding Observations: France, CERD/C/FRA/CO/16 (18 April 2005), 
paragraph. 18. 
180
 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 341/80 of 18 December 1979 and entered into 
force on 3 September 1981. 
181
 See RJ Cook and S Howard ‗Accommodating Women‘s Differences under the Women‘s Anti-
Discrimination Convention‘ (2007) 56 Emory Law Journal 1039, 1043 -48. 
182
 CEDAW Committee, Communication Kayhan v Turkey (note 19 above). 
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In addition, religious freedom is also protected in terms of the express guarantee of 
minority rights under article 27.
183
  The restriction may indeed also infringe on 
international standards protecting the rights of minorities.  Persons belonging to 
religious minorities should be enabled to express their characteristics, which may 
include the right to use their traditional dress or attire.
184
  It is well know that France is 
unreceptive to the concept of ‗group‘ or ‗minority‘ rights and has entered an expressed 
reservation to article 27 of the ICCPR.
185
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the approaches followed by the various international bodies 
when a limitation imposed on the right to manifest religion through the observation of 
religious rites as well as the cultivation religious appearances is scrutinised.  From this 
analysis the following similarities were identified.  Within the international context the 
UN framework, the European and American regional frameworks all require 
compliance with similar criteria when the justifiability of a limitation on the right to 
manifest religious belief is determined. 
 
Firstly, when the need to protect public interests such as public health and public 
safety are relied upon, these bodies in most instances will rely on such public interests 
                                                          
183
 Article 27 of the ICCPR reads that: ‗In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use 
their own language‘. 
184
 Article 4(2) of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Religious, and 
Linguistic Minorities. 
185
 Accession of France to ICCPR 8 November 1980. 
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in an attempt to protect the health and the safety of a particular individual whose 
religious rights are being limited.  This approach is criticised and it is suggested that 
these criteria of a public health or public safety interest should not be applied in this 
manner – particularly not when the religious adherent is exercising a cognisant, 
informed and uncoerced positive decision to manifest her religious belief, while being 
fully aware of the fact that this decision may impact on her individual health or safety.  
It is further suggested that the appropriate manner to balance the conflicting interest of 
religion, on the one hand, and the individuals‘ own safety or health, on the other hand, 
be left to the individual herself to determine. 
 
Secondly, when applying the requirement that the limitation must serve a public 
interest such as public safety, order or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, 
it is apparent that these bodies regularly interchange these public interests with each 
other.  For example when scrutinising a limitation imposed on the right to wear the 
Islamic headscarf, international bodies interchangeably refer to the need to protect 
public safety, public order as well as the rights of others.  As a result these public 
interests are treated with a measure of a relativity measure in achieving the desired 
public interest. 
 
International bodies have been eager to interpret the provision of public order in a 
more general sense and not restricted to the prevention as such of public disorder.  As 
a result of these interpretations, international bodies are more inclined to find that a 
limitation is justified in a secular state.  The limitation is considered to ensure 
harmonious coexistence between adherents of various faiths and is thus seen as 
protecting the public order and the beliefs of others.  This narrow interpretation of 
public order is not justified and it is strongly suggested that this approach poses an 
unwarranted infringement on the right to freely manifest religious belief.  A more 
tailored approach to balance the need to protect the public against disorder on the one 
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hand, and the right to freely manifest religious belief, on the other hand should be 
found. 
 
A possible approach would be to harmonise the principles of liberty and equality 
through assessing the following questions: namely, does the display of, for example, 
the Islamic headscarf cast any doubt on the principle of secularism, and does the 
adherent contravene the principle of secularism through her display of the Islamic 
headscarf? 
 
Thirdly, it is contended that secularism per se cannot establish sufficient ground for 
the justification of an infringement on the right to manifest religious belief of those 
outside of the public sector on the ground of public order.  This contention is also 
advanced when the limitation imposed is on those in the public sector.  Neutrality 
cannot be attained through the removal of visible appearance of orientation.  For 
example, gender and race orientation are not able to be eradicated and would remain 
as indicators of any predisposition.  Therefore, it is suggested that just as neutrality in 
instances of race and gender orientation is achieved through the imposition of 
effective workplace regulations and codes of conduct that are aimed at ensuring 
professional, independent, impartial conduct in the public sector, the same is possible 
for religious orientation. 
 
In particular, the very notion of the existence of neutrality is questioned.  Almost all 
the cases discussed illustrate that the notions of state neutrality and uniformity are 
often indicative of a predisposition towards traditional religions.  The effect of this 
predisposition is that the rights of adherents of non-traditional religions are often 
limited and these adherents are discriminated against. 
 
In this regard emphasis is placed upon the inference by the ECtHR that the pursuit of 
neutrality appears to have imposed a secular point of view.  This has resulted in the 
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devaluation of religious convictions and manifestations in the public domain.  As a 
result, support for religious pluralism has been abandoned in favour of the notion of 
secularism or non-religion.  States must be reminded of their obligation to take all 
appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other 
beliefs.
186
  The appeal of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief is 
relevant in this regard: 
[D]ress should not be the subject of political regulation [and] flexible and tolerant 
attitudes [are needed] so as to allow the variety and richness of ... garments to 
manifest themselves without constraints.
187
 
 
Fourthly, it is imperative that the necessity to protect the identified public interest is 
proportionate to the infringement on the adherents‘ ability to manifest her religious 
belief.  In this regard, the importance and the nature of the non-derogable right of 
freedom of religion must be adequately considered.  Each case must be evaluated on 
its own merits in terms of which the right to manifest religious belief is balanced 
against the need to protect public safety, order, health, morality or the fundamental 
freedoms of others.  The tendency of the international bodies to find a limitation 
justifiable without progressing to the necessity analysis and without therefore 
balancing these rights is criticised. 
 
A further approach in evaluating the necessity of a limitation is to evaluate the 
proportionality of the limitation in relation to the state interest served.  In this 
evaluation, the proportionality test requires that the least restrictive infringement on 
the right must be made in order to serve the state interest.  This evaluation can only be 
made if the public interest at which the limitation is aimed has been identified. 
                                                          
186
 See article 4 (2) of the 1981 Declaration. 
187
 Special Rapporteur Amor Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief UN Doc E/CN 4/1996/95/ Add 2 
paragraph 97 (1996). 
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Fifthly, in determining the proportionality of the infringement in relation to the public 
interest served, it is once again apparent that the standard of neutrality is indefinable.  
International bodies and states are influenced by values.  These values are usually the 
values of the dominant or majority religion or tradition.  These bodies may attempt to 
perpetuate these values and privileges even in times of increasing religious diversity 
and multiculturalism. 
 
In summary, when scrutinising a limitation for justifiability international bodies 
should identify the public interest that the limitation is aimed at protecting.   
Thereafter this interest must be weighed against the infringement to ensure a narrowly 
tailored limitation.  Claims by the relevant authority of neutrality and uniformity 
should be considered in light of the indefinable nature of these concepts.  The judicial 
body should actively attempt to balanced diverse religious values with other values.
188
                                                          
188
 It has been suggested that criteria to give guidance on how best to balance these competing claims is 
advisable.  In this regard, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the 
OSCE has developed Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion or Belief prepared by 
the OSCE/ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief in consultation with the 
Council of Europe‘s Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), 2004. 
Available at <http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_13600.html> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
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Chapter 7 
Application of the right to manifest religious belief in selected national legal 
contexts 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter the application of the right to manifest religious belief in the 
international legal context was analysed.  From this analysis it is evident that 
limitations imposed on the right to manifest religious belief has frequently required 
judicial review.  In particular the display of the Islamic headscarf-hijab has repeatedly 
been the ground for approaching the international enforcement bodies.  The rights of 
students at universities to wear the Islamic headscarf-hijab was raised in accordance 
with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the 
matters of Karaduman v Turkey;
1
 Bulut v Turkey Kurtulmus
2
 and Turkey and Leyla 
Sahin v Turkey.
3
  In the matter of Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan
4
 a student at a 
University in Uzbekistan was successful in relying on the protection afforded in terms 
of article 18 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  
The right of teachers to wear the Islamic headscarf-hijab was also the point of concern 
in the matters of Dahlab v Switzerland
5
 and Kayhan v Turkey.
6
  The right of pupils to 
                                                          
1
 Karaduman v Turkey, App. No. 16278/90 (EComHR, 74, DR 93, 3 May 1993) inadmissibility 
decision. 
2
 Bulut v Turkey Kurtulmus Application no. 18783/91. 
3
 Application No 44774/98, Leyla Sahin v Turkey, Grand Chambers, Judgment of 10 November 2005, 
19 BHCR 590, [2006] ELR 73. (Sahin v Turky). 
4
 Communication No. 931/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (2004). 
5
 Dahlab v Switzerland, application No. 42393/98, ECtHR decision of 15 February 2001 (cf. ECHR 
2001-V). 
6
 Rahime Kayhan v Turkey, Communication No -8/2005, CEDAW/C/34/D/8/2005 (2006). 
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wear the headscarf-hijab has been at issue in the matters of Dogru v France,
7
 Kervanci 
v France
8
 as well as Atkas v France.
9
 
 
The rights of other religious minorities to display religious dress, in casu the Sikh 
turban, was advanced through relying upon article 18 of the ICCPR in the matter of 
Singh Binder v Canada,
10
 and denied in the matter of Mann Singh v France
11
 by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  The right of a Muslim prisoner to wear a 
beard was successfully protected in the matter of Clement Boodoo v Trinidad and 
Tobago
12
 in terms of article 18 of the ICCPR. 
 
The claim of a Buddhist prisoner to wear a beard was, however, found inadmissible in 
X v Austria.
13
  So too was the claim by a Sikh prisoner to wear special clothing in X v 
United Kingdom.
14
  Likewise the right of a Muslim school teacher to take an extended 
lunch on Fridays enabling him to attend mosque, was found inadmissible in both 
Ahmad v United Kingdom
15
 and X v United Kingdom.
16
 
 
                                                          
7
 Dogru v France (No 27058/05) (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008). 
Available at <http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1579.html> last accessed on 10 May 2010 
8
 Kervanci v France (No 31645/04). (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008) (no English translation available, according to 
the European Court of Human Rights website). 
9
 Atkas v France (No. 43563/08). 
10
 Singh Binder v Canada, Comm No 208/ 1986 (UN Human Rights Committee, 9 November 1989) U 
N Doc A/45/40 (Vol II) Annex IX, SE (1990). 
11
 Mann Singh v France (No 24479/07). 
12
 Clement Boodoo v Trinidad and Tobago Comm No 721/1996 (UN Human Rights Committee, 2 April 
2002. 
13
 X v Austria App No 1753 /63 (EComHR, 15 February 1965) inadmissibility decision, Yb 8, 174. 
14
 X v United Kingdom App No 8231/78(EComHR, 28 Decisions and Reports 5, 28, 6 March 1982) 
inadmissibility decision. 
15
 Ahmad v United Kingdom App No 8160/78, 4 EComHR 126 (1981). 
16
 X v United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78 (1981) 22 DR 27. 
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From the above cases it is apparent that the display of religious symbols in the public 
sphere has brought about much debate, and at the forefront of this debate is the Islamic 
headscarf. 
 
7.1.1 Religious diversity 
 
Despite measures put in place in some countries to curb immigration,
17
 it is foreseen 
that the debate regarding the protection of religious diversity will intensify due to the 
impact of globalisation and the effect of increased migration that has altered the 
composition of traditionally homogenous nations.  It is estimated that the population 
of France is about 95 million of which five million are Muslim.
18
  In Germany, Turks 
make up one of the largest immigrant group
19
 of which ninety five percent are 
Muslim.  Indeed integration of Muslim communities into the local culture has been 
problematic at times. 
 
Together with the increase in population diversity, perceptions of the wearing of the 
Islamic headscarf are varied as well.
20
  Positive perceptions of the headscarf accept the 
                                                          
17
 See generally J Doomernik & J Michael Modes of Migration Regulation and Control in Europe 
(2008). 
18
 Exact numbers of Muslims in France are not possible to calculate since the country does not officially 
track religion and ethnicity, though it is estimated at five to ten percent. CIA World Factbook (2005).  
Available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/geos/fr.html> last accessed on 10 October 
2010.  The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considers that this 
inadequate statistical coverage impacts negatively on France‘s efforts to combat racial discrimination.  
See ‗Concluding Observations of the CERD‘, UC Doc CERD/C/FRA/CO/16 (18 April 2005). 
19
 Information available at <http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de> last accessed 09 August 2010. 
20
 T Choudhury ‗Perceptions of discrimination and Islamophobia - Voices from members of Muslim 
communities in the European Union EUMC 2006‘ (2006) European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia 8. 
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headscarf as a symbol of identity or a religious symbol that allows women to 
participate as emancipated and dignified members in a secular society.
21
  Negative 
perceptions may view the headscarf as a political symbol or an obligation that 
subjugates women.
22
 
 
In response to these concerns some states have undertaken measures to ban the 
wearing of religious symbols.  Conspicuous religious symbols have been banned in 
state primary and secondary schools in France
23
 and are prohibited in universities in 
Turkey.
24
  On the other hand, headscarves can be worn in most circumstances in the 
Netherlands.
25
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Available at <http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Perceptions_EN.pdf> last accessed on 
09 August 2010. 
21
 For an overview of the diverse meanings attached to the wear of the Islamic headscarf see AK Wing 
& MN Smith ‗Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban‘ 
(2006) 39 University of California Davis Law Review 743. 
22
 See discussion of bias in section 6.3.4.6. 
23
 The French Law of 2004.  Discussed in more detail in section 7.2.2. 
24
 See discussion of Sahin v Turkey (note 3 above) in section 6.2.3.1. 
25
 For a discussion on the headscarf in parts of Europe see generally E Brems ‗Diversity in the 
Classroom: The Headscarf Controversy in European Schools‘ (2006) Peace and Change 117.  Brems 
notes that in the Netherlands both scholars and teachers are permitted to wear the veil and the issue is 
not treated as a matter of religious freedom but as a matter of equal treatment or non-discrimination.  
The Equal Treatment Commission has examined complaints of teachers.  The Commission claimed that 
the mere fact that a teacher wears an Islamic headscarf does not preclude a neutral disposition.  The 
existence of such an attitude can only be made after a discussion with the relevant teacher.  In Belgium 
scholars may be restricted from wearing the Islamic headscarf as the right to wear the headscarf is left 
to the discretion of the schools, both public and Catholic schools.  The Belgium government has also 
created a commission to examine the issue of the Islamic headscarf and secularism.  The Commission 
presented three different alternatives, ranging from a general prohibition to the freedom to manifest 
one‘s religious belief. Brems ibid 123. 
 
 
 
 
282 
 
The accommodation of religious symbols is however dependent on a variety of 
factors, including generally the following: firstly, the legal arrangement between the 
state and religion; secondly, the constitutional provisions in terms of which the right to 
freedom of religion in general and in particular the right to manifest religious belief is 
protected. Thirdly, the manner in which a limitation of the right to manifest religious 
belief in the public sphere will be justified in terms of the application of, for example, 
a constitutional proportionality review test.  This review requires that the right be 
balanced against the possible public interest threat.  However, the manner in which 
this balancing act is interpreted will differ from state to state.  This difference in 
approach is generally based on the political and legal doctrine of a state and is often 
influenced by the cultural and historical origin of the specific state.  What follows next 
is an investigative analysis of these factors in determining the scope and application of 
the right to freedom of religion and the right to manifest religious belief in certain 
countries. 
 
7.1.2 Investigative overview 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the foundations of the right to freedom of 
religion in the following five countries; France, the United Kingdom (England), 
Germany, the United States of America (USA) and Canada.  The legal application of 
the right to freedom of religion is analysed in these countries with regards to a 
selection of cases
26
 to appreciate the validity and effectiveness of the South African 
national legal norms and practices and to gather suggestions about how best to 
interpret these norms in the event of future challenges.  However, any investigative 
evaluation of other countries‘ systems must always be carried out subject to the 
proviso that all countries face unique challenges.  The investigative component of this 
                                                          
26
 The selection in general focused on cases in which the right to manifest religious belief through the 
display of religious dress or the practice of religious rites and rituals, was in question. 
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thesis therefore aims to determine to what extent the solutions found in other countries 
could be suitable and viable in the South African context.  The abovementioned 
countries were selected for the reasons discussed briefly next. 
 
7.1.2.1 Respect for the protection of fundamental rights 
 
The right to freedom of religion is provided for in international,
27
 regional
28
 and 
national instruments.
29
  The countries selected all are signatories to the United Nations 
(UN) instruments as well as specific regional instruments.  In addition the right to 
freedom of religion is also protected in constitutional or other legislative texts.  For 
this reason it is argued that France, the United Kingdom (England), Germany, the 
USA and Canada all share a commitment to religious liberty.  However, all these 
countries are confronted with the challenges of religious diversity that will be 
elaborated on in more detail in each country specific section, and which in turn raises 
the question of how to protect the religious rights of all. 
 
7.1.2.2 Historical culture 
 
The term historical culture is used to indicate the archaic disposition of religion and 
the relationship between religion and the specific state.  In this regard it is claimed that 
France, the United Kingdom (England) and Germany are all countries with an existing 
dominant and majority religious culture, predominantly either Roman Catholic or 
Protestant.  As a result of globalisation and immigration these countries are 
                                                          
27
 See section 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
28
 See section 4.8.1, 4.9 and 4.10. 
29
 See section 7.1. 
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increasingly confronted with the needs of minority or immigrant faiths.
30
  The 
existence of a minority presence may necessitate that the minority culture exerts its 
identity against the majority culture.
31
  For example, Martin claims that Catholic 
practice has been higher in Protestant countries where Catholics are in a minority than 
where they are in a majority and dominant.
32
 
 
On the other hand, it is claimed that both the USA and Canada are both countries 
settled by people of mostly European decent and are predominantly English speaking.  
It is reasoned that in this regard they share some resemblance with South Africa with 
regards to the migration of European settlers after 1652 and subsequent periods of 
colonisation.
33
 
 
7.1.2.3 Separation between the state and religion 
 
As indicated previously
34
 the relationship between the state and religion has a 
significant influence on the protection of the right to manifest religious belief.  France, 
on the one hand is the most extreme example of a system of separation of state and 
religion.  All of the countries that form part of this investigative analysis represent a 
different arrangement between the state and religion.  France is a proclaimed „laic‟ 
state and the principle of laïcité indicates that the state is seen as politically 
                                                          
30
 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs ‗International Migration 2006‘.  
Available at< http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006Migration_Chart/ >last accessed on 
10 May 2009. 
31
 See generally M Clarke „The concept of Sub-Culture‘ (1974) The British Journal of Sociology 428. 
32
 D Martin On Secularization Towards a Revised General Theory (2005) 92. 
33
 See generally AJ Christopher ‗Official land disposal policies and European settlement in southern 
Africa 1860–1960‘ (1983) 9 (4) Journal of Historical Geography 369. The impact of colonisation on 
the historical culture of South Africa is discussed in more detail in section 8.2. 
34
 See section 7.2.3. 
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independent of any religious influence.
35
  In England there is no separation between 
the state and religion and the Anglican Church is the established Church in England.
36
  
However, the notion of an established church does not give any preferential status to 
any religion and ‗all are entitled to equal respect‘.37  In contrast to the United Kingdom 
there is no state church in Germany and religion and the state are separated according 
to the principle of the neutrality of the state in the German Constitution.
38
  In the USA 
the relationship between the state and religion is determined in terms of the First 
Amendment that regulates the ‗establishment of religion‘,39 an ambiguous phrase 
which has been interpreted in different manners.
40
  These include preventing 
government from interfering with religion; alternatively preventing government from 
offering preferential treatment to certain religions; and lastly preventing government 
from prescribing religion.
41
 
 
Unlike the USA, France and Germany where the relationship between the state and 
religion is prescribed in the constitutional text, the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Canadian Charter) contains no explicit limit on government support for 
                                                          
35
 L Barnett ‗Freedom of Religion and Religious Symbols in the Public Sphere‘ (2008) Law and 
Government Division 1, 17. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Suleiman v Juffali 1 FLE 479, 490 (2002). 
38
 See generally K Ladeur ‗The Myth of The Neutral State and The Individualisation of Religion: The 
Relationship between State and Religion in The Face of Fundamentalism‘ (2009) Cardozo Law Review 
2445. 
39
 See generally Chemerinsky, ‗Why Church and State Should Be Separate‘ (2008), 49 William & Mary 
Bill of Rights Journal 2193. 
40
 See generally DP Apanovitch ‗Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God By The State‘ 
(1998) 47 Duke Law Journal 785. 
41
 Ibid. 
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religion. Stephenson goes so far as to argue that: [N]othing in the Charter nor 
Canadian jurisprudence prohibits the advancement of religion per se by the state‘.42 
Judges have however often held that state endorsement of one religion is an 
infringement on the right to freedom of religion and have argued that state sponsorship 
of one tradition discriminates against others.
43
 
 
Of particular interest is the inclusion of section 27 in the Canadian Charter from which 
it is apparent that the Canadian Charter was specifically designed to accommodate 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity.
44
  Section 28 guarantees the rights in the 
Charter equally to men and women. The interpretation of these Canadian Charter 
provisions has contributed to Canada‘s international reputation for egalitarianism.45 
 
7.1.2.4 Legal systems regulating fundamental rights 
 
The legal system affording protection to the right to freedom of religion and the 
limitation thereof can be structured in different manners.  One approach could be in 
terms of a constitutional provisions or another could be regulation in terms of the 
common law or specific legislation.  The USA, Germany and Canada, all have written 
constitutions entrenching the right to freedom of religion.  The United Kingdom does 
not have a constitution and the protection of fundamental rights is primarily through 
anti-discrimination laws.  More recently the enactment of the Human Rights Act of 
                                                          
42
 CA Stephenson ‗Religious Exercises and Instruction in Ontario Public Schools‘ (1991) 49 University 
of Toronto Faculty Law Review 82, 95. 
43
 See generally SI Smithey ‗Religious Freedom and Equality Concerns under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms‘ (2001) 34 (1) Canadian Journal of Political Science 85. 
44
 For this reason South Africa has relied heavily on the Canadian Charter‘s features in drafting its 
Constitution as to benefit by the combination of guarantees of rights and the provision of a general 
limitation clause. 
45
 See generally Smithey (note 43 above). 
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1998 has provided mechanisms in terms of which English Law has to respect the 
rights contained in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
7.1.3 Extent of the investigative analysis 
 
The current research takes the form of a literature review of the constitutional 
arrangement between the state and religion, as well as current law in relation to the 
protection afforded to the right to manifest a religious belief.  The manner in which 
these systems ultimately impact on the enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion is 
best illustrated through a discussion of the application of general limitation on the 
right to freedom of religion in the various jurisdictions.  For this reason the discussion 
will concentrate on some decisions of the courts relating to laws of general application 
that impose limitations on an individual‘s right to manifest religious belief.  This 
evaluation is not a comparative study as understood in its strict sense as explained in 
section 1.7. 
 
7.1.4 Limitation 
 
The selection of countries that are included in this chapter does not include African 
states other than South Africa, for reasons explained in section 1.7.  Similarly the 
inclusion of India was also discounted on specific grounds as clarified in section 1.7. 
 
Furthermore, the emphasis in this chapter is primarily on an analysis of the decisions 
of the court as explained in section 7.1.3.  In the selection of these decisions in the 
various jurisdictions, emphasis was placed on national cases that in general relied on 
international law, alternatively, in which the dispute progressed to an international 
forum.  The analysis of the jurisprudence of France was however compromised as 
 
 
 
 
288 
 
most of the decisions are not available in English; therefore to a large extent reliance 
was placed on secondary sources in this aspect of the investigation. 
7.2 France 
 
7.2.1 Relationship between the state and religion 
 
France is a proclaimed „laic‟ state.  The principle of laïcité46 has a central place in 
French national identity and indicates the concept in terms of which the state is seen as 
politically independent of any religious influence.
47.
  Public services are secularised, 
religious denominations enjoy legal equality and the principle of non-discrimination 
applies.
48
  Under the principle of laïcité religion is understood as an essential private 
matter in relation to which each individual should be able to exercise autonomous 
                                                          
46
 Rémond indicates that the French word laïcité has no equivalent in other language and the meaning 
thereof is exclusively French.
 
 See R René Religion and Society in Modern Europe Translated (1999) 
11.  Keane notes that the untranslatable nature of the French expression of laïcité is indicative of the 
fact that no other European society requires a word that underlines the absence of religion from the 
public sphere with such authority.  For example in Arabic and Farsi there is no word to describe secular, 
secularity or secularism, as the division between the worldly and the spiritual is unthinkable.  See J 
Keane ‗Secularism?‘ in D Marquand & RL Nettler (ed) Political Quarterly Religion and Democracy 
(2000) 15.  The English term laicism is used to translate the French term laïcité as proposed by J 
Baubérot ‗The Place of Religion in Public Life: The Lay Approach‘ in T Lindholm, WC Durham, BG 
Tahzib-Lie (eds.) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 441. 
47
 See generally J Gunn ‗Under God but not the Scarf. The Founding Myths of Religious Freedom in 
the United States and Laicite in France‘ (2004) 7 Journal of Church and State 8. 
48
 See generally J Baubérot ‗Secularism and French Religious Liberty: A Sociological and Historical 
View‘ (2003) Brigham Young University Law Review 241. 
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choice.
49
  However, limitations imposed on the freedom of religion can be justified 
with reference to the need to protect the public order of the secular state.
50
 
 
Laïcité stipulates that the religion should be excluded from the ‗public space‘, 
including civil affairs, and public education.
51
  For example, the public school is 
considered to be the forum for building an integrated cohesive nation, producing 
‗French citizens and not the citizens of multicultural ethnic policy‘.52  Laïcité can 
therefore be defined as separation between the state and religion in which the state is 
fundamentally separated from religion through the form of an anti-religion.
53
  This 
interpretation of separation has however been defined as a form of anti-religion to deal 
with the excesses of religion.
54
 
 
Despite this point of view the general position in France in general is that laïcité does 
not deny the existence of religion, as the constitution provides for religious freedom 
and secularism is seen as the means to sustain individual freedom of religion.
55
  The 
aim of the provision of laïcité is to allow the existence of diverse religions and 
accordingly the state cannot be associated with only one religion.
56
 
 
                                                          
49
 Ibid. 
50
 See generally J Freedman ‗Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma‘ (2004) 42 
(3) International Migration 5. 
51
 See generally Baubérot (note 48 above). 
52
 AE Galeotti ‗Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration‘ (1993) 21 (4) Political Theory 585, 
592. 
53
 Gunn (note 47 above) 8-9. 
54
 S Poulter ‗Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and France‘ 
(1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 50. 
55
 Article I of the Constitution of 1958  
56
 See generally Baubérbot (note 48 above). 
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From the above it is clear that laïcité is a multifaceted concept and there has been 
debate as to its meaning and application in a modern context, and specifically in so far 
as the integration of Muslim population is concerned.
57
  In understanding the 
multifaceted nature of the concept a brief overview of the historical development of 
the principle of laïcité is helpful. 
 
7.2.1.1 Historical development of the principle of laïcité
58
 
 
In France laïcité was entrenched through a series of legislative measures ensuring 
equality and freedom for all.  In 1905 a specific law on the relation between state and 
church was passed, ending the battle against the interference of the Catholic Church.
59
  
Article 1 of the statute of 1905 declares that: 
                                                          
57
 Freedman (note 50 above) 27. 
58
 For a historical overview of the acceptance of the principle of laïcité in France see generally C 
Dominique ‗Secularism in French Public Schools: Back to War? The French Statute of March 15, 2004‘ 
(2004) 54 The American Journal of Comparative Law 337. 
59
 Galton describes that the relationship between church and state in France was reached after centuries 
of embittered and often violent conflict, such as the Religious Wars from 1562 – 1598.  Indeed one of 
the objectives of the French Revolution (1789 – 1795) was to diminish the power of the Catholic 
Church.  The Constitution of 1795 proclaimed that state authority was derived from the people and 
introduced a separation of church and state in the fields of marriage, health and education.  The 1905 
Law of Separation concerning the relationship between state and church is considered to be the starting 
point for the principle of laicité.
 
  For a comprehensive overview of the history of the relationship 
between the State and Church in France see AH Galton Church and State in France 1300 – 1870 
(1907). 
For a further discussion see <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/MCEBW.htm> last accessed on 10 
May 2010. 
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The Republic ensures the liberty of conscience.  It guarantees the free exercise of 
religion, under the sole restrictions prescribed by the interest in public order, as 
prescribed below.
60
 
 
It is suggested that the 1905 law established the separation of religion and state and 
that the law was the foundation of the principle of laïcité.  However, the first reference 
to laïcité is made in the constitutional texts of 1946 and 1958.  Article 1 of the 1958 
Constitution ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of 
origin, race or religion.  It ensures respect of all beliefs, and declares that: 
France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic.  She ensures 
equality before the law to all citizens without distinction based on origin, race or 
religion. She respects all beliefs.
61
 
Article 2 of the 1958 Constitution states the motto of the Republic as ‗Liberty, 
Equality and Fraternity‘.  Equality is an integral component of the French 
constitutional framework and the concept of citizenship is based upon the Republican 
values of individualism and equality.  This philosophy sees all citizens as equal and 
consequently the law does not recognise any differences between citizens.  Therefore 
the law does not recognise minority rights, minority groups or ethnic citizens.
62
  
                                                          
60
 Article 1 Law on separation of church and state  
Available at  
<www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnDocument?base=LEX_SIMPLE_AV90&nod=1LX9051211P1> 
last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
61
 Article I of the Constitution of 1958 ‗La France est une République indivisible, laïque, democratic et 
sociale.  Elle assure l‟égalité de tous let citoyens san distinction d‟origine, de race our de religion.  Elle 
respecte toutes les croyantes. 
62
 France has taken the view that it has no minorities, stating in its third periodic report under the 
ICCPR:  ‗Since the basic principles of public law prohibit distinction between citizens on grounds of 
origin, race or religion, France is a country in which there are no minorities‘.  See in this regard the 
third periodic report on France under the ICCPR (15 May 1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/76/Add 7, paragraph 
394.  This point of view is further affirmed in that France has entered into a reservation regarding the 
application of Article 27 if the ICCPR in France.  Article 27 provides that: ‗In those States in which 
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Notwithstanding this policy of integration, it is widely accepted that the integration of 
Muslims, in particular, has been poorly treated and the multifaceted nature of laicité 
has brought debate as to its meaning and application in a modern context.
63
  This 
debate is evident in the passing of the French Law of 2004
64
 as discussed below. 
 
7.2.2 The French Law of 2004 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
ethic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied 
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy the own culture, to profess of 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language‘.  France‘s particular approach to minority 
rights is also evidenced in its refusal to became party to the Council of Europe‘s Framework 
Convention on National Minorities (1994) – See UN Doc CCPR/ C/79/Add 80 para 24, as well as the 
European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages (1992) and Convention 169 of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries (1989).  
The ICCPR Committee however does not agree with the French reasoning and has taken the view that 
‗The existence of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in a given state party does not depend upon 
a decision by the state party but requires to be established by objective criteria‘.  In this regard see 
General Comment 23, on the Rights of Minorities‘ UN Doc CCPR/C/21/ Rev 1/Add5 (8 April 1994).  
In addition in response to the statement that there are no minorities the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee responded as follows in the concluding observations to the third report:  ‗The ICCPR 
Human Rights Committee is, however, unable to agree that France is a country in which there are no 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities‘.  For a discussion of the French approach see generally D 
McGoldrick Human Rights and Religion-The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (2006) 43.  The 
French approach is in strong contrast with the approach followed in the USA, Canada and South Africa, 
where the community is perceived as multicultural and in which the group and culture is placed before 
individualism. 
63
 See Freedman (note 50 above) 5; P Weil ‗Lifting the veil‘ (2004) 22 (3) French Politics, Culture and 
Society 142, 143. 
64
 The law on the application of the principle of secularity in public schools was adopted on 15 March 
2004 and published on 17 March 2004 (Law of March 15, 2004 no. 2004-228)38.  (Loi no 2004-228 du 
15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues 
manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics). 
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Regardless of the above guarantee to the right to freedom of religion as well and right 
to manifest religious belief, President Jacques Chirac in December 2003 proposed a 
prohibition on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf-hijab in schools.
65
  Chirac‘s 
speech followed the publication of the Stasi Report,
66
 a wide-ranging document 
describing the difficulties of accommodating different races, cultures and religions 
while maintaining the principle of secularism.  The above report resulted in the French 
Law of 2004.  Article 1 of the Law of 2004 provides that: 
In state primary and secondary schools, the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils overtly 
manifest a religious affiliation is prohibited.  The school rules shall state that a dialogue shall 
precede the institution of disciplinary proceedings with the pupil.
67
 
Consequently the law prohibits the wearing of conspicuous (ostensiblement) religious 
affiliated symbols, clothing, and garb in public schools.  These symbols include the 
Islamic headscarf, Jewish skullcap, Sikh turban, and large Christian crosses.
68
  This 
                                                          
65
 Assemblée Nationale, Mission d‘information 1275, 4 December 2003 (the Debré report)  
Available at <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/debrereport> last accessed on 5 January 2010. 
66
 Report of the Commission de Reflexion sur l‟application du principe de la laïcité dans la Republique 
(hereinafter referred to as the Stasi Report). 
67
 ‗Dans les éscoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves 
manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit.  Le règlement intérieur rappelle 
que la mise en oeuvre d‟ une procédure disciplinaire est  precede d‟un dialogue avec l‟ élève‟ Law on 
secularity in public schools 2004-228 of March. 
68
 In March 2004, the Ministry of Education published regulations in a Circulaire to assist schools in 
determining ‗discreet religious symbols‘ the display which of was permitted. See Circulaire of 18 May 
2004, published in the Journal Officiel of 22 May 2005, 9033.  The Circulaire referred to ‗signs and 
attire, which when displayed, led to the immediate recognition of a religious affiliation‘.  The 
Circulaire explicitly refers to Muslim headscarves and Jewish skullcaps and large Christian crosses.  
The Sikh turban, is not mentioned in the Circulaire, however expulsion of boys wearing the turban was 
upheld by the French court.  See ‗Sikh Schoolboys Lose French Case‘. 19 April 2005 Available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/I/hi/world/europe/4461905.stm> last accessed on 09 August 2010.  
For a historical overview of the 2004 law see generally J Taieb ‗Freedom of religion: from France to the 
United States, a national conflict of law‘ (2004) 4 (3) Global Jurist Advances 1.  See also D Custos 
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ban was based on article 2 of the French Constitution and the intent by the law is to 
create neutrality and religious tolerance in public schools; however, it may have had 
the opposite effect.
69
  It is argued that through banning these symbols of various 
religions, the right to manifest one‘s religious belief has been severely limited.  
Furthermore it is reasoned that the law in effect creates conditions in which minority 
groups are required to surrender their distinctive characteristics, religious belief and 
religious tenets for the sake of assimilating into the French culture. 
 
In addition, the Law of 2004 has had a negative impact on the rights of learners to 
adhere to their religious belief.  On 20 January 2005, 48 students were expelled.  Most 
of those barred from attending classes were Muslim girls who refused to take off their 
headscarves while three Sikh boys were also ordered out of the classroom for wearing 
turbans.
70
  On 14 December 2007, a French court upheld the ban on the turbans law in 
                                                                                                                                                                       
‗Secularism in French Public Schools: Back to War? The French Statute of March 15, 2004‘ (2006) 54 
American Journal of Comparative Law 337. 
69
 The Muslim population has suffered direct and indirect discrimination in education, the work place 
and housing.
 
 See ‗The Situation of Muslims in France‘ in Monitoring the EU Accession Process: 
Minority Protection (New York, The Open Society Institute, 2002) Part 3.  Available at 
<www.eumap.org/reports/2002/eu/international/sections/france/2002_m_france.pdf> last accessed on 
10 May 2010.  This cycle of discrimination triggered the rioting of youths of mainly Arab and African 
origin in October/November 2005.  In November 2005, President Chirac declared a state of emergency.  
Décret no 2005-1387 du 8 novembre 2005 relatif à l‘ application de la loi no 55 – 385 du 3 avril 1955, 9 
November 2005 Journal official del la république française, Texte 6 sur 98. 
Available at  
<http://medias.lemonde.fr/mmpub/edt/doc/20051109/708103_joe_20051109_0261_0006.pdf>  
last accessed on 5 July 2010. 
70
 ‗Beyond the Body of Belief‘. 
Available at <http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/364.html> last accessed on 23/10/10.  See 
also Submission of The Becket Fund for Religious, Liberty 8 February 2008 to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council in relation to the Universal Periodic Review France.  Available at 
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public schools by expelling Bikramjit Singh, Jasvir Singh, and Ranjit Singh from the 
Louise-Michel High School of Bobigny.  The judge ruled that the under-turbans that 
they wore were not discreet, and the court concluded that in the interest of secularism 
in public schools, the ban should be kept in place.
71
 
 
More recently the impact of the prohibition of the Islamic headscarf has intensified 
and the prohibition will in all possibility be extended to banning face covering Islamic 
veils (niqab) in the public domain.
72
  The current French president, Nicolas Sarkozy 
has defended the ban on women wearing the full face veil and the Minister of Interior, 
Michèle Alliot-Marie considers the niqab to have no place in a secular society 
committed to women's rights.
73
  In this regard he stated that France is: 
[A]n old country anchored in a certain idea of how to live together. A full veil which 
completely hides the face is an attack on those values, which for us are so 
fundamental.  Citizenship has to be lived with an uncovered face. There can therefore 
be absolutely no solution other than a ban in all public places.
74
 
 
This comment illustrates the following two fundamental underpinnings of the 
prohibitions of conspicuous religious symbols in the public sphere.  First, that it 
                                                                                                                                                                       
<http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session2/FR/BFRL_FRA_UPR_S2_2008_BecketFun
dforReligiousLiberty_uprsubmission.pdf> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
71
 ECtHR judgment Jasvir Singh.  Available at  
<www.unitedsikhs.org/.../Translation_ECtHRJudgment_Jasvir_Singh_16_July_2009.doc>  
last accessed on 22 October 2010. 
72
 L Davies ‗Nicolas Sarkozy's cabinet approves bill to ban full Islamic veil‘guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 13 
July 2010.  
Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/13/french-ban-face-veils/print> last accessed 
on 10 September 2010.  This ban has already been approved by the lower house of parliament and will 
now move to the upper house of parliament. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Ibid. 
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attacks fundamental values such as equality, and second, the manner in which 
citizenship has to be lived – with an uncovered face.  These two underpinnings are 
explored in more detail below. 
 
7.2.2.1 The Islamic headscarf and gender inequality  
 
The comment of the French Minister of Interior, Alliot-Marie, shows that the 
prohibition of the Islamic headscarf is premised on a unitary assumption that the 
headscarf is a symbol of gender inequality.  This assumption does not acknowledge 
that the headscarf is also a symbol of female Muslim identity that has multiple 
religious and cultural dimensions.
75
  The Islamic headscarf derives its religious 
significance in the Islamic tradition from the Koran
76
 and validity and the extent of 
covering vary in different countries and among Muslim women.
77
  The headscarf has 
no unitary meaning.  Rather, ‗it reflects the diversity of women's experience and 
aspirations around the world‘.78  In this regard it has been noted that:  
An Islamic headscarf could mean: loyalty to tradition, belief in chastity of women, 
symbol of religious identity, respect for wishes of parents and families, signal of not 
being sexually available, expression of cultural identity, refusal to westernise.
79
 
                                                          
75
 Wing and Smith (note 21 above) 743. 
76
 The Koran is the word of Allah as told to the Prophet Mohammed.  Available at 
<http://www.islamonline.net/english/introducingislam/topic03.shtml> last accessed on 10 July 2009.  In 
this regard see generally further NA Shah ‗Women's Human Rights in the Koran: an Interpretive 
Approach‘ (2006) 28 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 868. 
77
 See section 1.3. 
78
 A Giddens ‗French Headscarf Ban Against Interests of Women‘ (2004) New Perspectives Quarterly 
43. 
79
 See N Nathwani ‗Islamic Headscarves and Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the Relevant Case 
Law of the European Court of Human Rights‘ (2007) 25 (2) Netherlands Quarterly Human Rights 
Journal 221, 244.  At least seven diverse competing and conflicting interpretations of Islamic identity 
have been identified.  In this regard see  MH Yavuz ‗Islam and Europeanisation in Turkish - Muslim 
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If the equality of Muslim women and their capability to make independent choices, for 
example as experienced by Muslim women being harassed for not wearing the 
Islamic-headscarf is the cause of this concern, it is argued that this concern cannot 
effectively be addressed through a ban on the wearing of such dress.  The 
empowerment of these women needs to be enhanced through the creation of enabling 
social, economical, cultural, legal and political conditions. 
 
7.2.2.2 The assignment of religion to the private sphere 
 
In addition to the fact that the prohibition of the Islamic headscarf is premised on the 
incorrect unitary assumption that the headscarf is a symbol of gender inequality, this 
prohibition is further grounded on the secularist notion that religion is a private 
matter.
80
  Secularism incorporates and relies on a division between the public and the 
private as well as the secular and religious.  Integrated into these divides is also the 
assumed divide between civilized and uncivilized.
81
 
 
Further it has been stated that the headscarf debate, illustrates that: 
[T]he French secular state today abides in a sense by the cuius region eius religio 
principle (the religion of the ruler is the religion of his subjects), even though it 
disclaims any religious allegiance and governs a largely irreligious society.
82
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
socio-political movements‘ in TA Byrnes and PJ Katzenstein (ed) Religion in an Expanding Europe 
(2006) 225, 227. 
80
 See S On ‗Brian Barry and the Headscarf Case in France‘ (2006) 5 Contemporary Political Theory 
176, 192. 
81
 T Asad Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (2003).  Asad includes in this list 
the divide between justified and unjustified violence for example as illustrated though the rhetoric of the 
justification of the ‗war on terror‘. 
82
 Ibid 175. 
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Although not specifically identifying French secularism as a religion, this comment 
suggests that French secularism is the ‗religion of the ruler‘ in terms of which the 
French government imposes its particular religious demands on its citizens in the 
public domain, with the aim of promoting social stability.
83
  This ‗religion of the ruler‘ 
demands religious neutrality of the public domain.  However, in this demand, the 
political demands of groups who claim the right to the public expression of faith are 
not taken into account.  In actual fact the approach precludes mutual accommodation 
between immigrant groups and host societies necessary for successful immigrant 
incorporation.
84
 
 
It makes no sense to tell Muslim school girls that they can wear headscarves at home 
but not at school. It is part of how they define themselves in public life.
85
  This divide 
between public and private produces a fragmented consciousness.  Religion cannot be 
restricted to the private sphere as ‗[i]t is linked to thought, to action; it influences our 
view on humanity and on the world as a whole; it influences culture and our concept 
of freedom itself‘.86 
 
7.2.2.3 The concept of French citizenship 
 
In addition to the separation between the public and the private sphere, French 
secularism further constitutes an opinion about true human existence and defines how 
                                                          
83
 Ibid. 
84
 J Casanova ‗Religion, European secular identities, and European integration‘ in TA Byrnes and PJ 
Katzenstein (ed) Religion in an Expanding Europe (2006) 65, 80. 
85
 Asad (note 81 above) 220. 
86
 L Bloß ‗European Law of Religion – organizational and institutional analysis of national systems and 
their implications for the future European Integration Process‘ (2003) 13/03 Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 13. 
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citizens ought to live and dress in the public realm.  It also specifies common values 
and interests for all French citizens.
87
  In this regard France abides by a secular 
tradition which sees national Republican identity as taking precedence over individual 
identity.
88
  French Republicanism emphasises the coming together of citizens who 
have distanced themselves from their particular cultural traditions.
89
  For this reason 
ethnic belonging and religious differences are relegated to the private sphere.  One of 
the crucial aspects of the French interpretation of the right to freedom of religion is 
that the right is defined as a liberté publique, and not as a civil right.
90
  The right is a 
natural right to enjoy the freedom of religion, but as defined and limited by state law.
91
 
 
It has been suggested that the turmoil about the Islamic headscarf may have its origin 
in the time of French colonialism in Algeria, and the racial and gender configurations 
that were formed at the time.
92
  This legacy of colonialism, together with a certain 
perception of sexuality and gender merges with the issue of the veil in France.  The 
veil, as a symbol of gender oppression, reveals the concept of what constitutes a 
proper and acceptable French citizen and femininity.
93
 
 
                                                          
87
 See generally A Merrett ‗Religious Liberty as a Paradigm For the Development of Human Rights‟ 
Research Paper (1997) 5.  Available at  
<http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=cewces_papers> last 
accessed on 24 October 2010. 
88
 Barnett (note 35 above) 28. 
89
 Ibid 29. 
90
 Ibid 26. 
91
 Ibid . 
92
 See generally JW Scott Politics of the Veil (2007). 
93
 B Bhandar ‗The Ties that Bind: Multiculturalism and Secularism Reconsidered‘ (2009) 36 (3) 
Journal of Law and Society 301, 317. 
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7.2.3 International concerns 
 
The legislative ban of the Islamic headscarves has been widely criticised.  Three 
leading international human rights non-governmental organisations, Human Rights 
Watch,
94
 the Minority Rights Group,
95
 and the International Helsinki Federation for 
Human Rights,
96
 have expressed the view that the French ban violates international 
human rights law.  In September 2005, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion, Asma Jahangir, visited France and expressed her concern at the indirect 
effects of the application of the law.
97
  The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief noted that the law constitutes a limitation of the right to manifest a 
religion or a belief.  In addition, this prohibition may not comply with paragraph 3 of 
article 18 of the ICCPR, that provides for certain such limitations under restrictive 
conditions as read together with General Comment 22, which emphasises that 
paragraph 3 of article 18 ‗is to be strictly interpreted‘.98  It is imperative to note that 
                                                          
94
 See ‗France: Headscarf Ban Violates Religious Freedom‘, Human Rights Watch, Statement of 27 
February 2004. 
Available at <http://www.hrw.org/English/doc/2004/02/26/france7666_txt.htm> last accessed on 10 
March 2009.  The report states that a proposed law would be ‗discriminatory‘ as it disproportionately 
affects Muslim girls. It stated that: ‗The impact of a ban on visible religious symbols, even though 
phrased in neutral terms, will fall disproportionately on Muslim girls, and thus violate anti-
discrimination provisions of international human rights law as well as the right to equal educational 
opportunity‘. 
95
 See ‗French Ban on Faith Symbols Would Contravene International Human Rights Law‘ Minority 
Rights Group 28 January 2004.  Available at <http://www.minorityrights.org/news_detail.asp?ID=20> 
last accessed on 6 July 2010. 
96
 See ‗A Ban in Religious Symbols Would Violate International Protection of Freedom of Religion‘ 
(17 December 2003).  Available at <www.hrwf.org> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
97
 ‗Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion Ends Visit to France‘ UN Press Release, 30 September 
2005.  Available at <www.un.org> last accessed on 5 July 2010. 
98
 Country missions: France September 2005 E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.4 
Available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/religion/visits.htm> last accessed on 5 July 2010. 
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the wearing or display of religious symbols is an essential part of the right to manifest 
one‘s religion.  This right can only be limited under strict conditions.99 
 
In summary, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief is of the 
opinion that the Law of 2004 is appropriate insofar as it is intended, in accordance 
with the principle of the best interests of the child, to protect the autonomy of minors 
who may be pressured or forced to wear a headscarf or other religious symbols.  
However, the law denies the rights of those minors who have freely chosen to wear a 
religious symbol to school as part of their religious belief.  In this regard the law may 
be counterproductive, by neglecting the principle of the best interests of the child and 
the right of the child to access to education.
100
  Moreover, the implementation of the 
law by educational institutions has led, in a number of cases, to abuse amongst young 
Muslim women.  The stigmatisation of the headscarf has provoked acts of religious 
intolerance when women wear it outside school, at university or in the workplace.
101
 
 
7.2.3.1 Possible international challenge to the Law of 2004 
 
                                                          
99
 See generally E Brems ‗Above Children's Heads - The Headscarf Controversy in European Schools 
from the Perspective of Children's Rights‘ (2006) 14 (2)  International Journal of Children‟s Rights 
119. 
100
 Regarding the impact of the Law of 2004 on the right to education see M Ssenyonjo ‗The Islamic 
veil and freedom of religion, the rights to education and work: a survey of recent international and 
national cases‘ (2007) 6 (3) Chinese Journal of International Law 653.  See generally also IT Plesner 
‗Legal Limitations to Freedom of Religion or Belief in School Education‘ (2006) 19 Emory 
International Law Review 557. 
101
 Country missions: France September 2005 E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.4 at 3 available at 
<http://www.2.ohchr.org/english/issues/religion/visits.htm> last accessed on 5 July 2010. 
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The legality of the Law of 2004 can be challenged in the international domain through 
referring the limitation to either the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
102
 or to the 
regional bodies of the ECJ in Luxembourg or the ECtHR in Strasbourg.
103
  The 
usefulness of these referrals is however questioned as discussed below. 
 
The most recent case law of the ECtHR is not too promising for those contesting the 
validity of the prohibition of conspicuous religious signs in public educational 
institutions in terms of the provisions of article 9 of the ECHR.  The ECtHR reasoning 
in the Sahin case would most likely apply to secular France as well.
104
  This inference 
is supported by Brems who argues that the ECtHR is likely to leave this issue to the 
state parties in line with the application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation.
105
 
 
The success of a challenge to the ECJ in Luxembourg on the ground that the Law of 
2004 is in violation of the principle of equality, only if the question falls under within 
the scope of EU law, is also not without difficulty.  The principle of equality is 
embedded in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and incorporated in the European 
Union Law under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.
106
  The Lisbon Treaty, however, 
                                                          
102
 The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allows for individual reference to the ICCPR Human Rights 
Committee.  Germany ratified on the 25 August 1993, France on 17 February 1984, Canada on the 19 
May 1976, whilst the UK and the USA have not signed the optional protocol to the ICCPR. 
103
 The Law of 2004 has indeed been referred to the ECtHR in Strasbourg in the matter of France v 
Atkas (note 9 above) as discussed in section 6.3.2.2.  However the matter was found inadmissible.  For 
further reading on an international challenge see generally A Riley ‗Headscarves, Skullcaps and 
Crosses: Is the Proposed French Ban Safe From European Challenge?‘(2004) Center for European 
Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 49. 
104
 See generally C Evans ‗The ―Islamic Scarf‖ in the European Court of Human Rights‘ (2006) 4 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 4. 
105
 Brems (note 25 above) 129. 
106
 See generally C McCrudden & S Prechal ‗The Concepts of Equality and Non-Discrimination in 
Europe: A practical approach European Network Of Legal Experts In The Field Of Gender Equality‘  
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encourages a conciliatory reading of the respective texts in the event of conflict 
between the European Charter of Fundamental Human Rights and the French 
Constitution.  In light of this conciliatory reading it is possible to infer that the ECJ too 
will not seek a confrontational decision.  However in light of the recent ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty there is to date no jurisprudence to support this inference. 
 
In this regard it can be reasoned that the restrictive concept of equality as embraced by 
the French judiciary will have to be reconciled with the Aristotelian approach 
articulated by the European courts in terms of which the worst form of inequality is to 
try to make unequal things equal.
107
  This French concept appears to prevent the 
examination of the question of restrictions of religious practices in indirect 
discrimination terms, as it fails to recognise the intrinsic difference between those 
believers whose religions require that they wear a conspicuous garb, and those who 
are not subjected to such a religious demand. 
 
7.3 United Kingdom - England 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) is a parliamentary democracy. It has neither a written 
constitution prescribing the separation of powers, nor an entrenched constitutional bill 
of rights.
108
  Therefore no constitutional guarantees for the protection of fundamental 
rights exist.
109
  In this regard reliance in the past were primarily made on anti-
                                                                                                                                                                       
Available at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4553&langId=en> last accessed on 1 December 2010. 
107
 See generally Dominique (note 58 above) 337. 
108
 United Nations Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir 
Mission To The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland A/HRC/7/10/Add.3 7 
February 2008, 14-23. 
109
 Ibid. 
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discrimination laws, such as the Race Relations Act (1976) dealing with issues of 
discrimination.
110
  More recently the Human Rights Act (1998) provides for domestic 
remedies in the event of a violation of a right as contained in the ECHR.
111
  In 
addition, European Community Law Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003 also provide for the protection of the religious rights of workers.  
Given the differences in the territories of the UK
112
 as well as the manner in which 
establishment of religion differs throughout the territories, the focus will be on 
England. 
 
7.3.1 Relationship between state and religion 
 
In the England there is no separation between state and religion.
113
  Quite the contrary 
is true as two prominent public life realms depend upon religious affiliation.  Firstly, 
the sovereign‘s position is tied with obligations towards Anglican Christianity.114  
Only Anglican Christians can inherit the Crown, and they must affirm this faith at 
their coronation.
115
  Reigning monarchs who convert to Roman Catholicism, or marry 
a Roman Catholic, lose the Crown instantaneously.
116
  In England the head of the state 
                                                          
110
 See  section 7.3.2.1. 
111
 See section 7.3.2.2. 
112
 England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
113
 B Cohen ‗Executive Summary – Discrimination based on religion and belief in the United Kingdom‘ 
in I Chopin, J Cormack and J Niessen (eds) The implementation of the Racial Equality Directive 
(2000/43/EC) and the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) as it relates to religion and belief 
in 15 EU Member States (2004),167. 
Available at <http://www.migration-online.de/data/migration_policy_group_5.pdf> last accessed on 29 
November 2010. 
114
 See generally Bloß (note 86 above). 
115
 P Cumper & P Edge ‗First Amongst Equals: The English State and the Anglican Church in the 21st 
Century?‘ (2006) University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 601, 617. 
116
Ibid 604. 
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is also the head of the established church, being the Church of England.
117
  Secondly, 
the appointment of the Lords Spiritual in the House of Lords, which is a legislative 
position, depends upon their association within a particular religious hierarchy.
118
 
 
Despite the existence of this establishment, the relationship between the state and 
religion in the legal system is aptly illustrated by the following remark by Munby J: 
Although historically this country is part of the Christian west, and although it has an 
established church which is Christian, I sit as a secular judge serving a multi-cultural 
community of many faiths in which all of us can now take pride, sworn to do justice 
―to all manner of people‖.  Religion – whatever the particular believer‘s faith – is no 
doubt something to be encouraged but it is not the business of the secular courts. … A 
secular judge must be wary of straying across the well-recognised divide between 
church and state.  It is not for a judge to weigh one religion against another.  All are 
entitled to equal respect, whether in times of peace or, as at present, amidst a clash of 
arms.
119
 
 
                                                          
117
 See section 9 of the Act of Supremacy 1558 that reads: ‗This Act united and annexed spiritual 
jurisdiction to the Crown, section 8: ‗We acknowledge that the Queen‘s excellent majesty, acting 
according to the laws of the realm, is the highest power under God in this kingdom and has supreme 
authority over all persons in all causes as well as ecclesiastical as civil.‘(Canon A7).  Minnerath 
explains that the Church of England was disestablished in Ireland in 1869 and in Wales in 1920 where 
the Anglican Church since became an association under private law.  In Scotland the Presbyterian 
Church was established in the sixteenth century.  In this regard see generally R Minnerath ‗The Right to 
Autonomy in Religious Affairs‘ in T Lindholm, WC Durham & BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (2004) 302; see also P Cumper ‗Religious Liberty in the 
United Kingdom‘ in Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (ed) JD van 
der Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) (1996) 205- 242. 
118
 Cumper & Edge (note 115 above) 620. 
119
 Suleiman v Juffali (note 37 above) (In which it was considered whether a Muslim talaq (divorce) 
could be recognised in the UK family law).  Although this is a civil matter this remark has even more 
relevance in the public domain. 
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Of particular relevance, is the notion of an established church that does not give 
preferential status to any religion.  In addition all religions are considered as a positive 
component of life which should be supported by the state.  In general, the established 
church is given visibility in public life and forms a central part of many symbolic 
functions and legislative participation.
120
  These forms of the public display of 
religious expression have not caused much debate as the English establishment does 
not impose any religious belief on its citizens and publicly values the role of 
religion.
121
 
 
While recognising that the established church inevitably reflects the social position 
and historical inheritance of Christianity in British society, Modood argues that: 
The minimal nature of the Anglican establishment, its relative openness to other 
denominations and faiths seeking public space and the fact that its very existence is an 
ongoing acknowledgement of the public character of religion are all reasons why it 
may seem far less intimidating to minority faiths than a triumphant secularism.  
Where secularism is already the dominant ideology and the national church is 
marginal, it is dishonest to suggest that religious equality and empowerment of the 
new minority faiths begins with a critique of establishment.
122
 
 
Despite Modood‘s benign evaluation of the establishment of the Church of England, 
religious privileges to the established church remain protected in law.  The Church of 
                                                          
120
 There are a number of seats within the House of Lords (non-elected Second Chamber of Parliament) 
for a number of bishops of the Church of England. 
121
 JD Fischer & CJ Wallace ‗God and Caesar in the Twenty First Century: What recent cases say about 
Church-State Relations in England and the United States‘ (2006) 18 University of Louisville Journal of 
International Law 485, 491. 
122
 T Modood ‗Minorities, Faith and Citizenship‘ (1992) 12 Discernment: A Christian Journal for Inter-
Religious Encounter 59, 60. 
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England remains privileged.
123
  Weller too opposes the arguments put forward by 
Modood and conversely claims that: 
[T]he implications of the Establishment to do with education, the law and pastoral 
services are not just of a ‗minimal nature‟ and that they, in fact, have substantial 
consequences for individuals, and certainly for communities and organizations of the 
other than established religious traditions.
124
 
 
Although Modood and Weller have different opinions regarding the influence of the 
established church on the right to freedom of religion, it is reasoned that both Modood 
and Weller are correct in their opinion that the existence of an established church does 
acknowledge the importance of religion in civil society.  In this recognition it is a 
particular conception of the dominant religion that is acknowledged and not 
necessarily a diversity of religions.
125
  The protection of these minority religious rights 
under such a regime is evaluated next. 
 
7.3.2 Legal framework for the protection of fundamental rights 
 
As no constitutional guarantees for the protection of fundamental rights exists in the 
UK, protection is primarily given by way of specific anti-discrimination laws, such as 
the Race Relations Act and the Human Rights Act.  Both of which are  discussed in 
more detail below.  Other specific legislation includes, for example, the Prison Act of 
1952, in terms of which provision is made for religious diets.  Also Sikh prisoners are 
                                                          
123
 Within the Education Act and public education domain as well as the structural embedded position 
of the Church of England in chaplaincies in the armed forces and prison service. 
124
 P Weller ‗Equity, Inclusivity and Participation in a Plural Society: Challenging the Establishment of 
the Church of England‘ in PW Edge & G Harvey (eds) Law and Religion in Contempory Society: 
Communities, Individualism and the State (2002) 53, 62. 
125
 In this regard see generally Fischer & Wallace (note 121 above) 485. 
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permitted to keep a kirpan
126
 in the form of a small symbolic replica, inlaid in a 
comb.
127
 
 
There is no legislation that specifically addresses the manifestation of religious 
observances of employees.  A number of cases alleging indirect discrimination on 
racial grounds have been brought where the employer or the educational institution 
imposed a dress code on health and safety grounds that disadvantaged members of 
particular racial groups who were not able to comply with the dress requirements.  An 
example is a requirement for all railways repairs workers to wear protective 
headgear.
128
  The outcome of such a case would, as in any other complaint of indirect 
discrimination, depend on whether the employer could show that their need for the 
rule outweighed its discriminatory impact. 
 
Public health has also been invoked to justify limitations. For example, rules 
forbidding the wearing of beards in a chocolate factory,
129
 a confectionery factory,
130
 a 
bakery,
131
 and an ice-cream factory
132
 have been justified on the ground of protecting 
the public health.  The prohibition of female circumcision
133
 and ritual tattooing
134
 
may be justified as necessary to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
                                                          
126
 Baptized Sikhs, believe in five symbols of faith (the Five K's) including a comb (kangha), a pair of 
britches (kachha), a bracelet (karha), a head turban to cover uncut hair (keski), and a sword (kirpan).  In 
this regard see generally HS Dilagira Who are the Sikhs? (2000). 
127
 See Directory and Guide on Religious Practices in HM Prison Service (London 1992).  Available at 
<www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/assets/.../10000322_51Religion.pdf> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
128
 Singh v British Rail Engineering Ltd. [1986] ICR 22. 
129
 Panesar v Nestle Co. Ltd. [1980] I.C.R. 144. 
130
 Singh v Rowntree Mackintosh Ltd. [1979] I.R.L.R. 199. 
131
 Kabal Singh v R.H.M. Bakeries (Southern) Ltd., EAT 818/77. 
132
 Singh v Lyons Maid Ltd. [1975] IRLR 328. 
133
 Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985. 
134
 Section 2 of the Tattooing of Minors Act, 1969. 
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Ritual slaughtering of sheep or goats at religious festivals is considered contrary to the 
Protection of Animals Act 1911, to which there is no specific religious exemption.  In 
other instances statutory exemptions are made to allow for the protection of the right 
to freedom or religion.  For example, Sikhs enjoy exemptions from general rules 
requiring the wearing of crash helmets on motor cycles,
135
 and a special defence to 
prosecution for carrying a kirpan;
136
 exemption to the swearing of a Christian oath in 
judicial proceedings is provided.
137
  However, of particular relevance are the Race 
Relations Act of 1976 (RRA) and the Human Rights Act of 1998 (HRA), both of 
which are discussed in more detail below. 
 
7.3.2.1 Race Relations Act of 1976  
 
Often the right to manifest religious belief has been enforced in terms of the 
enforcement of equal treatment provisions.  Discrimination based on race is regulated 
in terms of the provisions of the RRA.  The RRA forbids discrimination on ‗racial 
grounds‘ in the workplace, either direct or indirect, on the grounds of colour, race, 
                                                          
135
 Section 16 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. 
136
 Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
137
 Section 1 of the Oaths Act 1978.  Further relevant legislation includes the Equality Act.  The 
Equality Act makes it illegal to discriminate on the grounds of ‗religion or belief‘ or the ‗lack of 
religion or belief‘ in the provision of goods, facilities and services, education, the use and disposal of 
property, and the exercise of public functions.  The Equality Act established the Commission for 
Equality and Human Rights which is responsible for promoting an awareness of the Act's provisions, 
promoting equality and diversity, and working towards the elimination of unlawful discrimination and 
harassment.  The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 defines ‗religious hatred‘ as hatred against a 
group of persons which may be determined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.  
The Act does not define religion or what constitutes a religious belief.  Offences must be threatening 
and have the intent to stir up religious hatred.  The Act is not applicable to utterances or behaviour 
inside private dwellings.  Similarly, criticism or mere dislike of a religious belief is excluded. 
 
 
 
 
310 
 
nationality or ethnic origin.
138
  To be successful in proving a claim of discrimination 
the claimant has to show that he belongs to a racial group.  In the matter of Mandla,
139
 
a Sikh boy who was denied admission to a school on the ground that he wished to 
wear a turban, was successful with his claim of indirect racial discrimination, as the 
House of Lords held that Sikhs are an ‗ethnic‘ as well as a religious group, and thereby 
protected under the provisions of the RRA.  The following two requirements were laid 
down to enable a person to qualify as a member of an ethnic group.  First, a long 
shared history, distinguishing it from other groups.  Second,  a cultural tradition of its 
own, including family and social customs, common geographical origin, common 
ancestors, common language, common literature and a common religion.
140
 
                                                          
138
 Section 3(1) of the RRA stipulates that: ‗racial grounds‘ means any of the following grounds, 
namely colour, race, nationality (including citizenship), ethnic and national origins‘. 
139
 Mandla v Lee [1983] IRLR 209  
140
 The case of Mandla v Lee remains the benchmark.  The requirements for an ethnic group were 
stipulated as follows in Mandla v Lee (note 139 above) 562 by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton: 
‗For a group to constitute an ethnic group in the sense of the 1976 Act, it must, in my opinion, regard 
itself, and be regarded by others, as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics. Some of 
these characteristics are essential; others are not essential but one or more of them will commonly be 
found and will help to distinguish the group from the surrounding community. The conditions which 
appear to me to be essential are these: – (1) a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as 
distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive; (2) a cultural tradition of 
its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with 
religious observance. In addition to those two essential characteristics the following characteristics are, 
in my opinion, relevant; (3) either a common geographical origin, or descent from a small number of 
common ancestors; (4) a common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group; (5) a common 
literature peculiar to the group; (6) a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or 
from the general community surrounding it; (7) being a minority or being an oppressed or a dominant 
group within a larger community, for example a conquered people (say, the inhabitants of England 
shortly after the Norman conquest) and their conquerors might both be ethnic groups. A group defined 
by reference to enough of these characteristics would be capable of including converts, for example, 
persons who marry into the group, and of excluding apostates. Provided a person who joins the group 
feels himself or herself to be a member of it, and is accepted by other members, then he is, for the 
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Ethnic origin therefore has been interpreted broadly and can include both religious and 
racial difference.  This broad interpretation is in line with the approach recommended 
in section 1.3.  In this regard Sikhs, Jews
141
 and Gypsies have been categorised as 
separate races. 
 
However, British courts and tribunals have held that Muslims, Rastafarians and 
Jehovah‘s Witnesses fall outside the protection of the RRA.142  Accordingly a 
Rastafarian‘s appeal was denied when an employer rejected his application for a 
position as a van driver with Crown Suppliers as he refused to shave off his 
dreadlocks.
143
  In R v Paul Simon Taylor
144
 the court held that the use and supply of 
cannabis by a young Rastafarian cannot be justified as lawful when motivated by 
religion. 
 
7.3.2.2 Human Rights Act 1998 
 
The HRA provides a mechanism for the enforcement of the ECHR within the UK and 
is a mechanism in terms of which English Law can be harmonised with the provisions 
                                                                                                                                                                       
purposes, of the Act, a member. That appears to be consistent with the words at the end of subsection 
(1) of section3: References to a person's racial group refer to any group into which he falls.‘ 
141
 A Jewish employee was also excluded from protection in Seide v Gillette Industries Ltd. [1980], 
IRLR 427 at 430, where the discrimination was based on religious grounds and was not racially 
motivated. 
142
 Most notably, it was recently held by the Court of Appeal that Rastafarians were not within the 
protection of the RRA because, although their movement goes back nearly sixty years, and ‗they are a 
separate group with identifiable characteristics, they have not established some separate identity by 
reference to their ethnic origins‘, as required by Mandla; see Dawkins v Dept. of Environment [1993] 
IRLR 284.  Therefore, as Rastafarians did not classify as a race this action could not be brought under 
the Race Relations Act. 
143
 Dawkins v Dept. of Environment [1993] IRLR 284, CA 528 -29. 
144
 R v Paul Simon Taylor [2001] EWCA Crim. 2263 (Criminal Division). 
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of the ECHR.
145
  Section 3 of the HRA determines that courts, ‗so far as where it is 
possible to do so‘ must read and give effect to primary and subordinate legislation in a 
way in which it is compatible with the ECHR.  In this manner the HRA positively 
affirms the human rights and the right to non-discrimination as entrenched in the 
ECHR. 
 
Before the enactment of the HRA the only protection for religious symbols was in 
terms of the RRA, with a result that ethnic symbols were better protected than 
religious symbols.  The HRA now provides for the protection of religious symbols.
146
  
State schools are accordingly under an obligation to comply with the provisions of the 
ECHR.
147
  When devising uniform policies, schools are therefore required to 
accommodate religious diversity.  The school has the obligation to allow for cultural 
and religious diversity while simultaneously maintaining uniformity in schools.  The 
Department of Children, Schools and Families has issued guidelines to assist schools 
in balancing religious diversity with uniform policies in schools.
148
  Schools are 
                                                          
145
 See generally A Kavanagh Constitutional review under the UK Human Rights Act (2009). 
146
 Article 9 of ECHR. 
147
 Section 6 of the HRA provides that ‗it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right‘. 
148
 See the guidelines issued by the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) to schools 
on school uniform and related policies, 4 October 2007, available at  
<http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/management/atoz/u/uniform> last accessed on 10 October 2010.  
Schools are left with balancing the promotion of respect for cultural and religious diversity and 
maintaining a shared ethos at school through the design of uniform policies.  This non-statutory 
guidance strongly recommends wide consultations on school uniform policies including community 
leaders representing minority ethnic and religious groups and calls on schools to act reasonably in 
accommodating religious requirements.  It further explains that restricting the freedom of pupils to 
manifest their religion may be lawful if justified on grounds specified in the HRA, including health, 
safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Furthermore, the guidance emphasises 
that each case will depend on the circumstances of the particular school and that it is for a school to 
determine what sort of uniform policy is appropriate for it. 
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required to act reasonably in accommodating religious requirements and Paragraph 22 
of the guidelines provide that:  
In fulfilling its obligations, a school may have to balance the rights of individual 
pupils against the best interests of the school community as a whole.  Where a school 
has good reason for restricting an individual‘s freedoms, for example, to ensure the 
effective delivery of teaching and learning, the promotion of cohesion and good order 
in the school, the prevention of bullying, or genuine health and safety or security 
considerations, then the restriction of an individual‘s rights to manifest their religion 
or belief may be justified.
149
 
 
The Department of Education‘s guidance150 regarding full-face veils in schools has 
lead to the Islamic Human Rights Commission stating that it is inappropriate for the 
Government to provide guidelines on how Muslim communities should express their 
faith.  This statement of the Islamic Human Rights Commission is justified as the right 
to freedom of religion should not be subjected to objective determination and the 
requirements of faith should be left to be determined by the adherents of such faith. 
 
7.3.3 Application of the HRA and the RRA 
 
The promulgation of the HRA has brought about considerable jurisprudence regarding 
the balancing of the right to freely manifest religious belief with the right of schools to 
impose uniform dress codes.  Prominent are the following decisions;
151
 first the 
                                                          
149
 See paragraph 19 DCSF guidance. 
150
 Department of Education guidance March 19, 2007. 
Available at <http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/management/atoz/u/uniform> last accessed on 10 October 
2010  
151
 The manner in which these decisions are arranged herein is drawn from S Bacquet ‗Manifestation of 
Belief and Religious Symbols at Schools: Setting Boundaries in English Courts‘ (2009) 4 Religion and 
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decision of the House of Lords
152
 in the matter of R (on the application of Begum) v 
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School
153
 regarding the display of a 
jilbab; second, the decision of R (on the application of X) v Head Teacher and 
Governors of Y School
154
 regarding the wear of a niqab; third, the matter of R (on the 
application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School
155
 regarding the wear of a 
‗purity ring‘.156 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Human Rights 121–135.  For a discussion on Begum see generally MM Idriss ‗The House of Lords, 
Shabina Begum and proportionality‘ (2006) 11(3) Judicial Review 239. 
152
 The House of Lords has served as the highest court in the UK from 1876.  In 2009 the UK Supreme 
Court took over the House of Lords judicial functions. 
153
 R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] 
UKHL 15, (Begum).  Shabina Begum, a Muslim, born in the UK to parents who came from Bangladesh 
at first wore the shalwar kameeze.  At the age of nearly 14 she contended that she wished to wear the 
jilbab – a long coat like garment that concealed the contours of the female body in accordance with the 
religious requirements of her faith.  The appeal to the House of Lords follows from a decision in March 
2005 in which the Court of Appeal declared that Shabina Begum had unlawfully been excluded from 
Denbigh High School for insisting to wear the jilbab.  See Decisions R (on the application of Begum) v 
Denbigh High School [2005] EWCA Civ 199 (02 March 2005) 1 WLR 3372 (Begum (2005)).  
Available at <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/199.html> last accessed on 10 July 
2010.  The appeal was against the decision of the England and Wales High Court (Administrative 
Court) Decisions - Begum, R (on the application of) v Denbigh High School [2004] EWHC 1389 
(Admin+) (15 June 2004) ELR 374.  Available at  
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2004/1389.html> last accessed on 10 July 2010.  In the 
court a quo Justice Bennett held that the school had acted reasonably in offering a uniform that satisfied 
the requirements of Islamic dress code (paragraph 8).  He further held that the reasonable uniform code 
was necessary for providing a positive and inclusive ethos in the school (paragraph 42). 
154
 R (on the application of X) v Head Teacher and Governors of Y School [2008] 1 All ER 249 (X v Y).  
In this regard see also G Lee (2007) ‗Schoolgirl loses court battle to wear niqab‘ The Guardian 22 
February 2007. 
155
 R (on the application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin) 
(Playfoot). 
156
 A purity ring is a silver ring worn by members of the ‗Silver Ring Thing Movement‘ (SRT) as a 
symbol of their commitment to chastity before marriage. 
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The matter of R (on the application of Sarika Angel Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls‟ 
High School
157
 regarding the wear of a kara bangle
158
 was decided under the 
provisions of the Race Relations Act.  The three cases that were dealt with in 
accordance with the provisions of the HRA will be dealt with first, followed by the 
Watkins-Singh matter in terms of the provisions of the RRA. 
 
7.3.3.1 Human Rights Act 
 
With the enactment of the HRA the manifestation of religious symbols is provided for 
in terms of the provisions of the ECHR.   The court will first enquire if section 9 of the 
ECHR
159
 is applicable in that a sincerely held religious belief is compromised.  
Thereafter the court will have to determine if the right has been limited and if so if the 
limitation is justified.  The investigation of the courts in the matters of Begum, X v Y 
and Playfoot are discussed next. 
 
Is there a sincerely held religious belief in terms of article 9 of the ECHR? 
 
The court at first enquires if there is an infringement of a sincerely held religious 
belief conducting this inquiry.  In the matters of Begum, X v Y and Playfoot, the court 
without difficulty held that the claimants‘ belief was sincere.  However in Playfoot, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
See: <http://www.silverringthing.org.uk> last accessed on 1 July 2010. 
157
 R (on the application of Sarika Angel Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls‟ High School [2008] EWHC 
1865 (Admin) (Watkins-Singh). 
158
 This is a thin bracelet that Sikhs wear as a manifestation of their belonging to the Sikh faith. The 
kara bangle is part of the five Ks, the five outward signs required of a Sikh to wear.  In this regard see 
generally BN Banerjee Hindu culture, custom, and ceremony (1978). 
159
 See section 6.3. 
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the judge found that article 9 was not applicable as a ‗purity ring‘ was not a 
requirement of the Catholic faith.
160
  In Playfoot the court clearly favours religious 
symbols over social and cultural symbols.  This approach is criticised as the court does 
not appreciate that a symbol may be a reflection of the particular claimant‘s 
understanding of the requirements of her tradition or belief. 
 
Is there a limitation of the right that is justified? 
 
Having found in Begum and X v Y that the claimants had a sincerely held religious 
belief, the courts next determined if the claimants‘ right had been limited.  The court 
in both Begum
161
 and X v Y found that there was no interference with the right to 
freely manifest religious belief.  The reasoning in both Begum
162
 and X v Y
163
 was 
based on the fact that the claimants had voluntary chosen to attend the schools, were 
aware of the uniform policies and had access to other schools where they would be 
permitted to wear the jilbab or the niqab. 
 
The reliance upon the voluntary nature of Shabina Begums‘ school attendance is put 
forward by Lord Hoffmann as follows: 
I accept that wearing a jilbab to a mixed school was, for her, a manifestation of her 
religion. The fact that most other Muslims might not have thought it necessary is 
irrelevant. But her right was not in my opinion infringed because there was nothing to 
                                                          
160
 Playfoot (note 155 above) 23–24. 
161
 For a general discussion of the decision of the House of Lords see Idriss (note 151 above) 239. 
162
 In Begum (note 153 above) the court stated that the school had been chosen by the claimant; the 
uniform policy had clearly been explained to parents and pupils; there were other schools that the 
claimant could attend and where she would be allowed to wear the jilbab; the school had designed its 
policy taking into account the needs of the Muslim community.  See paragraphs. 25 and 32. 
163
 In X v Y (note 154 above) the court stated that since the claimant had been offered another place at a 
school where she could wear the niqab the Buckinghamshire school did not infringe on her right to 
manifest her religious belief. 
 
 
 
 
317 
 
stop her from going to a school where her religion did not require a jilbab or where 
she was allowed to wear one. Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to 
manifest one‘s religion at any time and place of one‘s own choosing.164 
 
The court‘s reliance upon the voluntary nature of attendance is reminiscent of the 
reasoning of Ahmad v United Kingdom
165
 and X v United Kingdom.
166
  The approach 
of the European Commission of Human Rights in these matters has been previously 
criticised.
167
  Similarly the approach of the courts in the matter of Begum and X v Y is 
problematic in light of the fact that the court merely relies upon the fact that a claimant 
has a choice.  The court consequently fails to scrutinise the justifiability of the limiting 
provision on the right to manifest religious belief.  It is argued that the point of 
departure of the court in determining the justifiability of a limitation on the right to 
manifest religious belief, should be as follows:  The court should be aware that even 
apparently neutral uniform policies may indeed be representative of the norms of the 
dominant.  In addition, the court should not assume that an apparent voluntary choice 
of attendance indeed is representative of the individual‘s choice.  What may appear 
voluntary to the dominant may in actual fact not represent any choice to the vulnerable 
and marginalised, who at times may be without the competence to exercise such a 
choice.  Furthermore the court ought to be mindful of the discrimination that an 
individual suffers in comparison with others who are not expected to exercise a choice 
or either failing to comply with the tenets of their faith or finding an alternative 
school. 
 
The courts in both the matter of Begum and X v Y further assert that the school is best 
situated to deal with school uniform requirements.  Judges have been hesitant to 
                                                          
164
 Begum (note 153 above) 50. 
165
 Ahmad v United Kingdom (note 15 above). 
166
 X v United Kingdom (note 16 above) at 33. 
167
 See section 6.2.3.3. 
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adjudicate on ‗religious‘ matters168 and have been more inclined to defer, in the same 
way as the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) has applied the ‗margin of 
appreciation‘.169  In considering the proportionality of the school‘s limitation on the 
right to manifest the religious belief of Shabina Begum, Lord Bingham refers to the 
decision of the ECtHR in Sahin v Turkey
170
 and the need to balance the right to 
manifest religious belief with the need for ‗religious harmony and tolerance between 
opposing or competing groups and of pluralism and broadmindedness.
171
  It is clear 
that the national court therefore relies on the ECtHR application of the ‗margin of 
appreciation‘ in the matter of Begum as well.  Lords Bingham, Hoffmann and Scott 
reasoned that the school itself was in the ‗best position to weigh and consider‘172 the 
impact of the school uniform policy on the rights of others, and that the schools 
uniform policy was ‗well within the margin of discretion that must be allowed to the 
school‘s managers‘.173  That the school is best situated to determine what uniform 
would best suit the schools needs, as illustrated in the following statement of Lord 
Bingham: 
It would in my opinion be irresponsible of any court, lacking the experience, 
background and detailed knowledge of the head teacher, staff and governors, to 
overrule their judgement on a matter as sensitive as this.  The power of decision has 
been given to them for the compelling reason that they are best placed to exercise it.  
And I see no reason to disturb their decision.
174
 
                                                          
168
 See Lord Bingham‘s statement in Begum:  „This House is not, and could not be, invited to rule on 
whether Islamic dress, or any feature of Islamic dress, should or should not be permitted in a school of 
this country.  That would be a most inappropriate question for the House in its judicial capacity‘.  
Begum (note 153 above) 2. 
169
 See section 6.2.2.1. 
170
 Sahin v Turkey (note 3 above). 
171
 Begum, (note 153 above) 32. 
172
 Ibid 65. 
173
 Ibid 84. 
174
 Ibid 34. 
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In deferring to the school authorities in the matter of Begum, as well as negating the 
possibility of an infringement on the right to manifest religious belief as the attendance 
at the school was voluntary, the House of Lords fails to consider the necessity of the 
limitation imposed on the right to manifest religious belief.  The proportionality of the 
limitation in seeking to fulfil a legitimate aim and a pressing social need, which the 
limitation must meet in a relevant and sufficient manner, is not scrutinised.  This 
approach of the House of Lords does not protect the right to freedom of religion in any 
manner as no opportunity for judicial scrutiny of a limitation is provided. 
 
The House of Lords deferred to the school authorities who were of the opinion that the 
restriction on the right to wear the jilbab in Begum was necessary to preserve 
pluralism and the cohesion within the Muslim student population.  It is objectionable, 
that the Law Lords, although not adjudicating as an international body, have continued 
to apply the international doctrine of the margin of appreciation.  However, here the 
margin has not been used to defer to another state legislature, but deference has been 
made to schooling authorities.  It is argued that this deference does not allow the court 
to scrutinise infringements and is an incorrect appreciation of the role of the margin of 
appreciation. 
 
Cohesion is arguably assisted by a uniform dress code which can ‗smooth over ethnic, 
religious, and social divisions‘.175  This approach in Begum does not reflect on how 
the display of religious symbols such as the jilbab may indeed enhance pluralism and 
diversity.  The court merely considers the display too visibly different and that it 
therefore should be suppressed.
176
  In this regard it is reasoned that the Law Lords 
interpreted the concept of multiculturalism as tied to Christian culture and not as a 
                                                          
175
 Ibid 97. 
176
 Bhandar (note 93 above) 313.  See generally also Bacquet (note 151 above) 121. 
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means of negotiating between different cultures.
177
  Bhandar argues that culture is a 
set of practices, strongly associated with religious belief.  For this reason the principle 
of multiculturalism, in the UK, is tied up with British cultural and religious identity.
178
  
As a result, multiculturalism does not reflect different practices that exist in relation to 
one another and in terms of which a range of cultural differences can be negotiated, 
but for  a concept tied to Christian culture. 
 
7.3.3.2 Race Relations Act 
 
It was only in the matter of Watkins-Singh that the right to manifest religious belief 
was protected and the limitation imposed on the display of the kara bracelet was found 
unjustified.  This endorsement of the right was achieved through relying upon the 
provisions of the RRA, in terms of which Sikhs are considered to be a racial group.  It 
was not possible for the matters of Begum and X v Y to be heard in terms of the 
provisions of the RRA as Muslims are not considered to constitute a race.  In 
comparing the decisions in Begum, X v Y, Playfoot with the decision in Watkins-Singh 
it is clear that the HRA has not, as of yet, afforded a higher standard of protection and 
that the right to diversity was better accommodated in terms of the RRA. 
 
7.3.3.3 Appraisal of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Begum. 
 
In contrast with the approach of the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal provides a 
more nuanced consideration of the reality that the Islamic headscarf is diverse in its 
                                                          
177
 Ibid Bhandar 324. 
178
 Ibid 320. 
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meaning and application.
179
  The right to manifest religious belief is left to the 
individual herself to decide.  The Court of Appeal further correctly considers the 
different interpretations of what represents a suitable manifestation of the Islamic 
headscarf.  For some the shalwar kameeze is sufficient but for others, albeit a 
minority, a garment like the jilbab, which disguises the shape of the wearer's arms and 
legs, is required.
180
 
 
Lord Justice Brooke further held that the Civil Court erred in questioning the 
correctness of the beliefs to wear the jilbab.  In this regard the Court of Appeal 
referred to the matter of Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria in which it was held that: 
[T]he right to freedom of religion ... excludes any discretion on the part of the State to 
determine whether religious belief or the means used to express such beliefs are 
legitimate.
 181
 
 
The Court of Appeal goes to great lengths to confirm that the UK is a multicultural 
society
182
 and that it is not the role of the school authorities to choose between various 
sincerely held religious beliefs, even if a belief is held by a very small minority.
183
 
 
It is argued that this approach of the Court of Appeal is the correct approach, in that 
the schooling authorities indeed do not have the ability to adjudicate on the validity of 
sincerely held beliefs and all manifestations must be considered as expressing the 
individuals‘ sincere religious belief.  Although the right to manifest religious belief 
                                                          
179
 In this regard see generally G Davies ‗Banning the Jilbab: Reflections on Restricting Religious 
Clothing in the Light of the Court of Appeal in SB v Denbigh High School‘ (2005) 1 European 
Constitutional Law Review 511. 
180
 Begum 2005 (note 153 above) 48. 
181
 Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (26
th
 October 2000: Appln No. 30985/96) the European Court of 
Human Rights, paragraph 78. 
182
  Begum 2005 (note 153 above) 91. 
183
 Begum 2005 (note 153 above) 93. 
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may be limited, such a limitation must be analysed to determine if the limitation is 
justified.  The court cannot avoid such an analysis in deciding that certain 
manifestations are not considered representative of the religious belief and 
consequently no right has been infringed and no justification analysis is required.  
Such an approach does not further the protection of the right to manifest religious 
belief as the limiting provision is not scrutinised at all. 
 
The point of departure of the Court of Appeal in determining the justifiability of a 
limitation on the right to manifest religious belief is mindful that even apparently 
neutral uniform policies may indeed be representative of the norms of the dominant.  
A neutral rule may therefore inflict harm on the vulnerable religious other.  The Court 
of Appeal is vigilant not to impose the norms of the dominant on the marginalised.  In 
approaching the limitation with this manner the right to manifest religious belief is 
afforded better protection. 
 
7.3.4 The European Union Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 
 
Non-discrimination of employees is regulated in terms of the provisions of European 
Union law aimed at securing an internal market in which employees can move freely 
from one member state to another for employment purposes.
184
  In terms of European 
                                                          
184
 Two European Community Directives, the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment 
Framework Directive, define a set of principles that offer everyone in the EU a common minimum level 
of legal protection against discrimination. Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 and Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000.  Both directives follow directly from article 13 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty establishing the European Community which reads: ‗the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate 
action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation‘. 
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Union law an issue of alleged discrimination for wearing a niqab at work was heard in 
the case of Aishah Azmi v Headfield School and Kirklees Metropolitan Borough 
Council.
185
  These regulations
186
 prohibit ‗direct discrimination‘, ‗indirect 
discrimination‘ and discrimination by way of ‗victimisation‘ or ‗harassment‘ in the 
workplace by reason of ‗any religion, religious belief or similar philosophical belief‘.  
Ms Azmi wore a niqab while assisting pupils between the age six to eleven with 
maths.  Ms Amzi was informed that she would not be able to wear the veil while 
working with children.  She removed it in front of her pupils but refused to do so in 
front of male teachers.  She was subsequently suspended. 
 
The claims of direct and indirect discrimination were dismissed as the reasons for 
prohibiting her to wear the veil were objective.  Namely for the needs of the children 
to have full face visual communication.  Ms Azmi appealed to the Employment 
Appeals Tribunal (EAT) which held that there was no direct discrimination, probably 
indirect discrimination but that the actions of the school were justified.  Both the court 
a quo and the appeal tribunal failed to identify that the right to freedom of religion had 
been infringed and failed to scrutinise the justifiability of the limiting provision. 
 
This decision signalled to Muslim women who wish to wear the niqab at work that 
they should rather stay at home.
187
  This need to suppress visible signs of difference 
was also evident in the decision of Watkins-Singh where the kara, a less visible sign of 
                                                          
185
 Aishah Azmi v Headfield School and Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council. Employment Tribunal, 
case number 1801450/2006, 6 October 2006; Employment Appeals Tribunal, Appeal No. 
UKEAT/0009/07/MAA. 30 March 2007. Available at  
<www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/Public/Upload/07_0009ResfhAMMAA.doc> last accessed on 10 
March 2010.  See also D Wise ‗Wearing the Veil‘ (2006) 156 New Law Journal 1786. 
186
 Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Framework Directive (note 184 above). 
187
 M Morris ‗Blair Tells Immigrants to Integrate or Stay Away‘ (2006) The Independent, 9 December 
2006; F Yeoman ‗Accept British Way of Life or Stay Away, Blair Tells Migrants‘ (2006) The Times, 9 
December 2006. 
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difference was permitted.
188
  Increasingly Muslims in Europe are feeling that 
acceptance by society is premised on the assumption that they should lose some aspect 
of their Muslim identity.
189
  British Muslim minorities however are claiming that: 
[T]hey should not be marginal, subordinate or excluded; that they too [have] their 
values, norms and voices--should be part of the structuring of the public space.
190
 
 
7.4 Germany 
 
Germany is a federal state, with 16 Länder
191
 and is a constitutional democracy.  
Fundamental human rights are guaranteed in the federal and state constitutions.
192
  The 
foundational principles contained in the German Constitution
193
 are the values of 
dignity and equality.
194
  The right to freedom of religion is protected in terms of 
                                                          
188
 See generally A Vakulenko, ‗Islamic Dress in Human Rights Jurisprudence: A Critique of Current 
Trends‘ (2007) 7 (4) Human Rights Law Review 721. 
189
 See generally Choudhury (note 20 above). 
190
 T Madood ‗Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7‘ (2005) Open Democracy (29 September 2005), 
Available at <www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/multiculturalism_2879.jsp> last accessed on 
11 May 2009.  
191
 The Länder are Baden–Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North Rhine–Westphalia, Rhineland–Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, 
Lower-Saxony, Schleswig–Holstein, Thuringia.  Available at <www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/info/ f> last 
accessed on 3 May 2009. 
192
 Susanne Baer (2005) Country Report Germany drafted for the European Network of Legal Experts 
in the nondiscrimination field (on the grounds of Race or Ethnic Origin, Age, Disability, Religion or 
Belief and Sexual Orientation).  Available at  
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamental_rights/policy/aneval/mon_en.htm> last 
accessed on 3 August 2010. 
193
 See the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Available at <www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/info/germanbasiclaw.pdf> last accessed on 3 May 2009. 
194
 Article 1 (dignity), article 3 (equality) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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article. 4.  The right protects freedom of faith, conscience and of religious and other, 
secular beliefs or weltanschauung.
195
 
 
7.4.1 Relationship between state and religion 
 
There is no state church in Germany.  Religion and state is separated according to the 
principle of the neutrality of the state.
196
  Religious communities with corporation 
status enjoy privileges in that they have a right to levy a church tax on local residents 
who do not actively leave the church and from their members.
197
 
 
 
7.4.2 Application of the right to manifest religious belief – Ludin case 
 
The right to freedom of religion is afforded and has been offered considerable 
protection as seen from the following discussion from the Ludin v Land Baden-
Württemberg.
198
  In the case of Ludin the Constitutional Court examined closely if the 
                                                          
195
 Weltanschauung can be translated to mean literally: world-view, sometimes translated as 
‗philosophic‘ beliefs.  See translation of S Baer (2005) Country Report Germany drafted for the 
European Network of Legal Experts in the nondiscrimination field (on the grounds of Race or Ethnic 
origin, Age, Disability, Religion or belief and Sexual Orientation).  Available at  
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamental_rights/policy/aneval/mon_en.htm> last 
accessed on 3 September 2010. 
196
 Germany laid down the theoretical principle of neutrality in religious matters in article 140 
Grundgesetz in connection with article 137 (1) Weimarer Reichsverfassung: ‗Es besteht keine 
Staatskirche‘.  (There is no State Church). 
197
 See generally CR Barker ‗Church and State Relationships in German ―Public Benefit‖ Law‘ (2000) 
3 (2) The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 1. 
198
 German Constitutional Court, Ludin v Land Baden-Württemberg Case No 2BvR 1436/02, Judgment 
of 24 September 2003, (Ludin).  For a overview of the Ludin case see RS Fogel ‗Headscarves in 
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state action was justified or at the very least tolerated by the Constitution.
199
  In terms 
of the proportionality principle it is required that the limitation imposed on a 
constitutionally protected right by the state is proportionate to the objectives pursued 
by the limitation.
200
  When a litigant alleges a violation of her right to freedom of 
religion by public authorities the court makes its findings in two stages: first, it 
determines, whether the conduct infringes on the right to freedom of religion; second, 
if it does, the court then examines whether the infringement on her right to manifest 
her religious belief is justified.
201
  The approach of the courts in the review of a 
limitation of the right to manifest religious belief is clear from an analysis of the case 
of Ludin.  In the matter of Ludin, Fereshta Ludin a 26-year-old German schoolteacher 
of Muslim faith, was turned down for a permanent teaching position in a state primary 
school in Baden-Württemberg.  The school board, in deciding not to appoint Ms 
Ludin, was primarily influenced by the following two considerations.  First, the 
display of the headscarf was considered incompatible with the principle of state 
                                                                                                                                                                       
German Public Schools: Religious Minorities are Welcome in Germany, Unless - God Forbid - They 
are Religious‘ (2006) 51 New York Law School Law Review 618; RA Kahn  ‗The Headscarf as Threat: a 
Comparison of German and U.S. Legal Discourses‘ (2007) 40 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
417-444; PH Coetzee & APJ Roux ‗Ludin‘s Kopftuch (headdress): A problem of religious freedom in 
German schools‘ (2004) 69(2) Koers 277 – 315; and M Mahlman ‗Religious Tolerance, Pluralist 
Society and the Neutrality of the State: The Federal Constitutional Court‘s Decision in the Headscarf 
case‘ (2003) 4 German Law Journal 1099; A von Campenhausen ‗The German Headscarf‘ (2004) 
Brigham Young University Law Review 655; O Gerstenberg Germany: Freedom of Conscience in 
Public Schools (2003) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 94. 
199
 C Koch ‗Classroom Crucifixes, Teacher Headscarves, Faith Healers and More-The German 
Experience of Religious Freedom Under a Bill of Rights‘. 
Available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1521307> last accessed on 23 
September 2010. 
200
 D Grimm ‗Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence‘ (2007) 57 (2) 
University of Toronto Law Journal 383, 385. 
201
Ibid. 
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neutrality.
202
  Second, the display of the headscarf could challenge integration and 
influence the impressionable young students to conform to Islam. 
 
Ms Ludin appealed this decision through three levels of the German administrative 
courts: from the administrative court in Stuttgart
203
 to the administrative court of 
Baden-Württemberg
204
 to the Federal Administrative Court
205
 the highest court of 
appeal for administrative law in Germany.  The Federal Administrative Court upheld 
the board of education's denial of employment to Ms Ludin and ruled that teachers are 
representatives of the state and must refrain from openly displaying religious symbols 
in class. Younger students in particular, the court explained, can be easily influenced 
and have yet to learn mutual respect and tolerance for those with different beliefs.
206
  
The right to manifest religious belief was therefore balanced with the rights of school 
children to be free from religious coercion. 
 
After exhausting all remedies in the German administrative court system, Ms Ludin 
launched a constitutional complaint with the German Constitutional Court.
207
  She 
alleged that her right of religious freedom, as enshrined in article 4 of the German 
Basic Law had been violated.  Specifically, she claimed that wearing the headscarf 
was a manifestation of her personally held religious belief.
208
  The Constitutional 
Court overturned the Federal Administrative Court's decision and upheld Ms Ludin's 
                                                          
202
 Staatlichen Neutralitatsgebot. 
203
 (Verwaltungsgericht) of Stuttgart (decision of 24 March 2000). 
204
 (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) of Baden-Württemberg (26 June 2001). 
205
 Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) (4 July 2002). 
206
 Ludin (note 201 above) 8. 
207
 The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). 
208
 In addition to relying on the protection of Article 4 Ms Ludin also claimed that her rights in terms of 
articles 1(1) (human dignity), 2(1) (personal freedoms), 3(1) and (3) (equality before the law), 4(1) and 
(2) (freedom of faith, conscience and creed) and 33(2) and (3) (equal citizenship and equal access to 
civil service employment) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany had been infringed. 
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right to wear a headscarf in the classroom.  The Constitutional Court thereby affirmed 
the importance of the right to manifest religious belief that was considered sufficiently 
important to trump the lesser harm of the possible coercion of school going children. 
 
It is exemplary that the Constitutional Court confirmed that the headscarf cannot 
simply be considered as a sign of suppression to women.
209
  In addition the Court also 
confirmed that the religious dress of a teacher does not implicate the neutrality of the 
state, if the state did not instruct the display of such religious dress.
210
  This 
affirmation is in contrast with the decisions of the ECtHR in both the Dahlab v 
Switzerland
211
 and Sahin v Turkey.
212
 
 
The reasoning of Constitutional Court was that in the absence of a generally applicable 
law a teacher could not be refused public office for displaying a religious symbol.
213
  
The majority further held that there may however be good reasons for a stricter 
interpretation of the neutrality principle, as a result of the increased religious pluralism 
in German society and the possibility for conflict at schools.
214
  Consequently, 
although the majority judgment permitted the wearing of the Islamic headscarf, this 
decision was based on the lack of sufficiently clear legislation regulating the wear of 
religious symbols.  As a result of the decision in Ludin, the legislature of Baden-
Württemberg enacted a statute providing for such a regulation.
215
  The law provides 
that: 
                                                          
209
 Ludin (note 201 above) 50. 
210
 Ludin (note 201 above) 54. 
211
 Dahlab (note 5 above).  See section 6.3.1 
212
 See Sahin as discussed in section 5.3.2.1. 
213
 Held by five of the eight judges in its second chamber (Senat). 
214
 Ludin (note 201 above) 64. 
215
 Five German Länder have adopted laws that prohibit Islamic symbols but specifically permit 
Christian ones in the public schools (Baden-Württemberg, Saarland, Hesse, Bavaria, and North Rhine-
Westphalia) see Universität Trier: Kopftuch, <http://www.uni-trier.de/index.php?id=24373> last 
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Teachers at public schools ... are not allowed to exercise political, religious, 
ideological or similar manifestations that may endanger or disturb the neutrality of the 
country towards pupils or parents or the political, religious or ideological peace of the 
school.
216
 
 
In terms of the regulation a nun's habit was considered to constitute ‗work attire‘.  
Hence Muslim teachers were banned from wearing a headscarf while nuns continued 
to wear habits while teaching in public schools.  Muslim public school teachers 
wearing religious symbols were therefore treated differently from otherwise equally-
situated Christian public school teachers, who wear religious symbols and clothing.
217
  
As a result a Muslim public school teacher who had been asked to remove her 
headscarf filed a complaint on the grounds of discrimination.
218
  The court agreed that 
certain religious persuasions could not be afforded preferential treatment, and that 
Baden-Württemberg had to either apply the law equally to all or not at all.
219
  
Consequently a reprieve exists for the display of religious symbols in public schools as 
long as there are nuns who teach.
220
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
accessed 5 May 2010.  All of these laws (with the exemption of Saarland) have been tested in courts, 
with the result that the ban over outlandish, but not Christian symbols has consistently been upheld. 
216
 Gesetz zur Anderung des Schulgesetzes Baden-Württembergs [Act Amending the School Code of 
Baden-Württemberg], April 1, 2004, Baden Württemberg GBl. S. 178, Nr. 6 (F.R.G.).  Available at 
<http://www.uni-trier.de/ievr/kopftuch/GesetzBadenWuerttemberg01042004.htm> 
(German),<http://www.uni-trier.de/ievr/eng/kopftuch.htm> (abridged English) last accessed on 10 May 
2010. 
217
 Fogel (note 201 above) 642. 
218
 BVerwGE [Federal Administrative Court], June 24, 2004, 2 C 45.03 (F.R.G.).  Available at 
<http://www.bverwg.de/media/archive/2282.pdf> last accessed on 10 May 2010. 
219
 Ibid. 
220
 See D Hipp ‗Koptfuch-Urteil: Nonnen retten den Islam‘ [Headscarf Decision: Nuns Rescue 
Islam],Spiegel Online 8 July 2006. 
Available at <http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/schule/0,1518,425678,00.html> last accessed on 10 
May 2010. 
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This decision is illustrative of the historical commitment that some of the German 
federal states have to Christianity.  The ex lege separation between state and religion 
therefore in no manner corresponds with a de facto neutrality of the state towards 
religion.  The majority and dominant faith clearly enjoys benefits that minority faiths 
do not share.   This line of reasoning is supported by Bhandar who argues that culture 
is strongly associated with religious belief.  Therefore the principle (or culture) of 
neutrality, in Germany is tied with German identity, embodied in cultural and religious 
identity.
221
  As a result, neutrality too is tied to Christian culture. 
 
7.5 United States of America 
 
The relationship between the state and religion in the USA, as in France, has been 
shaped by history.
222
  The uprising against the British resulted in the USA‘s 
Declaration of Independence (1776) and the first Constitution (1787), as well as Bill 
of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution.
223
  Thomas Jefferson made use 
of the dictates of natural law as a basis for dissolving the political ties with Britain in 
writing the Declaration.
224
  The supremacy of the Constitution as well as the ten 
                                                          
221
 Bhandar (note 93 above) 324. 
222
 See generally RM Doshi ‗Nonincorporation of the Establishment Clause: Satisfying the Demands of 
Equality, Pluralism and Originalism‘ (2010) 98 Georgetown Law Journal 459. 
223
 The Bill of Rights refers to the twelve amendments submitted by Congress to the states of which ten 
were ratified by the states in September 1789.  See generally CH Esbeck ‗Differentiating the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses‘ (2000) 42(2) Journal of Church and State 311. 
224
 ‗The right to life, liberty, and property as celebrated by John Locke formed the foundation of the 
American Declaration of Independence, the English Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of 
Rights. In this regard see D Davis ‗The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: 
Examining the Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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constitutional amendments was emphasised in the matter of Marbury v Madison.
225
  
The legal system in the USA has a federal tradition in terms of which the power to 
make and apply law is shared between the central (federal) and local (state) 
government.
226
 
 
7.5.1 The relationship between the state and religion  
 
The most important religious guarantee is contained in the First Amendment to the 
USA Constitution.  The First Amendment, drafted in 1789 and ratified in 1791, 
provides that: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. 
This provision contains two distinct, yet interrelated provisions.
227
  Firstly, there is the 
prohibition of the ‗establishment of religion‘.228  Secondly, there is the warranty of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief‘ (2002) Brigham Young University Law 
Review 217, 221.  See also Declaration of Independence 1776‘ available at  
<http://www.solarnavigator.net/history/declaration_of_independence.htm> last accessed on 23 October 
2010.  See also R Charlow ‗The Elusive Meaning of Religious Equality‘ (2006) 83(5) Washington 
University Law Review 1, 29-30. 
225
 Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
226‗American Legal Tradition.‘ Available at  
<http://faculty.ucc.edu/egh-damerow/american_legal_tradition.htm> last accessed on 20 October 2010. 
227
 In this regard see generally MA Graber ‗Our Paradoxical Religion Clauses‘ (2009) 69 Maryland 
Law Review 1. 
228
 Regarding ways in which a specific religion can be established Monsma indicated that one can think 
of spoken prayers or Bible readings in public schools; public displays of the Ten Commandments; 
religious symbols such as a cross, nativity scene, or menorah in a public park; prayers at the start of 
legislative sessions; religious mottoes on coins or on city or state seals; and prayers at commencement 
exercises or at high school football games.  In this regard see SV Monsma Church-State Relations in 
Crisis, Debating Neutrality (2002) 262. 
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‗free exercise‘ of religion.  The phrase ‗establishment of religion‘ appears to be clear, 
however the phrase ‗disestablishment‘ can be used to describe either separationism,229 
or neutrality,
230
 or accommodationist.
231
  From these ways of application the following 
interpretations of the phrase disestablishment have all enjoyed support:  First, as a 
means of preventing government from interfering with religious doctrine.  Second, 
aimed at preventing government from offering preferential treatment to certain 
religions.  Third, intended to prevent government from prescribing obligatory forms of 
religious belief.
232
 
                                                          
229
 Chemerinsky explains that strict separation requires that to the greatest extent possible the religion 
and state should be separated.  Government should be secular and religion should be relegated to the 
private realm.  This interpretation is argued to be supported by Thomas Jefferson‘s ‗wall of separation 
between church and state‘.  The separationist provision has primarily been contested in matters 
concerned with public school education, amongst others aspect related to the following issues:  
Participation in daily school prayers, teaching creation theory as well as the utilisation of public spaces 
for religious displays, such as nativity crèche scenes.  See generally Chemerinsky (note 39 above). 
230
 Chemerinsky calls it the ‗neutrality‘ approach‘ because he is of the opinion that the other approaches 
are not neutral at all.  For example the ‗the role of God in our Nation's heritage‘ is recognised in Van 
Orden v Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687.  See also Lee v Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (quoting County of Allegheny v ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,657 (1989), in which he recognised 
that the establishment clause must be construed in light of the ‗[g]overnment policies of 
accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion [that] are an accepted part of our political 
and cultural heritage‘.  See generally Chemerinsky, (note 39 above). 
231
 Chemerinsky identifies a third competing vision, quite different from the first two, is called the 
accommodationist perspective. This view says argues that both religion and government should be 
accommodated, and therefore accommodates government support for religion. This approach says that 
the government violates the establishment clause only if it literally establishes a church or coerces 
religious participation.  See generally Chemerinsky (note 39 above). 
232
 Chemerinsky argues that there are three competing conceptions of non-establishment among the 
Justices, see generally Chemerinsky (note 39 above).  See also J Witte & CM Green ‗The American 
Constitutional Experiment in Religious Human Rights: The Perennial Search for Principles‘ in  JD van 
der Vyver & J Witte (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 
497 - 558, 528-9. 
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The USA Supreme Court has used various tests to determine whether government 
action violates the establishment clause, including the Lemon test,
233
 the endorsement 
test,
234
 the coercion test,
235
 and the neutrality test.
236
  If the government measures do 
not satisfy a particular test used by the court in any given case, it violates the 
establishment clause.
237
  Justice O‘ Connor in a concurring opinion noted that when 
                                                          
233
 Lemon v Kurtman 403 U.S. 602, 612-13(1971) in which case it was stated that there are three tests 
that can be gleaned from the Supreme Court establishment jurisprudence: ‗[F]irst the State must have a 
secular legislative purpose; second, its principle of primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion, (citing Board of Education v Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)); finally , the statute 
must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion,‘ (citing Walz v Tax Commissioner  
of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
234
 County of Allegheny v ACLU , 492 U.S 573, 593 (1989) in which case endorsement was defined as 
being closely linked to promotion and stating that the endorsement test examines whether the 
government is promoting one religion over another.  The endorsement test replaced the excessive 
entanglement test.  The endorsement test precludes government from conveying or attempting to 
convey that religion or a particular religion is favoured or preferred. 
235
 Lee v Weisman (see note 230).  In the matter of Lee the majority of the court held that a subtle 
coercive pressure is exercised on people to stand during the recital of a graduation prayer.  The coercion 
test holds that ‗at a minimum  ... government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in a 
religion or its exercise.  From this judgment it is clear that the interpretation of the establishment clause 
is largely about protecting non-adherents form public manifestation of religion that may indicate their 
non-belief.  In this regard see RL Shaw ‗The Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion‘ 
(2004) 83(1) Oregon Law Review 1, 20. 
236
 Mitchell v Helms 530 U.S. 793,809 (2000).  The court held that if all (religious, irreligious and a-
religious belief) were eligible for government aid, then no one would conclude that any preference was 
shown to any of the beliefs. 
237
 In American jurisprudence multiple tests are available in terms of which the appropriateness of 
government action regarding religion is assessed and for balancing competing claims between 
establishment and free exercise.  Consequently, the definition of what is meant by establishing a 
religion has become fluid.  Examples of the fluidity of the meaning of non-establishment is apparent 
from the following contradicting decisions.  For example in Lynch v Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675, 104 
S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) the court held a nativity Crèche in a city park did not violate the 
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government endorses a particular religious activity it ‗sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, … and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favoured members of the political community‘.238 
 
It has been suggested that the principal aim of the non-establishment clause was to 
grant religious rights to all religions synonymous with Protestant Christianity.
239
  
Protestantism therefore surpassed Catholicism, Judaism and indigenous faiths despite 
guarantees of equal protection.  Religious inequality remains prevalent and the 
religious rights of Jews, Mormons and American Indians are often disregarded;
240
 this 
disregard is aptly articulated by Blackmun J: 
When the government puts its imprimatur on a particular religion, it conveys a 
message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to the favored beliefs.  A 
government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it 
asserts that God prefers some.
241
 
 
However, in general, none of the drafters to the First Amendment intended to preclude 
religion totally from the public domain.
242
  The intention was to separate church from 
state and in so doing to protect the individual‘s right to freedom of religion.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                       
establishment clause.  On the other hand, in McCreary County v American Civil Liberties Union, 125 
S.Ct. 2722 (2005) the court held that a display of Ten Commandments in Texas court did violate the 
establishment clause.  The Court emphasised that reference to sacred texts on public property would not 
always violate the establishment clause.  In Van Orden v Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (2005) the court held 
that a monument with Ten Commandments on the Texas state state grounds did not violate the 
establishment clause.  Therefore neutrality means that government cannot favour one religion over 
another but also should not favour non-religion over religion. 
238
 Lynch v Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984), 688 (O‘Connor J 
concurring). 
239
 J Witte & CM Green (note 232 above) 514. 
240
 See generally LH Fuchs The American Kaleidescope: Race, Ethnicity and the Civic Culture (1990). 
241
 Lee v Weismen, 505 U S 577, 606 -07 (1992) (Blackmun J concurring). 
242
 J Witte & CM Green (note 232) 526. 
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establishment clause and the free exercise clause are indeed intended to support each 
other in ensuring that religion is neither favoured nor disfavoured.
243
  Accordingly, no 
conflict exists between the free exercise clause and disestablishment clause as a right 
to free exercise of religion exists, but organs of the state may not assist.
244
  The 
reasoning behind this disestablishment is that if the state endorses a specific religion it 
creates a sense of symbolic affirmation of a particular religion often at the cost of 
religious minorities.
245
 
 
As the emphasis is on the right to manifest religious belief, the above discussion of the 
establishment provisions is considered sufficient.  The free exercise provision in 
relation to the manifestation of religious belief is analysed next. 
 
7.5.2 Free exercise of religion 
 
The right to free exercise of religion includes the right to manifest one‘s religion in 
accordance with that belief and includes types of conduct associated with religious 
activity, such as worship, teaching, practice and observance.  For example, the right to 
practice enables the religious believer to act in accordance with the dictates of her own 
belief.  Over the last 30 years the level of scrutiny in terms of which an infringement 
on the right to manifest religious belief has been subjected to has altered drastically.  
First the required test was the compelling state interest test, over time this test was 
replaced with a reasonableness test.  Even more recently the level of scrutiny has even 
been reduced even further in that a neutral generally applicable rule is not considered 
                                                          
243
 TA Uddin ‗Evolution towards Neutrality: Evolution disclaimers, Establishment Jurisprudence 
Confusions, and a Proposal of Untainted Fruits of a Poisonous Tree‘ (2007) Spring Rutgers Journal of 
Law & Religion 1, 7. 
244
 L Douglas ‗Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty‘ (1992) 60 (3) George. 
Washington Law Review 841, 843. 
245
 Ibid 844. 
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as an infringement on the right to freedom of religion.  A brief evaluation of these 
three tests follows next. 
 
Compelling state interest test 
 
In Sherbert v Verner
246
 the USA Supreme Court held that the states action forced 
Sherbert to either abandon her religious principles in order to work on Saturdays, 
which as a Seventh - day Adventist she refused, or alternatively to be dismissed.  On 
the grounds that she refused to accept available work and accordingly be denied 
unemployment compensation.  Justice Brennan writing on behalf of the majority held 
that ‗[g]overnment imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden on the 
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed on the appellant for her Saturday 
worship‘.247 
 
For the government to justify its denial it would have to show that there was no 
alternative form of regulation available to prevent fraudulent unemployment claims 
without infringing on the First Amendment right.  Accordingly, the individual must be 
accommodated unless the state can show that a compelling state interest exists and that 
no less restrictive alternative is available. 
 
The Supreme Court in Sherbert designed a free exercise constitutional test along the 
following criteria:  First, the policy or law must serve a compelling state interest.  
Second, the policy or law must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest with the 
least possible intrusion on free exercise rights.  Third, it must be non-discriminatory 
against religion and lastly, non-discriminatory against religion in its application.  This 
test was later called ‗the compelling state interest test‘.248 
                                                          
246
 Sherbert v Verner 374 US 398, 404 (1963). 
247
 Ibid. 
248
 J Witte & CM Green (note 232 above) 539. 
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The application the compelling state interest test even allowed Amish parents to be 
exempted from compliance with compulsory school attendance to preserve their 
attitudes towards life and family.
249
  Following the principles laid down in the 
Sherbert case the Supreme Court in Winconsin v Yoder
250
 defended the right of Old 
Order Amish parents to protect their children from the imposition of values contrary to 
their traditional Amish beliefs while attending school. 
 
Reasonableness test 
 
The extensive protection of the right to freedom of religion was brought to an abrupt 
end in Goldman v Weinberger,
251
 where the court held that the First Amendment does 
not prohibit the Air Force from disallowing a rabbi serving as a clinical psychologist 
in a USA Air Force hospital, from wearing his yarmulke as part of his military 
uniform.  The significance of uniformity in the military may also burden the rights of 
religious believers to manifest their religious belief within the confines of military 
service.
252
  The need to accommodate such diverse religious practice was rejected by a 
narrow majority
253
 of the Supreme Court, which held that ‗[t]he First Amendment 
does not require the military to accommodate such practices in the face of its view that 
they would detract from the uniformity sought by the dress regulation‘.254 
                                                          
249
 Wisconsin v Yoder 406 U S 205 (1972). 
250
 Ibid. 
251
 Goldman v Weinberger 475 U S 503 (1986).  See generally LS Sheleff ‗Rabbi Captain Goldman‘s 
Yarmulke, Freedom of Religion and Conscience, and Civil (Military) Disobedience‘ (1987) Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights 17. 
252
 A further area in which the military may burden the right to freedom of religion is military 
conscription.  In this regard the CH Heyns A Jurisprudential Analysis of Civil Disobedience in South 
Africa LLD Thesis University of the Witwatersrand (1991). 
253
 Five for the majority and four for the minority. 
254
 Goldman v Weinberger (note 251 above) 509-10. 
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No inquiry was made into whether a compelling state interest was served by a 
narrowly tailored rule that made the least possible intrusion on the right to freedom of 
religion, as required in the Shebert case.  The court simply asked if a duty to 
accommodate existed.  Through this interpretation the compelling state interest test 
was replaced with a reasonableness test.  The proportionality of a narrowly tailored 
intrusion was no longer evaluated. 
 
The reasonableness test was also applied in the matter of Lyng v Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Association.
255
  In Lyng the court recognised that the building of 
a road through a sacred site used for centuries by American Indians, would have 
severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion.
256
  Nevertheless the court 
permitted and defended this action of the USA Forest Services as follows: 
The crucial word in the constitutional text is ‗prohibit‘. ... However much we wish it 
otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every 
citizen‘s religious needs and desires.257 
 
Apparently neutral and generally applicable rule test 
 
The limiting effect of the reasonableness test on the right to freely exercise religious 
belief was further entrenched in the even more narrow free exercise test set up in 
Oregon Department of Human Resources v Smith.
258
  Smith, an American Indian, who 
occasionally ingested peyote as part of a sacramental rite, was dismissed because of 
                                                          
255
 Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association 485 U S 439 (1988). 
256
 Ibid. 
257
 Ibid O‘Connor J, 451. 
258
 Oregon Department of Human Resources v Smith 494 U S 872 (1990) (Smith). 
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this practice.  His application for unemployment compensation was denied on the 
ground that taking peyote
259
 was a criminal activity. 
 
In a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court reasoned that free exercise was no 
longer a defence to neutral, generally applicable government actions.  It was further 
held that the prohibition was not solely directed at the religious practice, but 
incidentally forbade an act that religion required.  Consequently the free exercise 
clause confers no constitutional protection where government action is considered 
neutral and generally applicable.
 260
  Therefore the act of criminalising is not subject to 
scrutiny on the grounds of a religious right, as the state does not have to defend its 
ban. 
 
Scalia J expressed in the leading judgment the concern that to find otherwise would 
create ‗a private right to ignore generally applicable laws‘.  Scalia J understands that 
such a system will disfavour minority religions that do not have the means to influence 
the legislative process, but he believes that is the price to pay if we want to avoid 
anarchy.  Accordingly a neutral law of general application will prevail, regardless of 
the nature of the state‘s interest or the nature of the interest of the religious believer.261  
Smith indicates a near total loss of the constitutional protection of the right to freedom 
of religion and in particular the right to manifest religious belief.. 
 
It has been argued that the Smith decision appears to be in conflict with the 
requirement that the state shall not interfere in the religious life of individuals, as the 
Smith decision authorises the state to dominate minority religious groups, and to 
                                                          
259
 Peyote is a natural hallucinogenic that is taken by eating part of a cactus plant. 
260
 Smith (note 258 above) Scalia J, 879. 
261
 The negative impact of the Smith case would have been reduced in terms of the provisions of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act  1993 Pub L No 103 -141 (Nov 16 1993), 107 Stat. 1488, codified 
at 42 U S C A 2000bb to 2000-4 (Supp. V 1993). 
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deprive them of their capacity to exercise their faith freely.
262
  The significance of 
Smith was that a limitation of the First Amendment right to freedom of religion could 
be imposed without any justification.  In response Congress passed the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Amendments Act (1994) in terms of which it is permissible 
to create religious exemptions.
263
 
 
The Act does not protect the use of cannabis by Rastafarians.  The question as to 
whether the distinction between the two communities constitutes unconstitutional 
religious discrimination, was previously considered in the case of State v McBride.
264
  
The court distinguished between the two communities on the following three grounds; 
firstly, peyote was used in limited quantities and during specific ceremonies only; 
secondly, the abuse of peyote was far less common than the abuse of cannabis; and 
lastly, the USA had a special duty to respect the cultural integrity of Native 
Americans, and found the discrimination justified.
265
 
 
In addition, the USA Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA)
266
 which required state and federal governments to justify burdens on the free 
                                                          
262
 In this regard see generally L Douglas ‗The Many Meanings of Separation‘ (2003) 70 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1701. 
263
 Regarding the protection of Indian religious beliefs, including long hair and braids – see generally J 
Dalton ‗There is nothing light about Feathers: Finding Form in the Jurisprudence of Native American 
Religious Exemptions‘ (2005) Brigham Young University Law Review 1575. 
264
 State v McBride 955 P 2d 133 (Kan Ct App (1998)). 
265
BC Taylor ‗Kansas Denies Religion-Based Defense to Rastafarians on Marijuana Charges.‘(1998) 38 
Washburn Law Journal 307. 
266
 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 USC.  The USA congress also passed the 
International Religious Freedom Act in 1998 in an attempt to protect against international religious 
persecutions.  The Act directs the State Department to prepare annual reports assessing and describing 
violations of religious freedom in each country.  They then evaluate the suggestions brought forward by 
the USA Commission on International Religious Freedom and of an Ambassador at Large for 
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exercise of religion by demonstrating that the restriction serves a compelling 
governmental interest in the least restrictive means possible.  In the matter of City of 
Boerne v Flores
267
 the USA Supreme Court held that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act only applied to federal institutions, as Congress did not have the 
capacity to bind the states in such a manner.
268
  The RFRA however made an 
exemption possible for members of the Christian Spiritists who wished to import 
hoasca, a tea containing a federally proscribed hallucinogen, which, it claimed, 
facilitated communion. The Supreme Court dismissed the federal Government‘s 
submission that no exemption could be granted to accommodate the sect‘s sacramental 
use of hoasca. The Court held that the government‘s failure to grant an exemption to 
the claimants was inconsistent with their rights under the RFRA.
269
 
 
Native Americans are not the only group whose religious and cultural rights have been 
restricted.  The ritual sacrifice of small animals by the Santeria minority in South 
Florida at its worship services, (a practice of over four thousand years), has been 
                                                                                                                                                                       
International Religious Freedom, against which countries the USA president is then capable of 
imposing penalties as well as sanctions on countries found to be restricting freedom of religion based on 
the report.  In this regard see generally Davis (note 224 above) 233.  For an critical evaluation of the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 see PG ‗US Unilateralism and the International Protection 
of Religious Freedom:  The Multilateral Alternative‘ Danchin (2002) 41 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 33. 
267
 City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 506 (1997). 
268
 For a comprehensive overview of the implementation of religious freedom in USA prisons see 
generally L Boothby ‗Protecting of Freedom of Religion in Restricted or Institutional Settings‘ in T 
Lindholm, WC Durham & BG Tahzib-Lie (eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A 
Deskbook (2004) 407. 
269
 US Supreme Court decision, Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 
1211 (2006). 
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banned by ordinance.
270
  In the case of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of 
Haileah
271
 the Supreme Court while applying the Smith test, nevertheless held a city 
ordinance, that subjected followers of the Santerian faith who engaged in the ritual 
slaughter of animals subject to criminal punishment, unconstitutional, as it was neither 
of general application nor neutrally applied.  Therefore as a particular religion was 
being singled out for adverse treatment, the free exercise clause did in this instance 
provide protection. 
 
In the final instance the applicable test to determine the justifiability of an 
infringement on the right to manifest religious belief is the test applied in Smith.  
Namely that an apparently neutral and generally applicable rule will not be considered 
to constitute an unjustified infringement on the right to manifest religious belief. 
 
7.6 Canada 
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian Charter)
272
 is a bill of rights 
entrenched in the Constitution Act of 1982, and guarantees political and civil rights of 
the people in Canada. 
 
                                                          
270
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (S.D. Fla. 1989), 
afl'dmem., 936 F.2d 586 (11 th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, No. 91-948, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1707 (U.S. 
Mar. 23, 1992). 
271
 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Haileah 508 US 520 - Supreme Court, 1993. 
272
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c 11. 
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7.6.1 Relationship between state and religion
273
 
 
Unlike the USA or France, where the relationship between the state and religion is 
prescribed in the Constitutional text, the Canadian Charter contains no explicit limit on 
government support for religion. Stephenson goes so far as to argue that ‗nothing in 
the Charter nor Canadian jurisprudence prohibits the advancement of religion per se 
by the state‘.274 
 
Judges have however often held that state endorsement of one religion is an 
infringement of the right to freedom of religion and have argued that state sponsorship 
of one tradition discriminates against others.  Endorsement is said to create an 
advantage for the dominant religion as well as to impose pressure on minorities to 
comply with the dominant belief.  A case that aptly describes the advantage of state 
endorsement for the dominant religion is the matter of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd.
275
  In 
Big M Drug Mart case the Supreme Court was asked to decide upon the 
constitutionality of Sunday closing laws.  As a result, the Lord‘s Day Act of 1906 that 
prohibited most commercial activity on Sundays was overturned by the Court.  The 
Court held that the right to freedom of religion
276
 was violated as the state was 
imposing a religious viewpoint on those who held different beliefs and therefore 
                                                          
273
 For a more detailed history of the relation between church and state in Canada see generally IT 
Benson ‗The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada: Challenges and Opportunities‘ (2007) 21 
(1) Emory International Law Review 113. 
274
 Stephenson (note 42 above) 95. 
275
 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Big M Drug Mart).  Regarding the Big M Drug Mart 
case see generally DM Brown ‗Freedom from or Freedom for?  Religion as a Case Study in Defining 
the Content of Charter Rights‘ (2000) 33 University of British Columbia Law Review. 98.  See also J 
Patrick ‗Church, State and Charter Canada‘s hidden establishment clause‘ (2006) 14 Tulsa Journal of 
Comparative & International Law 27. 
276
 Section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter guarantees in that: ‗Everyone has … freedom of thought, 
conscience and belief‘. 
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violating the essence of the concept of freedom of religion which is 
277
 ‗the right to 
entertain such religious belief as a person chooses, [and] the right to declare religious 
belief openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal‘.278 
 
In the matter of Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education 
279
 the anti-establishment 
principle was extended to public schools in relation to the reading of scripture and 
prayer at the opening or closing of each public school day.  The court held that 
compelling students to choose not to participate marked them as outsiders and violates 
their right to be free from participation in religious practices.
280
 
 
7.6.2 Constitutional protection of the right to freedom of religion 
 
The right to freedom of religion is protected in several Canadian Charter provisions.
281
  
The Canadian Charter in section 2(a) guarantees that: ‗[e]veryone has … freedom of 
thought, conscience and belief.
 282
 
 
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex age or mental disability.
283
  Section 27 
                                                          
277
 Big M Drug Mart Ltd.; R.B. v Children‟s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315; 
Brown (note 275 above) 98-103. 
278
 Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (note 275 above) 336-37. 
279
 Zylberburg v Sudbury Board of Education [1988] 52 D.L.R. (4th) 577. 
280
 Ibid 588-89. 
281
 For a more comprehensive overview of the provisions of the Canadian Charter protecting the right to 
freedom of religion see generally Smithey (note 43 above) 85. 
282
 On freedom of religion in Canada see generally R Moon ‗Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: 
Religious Freedom Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms‘ (2003) 41(3) Brandeis Law 
Journal 562. 
283
 Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter states that: ‗Every individual is equal before and under the 
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
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emphasises multiculturalism and declares that the Canadian Charter ‗shall be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians‘.284  Section 27 suggests that religion is included 
in culture and that the Canadian Charter is aimed at protecting all cultures.  The 
Canadian Charter hence acknowledged that the individual holder of rights has a 
composite inherited and acquired identity, which the state must respect.
285
  From the 
inclusion of section 27, it is apparent that the Canadian Charter was specifically 
designed to accommodate ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity.
286
 
 
7.6.3 Definition of religion as a personal and private autonomous choice 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability.  In addition to the role played by the Canadian Charter provisions of the 
Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S., 1985, c. H-6 ) aimed at the elimination of discriminatory practices 
are also relevant.  The purpose of the act is outlined in Section 2(a) which provides: ‗every individual 
should have an equal opportunity with other individuals to make for himself or herself the life that he or 
she is able and wishes to have, consistent with his or her duties and obligations as a member of society, 
without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, 
disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted‘. 
284
 Section 27 of the Canadian Charter declares that the Charter ‗shall be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.‘ 
285
 In this regard see generally L Weinrib ‗Canada‘s Charter: Rights Protection in a Cultural Mosaic.‘ 
(1996) 4 Cardoza Journal of International and Comparative Law 395. 
286
 For this reason South Africa has relied heavily on the Canadian Charter‘s features in drafting its 
Constitution as to benefit by the combination of guarantees of rights and the provision of a general 
limitation clause. 
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It is suggested that through the interpretation of the courts, religion has been moulded 
in a particular fashion.
287
  This suggestion is based on the manner in which the court 
defined religion in the Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem
288
 case as follows: 
Defined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of 
faith and worship. Religion also tends to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or 
controlling power. In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal 
convictions or beliefs connected to an individual's spiritual faith and integrally linked 
to one's self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow 
individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that 
spiritual faith.
289
 
 
From this definition, religion is perceived as comprising of the following elements: 
first, religion is essentially individual; second, religion is directed towards autonomous 
choice; and lastly, religion is a private concern.  Religion is therefore a personal and 
private matter and not a community or cultural experience.
290
 
 
This definition of religion as purely an autonomous choice does not adequately reflect 
the cultural and identity aspect of religion.
291
  This non-recognition of the cultural 
element of religion has further implications for the role of religion in the public 
sphere.  This divide of religion as a private choice fails to acknowledge the cultural 
significance of religion.  Therefore in applying this definition of religion as an 
essentially private choice, the courts are not acknowledging the cultural and public 
demands of religion.  Berger further contends that this inadequate interpretation of 
                                                          
287
 BL Berger ‗Law‘s Religion: Rendering Culture‘ (2007) 45 (2) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 277. 
288
 Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem (2005) 29 S.C.L.R.  In the matter of Amselem the right of Orthodox 
Jews to build succahs on their balconies was affirmed. The religious freedom took preference over the 
condominium agreement that prohibited decorations and constructions on balconies. 
289
 Ibid 39. 
290
 Ibid 32. 
291
 See generally Berger (note 287 above). 
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religion has failed to appreciate religion as a culture and has failed to accommodate 
the cultural claims of religion.
292
 
 
Following a similar line of reasoning, Benson claims that religious belief should be 
afforded relevance in the public domain.
293
  Secular Canada should accordingly be 
understood to be religiously inclusive rather than exclusive.  Benson further claims 
that this role for religion should be structured according to the principle of cooperation 
between religion and the state, in which both the state, as well as religion have 
separate roles.  Cooperation will recognise the public dimension of religion in 
important areas such as education and health care.
294
 
 
7.6.4 Application of the right  
 
The right to freedom of religion is not absolute and may be subject to ‗such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society‘.295  Courts have the responsibility to balance certain competing claims.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada has established a test for the application of section 1.  This 
test requires that a limiting law must have a sufficiently important governmental 
                                                          
292
 Ibid. 
293
 IT Benson ‗Taking a Fresh Look at Religion and Public Policy in Canada : The Need for a Paradigm 
Shift‘  (2008) This background paper was commissioned by the Federal Government of Canada‘s 
Policy Research Initiative for a broader study of multi-culturalism. 
294
Ibid. 
295
 Section 1 of the Canadian Charter reads: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees 
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
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objective, be rationally connected to that objective and be proportional in its impact on 
rights, given the importance of the legislative objective.
296
 
 
In determining whether a limit meets the criteria, the legislative goal must constitute a 
pressing and substantial concern, and furthermore must be proportionate to the effect.  
Regarding proportionality, the limiting measure must be carefully designed or 
rationally connected to the objective.  Furthermore, the infringement on the right must 
be in proportion to the legislative object and as least infringing as possible. 
 
The general limitation clause contained in section 1 has brought about a two stage 
investigation into a limitation imposed on a Charter right.  In the first stage the 
claimant has to show a right and an infringement of such right.  In the second stage, 
the state has to show that the limitation is ‗prescribed by law‘ and ‗justified in a free 
and democratic society‘. 
 
The Canadian approach towards religion has been to promote multiculturalism 
through the state playing a neutral role in accommodating the diversity of religions.
297
  
In accommodating this diversity the state has to reasonably accommodate the religious 
belief of minorities in an effort to diminish the imposition of the norms of the 
dominant majority faith.
298
 
                                                          
296
 R v Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.  Oakes requires that (1) the infringing measure has an objective of 
sufficient importance to warrant overriding a Canadian Charter right, and (2) the means chosen are 
proportional to the objective. In order to assess the second of these criteria, the court must ensure that 
(a) the means chosen are rationally connected to the objective, (b) the means impair the right as little as 
possible, and (c) there is proportionality between the effects of the infringing measure and the objective. 
A failure to prove any of these elements is fatal to the government‘s justification and the measure will 
be deemed unconstitutional. 
297See generally B Berger ‗The Limits of Belief:  Freedom of Religion, Secularism, and the Liberal 
State.‘ (2002) 17 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 51. 
298
L Barnett (note 35 above) 26. 
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Accommodating diversity  
 
A case in which the accommodation of diversity is appropriately displayed is the 
matter of Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite- Bourgeoys.
299
  Following the 
decision of Multani the kirpan may be worn at schools as the court found that the 
kirpan ban indeed significantly infringed on Gurbaj Singh‘s sincerely held religious 
belief.
300
  The decision in Multani confirms the opportunity of introducing students to 
an understanding of diverse cultures and heritages.
301
  The court noted that: 
                                                          
299
 Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite- Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.) (Multani).  The 
record of the case is as follows:  The Quebec Superior Court Multani (tuteur de) v Commission scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeois, [2002] J.Q. no. 619 (Que. S.C.), 5, Tellier J granted an interim injunction 
permitting Gurbaj to wear his kirpan to school under the conditions imposed.  In May 2002 Grenier J of 
the Quebec Superior Court affirmed Gurbaj‘s right to wear his kirpan to school under strict conditions, 
an acceptable accommodation measure that would render the kirpan inoffensive.  See Multani (tuteur 
de) v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeois, [2002] J.Q. no. 1131 (Que. S.C.) 5, Grenier J.  The 
decision was taken on appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal in Multani v Commission scolaire 
Marguerite-Bourgeoys (2004), 241 D.L.R. (4th) 336 (Que. C.A.), 8, Lemelin J (ad hoc), Pelletier and 
Rochon JJA concurring, allowed the appeal and endorsed the zero tolerance policy on kirpans.  
Following this the Supreme Court overturned the Quebec Court of Appeal‘s ruling.  The majority 
decided the case applying constitutional law principles.  Regarding the case of Multani see generally 
AN Crawford ‗Learning Lessons from Multani: Considering Canada‘s Response Response to Religious 
Garb Issues in Public Schools‘ (2007) 36 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 159. 
300
 The fact that different people practise the same religion in different ways does not affect the validity 
of the case of a person alleging that his or her freedom of religion has been infringed. What an 
individual must do is show that he or she sincerely believes that a certain belief or practice is required 
by his or her religion. The religious belief must be asserted in good faith and must not be fictitious, 
capricious or an artifice. In this regard see Syndicate Northcrest v Amselem (see note 288)). 
301
 In Tuli v St. Albert Protestant Separate School the court found that allowing the kirpan would 
‗provide those who are unfamiliar with the tenet of his faith an opportunity to be introduced to and to 
develop an understanding of another's culture and heritage‘. Tuli v St. Albert Protestant Separate Sch. 
Dist. No. 6 [1985] 8 C.H.R.R. D/3906 (Can.) 3906. 
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[A] total prohibition against wearing a kirpan to school undermines the value of this 
religious symbol and sends students the message that some religious practices do not 
merit the same protection as others.
302
 
 
The court balances the interest at which the ban is aimed at furthering with the 
infringement on the right to manifest religious belief and finds the infringement 
disproportionate.  In addition the court appreciated the need to promote values such as 
multiculturalism, diversity, and tolerance, values that would have been suppressed by 
such an absolute prohibition.  Schools that form part of the educational culture have a 
special duty to seek to develop a culture respectful of the rights of others.  The court 
acknowledged the existence of valid safety concerns but confirmed that banning all 
potential weapons was not realistic as pencils and baseball bats might serve as 
weapons too.
303
  However where safety is a valid concern, for example during air 
travel, the kirpan has been prohibited,
304
 as under these circumstances the 
infringement was not disproportionate to the aim. 
 
Another example of the accommodation of diversity is illustrated by the decision in 
the Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta.
305
  In this matter the government 
of Alberta, in terms of an amending regulation,
306
 required that every individual who 
sought a driver‘s licence had to have a photograph taken.  The aim of this requirement 
was to prevent identity theft, facilitate harmonisation with other provinces and reduce 
terrorism.  Members of the Hutterian Brethen believe that it is a sin to be 
photographed.  The issue for the court to decide was if the requirement could be seen 
                                                          
302
 Multani (note 299 above) 79. 
303
 Multani (note 299 above) 46. 
304
 Nijjar v Canada 3000 Airlines Ltd. [1999] C.H.R.D. No. 3. 
305
 Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta 2007 ABCA 160. 
306
 Alta. Reg. 320/2002, as amended by Operator Licensing and Vehicle Control Amendment 
Regulation, Alta. Reg. 137/2003. 
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as a justified limitation on the Hutterian Brethen religious belief.  The Appeal Court 
confirmed the court a quo‟s decision that drivers‘ license cards are not universal, nor 
are they considered as a form of identification.  Therefore the regulation does not 
serve the objective and the infringement was consequently not justified. 
 
It is clear that the Appeal Court effectively weighs the object that the limitation seeks 
to address with the infringement of the adherent‘s belief.  The limitation must achieve 
the object in the least infringing manner, before it can be considered justifiable.  The 
approach of the court is welcomed in that both the right to freedom of religion, as well 
as the public interest of safety is balanced in a contextual manner. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
A critical assessment of the approaches followed in France, England, Germany, the 
USA and Canada follows next.  In this assessment the manner in which the 
relationship between the state and religion is structured and the impact thereof on the 
right to manifest religious belief is evaluated.  Thereafter, the way in which the 
protection of the right to manifest religious belief has been approached by the various 
courts is evaluated.  This evaluation is conducted so as to inform the South African 
position of best practices.  For this reason an appraisal of commendable attributes in 
the approaches of these five countries is also identified. 
 
7.7.1 Critical assessment 
 
The need for a case by case approach 
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The statutory approach prescribed in terms of the French Law of 2004 denies any 
opportunity to balance conflicting interests of the right to freedom of religion and the 
duty to protect the public order in accordance with the principle of secularism.  In 
following this approach the possibility of the conciliation of conflicting interests is not 
possible and only the values of the principle of secularism are endorsed.  This 
approach fails to appreciate the importance of the right to freedom of religion and that 
religious freedom is an especially sensitive domain in which a flexible and 
comprehensive approach is a better solution.  The balancing process conducted at the 
judicial evaluation of the possible justification of a limitation requires, (even if the 
claim is not accepted by the court), that the existence of the right is acknowledged and 
an attempt is made to reconcile two conflicting claims. 
 
This unfavourable result is also evident even when no statutory regulation exists and 
the courts have a consequently have a duty to scrutinise a limiting provision.  For 
example, the jurisprudence of the UK House of Lords and the decision of the USA 
Court illustrate that the courts did not suitably scrutinise the limiting provisions.  In 
both the Smith
307
 and Begum
308
 cases the court did not adequately balance the right to 
manifest religious belief with the competing interests.  In the matter of Smith the 
existence of a generally applicable, neutral law that was not specifically aimed against 
a particular religious group, was considered by the court not to unjustifiably infringe 
on the right to freely manifest religious belief.  Similarly in the matter of Begum, and 
in the lower court decision of X v Y,
309
 it was argued that the claimant had a choice 
which school she wished to attend, and as a result the infringement was voluntary and 
no further scrutiny of the limiting provision was required.  Further, the court in Begum 
                                                          
307
 Oregon Department of Human Resources v Smith 494 U S 872 (1990) (Smith). 
308
 R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] 
UKHL 15 (Begum). 
309
 R (on the application of X) v Head Teacher and Governors of Y School [2008] 1 All ER 249 (X v Y). 
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regrettably, although not adjudicating as an international body, continued to apply an 
approach similar to the international doctrine of the ‗margin of appreciation‘ and 
deferred to the schooling authorities who the court considered best situated to evaluate 
the appropriateness of uniform requirements.  However this ‗deference‘ did not allow 
the court to scrutinise the proportionality of the limitation in seeking to fulfil a 
legitimate aim as well as furthering a pressing social need. 
 
From the above discussion it can be summarised that the right to freedom of religion is 
most adequately protected if any limitation thereon is scrutinised on a case by case 
basis.  A statutory approach that does not allow for a case by case analysis is therefore 
not in the best interest of the right to manifest religious belief.  In addition when the 
court indeed has a duty to scrutinise limiting provisions, the court ought to consider 
this task with the utmost of consideration.  The voluntary nature of a limitation per se 
should not absolve the court from this analysis.  
 
In addition to the need to adequately scrutinise each limitation, on a case by case basis, 
the following additional factors have been identified which may negatively impact on 
the ultimate protection afforded to the right to manifest religious belief. 
 
The interpretation of the concept citizen and the principle of secularism 
 
In both England and France the need of people of difference to integrate is evident.  
This requirement is more prevalent in France, as the concept of citizenship is based 
upon the Republican values which see all citizens as equal and consequently the law 
does not recognise any differences between citizens.  The French and to a lesser extent 
the English approach is in strong contrast with the approach followed in the USA, 
Canada and South Africa, where the community is perceived as multicultural and in 
which the group and culture is placed before individualism. 
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The manner in which the principle of secularism is interpreted in France is to mean a 
public space void of religious influence and not a space in which all religions are 
accommodated equally.  This interpretation denies the fact that secularism developed 
in response to the excesses of religion and resulting religious conflicts as discussed in 
section 3.3.  Further, this interpretation does not acknowledge that a neutral space 
often bears resemblance to the dictates of the dominant group.  For example, the 
French Law of 2004 implicitly provides for the discrete signs of religious affiliation 
that are prevalent in the Catholic faith.  However, minority religions which prescribe 
the display of religious symbols are directly affected by the ban.  The religious 
affiliation of the dominant group is also evident from the legislation passed in 
Germany subject to the matter of Ludin, in terms of which a nun's habit was 
considered to constitute ‗work attire‘. 
 
The public – private divide 
 
The divide between the public and the private is a further factor that negatively 
impacts on the protection afforded to the right to manifest religious belief.  This divide 
between public and private produces a fragmented consciousness and denies an 
understanding that religion cannot be restricted to the private sphere as it influences 
our view on humanity and on the world as a whole.  In addition this divide does not 
advance the opportunity for Muslim women to participate in the public life.  It is 
suggested that the principles of pluralism as well as respect for the rights of others, the 
right to equality and non-discrimination should endorse the display of the Islamic 
headscarf-hijab in private or public. 
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The impact of these three factors on the right to freedom of religion and in particular 
the right to manifest religious belief are further closely related to the manner in which 
religion is defined. 
 
Definition of religion as an individual, autonomous choice and a private concern 
 
Religion is generally defined as an essentially individual, autonomous choice; and a 
private concern.
310
  This approach towards religion as essentially a private choice does 
not allow for the cultural and public demands of religion to be taken into consideration 
and to be afforded their full value and effect.  It is interesting to observe that religion 
is defined as an individual, autonomous and private choice in both secular societies as 
well as communities in which multiculturalism is advanced, such as the UK.  In this 
regard it is important to remember that the notion of secularism, as well as the notion 
of multiculturalism is embedded in cultural and religious identity.  Accordingly, the 
concept of secularism does not reflect state neutrality towards religion.  In addition the 
concept of a multicultural society is not an indication of a state in which different 
religious or cultural practices coexist.  As both the culture of secularism and the 
culture of multiculturalism is tied up to French or British culture respectively and 
therefore associated with Christian culture. 
 
For example, the House of Lords ‗deferred‘ to the school authorities, who were of the 
opinion that the limitation on the right to wear the jilbab in Begum was necessary to 
preserve pluralism and the cohesion within the Muslim student population.  This 
approach does not reflect how expressions such as the jilbab may indeed enhance 
pluralism.  It is apparent that the stricter interpretation of the Islamic dress as 
representative of a particular point of view in a multicultural society was not valued. 
 
                                                          
310
 See the discussion of the Syndicate Northwest v Amselem (note 288 above). 
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The manner in which the wearing of the Islamic headscarf is interpreted by the 
authorities is closely related to the perceived need for integration and uniformity.  This 
expression for integration and uniformity defines how citizens ought to live and dress 
in the public realm and specifies common values and interests for all citizens.  The 
Islamic headscarf is generally afforded a unilateral meaning in terms of which it has 
been seen as a sign of inequality and oppression.  This one-sided approach is not a true 
reflection of the diversity of meanings that is attached to the headscarf by those who 
wear it. 
 
If indeed the autonomous life choices of Muslim women are of concern this cannot 
adequately be addressed through a ban on the wearing of such dress.  A favourable 
social, economical, cultural, legal and political environment must be created in which 
women are more able to make autonomous choices. 
 
 
7.7.2 Appraisal 
 
From the above discussion, the inadequacies of the regulatory approach of France, the 
failure of the House of Lords and the USA Supreme Court to adequately scrutinise the 
limiting provisions in the decisions of Begum and Smith have been critiqued.  In 
contrast to these shortcomings discussed above, are the commendable decisions of 
Ludin
311
 and Multani.
312
 
 
It is exemplary that the Constitutional Court of Germany in the matter of Ludin 
confirmed that the headscarf cannot unilaterally be considered as a sign of suppression 
                                                          
311
 Ludin v Land Baden-Württemberg Case No 2BvR 1436/02, Judgment of 24 September 2003, 
(Ludin). 
312
 Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite- Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.) (Multani). 
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of women.
313
  In addition the Court also confirmed that the religious dress of a teacher 
does not implicate the neutrality of the state if the state did not instruct the display of 
such religious dress.
314
 
 
From the Canadian jurisprudence it is commendable that the court in Multani does not 
evaluate the manner in which the adherent interprets the obligations of his faith.  The 
court does not question if this is a ‗mainstream‘ interpretation of the requirements of 
the faith, but merely requires that the adherent must sincerely hold this requirement.  
In addition the Canadian jurisprudence does not require that the claimant should show 
that the manifestation is obligatory; voluntary practices are also protected.  The court 
further confirms that to disallow certain practices protection, indicates that these 
religions and practices, as well as their adherents are less deserving of protection in 
that: 
[A] total prohibition against wearing a kirpan to school undermines the value of this 
religious symbol and sends students the message that some religious practices do not 
merit the same protection as others.
315
 
 
It is argued that the approach followed in the cases of Ludin and Multani are more in 
line with the principle of affording the right to manifest religious belief extensive 
protection.  It is imperative that religion is not seen as essentially an individual, 
autonomous and private choice.  The cultural and public demands of religion have to 
be taken into consideration so that religious rights may be afforded their full value and 
effect.  A secular argument of a neutral public space must be appreciated as reflective 
of influence of the culture of Christianity and therefore not neutral at all.  It is only 
with awareness of these considerations that the right to manifest religious belief will 
be afforded true and meaningful protection and development. 
                                                          
313
 Ludin (note 311 above) 50. 
314
 Ludin (note 311 above) 54. 
315
 Multani (note 312 above) 79. 
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Chapter 8 
Legal context and application of the right to freedom of religion: 
South Africa 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The South African Constitution
1
 is the supreme law of South Africa (SA) and any law 
inconsistent with the provisions contained therein is invalid.
2
  Chapter 2 contains a 
Bill of Rights which is the cornerstone of the democracy and enshrines the rights of all 
the people, while affirming the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.
3
  The right to freedom of religion is specifically included as a fundamental 
right of everyone.
4
  In addition, the right to freedom of religion is extensively referred 
to throughout the Constitution.
5
 
                                                          
1
 Constitution of the Republic of SA 1996, which was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 
May 1996 and signed into law on 10 December 1996 (herein after referred to as the Constitution of 
SA). 
2
 Section 2 of the Constitution of SA. 
3
 See section 7(1) of the Constitution of SA provides:  ‗The Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy 
in South Africa.  It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom‘.  The drafting of the SA Constitution was influenced by 
libertarians focusing on individual liberty while egalitarians emphasised equality as the central value.  
The tension between a libertarian and an egalitarian approach is also prevalent in the discourse 
pertaining to the right to freedom of religion and the right to manifest religious beliefs that may be 
limited. 
4
 Section 15 of the Constitution of SA.  On an international level SA is a member of the United Nations 
(UN) and as bound under international law by the Charter of the United Nations, which imposes a duty 
on all states to promote `human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion'.  SA has also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which protects religious human rights in article 18; and the African Charter on Human and 
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In the brief period since the adoption of a constitutional framework a significant body 
of jurisprudence has been advanced by the Constitutional Court regarding this right to 
freedom of religion which will be discussed below.  The Constitutional Court‘s 
religion jurisprudence has been developed, inter alia, in the following cases: Lawrence 
v The State and Another, Negal The State and Another, Solberg v The State and 
Another,
6
 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education,
7
 Prince v 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Peoples' Rights (African Charter), which provides in article 8 that: ‗Freedom of conscience, the 
profession and free practice of religion shall be tolerated. No one may, subject to law and order, be 
submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms‘.  See the discussion in section 4.10. 
5
 See the Preamble of the Constitution of SA as well as section 3 which includes within the linguistic 
rights ‗Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and other languages used for religious purposes, Section 15 which 
guarantees the right to freedom of religion‘, section 16, which contains a general freedom of expression 
clause, does not apply to advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion where it 
constitutes incitement to cause harm.  See also sections 31, 35, 48, 95, 107, 135 and schedule 2 of the 
Constitution of SA. 
6
 Lawrence v The State and Another, Negal The State and Another, Solberg v The State and Another 
1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC) 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) (Lawrence).  This case dealt with religious 
freedom, contained in section 14 of the 1993 Interim Constitution.  The wording of section 14 is similar 
to the wording of section 15 of the Constitution of SA.  The principles regarding section 14 would 
therefore also apply to section 15 of the Constitution of SA.  This matter was an appeal from criminal 
convictions in terms of the Liquor Act.  The Court had to consider whether certain provisions of the 
Liquor Act, 27 of 1989, that prohibit the sale of liquor on Sundays, were unconstitutional in terms of the 
provisions of section 14 of the Interim Constitution.  The majority of the court held that the provisions 
were constitutional. 
7
 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC), 2000 (10) BCLR 
1051 (CC) 6 (Christian Education).  The case dealt with a constitutional challenge to section 10 of the 
South African Schools Act outlawing corporal punishment in schools. The court held that the 
prohibition limited the individual and community rights of Christian parents and therefore constituted 
an infringement of section 15 and 31 of the Constitution of SA.  However in applying a proportionality 
analysis and weighing up various factors in the context of the limitations clause, Sachs J in a unanimous 
decision found the limitation to be justified. 
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President, Cape Law Society, and Others
8
 and MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v 
Pillay.
9
 
 
Prior to the commencement of the Interim Constitution,
10
 SA followed the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty.
11
  Accordingly, the courts were tasked with merely 
                                                          
8
 Prince v President, Cape Law Society, and Others 2001 (2) SA 388 (CC); 2001 (2) BCLR 133 (CC) 
(Prince).  This case questioned the constitutional validity of the prohibition on the use or possession of 
cannabis when its use or possession was inspired by the Rastafarian religion.  The majority held that the 
prohibition restricted the right to freedom of religion but that the limitation was justified.  The judgment 
of the Constitutional Court follows appeals from both the Cape High Court in Prince v President of the 
Law Society, Cape of Good Hope and Others 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C), in which the Cape Town High 
Court dismissed the application of Mr Prince to set aside the decision of the Law Society of the Cape of 
Good Hope.  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the High Court, 
Prince v President, Cape Law Society, and Others 2000 (3) SA 845 (SCA); 2000 (7) BCLR 823 (SCA) 
and finally referred to the Constitutional Court in Prince v President, Cape Law Society, and Others 
2001 (2) SA 388 (CC); 2001 (2) BCLR 133 (CC) in which the court requested further particulars and 
handed the final decision down in Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope. 
2002 (2) SA 794 (CC); 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC).  Subsequent to the decision of the Constitutional 
Court, the matter was taken to the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights.  See Decision of 
African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights; Prince v South Africa African Comm Hum & 
Peoples‘ Rights, Comm No 255/2002; (2004) AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004) who found no violation.  A 
communication was further addressed to the ICCPR Human Rights Committee (Prince v South Africa 
communication no 1474/2006, views adopted on 31 October 2007 CCPR/C/91/D/1474/2006 14 
November 2007).  The committee concluded that the communication was admissible, on the merits it 
ruled that the facts before it did not reveal a breach of articles 18, 26 or 27 of the ICCPR. 
9
 MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) (Pillay).  
The case concerns the place of religious and cultural expression in public schools  A school uniform 
code was challenged in terms of the provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the Equality Act) with regards to the extent of protection afforded to 
cultural and religious rights in the public school setting.  The court found that the school uniform code 
did indeed discriminate against the cultural and religious practices of Sunali Pillay. 
10
 27 April 1994. 
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applying the law and had no power to scrutinise discriminating or restricting 
legislation.  Rights in general, and religious rights in particular, were regulated either 
in terms of legislation or the common law.
12
  Both the common law and statute 
showed a Christian bias.
13
  This Christian bias is still prevalent today and at times may 
impact negatively on the application of the right to religious and cultural practices.  
Therefore an appreciation of the history of religious domination is important in 
understanding the present day approach to the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion in the South African context.  For this reason this chapter will first give a brief 
overview of the history of religious domination in SA.  This will be followed with an 
overview of both the past and current relationship between the state and religion.  It is 
against this background that the application of the right to manifest religious and 
cultural practices will be evaluated. 
 
As suggested above, religion in SA has been entwined with the economic, social, and 
political relations of power that have privileged some, but have excluded many 
others.
14
  The history of Christian dominance commenced during the period of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
11
 Section 34(3) of the Republic of SA Constitution Act 110 of 1983 determined that the courts could 
merely comment on whether the procedural requirements of an act had been met. 
12
 SA‘s common law originated from Roman-Dutch law, and was further influenced by English law as 
well as the jurisprudence of the courts.  For a general overview of religious human rights in SA before 
and shortly after the first democratic elections in 1994 see generally LM du Plessis ‗Religious Human 
Rights in South Africa‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global 
Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 441; see generally LM du Plessis, ‗Religion, Law and State in 
South Africa‘ (1997) 4 European Journal for Church and State Research 221. 
13
 For a detailed overview of the privileged relationship between the state and the Dutch Reformed 
Church in SA see EE Goodsell ‗Constitution, Custom, and Creed: Balancing Human Rights Concerns 
With Cultural And Religious Freedom in Today's South Africa‘ (2007) Brigham Young University Law 
Review 109. 
14
 D Chidester Religions of South Africa (1992) 11. 
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colonialism and was further entrenched through Christian missionary endeavours.
15
  
As a result SA was subjected to comprehensive Christian control.
16
  The domination 
of the Christian Protestant faith in particular brought about many incidents of conflict 
and tension as will be discussed next. 
 
8.2 History of religious domination and conflict 
 
The permanent presence of Christianity in SA can be traced to the arrival of the Dutch 
East India Company in 1652.  The Cape Colony, under the Dutch East India Company 
(1652-1795), prohibited any other religion at the Cape besides the Dutch Reformed – 
Protestant faith.
17
  The period of colonialism was combined with a vigorous Christian 
mission into southern Africa.
18
  During the period of control of the government of the 
Union of SA the Protestant church become particularly powerful.
19
  The history of 
religious conflict in SA therefore is symbolic of, in particular, the domination of the 
Protestant faith.  Examples of discriminatory behaviour against other faiths are 
plentiful and the following incidents serve as a case in point.  Permission to build the 
first Muslim mosque was only granted in 1798.
20
  The recognition of religious 
pluralism was extended when permission was granted to build the first Catholic 
church in 1822,
21
 followed by the first Hindu temple in 1868.
22
  Traditional African 
                                                          
15
 Ibid 13. 
16
 Ibid.  At the same time European Christianity itself became the endorsed worldview in Africa.  In this 
regard see Chidester (note 14 above) 37.  In addition missionary teachings undermined the political 
authority of chiefs and subverted the social order of African societies.  See Chidester (note 14 above) 
44. 
17
 Chidester (see note 14 above) 14. 
18
 Ibid 13. 
19
 Ibid 14. 
20
 Ibid 151. 
21
 Ibid 150 -51. 
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religion too was not left untouched from the influence of Christian domination, as the 
Christian mission became a space for the endorsement of a particular European 
Christian worldview in Africa.
23
  The influence thereof on traditional African religion 
is evident from movements such as the Zion Christian Church.
24
 
 
The bias towards other faiths was also prevalent in the actions of the local authorities.  
For example, in 1856, municipal authorities in Cape Town banned the annual religious 
festival of Khalifa (also known as Ratiep) as ‗dangerous to the law and peace of the 
community‘.25  During the festival Muslim devotees enacted a show that included self-
torture by way of sticking sharp spears or swords through their bodies.  The banning 
of the Khalifa festival initiated a new period of government interference in the 
religious practices of the Islamic community in the Cape.
26
 
 
Sacred burial sites of the Muslim population in Cape Town were also disturbed.  In 
1857 a Bill
27
 was proposed in terms of which burial sites in the city would be removed 
from the control of religious organisations.  Objections of religious groups in the city 
defeated the proposed legislation.  In terms of the Public Health Act of 1883, the Cape 
Town municipality took action to regulate Muslim burials and the ensuing municipal 
closing of a Muslim sacred site resulted in a mass demonstration of protest in January 
1886.
28
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
22
 Ibid 151. 
23
 Ibid 37. 
24
 Ibid 14. 
25
 Ibid 162. 
26
 Ibid 163. 
27
 The Cape Town Cemeteries Bill of 1857. 
28
 Chidester (note 14 above) 164. 
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In addition to disputes regarding acceptable burial rites and festivities, conflict over 
health care was also evident.  These conflicts all were representative of the larger 
difference of opinion between two different religious ways of life.
29
  Healthcare 
measures aimed at combating the epidemics of smallpox were developed by the 
Municipality of Cape Town in the early 1800s.  Measures included vaccinations, 
isolation in hospitals, and sanitation measures.  In particular the need to vaccinate 
caused tension as most Muslims refused to have their bodies pierced by vaccination.
30
 
 
Similar prejudice was also displayed against other religions.  For example, in 1912 a 
South African court ruled that all polygamous marriages, permitted in both Hindu and 
Muslim practice, were illegal in SA.
31
  In 1930 immigration restrictions and quotas 
were imposed on the entry of eastern European Jews.
32
  DF Malan who later became 
Prime Minister of SA declared that: 
Anti-Semitism formed part of an Afrikaner nationalist ideology that promised power 
and purity to a white, Christian, Afrikaans-speaking nation.
33
 
 
                                                          
29
 Ibid. 
30
 See generally A Davids ‗The Revolt of the Malays: A Study of the Reactions of the Cape Muslims to 
the Smallpox Epidemics of the Nineteenth Century Cape Town‘ (1983) 5 Studies in the History of Cape 
Town 55. 
31
 See generally A Kerr ‗Back to the Problems of a Hundred or More Years Ago: Public Policy 
Concerning Contracts Relating to Marriages that are Potentially or Actually Polygamous‘ (1984) 101 
South African Law Journal 445.  Regarding the illegality of Muslim marriages see Esop v Union 
Government (Minister of the Interior) 1913 CPD 133. In which it was stated that: ‗Mariam is in law the 
concubine and not the wife of the applicant‘.  Consequently numerous Indian wives were reduced to 
concubines.  Gandhi interpreted the judgement to imply that all marriages not concluded in terms of 
Christian rites were null and void.  In this regard see generally W le Roux ‗Conscience against the law: 
Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Bram Fischer as practising lawyers during the struggle‘ (2001) 
XXXXII CODICILLVS 36. 
32
 Chidester (note 14 above) 180. 
33
 Ibid. 
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Further examples of prejudice that had an influence on religious diversity include for 
example the Bantu Education Act of 1953, in terms of which education was 
segregated according to racial groups.  The government in an attempt to assume 
greater national control over education
34
 cut state subsidies to the Catholic mission 
schools that at the time were largely responsible for the education of black learners.
35
  
This reduction in spending impacted negatively on the mission undertakings of the 
Roman Catholic faith. 
 
In addition to the domination of the Protestant faith over Islam, Judaism and 
Catholicism, it has been contended that imperial religions and in particular missionary 
or proselytising religions such as Christianity or Islam further violated the communal 
expressions of traditional African religions
36
 and individual conscience of Africans.  
African tradition and religion were subverted and in this manner Africans have been 
deprived of essential elements of the humanity.
37
  This paternalistic approach deemed, 
for example, African dances, marriage ceremonies and actions of worship as 
incompatible with Christianity.  Through a process of continued acculturation African 
religions have in many instances suffered harm or destruction.
38
 
 
                                                          
34
 Ibid 157-8. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 This paternalistic approach was not only directed towards African religions but targeted in the field of 
medicine, politics and economics.  MW Mutua ‗Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing 
Religious Freedom in the African Context‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human 
Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 417,428. 
37
 Mutua (note 36 above) 418.  See also generally JS Pobee ‗Africa‘s Search for Religious Human 
Rights  Through Returning to the Wells of Living Water‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte Jr Religious 
Human Rights in a Global Perspective Legal Perspectives (1996) 391. 
38
 Mutua (note 36 above) 419.  For an differing perspective see generally L Van der Poll ‗The impact of 
traditional sex practices on the construction of female sexuality: An African human rights perspective‘ 
(2009) 13(2) Law, Democracy & Development 1. 
 
 
 
 
366 
 
All of the above incidents illustrate the detrimental effect of dominance of one faith 
over another.  This dominance may be further entrenched in the relationship between 
the state and religion, a discussion on which follows next. 
 
8.3 Historical relationship between the state and religion 
 
The relationship between the state and religion as indicated previously
39
 has a direct 
impact on the degree to which the right to freedom of religion is protected.  As a 
general rule it is premised that the state should be neutral towards religion.  In 
displaying a neutral disposition it is reasoned that the state will not favour or disfavour 
any religion and will therefore treat all religions the same.  This approach is claimed to 
ensure extensive protection of the right to manifest religious belief.
40
 
 
For the first phase of colonialism in SA the Dutch Reformed Church was legally 
established by the government as the only permitted religious organisation in the Cape 
until 1778.
41
  During the rule of the Batavian Republic in 1804 Commissioner General 
de Mist issued an edict of religious toleration.  According to De Mist‘s Kerkenordre 
equal protection of all religions is provided in that ‗[a]ll religious societies, which for 
                                                          
39
 See section 3.4 
40
 See section 3.7. 
41
 Chidester (note 14 above) 77.  Chidester also states that although Catholics, Muslims, and others 
lived in the Cape colony, they were prohibited from practicing their religions in public.  The exclusion 
of, in particular, the Catholic faith from the Cape Colony was directly related to the European religious 
conflict as discussed in section 2.2.  In this regard see Chidester (note 14 above) 148.  At this time the 
religion of slaves was determined in terms of an ordinance (1770) that prohibited the buying or selling 
slaves who had converted to Christianity.  In light of this prohibition, slave-owners excluded their 
slaves from Christian conversion or baptism in order to retain property rights over them.  In this regard 
see Chidester (note 14 above) 35.  See generally P Coertzen ‗Freedom of religion in South Africa: Then 
and now 1652 – 2008‘ (2008) 29 (2) Verbum Et Ecclesia Journal 345. 
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the furtherance of virtue and good morals worshipped an Almighty Being, are to enjoy 
in this colony equal protection from the laws‘.42  Under British rule, from 1806, the 
Earl of Caledon in 1806 too was given instructions from London to continue with the 
practice of religious toleration: 
[T]o permit liberty of conscience and the free exercise of religious worship to all persons who 
inhabit or frequent the settlement provided they be contended with a peaceful enjoyment of the 
said, without giving offence or scandal to the government.
43
 
 
The Union of SA
44
 and the subsequent Republic did not provide for an established 
church; however the state was biased towards the Protestant - Calvinist tradition as 
displayed through the relationship between the state and religion.
45
  This predominant 
Afrikaner religion was promoted in particular in the three Afrikaans churches,
46
 which 
offered religious justification for the ideology of apartheid.
47
 
                                                          
42
 As ordered by commissioner-general De Mist‘s Kerkenordre of 1804 which allowed only for 
religious ceremonies and public gatherings of religions that were in existence when the Batavian 
Republic won control over the Cape Colony.  In this regard see JD van der Vyver (1986) ‗Religion‘ in 
WA Joubert and TJ Scott (eds) LAWSA volume 23 paragraph 225. 
43
 Chidester (note 14 above) 150. 
44
 (1910 – 1961). 
45
 See generally JD van der Vyver ‗Constitutional perspectives of Church –State relations in South 
Africa‘ (1999) Brigham Young University Law Review 635; GE Devenish ‗Freedom of religion, belief 
and opinion‘ (1995) 16(1) Obiter 15.  
46
 The ‗Hervormde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church), the ‗Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk‟ and the 
‗Gereformeerde Kerk‟.  See Chidester (note 14 above) 79. 
47
 GC Oosthuizen Religion, Intergroup Relations and Social Change in South Africa. Work Committee: 
Religion, Human Science Research Council (HSRC) Investigation into Intergroup Relations (1985) 38 – 
40.  Examples of this include the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, Act 55 of 1949 which prohibited 
marriages between couples from different race groups; the Immorality Amendment Act 21 of 1950; 
Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957; the Group Areas Act 77 of 1957; and the Native Laws Amendment 
Act 36 of 1957 with the so-called church section (section 29(c) in terms of which non-whites could be 
prohibited from attending church services in white areas).  Religion and elements thereof were 
controlled by the policies of the government. 
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A close relationship between the Dutch Reformed Church and the state continued in 
the Union of SA, particularly when the National Party government came to power in 
1948.
48
  The National Party was resolute that its programmes of Christian Afrikaner 
nationalism were consistent with Christianity.
49
  The National Party government‘s 
Constitution of 1983 declared that SA was a Christian country, endorsing a particular 
Protestant, national understanding of Christianity.
50
  This bias was finally addressed 
with the passing of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of SA 1993
51
 and 
confirmed in the Constitution of the Republic of SA 1996.
52
  As a result the religious 
bias towards the Dutch Reformed faith would no longer be in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution.
53
  The permeation of Protestant Christianity into South 
African tradition is however is more difficult to erase and has to some extent 
continued to impact on the manner in which the right to freedom of religion is 
protected in SA, as illustrated next. 
 
                                                          
48
 Chidester (note 14 above) 15. 
49
 Ibid.  An initiated separation from the Cape Dutch Reformed Church resulted in the formation of a 
new church, the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk.  The constitution of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk 
specifically excluded blacks from membership. In this regard see generally See Chidester (note 14 
above) 79.  This racial division of the Dutch Reformed Church continued throughout the twentieth 
century.  Eventually, the church was divided by racial classifications into four separate churches: the 
white Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, the Sendingkerk, the NGK in Africa, and the Indian Reformed 
Church.  The clergy of the Dutch Reformed Church played an active role in formulating the doctrine 
and policy of apartheid.  See generally Chidester (note 14 above) 82. 
50
 Chidester (note 14 above) 148. 
51
 Section 14 of the Interim Constitution. 
52
 Section 15 of the Constitution of SA. 
53
 In this regard see generally P Coertzen (note 41 above) 345; P Coertzen, ‗Christian freedom and 
freedom of religion with reference to the South African constitution (1996)‘ (2005) 46 (3/4) Dutch 
Reformed Theological Journal 351. 
 
 
 
 
369 
 
8.4 Current relationship between the state and religion: Lawrence v The State 
 
As discussed previously, international norms do not prescribe the existence of any 
specific juridical relationship between the state and religion
54
 and are intended to 
accommodate diverse religious arrangements ranging from an established church on 
the one hand, to a secular state on the other.
55
  In the Constitution there is no strict 
separation to be found between the state and religion
56
 and the insertion of a provision 
similar to the United States of America‘s (USA) ‗establishment clauses‘57 that creates 
a ‗wall of separation‘ was rejected by the drafters of the Constitution.58  SA, in 
                                                          
54
 See Section 6.1. 
55
 See section 3.5. 
56
 In this regard see generally LM du Plessis ‗Freedom of or Freedom from Religion? An Overview of 
Issues Pertinent to the Constitutional Protection of Religious Rights and Freedom in ―the New South 
Africa‖‘ (2001) Brigham Young University Law Review 439; du Plessis (1996) (note 12 above) 457; JD 
van der Vyver (note 45 above) 635; du Plessis (1997) (note 12 above) 221; W Freedman ‗Church-state 
relations and the right to religious freedom‘ (1997) 3 Tydskrif vir Suid- Afrikaanse Reg 156; GR 
McLean ‗Freedom of religion and state neutrality: A philosophical problem‘ (1997) 114 (1) South 
African Law Journal 174; EFJ Malherbe ‗Die Grondwetlike Beskerming van Godsdiensvryheid‘ (1998) 
25 (4) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 673; and B Bekink ‗The Intrinsic Uneasy Triangle Between 
Constitutionalism, Secularism and the Right to Freedom of Religion – a South African Perspective‘ 
(2008) 3 Tydskrif vir Suid Afrikaanse Reg 481. 
57
 The phrase ‗establishment clause‘ originates from USA jurisprudence with the constitutional 
prohibition of the establishment of religion by the state and has been implemented since the 1940‘s by 
the USA Supreme Court.  The decision in Everson v Board of Education 330 US 1 (1946) 18 initiated 
the wall of separation doctrine in that the court held that: ‗The First Amendment has erected a wall 
between the state and church.  That wall must be kept high and impregnable.‘ 
58
 Regarding the intent of the drafters see generally A Sachs Advancing Human Rights in South Africa 
(1992), in which Sachs reminds of the incident in which then President FW de Klerk got into trouble 
with his supporters for closing his eyes while a Muslim prayer was being said at the Convention for a 
Democratic SA (CODESA).  At CODESA the issue of religious freedom was raised, as to whether SA 
was a Christian country or a country of many faiths, in which all religions play an equally important 
role.  Sachs further confirms that the approach adopted towards the right to freedom of religion in the 
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response to its history of discrimination, constructed a new dispensation where 
considerations of human dignity and equality are supreme.  This egalitarian approach 
set the country on a different course.
59
 
 
The Constitution deals with religion in an equitable manner and the conciliatory 
preamble to the 1996 Constitution confirms this as follows: 
We, the people of South Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past; Honour those 
who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; Respect those who have worked to 
build and develop our country; and Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live 
in it, united in our diversity. 
 
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the 
supreme law of the Republic so as to: Heal the divisions of the past and establish a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; Lay 
the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on 
the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; Improve the 
quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; Build a united and 
democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the 
family of nations. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
South African Constitution depicts the South African reality.  He states that: ‗A great majority of South 
Africans are believers, to whom religion has a deep importance.  Religion goes well beyond a question 
of faith; it is part and parcel of our culture.  Believers and non-believers sing Nkosi Sikelel‟ iAfrika - 
God Bless Africa - with equal passion.  The South African Constitution recognises the autonomous 
spheres of religion and the state, but allows for co-operation between them, rather than absolute 
separation, while giving no religion a preference over the other‘.  A Sachs (note 58 above)180.  See also 
generally W Freedman ‗The Right to Religous Liberty, the Right to Religious Equality and section 
15(1) of the South African Constitution‘(2000) 11 (1) Stellenbosch Law Review 99 and L du Plessis and 
H Corder Understanding South Africa‟s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994). 
59
 See generally van der Vyver (note 45 above) 671.  See generally also K Henrard ‗The 
accommodation of religious diversity in South Africa against the background of the centrality of the 
equality principle in the new constitutional dispensation‘ (2001) 45 (1) Journal of African Law 51. 
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May God protect our people. Nkosi Sikelel' i Afrika. Morena boloka setjhaba sa heso. 
God seën Suid-Afrika. God bless South Africa. Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afurika. Hosi 
katekisa Afrika.
60
 
 
The Preamble acknowledged the ‗injustices of the past‘, reiterates the need for healing 
the ‗divisions of the past‘ and seeks to build a ‗united and democratic South Africa‘.  
At the end reference is made to the blessing contained in the national anthem, which is 
once again included in the Postamble, ‗Nkosi Sikelel' i Afrika‟ (God bless Africa). 
 
According to Sachs the Constitution affirms a secular state, but with religion, in terms 
of which secular does not mean to be anti-religious, but that there is no official 
religion, nor favouring of one denomination over another, nor discriminating against 
non-believers.
61
  This point of view is confirmed by du Plessis who states that 
tolerance of religious diversity entails ‗even-handed treatment of diverse religions and 
of religious groups, communities, and institutions with potentially conflicting 
                                                          
60
 Preamble to the South African Constitution.  When the Constitutional Court was called upon to 
certify compliance of the 1996 Constitution with the constitutional principles specified in the Interim 
Constitution, petitions were submitted to the Court raising objections to the preambular references to 
deity.  The Court did not invite the concerned petitioners to submit oral arguments, and indeed did not 
deal with their objections in the certification judgments.  See In re Certification of the Amended Text of 
the Constitution of the RSA, 1997 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); In re Certification of the Amended Text of the 
Constitution of the RSA, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC).  The multiple references to ‗God‘ in the Post- and 
Preambles of the national Constitutions according to Heyns and Brand are not references to a particular 
god and consequently only supports (theistic) religion in general and is not necessarily support for a 
particular religion.  In this regard see C Heyns & D Brand ‗The Constitutional Protection of Religious 
Human Rights in Southern Africa‘ (2000) 14 Emory international Law Review 699, 705. 
61
 Sachs (note 58 above)180. 
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interests‘.62  In this regard it can be argued that SA generally follows an 
accommodationist approach towards religion as discussed previously.
63
 
 
Religion is dealt with under the freedom of religion provisions contained in section[s] 
15
64
 and 31
65
 as well as the equality provisions and education provisions in section[s] 
9
66
 and 29
67
 respectively.  Section 15(2) allows for the conduct of religious 
                                                          
62
 du Plessis (note 56 above) 439.  See generally also Heyns & Brand (note 60 above) 751; see also C 
Heyns & D Brand ‗The Constitutional Protection Of Religious Human Rights In Southern Africa‘ 
(2000) 33 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 53; see also Bekink (note 56 
above) 481. 
63
 See section 3.6.  In this point of view this study is supported by Heyns & Brand (note 62 above) 53 
who describe the South African government as ‗accommodationist‘ in its approach to religious groups: 
it may support such groups, as long as its support is fair and even-handed and it has a valid reason for 
doing so.  
64
 Section 15 (1) of the Constitution of SA provides that: ‗Everyone has the right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion‘.  For a general discussions of the right to freedom of 
religion and the application thereof in South Africa, see P Farlam ‗Freedom of religion, conscience, 
thought and belief‘ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2006); I Currie & J de 
Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005). 
65
 Section 31(1) of the Constitution of SA provides that: ‗Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or 
linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community: a) to enjoy 
their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and b) to form, join and maintain cultural, 
religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.  Section 31(2) The rights in 
subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights‘. 
66
 Section 9(1) of the Constitution of SA guarantees equality before and equal protection of the law 
subject to remedial action ‗to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination‘.  Section 9(3) then proscribes unfair discrimination ‗against anyone on one or 
more grounds‘ and lists a number of grounds explicitly.  Included in this list are culture, religion, 
conscience, and belief. 
67
 Section 29(1) of the Constitution of SA provides that: ―Everyone has the right -(a) to a basic 
education, including adult basic education; and (b) to further education, which the state, through 
reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible‘. 
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observances at state or state-aided institutions, provided that they take place on an 
equitable basis, rules made by appropriate public authorities are followed and 
attendance at them are free and voluntary.
68
  The right to establish and maintain, at 
own expense, independent educational institutions, including, for instance religiously 
and/or denominationally specific schools, is entrenched in section 29(3).  Such 
institutions may not discriminate on the basis of race, must be registered with the state 
and must maintain standards not inferior to those at comparable public educational 
institutions.  Section 15(3) of the Constitution authorises legislation recognising 
marriages concluded under systems of religious personal or family law.  Both of these 
sections contain specific limitation provisions that require the weighing of interests 
and do not merely provide for the full recognition of religious interests over secular 
interests. 
 
From the above it is clear that the Constitution does not prohibit a relationship 
between the state and religion.  On the contrary, it can be said that the relationship 
between the state and religion displays the following characteristics: firstly, the state 
displays at the least an even-handed approach
69
 and at the best constructive 
coexistence towards religion.
70
  Secondly, the state acts free from coercion or 
constraint towards religion;
71
 and finally, the state is assigned with the duty to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil
72
 the right to freedom of religion.  Each of these 
characteristics are discussed next. 
                                                          
68
 The requirement of an ‗equitable basis‘ is subject to differing interpretations.  For a discussion on the 
different opinions see G van der Schyff The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (2001) LLM 
Thesis Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit 189 onwards. 
69
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 122. 
70
 See generally Sachs confirming that collaboration between the secular and religion on matters of 
mutual concern is advisable.  In this regard see Sachs (Note 58 above) 46. 
71
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per Chaskalson P, paragraph 92. 
72
 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of SA. 
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8.4.1 Even-handed and constructive coexistence 
 
The Constitution foresees peaceful and constructive coexistence between the state and 
religion against a constitutional background.  The requirement of equity as well as the 
non coercive nature of religious observations is prevalent throughout section 15(2) and 
15(3).  ‗Evenhandedness‘ in official dealings related to religion is a prerequisite of all 
official actions.
73
  This requirement for even-handed action by the state towards 
different religions is in stark contrast with the pre-constitutional era as indicated 
previously, and was considered in the matter of Lawrence.
74
 
 
In the case of Lawrence it was argued by the appellants that the purpose of the 
prohibition to sell liquor on Sundays was to ‗induce submission to a sectarian 
Christian conception of the proper observance of the Christian Sabbath and Christian 
holidays or, perhaps, to compel the observance of the Christian Sabbath and Christian 
holidays‘75 and that these provisions were therefore unconstitutional.  The court held 
however that the provisions were not unconstitutional. 
 
Sachs J writing in a separate concurring judgment reflects on the absence of state 
neutrality in the pre-constitutional era.
76
  He points toward numerous statutory 
provisions which clearly sided with Christian faith as well as the imposition of 
                                                          
73
 See generally van de Vyver (note 45 above). 
74
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 122. 
75
Lawrence (note 6 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 85. 
76
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 149.  Van der Vyver confirms this religious 
favoritism which in essence held that the coupling of Sundays, Good Friday and Christmas Day as 
‗closed days‘ for the purpose of a grocer‘s wine license amounted to endorsement by the state of the 
Christian Sabbath.  JD van der Vyver ‗The Contours of Religious Liberty in South Africa‘ (2007) 21 
Emory International Law Review 77, 99. 
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Christian values on the regulation of society and the development of law, in particular 
family law and the validity of marriage.
77
 
 
Another case in which the court was tasked with balancing the secular with the sacred 
was the matter of Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie.
78
 The court found 
both the Marriage Act
79
 and the common law definition of marriage unconstitutional 
as they both discriminated against homosexual couples.  In reaching this decision 
Sachs J offered a balanced understanding of the public realm as a sphere of ‗co-
existence‘ in which there ought to be mutually respectful co-existence between the 
secular and the sacred.
80
  The function of the court is to recognise the sphere which 
each inhabits and not to force the one sphere into the other.  An open and democratic 
society should accommodate and manage difference in a reasonable and fair manner, 
allowing different concepts to inhabit the same public realm in a way that shows equal 
concern and respect for all.
81
 
 
In the context of Fourie the court held that the right of same-sex couples to enjoy the 
same status, entitlements and responsibilities of marriage is in no way inconsistent 
with the rights of religious organisations to continue to refuse to celebrate same-sex 
unions.
82
  Therefore the claims of same-sex couples cannot be negated by invoking the 
                                                          
77
 Lawrence (note 6 above) paragraph 151. 
78
 Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Lesbian and Gay Equality Project & Others v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) (Fourie). The Fourie matter 
concerned the common-law definition of marriage, which prohibited marriage between members of the 
same sex as well as a challenge to the constitutionality of sections of the Marriage Act.   The court held 
that both the Marriage Act and the common law definition of marriage were unconstitutional to the 
extent that they discriminated against homosexual couples. 
79
 Marriage Act, Act 25 of 1961. 
80
 Fourie (note 78 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 94. 
81
 Fourie (note 78 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 95 
82
 Fourie (note 78 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 97. 
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claims of believers.  These different claims do not collide; they co-exist in a 
constitutional realm based on accommodation of diversity.
83
 
 
In the above judgment Sachs does not only call for a relationship of co-existence 
between the public sphere and religion, but he further asserts how important 
impartiality is.  This is also confirmed in his dissent in Lawrence where Sachs J makes 
reference to how that: 
[A]ny endorsement by the state today of Christianity as a privileged religion not only disturbs 
the general principle of impartiality in relation to matters of belief and opinion, but also serves 
to activate memories of painful past discrimination and disadvantage based on religious 
affiliation.
84
 
 
The language of power is used to illustrate that even ‗apparently harmless provisions‘ 
may have severe implications,
85
 in that these apparently harmless provisions ‗convey a 
message of exclusion‘.86  This exclusion may also send a message that people and 
their different religions or cultures are not welcome.
87
  Sachs goes further and 
demands not only substantive equality, but also calls for respect, diversity, tolerance 
and mutual accommodation.  This openness coupled with diversity according to Sachs 
J presupposes that: 
[P]ersons may on their own, or in community with others, express the right to be different in 
belief or behaviour, without sacrificing any of the entitlements of the right to be the same in 
terms of common citizenship.
88
 
 
                                                          
83
 Fourie (note 78 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 94–98. 
84
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 152. 
85
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 153. 
86
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 170. 
87
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 65, where the Constitutional Court was again tasked 
with an apparent harmless neutral school uniform code. 
88
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 170. 
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There is a clear appreciation of difference and the need to accommodate diversity 
without placing differentiation in a hierarchical framework, in which the state would 
appear to take sides.
89
  In addition to the requirement of evenhandedness, the state‘s 
constructive interaction with religion must be free from coercion or may not constrain 
religious belief.  This accommodating stance towards religious difference is supported 
and it is argued that the application of such an approach will aid in protecting the right 
to manifest religious belief in a diverse society. 
 
It can be argued that in contrast with the decision of the House of Lords in R (on the 
application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School 
90
 the 
point of the departure of the Constitutional Court is correct.  The court is sensitive to 
difference and does not classify what is reasonable behaviour.  In contrast with the 
decision in Fourie in Begum the court classified that the ‗school‘s uniform rules were 
more than reasonable in taking into account cultural and religious concerns‘.91 
 
8.4.2 Free from coercion and constraint coupled with equity  
 
All the rights in the Constitution must be interpreted to promote the underlying values 
of ‗human dignity, equality and freedom‘.92  The values of dignity, equality and 
freedom enhance and reinforce one another.  For example, human dignity has little 
value without freedom, for without freedom personal development is not possible.  To 
                                                          
89
 Lawrence (note 6 above) paragraph 170. 
90
 R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] 
UKHL 15 (Begum). 
91
Begum (note 90 above) 11. 
92
 Section 7 (2) of the Constitution of SA. 
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deny people their freedom is to deny them their dignity.  Each individual must have 
the freedom to pursue her own individual ends.
93
 
 
The importance of the value of freedom is confirmed in the Lawrence case.  
Chaskalson P, delivering the majority judgment, makes reference to the definition of 
freedom of religion in the Canadian case Big M Drug Mart where it was stated:  
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs 
as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance 
or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and 
dissemination.
94
 
 
The right to freedom of religion therefore requires an absence of coercion or constraint 
by the state and the absence of measures that could force people to act in a manner 
contrary to their religious beliefs.
95
  Within the parameters of this definition 
Chaskalson P held the opinion that the right to freedom of religion can only be 
impaired under two circumstances, namely if there was coercion to observe the 
practices of a particular religion or if constraints were placed on the observance of 
one's own religion by the state.  As the relevant provisions of the Liquor Act did not 
compel any persons in casu to observe a certain faith and as these provisions did not 
‗constrain their right to entertain such religious beliefs as they might choose‘,96 they 
were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Constitution. 
 
Chaskalson P further held that the Interim Constitution does not contain an 
establishment clause and that such a clause should not be read into the religious liberty 
provisions.  In addition the right to freedom of religion could only be impaired by 
                                                          
93
 See S Woolman ‗Dignity‘ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006) 36. 
94
 R v Big M Drug Mart (1985) 13 CRR 64 97 (Big M Drug Mart). 
95
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 128. 
96
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 128. 
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coercive religious endorsement.
97
  O‘Regan J on the other hand, held that not only 
coercive state endorsement, but any endorsement of religion by the state, could 
infringe on the religious liberty guarantees.
98
  O‘Regan J further observes that 
voluntariness is not the only precondition and that the observance must be equitable.  
O‘Regan J indicates: 
In my view, this additional requirement of fairness or equity reflects an important 
component of the conception of freedom of religion contained in our Constitution.  
Our society possesses a rich and diverse range of religions. Although the state is 
permitted to allow religious observances, it is not permitted to act inequitably.
99
 
 
Chaskalson clearly prefers a narrow definition of the right to freedom of religion, 
namely that the right is a liberty right.  O‘Regan, on the other hand prefers a wider 
definition of the right to freedom of religion, namely as a liberty and an equality right.  
In terms of this wider definition of the right to freedom of religion, it is not sufficient 
that the legislature simply refrains from coercion.  It is further required that the 
legislature refrains from favouring one religion over others.
100
  This study concurs 
with the wider definition of O‘Regan in terms of which the right to freedom of religion 
should be defined as both a liberty and an equality right.  This approach is also in line 
with the values which underlie the interpretation of the Constitution, namely the 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.
101
 
 
It is therefore contended that the interaction between the state and religion should not 
violate the duty of the state to non-identification, in terms of which the state has a duty 
to treat and promote all religious denominations in an equal manner.  This approach is 
                                                          
97
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 101. 
98
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 116. 
99
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 121. 
100
 In this regard see also Freedman (note 58 above)102 – 08. 
101
 Section 39(1) of the Constitution of SA as further discussed in Section 8.4.3.1. 
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affirmed in the remark of Sachs J who indicates that the identification of the state with 
one religion, in effect divides the nation ‗into insiders who belong, and outsiders who 
are tolerated 
 
in the multi-faith, heterodox society contemplated by our 
Constitution‘.102 
 
Dividing society into insiders and outsiders does not aid in the reconciliation of the 
nation, as read from the postscript of the Interim Constitution which states that: 
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided 
society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future 
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and 
development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, 
belief or sex.  
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace 
require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of 
society.  
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South 
Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross 
violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent 
conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.
103
 
                                                          
102
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 179. 
103
 Reference made to the importance of the Postscript by Sachs J in Lawrence (note 6 above), 147.  
This historic bridge is encapsulated in the principle of ‗Transformative Constitutionalism‘.  In this 
regard see generally KE Klare ‗Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism‘ (1998) 14 South 
African Journal of Human Rights 146.  See also H Botha ‗Freedom and Constraint in Constitutional 
Adjudication‘ (2004) 20 South African Journal of Human Rights 249, 251. JC Froneman ‗Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Culture: Our ―Vision‖ of Law‘ (2005)16 (1) Stellenbosch Law Review 3, 32 
Justice P Langa ‗Transformative Constitutionalism‘ (2006) 17 (3) Stellenbosch Law Review 351, 353. 
M Pieterse ‗What Do We Mean When We Talk about Transformative Constitutionalism?‘ (2005) 20 
South African Public Law 155, 161-63.  The description of transformative constitutionalism offered by 
Pieterse incorporates the following ingredients: the attainment of substantive equality, the realisation of 
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The need for reconciliation to overcome the division of the past emphasises the 
importance of tolerance and mutual accommodation of diversity.
104
  It is argued that 
through accommodation of this diversity the right to manifest religious belief in a 
diverse society is best protected. 
 
8.4.3 Positive duty to promote 
 
In addition to requiring an even-handed constructive interaction that is free of coercion 
or constraint, the state has a duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights.
105
  The duty to respect requires that the state may not violate the right to 
freedom of religion and should endeavour to respect the full extent of the right to 
freedom of religion, as envisaged by the Bill of Rights.  The duty to protect requires 
that the state must take steps to prevent violations of the right to freedom of religion.  
Accordingly, the state has a positive duty to act in the interest of religious freedom by 
prohibiting religious discrimination by the state and private individuals.
106
  The duty to 
promote and fulfil requires that the state take steps to facilitate the exercise of the 
right, so that the right to freedom of religion may flourish. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
social justice, the infusion of the private sphere with human rights standards and the promotion of a 
‗culture of justification‘ in public-law interactions. 
104
 For a detailed overview of the racial, ethnic and religious diversity of SA see. Goodsell (note 13 
above) 114 -115. 
105
 Section 7 (2) of the Constitution of SA. 
106
 The entrenched rights are not only protected against infringement by organs of the state, but also 
against infringement by individuals and organisations. Section 8(2) of the Constitution of  SA reads as 
follows:  ‗A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural person or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right. 
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The inclusion of a positive duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil religious 
freedom, further affirms that the absolute separation between the state and religion is 
not envisaged in the Constitution
107
 as the state has a duty to promote the right to 
freedom of religion.  In fulfilling the requirement to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Constitution certain interpretative duties are encapsulated in the 
Constitution, which are briefly discussed below.
108
 
 
8.4.3.1 Interpretation of fundamental human rights 
 
The Constitution requires that religious and other rights be interpreted in context, 
permeated with the values
109
 which are articulated throughout the Constitution.  
Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or forum must follow a value based approach in that the court ‗must 
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom‘.110  Accordingly the interpretation of the Bill of Rights 
must advance the values enumerated on in section 1 of the Constitution, which 
include, human dignity,
111
 the achievement of equality, the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism. 
                                                          
107
 Malherbe (see note 56 above) 698. 
108
 For a more comprehensive discussion of the task of Constitutional interpretation see generally D 
Davis, M Chaskalson, J de Waal ‗Democracy and constitutionalism: the role of constitutional 
interpretation‘ in D van Wyk, et al (eds) Rights and constitutionalism, the new South African legal 
order (1994); JR de Ville Constitutional and statutory interpretation (2000); LM du Plessis Re-
interpretation of statutes (2002); L M du Plessis ‗Legal Academics and the Open Community of 
Constitutional Interpretation‘ (1996) 12 South African Journal on Human Rights 214. 
109
 The values which are articulated in the Preamble to the Constitution of SA as well as in the founding 
provisions in chapter 1 (and especially sections 1 and 2) of the Constitution of SA. 
110
 Section 39 (a) of the Constitution of SA. 
111
 Regarding the interpretation based on dignity see in general LWH Ackermann ‗Menswaardigheid na 
tien jaar van regstaatlikheid in Suid-Afrika‘ (2004) 1 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1; A 
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Not only must the courts follow a ‗value-based‘ approach but section 39(b) further 
provides that the court ‗must consider international law‘.112  This rule is unconditional.  
However, the unconditional nature of section 39(b) does not entail that the court must 
follow international law, but that careful consideration must be given to international 
law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.  International treaties that have been 
incorporated into South African law must, however, be followed. 
 
The requirement to consider foreign law is not absolute in that section 39(c) provides 
that the court: ‗may consider foreign law‘.113  In addition to applying a contextual 
value based approach, the richness of foreign constitutions and the jurisprudence of 
foreign courts have been consulted to clarify application of the right to freedom of 
religion in a South African context.  Furthermore legislation must be interpreted and 
the common and customary law developed in a manner that promotes the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
114
 
 
From the discussion above it can be reasoned that the relationship between the state 
and religion is a relationship of constructive interaction between religion and the state 
in which all religions and non-religions are treated with equal respect and concern and 
in which the state has a positive duty to actively accommodate diversity.  It is within 
this context that the right to manifest religious belief and cultural practices will be 
evaluated next. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Chaskalson ‗The Third Bram Fischer Lecture: Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our 
Constitutional Order‘ (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 193,see also H Botha ‗Human 
Dignity in Comparative Perspective‘ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch Law Review 171. 
112
 See also L du Plessis ‗International Law and the Evolution of (domestic) Human-Rights Law in Post 
1994 South Africa‘ in J Nijman & A Nollkaemper (eds) New Perspectives on the Divide Between 
National and International Law (2007) 309-340. 
113
 Ibid. 
114
 See section 39(2) of the Constitution of SA. 
 
 
 
 
384 
 
8.5 The scope of the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief 
and opinion 
 
The scope of the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion 
is provided for in the following manner ‗[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion‘.115  Therefore belief systems such as 
agnosticism, atheism and secular humanism enjoy constitutional protection as well.
116
  
In defining conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion it is argued that a flexible 
approach
117
 coupled with a broad objective definition
118
 of religion is most suitable to 
                                                          
115
 Section 15 the Constitution of South Africa 15.  Regarding the right to freedom of religion see 
generally van der Vyver (see note 76 above) 110; Farlam (see note 64 above); S Woolman ‗Community 
rights: Language, culture and religion‘ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2003), D Meyerson ‗Religion and the South African constitution‘ in P Radan, D Meyerson & R 
Croucher (eds) Law and religion (2005). 
116
 This approach is supported by van Dijkhorst J in Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein Pretoria, 1998 
(4) SA 423, 449 where he states that:  ‗The atheist and agnostic is afforded protection under the 
freedom of thought, belief and opinion part of this section.  There is conceptually no room for him 
under the freedom of religion part.‘ 
117
 In this regard see the argument put forward by L du Plessis ‗Doing damage to freedom of religion‘ 
(2000) 11 (2) Stellenbosch Law Review 295, 304, in which he advocates for a flexible approach to the 
evaluation of religious beliefs and critiques the court a quo„s evaluation in Christian Education (note 7 
above). 
118
 See generally B Dickson ‗The United Nations and freedom of religion‘ (1995) 44 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 327.  It has been suggested that religious belief may demonstrate some of 
the following characteristics; a belief in a Supreme being/s; a belief in transcendent reality; a moral 
code; a worldview that provides an account of humanity‘s role in the universe and around which 
individuals organise their lives; sacred rituals, holy days and festivals, worship and prayer; sacred text 
or scriptures; the existence of a social organisation that promotes the belief system.  In this regard see 
generally the discussion in G van der Schyff ‗The Legal Definition of Religion and Its Application‘ 
(2002) 119 South African Law Journal 288.  For a critique on the broad definition of religion as held by 
Sachs J in the Fourie case (note 78 above), in which Sachs J defined religion as inclusive of world-
views which people regard as fundamentally important see B Bekink (note 56 above) 481, 497.  Bekink 
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ensuring extensive protection of the right to manifest religious belief.  This broad 
approach is also followed in the international legal context
119
 and is supported by 
Sachs J in the Christian Education case when he states that: 
This broad approach highlights that freedom of religion includes both the right to have 
a belief and the right to express such belief in practice.  It also brings out the fact that 
freedom of religion may be impaired by measures that coerce persons into acting or 
refraining from acting in a manner contrary to their beliefs.  Just as it is difficult to 
postulate a firm divide between religious thought and action based on religious belief, 
so it is not easy to separate the individual religious conscience from the collective 
setting in which it is frequently expressed.  Religious practice often involves 
interaction with fellow believers.  It usually has both an individual and a collective 
dimension and is often articulated through activities that are traditional and structured, 
and frequently ritualistic and ceremonial.
120
 
 
The broad approach is therefore not only limited to acknowledging the internal aspect 
of belief but in appreciating the forum externum as well.121  In addition, this approach 
appreciates that the right to freedom of religion may be infringed through coercion 
                                                                                                                                                                       
argues that a definition of religion should not be equated with a world-view of a secular character.  This 
restrictive critique of Bekink is neutralised by CW du Toit ‗Religious Freedom and Human Rights in 
South Africa After 1996: Responses and Challenges‘ (2006) Brigham Young University Law Review 
677, 690 where he states that Africans do not recognise a sharp division between the sacred and the 
secular. 
119
 See section 6.2 and 6.3. 
120
 Christian Education (note 7 above) as per Sachs J 19.  For a discussion on the Christian Education 
see generally M Pieterse ‗Religious Confusion: Christian Education South Africa v Minister of 
Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC)‘ (2001) 64 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg 672. 
121
 For a discussion on the recognition of the forum internum and the forum externum in international 
law see section 4.3.  See also the interpretative guidelines of General Comment 22 discussed in section 
4.3. 
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into acting contrary to a belief or refraining from acting in accordance with a belief.122  
This approach further acknowledges the indivisible nature of religion and the inherent 
difficulty in separating religious thoughts from religious action as well as the 
individual and collective processes of religion.  The indivisible nature of the right to 
freedom of religion is confirmed by Langa J in the matter of Prince where he mentions 
that: 
[S]ections 15(1) and 31(1)(a) complement one another.  Section 31(1)(a) emphasises 
and protects the associational nature of cultural, religious and language rights. In the 
context of religion, it emphasises the protection to be given to members of 
communities united by religion to practice their religion.
123
 
 
Section 31 recognises that people belonging to a cultural and religious community 
may not be denied the right to enjoy their culture, practise their religion or form, join, 
and maintain cultural and religious associations, provided that they do so in a manner 
that is consistent with the other provisions of the Bill of Rights.
124
  Part of the 
recognition is through the body of the Commission for the Promotion and Protection 
of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, tasked with 
promoting respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities.
125
  It 
                                                          
122
 For a distinction between coercion and restriction on the right to manifest religious belief see section 
6.2.3.2.  See also PM Taylor ‗Freedom of Religion UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice‟ 
(2005) 133, where he discusses performing acts incompatible with the dictates of a religion, such as 
taking the oath or the conscientious objection to military service. 
123
 Prince (note 8 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 39.  For a general discussion on Prince see 
generally P de Vos ‗Freedom of religion v drug traffic control: The Rastafarian, the law, society and the 
right to smoke the ―holy weed‖‘ (2001) 5 Law Democracy and Development 85. 
124See generally L Du Plessis ‗Religious freedom and equality as celebration of difference: a significant 
development in recent South African Constitutional case-law‘ (2009) 12 (4). Potchefstroom Electronic 
Review 10.  See also J De Waal, I Currie and G Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 265. 
125
 Section 181(1)(c) of the Constitution of South Africa identifies The Commission for the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CPPRCRLC).  Chapter 
9 of the Constitution of SA provides for ‗State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy‘ and 
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can therefore be summarised that the right to freedom of religion is entrenched as an 
individual right, a collective right and an institutional right.
126
 
 
In addition to the entrenchment of the right to freedom of religion in the above 
discussed provisions of the Constitution, a Charter of Religious Rights for South 
Africa was entered into in October 2010 by members of churches and religious 
communities.
127
  Of particular relevance are the following rights indentified in the 
Charter, namely the right to observe and exercise one‘s religion and the right to 
religious dignity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
sets out a series of institutions one of which is ‗the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities‘.  The institutions are independent and must 
report their activities to the legislature once a year.  Section 185 sets out the functions of the 
Commission which are listed as being (a) to promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and 
linguistic communities; (b) to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national 
unity among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination 
and free association.... The Commission is designed to assist Parliament by reviewing all legislation that 
might affect one of the interest groups (cultural, religious or linguistic) under its purview. 
126
 In this regard see generally A Krishnaswami Study of Discrimination in the  Matter of Religious 
Rights and Practices (1960) 20;  D Cole ‗Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative 
Framework‘ in JD van der Vyver & J Witte Jr (eds) Religious Human Rights in a Global Perspective 
Legal Perspectives (1996) 1, 29; as well as the collective dimension expressed in various international 
instruments as discussed in section 4.3.3.  The right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief 
and opinion includes the right to religious autonomy and religious choice, which includes aspects of the 
relationship between the state and religion, as well as the right to regulate one‘s own religious affairs 
through, for example, establishing own bodies or organisations and the rules of these organisations, and 
the functioning of these religious organisations in the legal world.  This study will not provide a 
comprehensive overview of these components of the right to freedom of religion.  In this regards see 
van der Schyff (note 68 above) 79 onwards. 
127
 South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms 21 October 2010 available at 
<http://academic.sun.ac.za/theology/religious-charter/>last accessed on 29 November 2010. 
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The equality clause further explicitly prohibits unfair discrimination, either directly or 
indirectly, based on religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
128
  The 
right to freedom of religion consequently is a right that functions both as a liberty 
right, on an individual and collective basis, and as an equality right.
129
  In view of 
these approaches, the values of equality and freedom that permeate the Constitution 
are taken into consideration.  The remaining value of dignity however also warrants 
consideration. 
 
It is important to view the right to freedom of religion in such a way that the 
indivisible nature of religious thoughts and actions are appreciated.  For it is only in 
following this approach, that the right to manifest religious belief is ensured extensive 
protection in a diverse society.  However, before proceeding with a discussion of right 
to manifest religious belief, it is important to note that all the rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights are not absolute and therefore may be limited.  The Constitution sets out 
a general limitations test in section 36.  What follows next is a brief evaluation of the 
general limitations test.
130
 
                                                          
128
 Section 9(3) of the Constitution of SA stipulates that: ‗The state may not unfairly discriminate 
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture, language and birth‘. 
129
 See Freedman (note 58 above) 100. Such a viewpoint is supplemented by section 9(2) of the 
Constitution of South Africa, which guarantees the equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms, and 
sections 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution of South Africa which prohibits unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of religion. 
130
 For a more comprehensive discussion of the limitation of rights in general see I Currie & J de Waal 
‗Limitation of rights‘ in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 163 – 188; H 
Cheadle ‗Limitation of Rights‘ in H Cheadle (et al) South African Constitutional Law : The Bill of 
Rights (2002) 696.  Regarding the limitation of the right to freedom of religion in particular see D 
Meyerson Rights Limited: Freedom of Expression, Religion and the South African Constitution (1997); 
S Woolman & H Botha ‗Limitations‘ in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (2009). 
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8.6 Limitation of the right to freedom of religion 
 
As shown above, the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion and that persons belonging to a 
cultural or religious community may not be denied the right to enjoy their culture or 
practice their religion in so far as such a practice is not inconsistent with any provision 
of the Bill of Rights.  When considering the diverse nature of communities it is 
inevitable that a practice that seems benign and natural in the eyes of one adherent 
might draw out feelings of aversion in another.  The question that may arise is the 
extent to which the personal religious preference of an individual should be tolerated 
and respected in instances of conflict.  For example, should a Muslim girl be required 
to relinquish her religious practices as a precondition for attending school or are 
schools obligated to meet her demands through religious accommodation?  And 
further, if accommodation is obliged, to which extent ought the manifestation of 
religious belief be afforded constitutional protection? 
 
All the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights may be limited subject to the provisions 
contained in the general limitations clause
131
 or in terms of provisions contained 
elsewhere in the Bill of Rights.
132
  In the event of a limitation, the complainant will 
have to prove that she is the bearer of the right to freedom of religion and that her right 
                                                          
131
 Section 36 of the SA Constitution.  A specific limitation clause, applicable to a particular right 
merely qualifies the general limitation test, with regard to specific aspects and does not replace the 
general test.  The right to observe religious rites, dietary practices or cultivate a religious appearance 
however, is not subject to a specific limitation clause and accordingly a further discussion of specific 
limitation clauses is not warranted. 
132
 See section 7(3) of the Constitution of SA which states that:  ‗The rights in the Bill of Rights are 
subject to limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.‘  For example 
religious and related rights can also be suspended during a duly declared state of emergency in terms of 
section 37(4) of the Constitution of SA. 
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has been violated.  This forms part of the first stage of the two staged approached 
enquiry.
133
 
 
It is contended that it is not the function of the court to pronounce on the truth or 
credibility of a religion.  In addition, the two-way approach followed by the High 
Court in Christian Education
134
 in establishing the applicability of section 15 is a 
sound approach.  This approach consists of both an objective and a subjective 
component.  The objective component requires that the belief or doctrine relied upon 
qualifies as a religion while the subjective component requires that the claimant 
sincerely believes in the religion.  The subjective component of religion is best 
illustrated by the following extract of the Prince case: 
Religion is a matter of faith and belief.  The beliefs that believers hold sacred and thus 
central to their religious faith may strike non-believers as bizarre, illogical or 
irrational.  Human beings may freely believe in what they cannot prove.  Yet, that 
their beliefs are bizarre, illogical or irrational to others or are incapable of scientific 
proof, does not detract from the fact that these are religious beliefs for the purposes of 
enjoying the protection guaranteed by the right to freedom of religion.  The believers 
should not be put to the proof of their beliefs or faith.  For this reason, it is undesirable 
for courts to enter into the debate whether a particular practice is central to a religion 
unless there is a genuine dispute as to the centrality of the practice.
135
 
                                                          
133
 Currie and de Waal (note 130 above) 163, 166. 
134
 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 1999 (4) SA 1092 (SE); 1999 (9) BCLR 
951 (SE). 
135
 Prince (note 8 above) as per Ngcobo J paragraph 42.  The approach in Prince is in contrast with the 
matter of Dlamini and Others v Green Four Security (2006) 27 ILJ 2098 (LC) and confirmed in 
Dlamini & others v Green Four Security CCPR/C/91/D/1474/2006 14 November 2007.  In Dlamini the 
claimants belonged to the Baptised Nazareth Group which, they submitted, did not allow them to trim 
their beards.  As a result they were dismissed for failing to comply with uniform requirements of the 
employer.  The Court concluded that the rule that security guards should be clean-shaven did not 
differentiate amongst employees.  The applicants had failed to prove that the no shave rule was an 
essential tenet of the Nazareth faith and therefore found no discrimination based on religion.  For a 
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Once the claimant has successfully proven that her right to freedom of religion has 
been infringed, the violator is required to show a justification for the infringement in 
the second stage of the analysis.
136
  If the infringement cannot be justified the religious 
practice will have to be accommodated.  Legal acceptance or accommodation depends 
on a variety of factors,
137
 but is most often rooted in a constitutional proportionality 
test that balances the right to freedom of religion against the possible impairment as 
discussed under the limitations provisions discussed next. 
 
8.6.1 General limitations test 
 
As indicated above in the first stage of the limitations analysis the claimant needs to 
establish that a sincerely held religious belief has been infringed.  Following this, the 
violator will have to prove that the infringement is constitutionally justified in terms of 
the requirements of the general limitations test.  Section 36, the general limitations test 
provision, reads as follows: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of a law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including – 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance and purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
                                                                                                                                                                       
more detailed discussion of the matter see A Govindjee ‗Beards, Nose Studs and Questions of Religion 
and Equality: Pillay v KwaZulu-Natal MEC of Education and Others; Dlamini & others v Green Four 
Security‘ (2007) 28 (2) Obiter 357, 373.  The approach of the court in Dlamini is in contrast with the 
position of the court in Pillay, in which the court did not question the centrality of the belief of the nose 
stud to the cultural practices. 
136
 Currie and de Waal (note 130 above)163, 166. 
137
 Reasonable accommodation is discussed in more detail in section 8.6.2. 
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(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
Only a law of general application may therefore limit the right to manifest religious 
belief.  In addition the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.  The justification 
represents the substantive test
138
 which implies that a balance between the limitation 
and its purpose worthy of a democratic society be reached, known as the so-called 
proportionality test.
139
  In terms of the proportionality test a democratic society takes 
cognisance of the position of the individual and the virtues of tolerance and religious 
diversity.  This process of weighing competing interests and rights in evaluating the 
constitutionality of an infringement of the right to freedom of religion does not occur 
in a vacuum, but takes place against the background of a tolerant, diverse and 
democratic society.  The process of balancing and evaluation takes place mindful of 
past injustices.  The balancing process is aptly summarised as follows: 
In sum, therefore, the Court places the purpose, effects and importance of the 
infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and effect of the 
infringement caused by the legislation on the other.  The more substantial the inroad 
into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds of justification must be.
140
 
 
                                                          
138
 N Smith ‗Freedom of religion under the Final Constitution‘ (1997) South African Law Journal 217, 
223. 
139
 See S v Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC),104 in which Chaskalson P 
held that section 36(1) requires ‗the weighing of competing values, and ultimately on an assessment 
based on proportionality.‘  It was in the matter of S v Makwanyane that the death penalty was declared 
unconstitutional. See also Lawrence (note 6 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 130, Christian 
Education (see note 7 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 31–35, 50-51. 
140
 S v Bhulwana, S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC); 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC), concerning the 
constitutionality of the presumption contained in section 21(1)(a)(I) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking 
Act. 
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Section 36 contains a set of relevant factors that need to be taken into consideration 
when determining the reasonableness and justifiability of a limitation.  What follows 
next is a brief consideration of the five factors listed in section 36 (1) (a) – (e).  These 
factors are aids to assist in the application of the general substantive limitation test as 
discussed above. 
 
(a) The nature of the right 
 
The nature of the right of religious liberty is unmistakably evident from the unanimous 
decision of the Constitutional Court in the Christian Education matter as written by 
Sachs J: 
There can be no doubt that the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion in the 
open and democratic society contemplated by the Constitution is important.
  
The right 
to believe or not to believe, and to act or not to act according to his or her beliefs or 
non-beliefs, is one of the key ingredients of any person‘s dignity.  Yet freedom of 
religion goes beyond protecting the inviolability of the individual conscience.  For 
many believers, their relationship with God or creation
 
is central to all their activities.  
It concerns their capacity to relate in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of 
themselves, their community and their universe.  For millions in all walks of life, 
religion provides support and nurture and a framework for individual and social 
stability and growth.  Religious belief has the capacity to awake concepts of self-
worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights.  It affects the 
believer‘s view of society and founds the distinction between right and wrong.  It 
expresses itself in the affirmation and continuity of powerful traditions that frequently 
have an ancient character transcending historical epochs and national boundaries.
141
 
 
                                                          
141
 Christian Education (note 7 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 36.  Also included in Prince (note 8 
above) as per Sachs J paragraph 151. 
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From the above quotation in the Christian Education case, the nature of the right to 
freedom of religion is seen as one of the ‗key ingredients‘ of a person‘s dignity.  
Furthermore the quotation refers to both the ‗community‘ and the ‗social stability‘.  It 
is argued that this reference is indicative of the interrelated nature of the right to 
religion and culture.  Therefore the importance of the right to freedom of religion is 
especially evident in the relationship between the person and her community.
142
  In 
light of the above discussed importance of the nature of the right to manifest religious 
belief, it is evident that the purpose of the limitation would therefore need to be in 
proportion to the importance of the nature of the right. 
 
(b) The importance and purpose of the limitation 
 
The purpose and importance of the limitation must be established and measured 
against an open democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.  
This requirement supports the weighing of competing values and interests.  In light of 
the importance attached to the right to freedom of religion, it is clear that the limitation 
would need to address an equally important goal.  In addition, the right to freedom 
may only be limited in pursuit of a legitimate goal.  The following goals could 
possibly serve as ground for limitation of the right, ‗public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others‘.143 
 
The limitation should be ‗necessary‘ in and open and democratic society based on 
religious tolerance which seeks to promote the utmost enjoyment of the right to 
religious freedom.
144
  In addition, the importance of the limitation could influence the 
                                                          
142
 See discussion on religion and culture in section 8.7. 
143
 See article 18 (3) or the ICCPR as discussed in section 4.3.1. 
144
 Smith claims that ‗Perhaps one can simply say that it would be unreasonable to limit freedom of 
religion in an open and democratic society unless it was really necessary.‘  See Smith (note 138 above) 
217, 223. 
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strictness of the application of the substantive limitation test.
145
  Following an 
examination of the purpose and importance of the nature of the right vis a vis the 
importance and purpose of the limitation the following enquiry is directed at 
evaluating the nature and extent of the limitation. 
 
(c) The nature and extent of the limitation 
 
The nature and extent of the limitation refers to the means of limitation and the 
manner in which the limitation is employed.  The nature and extent of the limitation is 
important in determining the possibility of less restricting ways in which the goal 
could be achieved.  For example, in the matter of Prince
146
 the Constitutional Court 
held that the importance of the limitation in countering the international concern of 
drug trafficking was in proportion to the restriction on the right to manifest religious 
rites, such as the use of cannabis. 
The relation between the nature of the right, the importance of the limitation and the 
extent of the limitation are aptly drawn together by Sachs J when he comments in the 
Lawrence matter as follows: 
The intensity or severity of the breach must accordingly be a highly relevant factor in 
any proportionality exercise; the more grievous the invasion of the right, the more 
compelling must be its justification.  Conversely, the lighter the transgression, the less 
stringent the requirement of justification.  Thus, I have no doubt that any state action 
which interfered directly with or compelled a particular form of religious observance 
would rarely pass the tests of reasonableness and necessity, if at all, and then only if 
the most compelling justificatory circumstances were established.  Indeed, there is a 
core to the individual conscience so intrinsic to the dignity of the human personality 
                                                          
145
 For example Rautenbach has argued that the more important the measure the less stringent the 
substantive test to be applied see  IM Rautenbach General Provisions of the South African Bill of Rights 
(1995) 112. 
146
 Prince (note 8 above). 
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that it is difficult to imagine any factors whatsoever that could justify its being 
penetrated by the state.
147
 
 
The above comment of Sachs J emphasises the pivotal nature of religious liberty to the 
dignity inherent in human personality.  Accordingly, any infringement of the right to 
freedom of religion must meet the most compelling of justificatory pre-conditions.  In 
this regard Meyerson argues that in a society based on the values of dignity, equality 
and freedom the state may only justifiably limit religious conduct if the reasons are 
acceptable to all reasonable persons, independent of a particular religious viewpoint.  
The proof of ‗neutral harm‘ on which ‗all reasonable people‘ can agree should be used 
as a test to determine the sustainability of limitations on the right to freedom of 
expression and religious rights.
148
 
 
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose 
 
The relation between the limitation of the right and the purpose of the limitation 
necessitates an enquiry into the extent to which the limitation achieves the purpose.  
Accordingly the effectiveness of the limitation is assessed.  A distinction is often 
drawn between under-inclusive limitations and over-inclusive limitations.
149
  An 
under-inclusive limitation achieves the purpose in an inadequate manner while an 
over-inclusive limitation achieves the purpose in an excessive manner.  A balance 
needs to be struck between the limitation and its purpose and the limitation should fit 
the purpose as precisely as is possible.  This balancing exercise supports the principle 
                                                          
147
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 168. 
148
 See generally D Meyerson (note 130 above). She claims that reliance on this test will maximise the 
free exercise of these rights. See also JE Buckingham ‗The Limits of Rights Limited‘ (2000) 11 
Stellenbosch Law Review 133 criticising Meyerson's proposals as being too freedom-centered. 
149
 See generally RP Bezanson ‗Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine‘ 
(1974) 7 Indiana Law Review 644. 
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of proportionality between the limitation and its purpose as well and indentifies if a 
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose exists. 
 
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
 
In determining if a less restrictive means could have been utilised to achieve the 
purpose, it is considered if a similar or comparable purpose could have been attained 
through the imposition of a reduced limitation on the right to religious liberty.  The 
limitation is therefore examined to determine if the purpose could have been achieved 
by ‗more or less effectively by less drastic means‘.150 
 
Application of the general limitations provision therefore depends on a context-
sensitive balancing exercise between various competing rights and interests in that: 
[L]imitations on constitutional rights can pass constitutional muster only if the Court 
concludes that, considering the nature and importance of the right and the extent to 
which it is limited, such limitation is justified in relation to the purpose, importance 
and effect of the provision which results in this limitation, taking into account the 
availability of less restrictive means to achieve this purpose. Though there might be 
special problems attendant on undertaking the limitations analysis in respect of 
religious practices, the standard to be applied is the nuanced and contextual one 
required by section 36 and not the rigid one of strict scrutiny.
151
 
 
An investigation into determining if the claimant could have been exempted also 
forms part of this balancing exercise and the question of reasonable accommodation 
arises.  The essential function of reasonable accommodation is to prevent the social 
marginalisation of groups and to accommodate and celebrate cultural and religious 
                                                          
150
 See generally E Brems ‗Human Rights Minimum and Maximum Perspectives‘ (2009) 9 (3) Human 
Rights Law Review 349. 
151
Christian Education (note 7 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 31. 
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diversity.  The right to manifest religious belief necessitate accommodation in a 
diverse society so that the right may be protected in full. 
 
8.6.2 Reasonable accommodation 
 
In societies committed to a multicultural conception of citizenship, accommodating 
religious and cultural difference is not only acceptable but desirable, as a public 
measure of facilitating equal citizenship.  Reasonable accommodation is therefore seen 
as a way in which religious and other minorities are enabled to express their cultural 
particularity.
152
 
 
A diverse society such as in SA requires not only tolerance but also mutual 
accommodation as well.  This diversity according to Sachs J presupposes that: 
[P]ersons may on their own, or in community with others, express the right to be 
different in belief or behaviour, without sacrificing any of the entitlements of the right 
to be the same in terms of common citizenship.
153
 
 
Accommodation therefore is not unfair, in particular if the group is a minority or a 
vulnerable group, as laws and regulations are often framed in a way that is consistent 
with the beliefs and values of the dominant, mainstream cultural groups.  For example, 
historically privileged forms of adornment cater for the dominant mainstream group 
                                                          
152
 Regarding Canada and SA‘s committment to multicultural citizenship see generally R Hirschl & A 
Shachar ‗The New Wall of Separation: Permitting Diversity, Restricting Competition‘ (2009) 30 
Cardozo Law Review 2535.  Hirschl and Shachar comments that in SA with its inclusive approach 
accommodation has been slow in the realms of customary law and the application of religious private 
law. 
153
 Lawrence (note 6 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 170. 
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but not for the vulnerable, minority groups.
154
  Genuine equality of opportunity, of the 
liberal multiculturalist conception, requires, for example an exemption to permit 
Muslim female pupils to wear headscarves in school to eliminate the excessive costs 
attached to compliance with the uniform regulations.
155
 
 
The South African Constitution is in many respects is designed to encourage 
accommodation.  The Preamble suggests the significance of national reconciliation.  
The need for reconciliation to overcome the division of the past emphasises the 
importance of tolerance and mutual accommodation of diversity.
156
  Through 
accommodation of this diversity the right to manifest religious belief in a diverse 
society may be best protected. 
 
The protection of the right to freedom of religion and the right to religious equality 
therefore all form part of the aim to cultivate tolerance and to respect diversity.
157
  
Tolerance requires even-handed treatment of diverse religions.
158
  Reasonable 
accommodation of difference requires that positive steps must be taken to promote the 
rights and display of difference in the South African society, allowing even those 
outside of the ‗mainstream‘ to swim freely in the water.159  To this end society can be 
described as follows: 
                                                          
154
 See generally P Lenta ‗Cultural and religious accommodations to school uniform regulations‘ (2008) 
S Woolman & T Roux (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 259. 
155
 Lenta (note 154 above) 261.  This is in contrast with the demand that all must comply with generally 
applicable laws as expressed by J Locke ‗A letter concerning toleration‘ in I Shapiro (ed) Two Treatises 
of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration (2003) 243. 
156
 For a detailed overview of the racial, ethnic and religious diversity of SA see EE Goodsell (note 13 
above) 109, 114 -115. 
157
 du Plessis (note 56 above) 422. 
158
 Ibid 451. 
159
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 76. 
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[S]ociety which values dignity, equality, and freedom must therefore require people to 
act positively to accommodate diversity.  Those steps might be as simple as granting 
and regulating an exemption from a general rule or they may require that the rules or 
practices be changed.
160
 
 
The question that remains is how far does this requirement of reasonable 
accommodation reach?  Does it require not more than an ‗undue hardship‘ together 
with not more than a de miminis cost
161
 or is ‗more than mere negligible effort … 
required to satisfy the duty to accommodate‘?162  The Constitutional Court has 
indicated that: 
There may be circumstances where fairness requires a reasonable accommodation, 
while in other circumstances it may require more or less, or something completely 
different. It will depend on the nature of the case and the nature of the interests 
involved.
163
 
The Constitution affirms diversity and the values of dignity, equality and freedom and 
therefore more than a mere de miminis cost is required in accommodating this 
diversity.  The need to accommodate diversity is even more acute if the discrimination 
arises from a rule that appears to be neutral, but which nevertheless marginalises 
certain portions of society.
164
  The more vulnerable the portion of society, the more 
                                                          
160
 Pillay (note 9 above) paragraph 75. 
161
 As required in the United States of America - Trans World Airlines Inc v Hardison 432 US 63 (1977) 
84. 
162
 As required by the Canadian Supreme Court in Central Okanagan School District No 23 v Renaud 
(1992) 2 SCR 970, 983g-985a. 
163
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 78. 
164
 Ibid.  Regarding neutral rules which may marginalise certain portions of society see the case of 
Garden Cities Incorporated Association Not for Gain v Northpine Islamic Society, 1999 2 SA 268 (C).  
In this matter the applicant, a developer, sold property to the respondent for the purpose of erecting a 
mosque.  In terms of the agreement the respondent would not conduct any activities that would be the 
source of nuisance or disturbance and the use of sound amplification was prohibited.  The respondent 
installed sound equipment to facilitate the athaan (call to prayer), a fundamental principle of the Islamic 
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important the protection afforded by the Bill of Right.
165
  It is important to be 
reminded that in the South African context, reasonable accommodation is not simply a 
matter of jurisprudential technique, but central to the constitutional enterprise of 
promoting the values contained in the Constitution. 
 
Overall, there should be a presumption in favour of accommodating religious 
difference.
166
  This presumption is even more compelling in the event of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
faith similar to the tolling of church bells.  An order interdicting the respondent to use the sound 
amplification equipment was requested and granted.  The court held that the prohibition did not infringe 
the right to freedom of religion of Muslims as it merely regulated, by consensus, a particular ritual 
practised at a particular place in the interests of other members of the community. 
165
 See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); 1998 
(12) BCLR 1517 (CC), 25 and as referred to in Prince (note 8 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 157.  
The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice dealt with the application of 
the sodomy laws and the compatibility thereof with the right to equality, the right to human dignity and 
the right to privacy.  The Constitutional Court confirmed all orders of the High Court and confirmed the 
offence of sodomy unconstitutional. 
166
 Regarding the right of scholars and employees to wear the Islamic headscarf see P Lenta ‗Muslim 
Headscarves in the Workplace and in Schools‘ (2007) 124 (2) South African Law Journal 296, 319.  
Lenta comments on two incidents of conflict between the religious obligation to wear a headscarf and 
regulations at the workplace and at schools that proscribe the wearing of headscarves.  The first is a 
matter brought before the Labour Court in which a social worker challenged her dismissal from 
employment at the Worcester Prison.  The Department of Correctional Services held that she violated 
the ‗corporate identity‘ by wearing a headscarf as required in terms of her Muslim faith and refusing to 
tuck her shirt into her skirt, in contravention with the official uniform for employees.  The employee 
was subsequently reinstated.  Another incident involved a Muslim schoolgirl, ordered by the 
Johannesburg school she attended to remove her headscarf, as the wear thereof was in breach of the 
school‘s uniform requirements.  Lenta maintains that a more appropriate response would be to view 
religious adherents, wearing religious symbols as citizens in a multicultural society living according to 
the beliefs of their culture (at 309) and that there is an duty to accommodate.  Any other ruling on this 
question would risk disregarding anti-discrimination legislation, as well as violating the religious liberty 
of the claimants (at 312).  In contrast with Lenta, Ngwena suggests that the state does not have an 
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accommodating the religious and cultural needs of the marginalised.  The consequence 
of the past injustices also need to be considered in seeking to build a just and equitable 
community.  The accommodation therefore requires a sensitive balancing of rights on 
a case by case basis as illustrated next in the jurisprudence of the courts.
167
 
 
The scope and application of the right to manifest religious belief will be analysed on 
a case by case basis in light of the aforementioned limitation test as well as the duty to 
ensure reasonable accommodation.  In this case by case evaluation the features of the 
right to freedom of religion as identified above will be utilised.  Consequently the 
emphasis in this discussion will be on the interrelated aspects of the right to freedom 
of religion, that is to say the collective nature of religion as culture, the right to 
religious non-discrimination and the value of religious faith for the individuals‘ 
dignity.  The emphasis in this discussion is further to evaluate how the interrelated 
aspects all should be protected in order to ensure the protection of the right to manifest 
religious belief. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
unlimited duty to accommodate.  For example, where there is a ‗compelling need‘ for a particular 
service and the accommodation of the beliefs of religious people would cause ‗undue hardship‘ to other 
people, that the state does not have a unlimited duty accommodate religious and other beliefs.  In this 
regard see C Ngwena ‗Conscientious objection and legal abortion in South Africa: Delineating the 
parameters‘ (2003) 28 Journal for Juridical Science 1, 10.  This approach is supported by Bonthuys 
where she maintains that the objections permitted in the performing of civil unions are indicates that 
homophobia is still permitted.  By allowing marriage officers to object only on the ground of sexual 
orientation, the state not only condones homophobia but is complicit in the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the social and symbolic recognition afforded to opposite-sex couples.  In this regards see 
generally E Bonthuys ‗Irrational accommodation: Conscience, Religion and Same-Sex Marriages in 
South Africa‘ (2008) 24 (2) South African Law Journal 125. 
167
 In this regard see generally LWH Ackermann ‗Some Reflections on the Constitutional Court's 
Freedom of Religion Jurisprudence‘ (2002) 43 Dutch Reformed Theological Journal 183; Farlam (note 
64 above) 41; Du Plessis (note 124 above) 9. 
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8.7. Collective nature of religion and culture 
 
Religion and culture encapsulate similarities and differences.
168
  Belief, on the one 
hand, by its very nature is something personal to the individual.  It belongs to the 
conscience, but belief also has a social dimension, a cultural dimension, and even a 
national dimension.
169
  Culture, on the other hand is describes as follows ‗it is who we 
are, how we see each other. ... It includes our languages, our body movements, the 
way we sit down next to each other, even the differing textures, rustles and fragrances 
of our clothes‘.170  Culture is therefore interpreted more broadly than religion, 
embracing everything that makes people social beings.
171
 
 
Section 15 protects an individual's freedom to hold whatever religion, while section 31 
embraces a community's freedom to practice a said religion or culture.
172
  As indicated 
above, the individual and cultural aspects complement each another.  In addition the 
cultural diversity of the South African population is recognised in various provisions 
of the Constitution
173
 and it is consequently of particular relevance within the South 
                                                          
168
 See J Amoah & T Bennett ‗The Freedoms of Religion and Culture Under The South African 
Constitution: Do Traditional African Religions Enjoy Equal Treatment? (2008) 24 Journal of Law and 
Religion 1, 7 
169
 Sachs (note 58 above) 180. 
170
 Sachs (note 58 above) 158. 
171
 Amoah and Bennett (note 168 above) 6.  See generally also GE Devenish ‗Minority rights and 
cultural pluralism – the protection of language and cultural identity in the 1996 Constitution‘ (1999) 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg 201; GJ Van Niekerk ‗Legal Pluralism‘ in JC 
Bekker, & C Rautenbach & NMI Goolam (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa (2006). 
172
 This distinction was taken from the Canadian case, R v Big M Drug Mart [1985] 1 SCR 295, 336 and 
incorporated into the Constitutional Court‘s jurisprudence by Chaskalson J in Lawrence (see note 6 
above) 92.  It was followed in Prince (note 8 above) as per Langa J 38 and Christian Education (see 
note 7 above) as per Sachs J 19. 
173
 See the Constitution of SA: sections 9, 30, 31, 181, 184-186, 235 as well as schedules 4 and 5 refer 
to culture, cultural life, cultural community and cultural heritage.  Sections 9, 15-16, 31 and 37 refer to 
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African context.  The term cultural diversity is however not defined, calling for an 
analysis of the manner in which culture has been applied to create some 
clarification.
174
 
 
Rautenbach et al identifies three ways in which the term culture is used in the 
Constitution.  First, as a ‗specific tradition based on ethics‘;175 second, as ‗a collective 
term for aesthetical expression‘,176 for example, art or literature and third, the term 
‗identifies and binds a specific group of people‘,177 based on a number of 
characteristics such a language, religion, beliefs and traditions.
178
 
 
Within this latter meaning it is evident that the term culture includes concepts such as 
religion.  It is argued that the appreciation of the fact that religion and culture may 
intersect is important in the evaluation of a suitable approach to protecting the right to 
manifest religious belief. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
religion, conscience, thought, belief and opinion while sections 15, 143, 211-212, 219 as well as 
schedules 4 and 5 refer to tradition or traditional leaders. 
174
 See generally C Rautenbach, F Jansen van Rensburg & G Pienaar ‗Culture (And Religion) In 
Constitutional Adjudication‘ (2003) 6 (1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1. 
175
 See Rautenbach, Jansen van Rensburg & Pienaar (note 174 above) 3.  See for example Islamic Unity 
Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority: 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) 27.  ‗[A] society based on a 
constitutionally protected culture of openness and democracy and universal human rights for South 
Africans.‘ 
176
 See Rautenbach, Jansen van Rensburg & Pienaar (note 174 above) 4. 
177
 Ibid. 
178
 Sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution of SA do not refer to culture in general but to ‗cultural life‘ 
and ‗their culture‘. According to I Currie ‗Minority Rights: Education, Culture, and Language‘ in A 
Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (1995) 35, 19 this indicates that culture in 
this context refers to a number of synonymous terms such as tradition, customs, civilisation, race, nation 
and folkways. 
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Furthermore, within the South African context the role of traditional African religion 
and culture has often been considered less deserving of protection than dominant 
Christian religion or culture.
179
  This point of view is further stimulated through the 
course of urbanisation that affords less importance to the traditional way of life.  Often 
this viewpoint is coupled with a tendency to regard traditional religions and culture as 
something less than ‗proper‘ in terms of Western thinking.  This was the dominant 
mode of thinking in the colonial past and is still present in the current day.
180
  For 
these reasons African culture is often not valued equally to other religions or cultures.  
As a result conflict has arisen with regards to, for example, animal sacrifice, which 
may offend municipal health regulations and animal rights activists
181
 and burial sites, 
which may infringe the rights of property owners.
182
  The balancing that needs to take 
place when the right to freedom of religion conflicts with other rights, such as the right 
to private property, will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
The inhibited recognition of African traditional customary law is also noticeable with 
regards to other religions and cultures that differ from the dominant religion and 
culture.  For example, limited applicability is also noticeable in the area of Muslim 
                                                          
179
 Chidester (note 14 above) 44-5. 
180
 See generally Amoah and Bennett (note 168 above)13-14. 
181
 In January 2007, Tony Yengeni, former Chief Whip of South Africa's governing party in Parliament, 
the African National Congress (ANC), celebrated his early release from a four-year prison sentence by 
slaughtering a bull at his father's house in the Cape Town township of Gugulethu. This time-honored 
African ritual was performed in order to appease the Yengeni family ancestors. Animal rights activists, 
however, decried the sacrifice as an act of unnecessary cruelty to the bull, and a public outcry ensued.  
In this regard see press release ‗Yengeni animal slaughter not criminal – South African Human Rights 
Commission‘ (23 January 2007). Available at  
 <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=qw1169538120458B262>  
last accessed on 24/01/2007. 
182
 Nkosi & Another v Bührmann 2002 (1) SA 372 (SCA) (Nkosi v Bührmann).  The case was in relation 
to conflict arising with regard to burial sites, which may infringe the rights of property owners. 
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Personal Law and African traditional Customary Law particularly with regards to the 
subject of marriage and succession.
183
 
                                                          
183
 A possible ground being that the customary and religious laws are infused with gender inequality. In 
this regard see D Ackermann ‗Women, Religion and Culture: A Feminist Perspective on ‗Freedom of 
Religion‘ (1994) 22 (3) Missionalia 212, 225:  ‗For women, freedom of religion means freedom from 
both religious and cultural constraints which impinge negatively on our experience . . . [A]s women 
struggle with the ambiguity of our relationship to the idea of ‗freedom of religion‘, while at the same 
time recognising our legitimate claims for a religious and  cultural identity, we need to challenge those 
aspects of both religion and culture which are oppressive to us and learn to live with the pain of 
ambiguity creatively.‘  See also the discussion of PE Andrews, 'Big Love'? The Recognition of 
Customary Marriages in South Africa‘ (2007) 64 Washington & Lee Law Review 1485, 1486 as well as 
the trilogy of cases in Mthembu: Mthembu v Letsela 1997 (2) SA 936 (TPD); Mthembu v Letsela & 
Another 1998 (2) SA 675 (T);  Mthembu v Letsela & Another 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA) permitting the 
application of discriminatory customary law provisions, and the opposite ruling in Bhe & Others v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha, & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), in which the Constitutional Court upheld a 
constitutional challenge to the rule of male primogeniture as it applies in the customary law of 
succession.  In Bhe, Langa DCJ writing the majority decision held that the African customary law rule 
of male primogeniture discriminated unfairly against women and illegitimate children and was, 
therefore, unconstitutional and invalid.  For an comparative perspective on how to deal with diverse 
cultural succession arrangements, see generally C Rautenbach ‗Indian succession laws with special 
reference to the position of females: a model for South Africa‘ (2008) 41 (1) Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 105.  With regard to the position of marriage see also 
Gumede v President of the Republic of South. Africa & Others 2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC).  Not only has 
the incorporation of customary law proven problematic, religious law, Muslim Personal Law and the 
limited recognition of Muslim marriages in particular has also not been without question.  In the case of 
Ryland v Edros, 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C) dealing with a divorced Muslim woman‘s claim for 
maintenance.  The court held that the transitional Constitution had the effect of soothing conventional 
prejudices about Muslim marriages, especially as the parties were married (although not according to 
South African law) and their union was in fact monogamous, therefore there was nothing repugnant 
about their union.  However, the court called into question a ‗public policy‘ that reflects the preferences 
and prejudices of the predominant Christian society.  For a proposal that Muslim Personal Law be 
recognised in terms of section 15(3) (a) of the Constitution of SA, so that its provisions can be brought 
into conformity with the constitutional Bill of Rights see generally N Moosa ‗The Interim and Final 
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The above point of view that certain religions or cultures seemingly do not comply 
with the dictates of the dominant perspective and are therefore something less than 
‗proper‘ has justly been criticised by the Constitutional Court in the matter of Pillay.  
In support of the decision in Pillay it is argued that there can be no universal scale of 
‗correctness‘.184  It is argued that equal treatment of all cultures and religions and non-
discrimination is imperative if we wish to ensure diversity.  The requirement of equal 
treatment is of particular importance with regard to the right to manifest diverse 
religious or cultural practices.  To evaluate the impact of a dominant perspective on 
the display of cultural and religious practices and to identify a suitable approach in 
terms of which these rights can be best protected in a diverse community, an analysis 
of the matter of Pillay case follows next. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Constitutions and Muslim Personal Law: Implications for South African Muslim Women‘ (1998) 9 
Stellenbosch Law Review 196.  A true victory was the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) in which 
Mahomed CJ held that the political and constitutional changes that had taken place were all evidence of 
the ‗new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and religious freedom‘ (paragraph 20) that pointed to the legal 
recognition of a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage.  Mofokeng argues that South African courts 
have failed to ‗promote the values of human dignity, equality and freedom‘ by not recognising that 
religious personal law (or at least religious family law) has become part of the mainstream legal system 
in SA.  In this regard see generally LL Mofokeng ‗The right to freedom of religion: an apparently 
misunderstood aspect of legal diversity in South Africa‘ (2007) 11 Law Democracy and Development 
121.  In contrast with South Africa, India recognises all forms of personal laws in private matters.  
While commercial, civil, and criminal matters are regulated according to secular law.  Family law 
matters, such as marriage and divorce, inheritance and succession are regulated in accordance with 
religious personal laws.  For a more recent discussion regarding the role of Muslim Personal Law in 
South Africa see generally C Rautenbach ‗Some comments on the current (and future) status of Muslim 
personal law in South Africa‘ (2004) (2) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1; N Pillay ‗Women's 
rights in human rights systems: Past, present and future‘ (2009) 13(2) Law, Democracy & Development 
36; and A Claassens & S Mnisi ‗Rural women redefining land rights in the context of living customary 
law‘ (2009) 25(3) South African Journal on Human Rights 491. 
184
 W Menski Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2006) 414, 
415. The determination of ‗rightness; or ‗correctness‘ is established by the religion concerned. 
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8.7.1. MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 
 
Sunali Pillay, in expressing her cultural identity, chose to wear a nose stud as part of a 
family tradition which honoured her as a responsible young adult and indicated that 
she had become eligible for marriage.
185
  As a result she faced disciplinary 
proceedings at her school for failing to remove the stud, the wearing of which was in 
contravention with the school code.
186
  The matter was referred the to the Equality 
Court which held that although a prima facie case of discrimination had been made 
out, the discrimination was not unfair, as the code had been drawn up in consultation 
with the learners, representative council, parents and the governing body.  The 
Equality Court accepted the purpose of the code as being ‗to promote uniformity and 
acceptable convention amongst the learners‘.187  On appeal to the Pietermaritzburg 
High Court
188
 the court held that the conduct of the school was indeed unfair, as the 
prohibition served to prolong discrimination against a vulnerable and marginalised 
group,
189
 and as the prohibition denied her the importance of her religion and culture it 
had a demeaning effect on her identity.  The court further held that the school had 
                                                          
185
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 7.  For a discussion on the Pillay case see generally 
C Rautenbach ‗Godsdienstige en Kulturele Simbole in Openbare Skole: Sigbaarwording en Groei van 
Regspluralisme in Suid-Afrika‘ (2008) Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch Law 25-37; Lenta (note 
154 above) 259; I Benson, ‗The case for religious inclusivism and the judicial recognition of religious 
associational rights: A response to Lenta‘ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 295. 
186
 The school uniform code stipulated as follows: ‗Jewellery: Ear-rings – plain round studs/sleepers 
may be worn, ONE in each ear lobe at the same level.  No other jewellery may be worn, except a wrist 
watch.  Jewellery includes any adornment/bristle which may be in any body piercing.  Watches must be 
in keeping with the school uniform.  Medic-Alert discs may be worn‘.  See Pillay (note 9 above) 
paragraph 5. 
187
 Pillay v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and Others 2006 (6) SA 363 (EqC) 14.  The judgments 
of the Equality Court and the High Court were analysed by Rautenbach (note 185 above) 25. 
188
 Pillay v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and Others 2006 (10) BCLR 1237 (N). 
189
 Indians and in particular South Indian Tamil Hindus. 
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failed to dismantle structures of discrimination and that the aims of the uniform code 
could have been achieved in a less infringing manner. 
 
Three themes in particular emerge from the decision in Pillay and are relevant for 
purposes of this evaluation:  Firstly, appreciation of the influence of historically 
privileged cultural and religious practices; secondly interpreting religious and cultural 
practices in a broad and flexible manner; and finally awareness of the intersection 
between culture and religion that is evident from this case.  It is argued that the 
approach of the court with regards to these three themes is commendable and that 
indeed the appreciation of these three themes enhanced the right to manifest religious 
belief and cultural practices in a diverse society.  These three themes are analysed in 
more detail below. 
 
Historically privileged cultural and religious practices 
 
On appeal to the Constitutional Court by the Department of Education and others, the 
court was faced with the question of whether the effect of the code was discriminatory. 
The court in the majority decision of Langa J held that the code indeed was 
discriminatory in so far as: 
The norm embodied by the Code was not neutral, but enforces mainstream and 
historically privileged forms of adornment, such as ear studs, …at the expense of the 
minority and historically excluded forms.  [Further continuing] It thus places a burden 
on learners who are unable to express themselves fully and must attend school in an 
environment that does not completely accept them.
190 
 
                                                          
190
 Pillay (note 9 above) paragraph 44. 
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The court identified that certain rules may have the appearance of neutrality but that 
these so-called neutral norms often merely represent historical privileges.  The impact 
of this dominance is further acknowledged when the court further stated that: 
The protection of the Constitution extends to all ... not only to those who happen to 
speak with the most powerful voice in the present cultural conversation.
191
 
The approach of the court in questioning the neutrality of rules and being perceptive to 
power imbalance is welcomed.  The Constitutional Court‘s awareness of the fact that 
neutral norms often reflect the historical power imbalances, as well as the court‘s 
accommodation of subjective practices in affirming diversity, are carried through in 
the court‘s dismissal of the argument that there was consultation in formulating the 
uniform code.  Although the court is appreciative of the value of consultation
192
 and 
affirms that consultation and public participation are worthy in promoting and 
deepening democracy,
193
 the court does not agree that consultation could immunise 
these decisions from constitutional scrutiny.  The reality is that many individual 
communities still retain historically unequal power relations which may make it more 
likely that decisions will infringe on the rights of disfavoured groups.
194
 
 
The court here in contrast with the decision of the House of Lords in Begum is mindful 
of the impact that historical unequal power relations may have on the possibility of 
true consensus and the possibility of voluntary waiving a right.  The South African 
Constitutional Court was further aware of the need to accommodate difference and to 
accept people as they are, in that: 
                                                          
191
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 54. 
192
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 80. 
193
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 83. 
194
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 83. 
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The development of an active rather than a purely formal sense of enjoying a common 
citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people with all their differences, as 
they are.
195 
 
The court not only appreciated the impact of historical privilege on religions and 
cultures that are different from the dominant religion or culture, but further enhanced 
the protection afforded to the right to practice diverse religious and cultural practices 
through the interpretation of the right to religion and culture in a broad and flexible 
manner as discussed next. 
 
Broad and flexible interpretation of the right 
 
The approach of the court in interpreting the right to freedom of religion in a broad 
and flexible is commendable.
196
  The court refrains from drawing a distinction 
between voluntary and obligatory practices.  Affording mandatory practices protection 
only, merely tolerates diversity and does not promote and celebrate the existence of 
diversity in any other way.
197
  The court adopted an approach to truly celebrate 
difference when Langa J held that: 
The protection of voluntary as well as obligatory practices also conforms to the 
Constitution‘s commitment to affirming diversity.  It is a commitment that is totally in 
accord with this nation‘s decisive break from its history of intolerance and exclusion. 
Differentiating between mandatory and voluntary practices does not celebrate or 
affirm diversity, it simply permits it.  That falls short of our constitutional project 
                                                          
195
 Fourie (note 78 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 60. 
196
 The approach of the court is also in line with the broad and flexible interpretation of the right to 
freedom of religion as discussed in section 8.5. 
197
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 65. 
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which not only affirms diversity, but promotes and celebrates it.  We cannot celebrate 
diversity by permitting it only when no other option remains
198
. 
 
In addition, the court also does not inquire as to the objective importance of the 
practice.  It is suggested that the court should not be concerned with the objective 
importance or centrality of a belief to a particular religion or culture, in so far as that: 
If Sunali states that the nose stud is central to her as a South Indian Tamil Hindu, it is 
not for the Court to tell her that she is wrong because others do not relate to that 
religion or culture in the same way
199
. 
 
The approach followed by the court also avoids the difficulties that have arisen, for 
example from the House of Lords endorsement of the ‗mainstream‘ acceptability of 
the shalwar kameeze as appropriate dress
200
 and therefore finding that there was no 
infringement of the right to manifest religious belief.  Furthermore the court was not 
concerned with only permitted symbols that are not conspicuous as applied in France 
in terms of the French Law of 2004.
201
  The difficulties of these approaches have been 
critiqued previously.
202
 
 
The Constitutional Court affirmed that the display of religion and culture in public is 
not a ‗parade of horribles‘ but a pageant of diversity which will enrich our schools and 
in turn our country.
203
  One of the concerns of the school was that a judgment in 
favour of Ms Pillay would be that many more learners would come to school for 
example displaying dreadlocks.
204
  The display by Rastafari of dreadlocks has 
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 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 64. 
199
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 87. 
200
 See discussion of Begum in section 7.3.2.2. 
201
 See section 7.2.2. 
202
 See section 6.3 and 6.2.3. 
203
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 107. 
204
 Ibid. 
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officially been recognised in the jurisprudence of SA
205
 and Zimbabwe.
206
  
Recognition of practices other than the display of dreadlocks by members of the 
                                                          
205
 The right of a Rastafari student to wear dreadlocks in a public school was affirmed in the High Court 
of SA decision in Antonie v Governing Body, Settlers High School and Others  2002 (4) SA 738 TPD 
(Antonie).  In Antonie, the High Court set aside the decision of a school governing body to suspend a 
Rastafari student who refused to cut her dreadlocks upon instructions from the school principal.  The 
school characterised her refusal not to wear dreadlocks as disruptive and amounting to ‗serious 
misconduct‘  According to a recent interpretation of the South African National Department of 
Education Manifesto in Education and Values it would be absurd in SA to expel, or even suspend a 
learner for breaking a school rule by wearing a Rastafari hairstyle to school, as this would not be in line 
with the values of tolerance reflected in the Manifesto.  In this regard see generally WJ van 
Vollenhoven & S Blignaut ‗Muslim learners religion expression through attire in cultural diverse public 
school in South Africa: A cul-de-sac?‘ (2007) 35 Journal of Family Ecology and Consumer Sciences 1, 
7.  Most recently the dismissal of several male employees, who insisted on wearing dreadlocks as a 
form of manifestation of their religious or cultural practices, was found to constitute unfair 
discrimination in terms of section 6 of the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998.  In this regard see 
Police and Prison Rights Union and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Another 
(C544/2007) [2010] ZALC 68; 2010 (9) BCLR 921 (LC)  
206
 Mr Chickeche, a devout Rastafari was considered by the presiding judge as unkempt and not 
properly dressed in his appearance to be admitted as a legal practitioner before the High Court.  The 
judge objected to the plaintiff‘s hair, which he wore in dreadlocks.  The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe 
held that the wearing of dreadlocks was a symbolic expression of the beliefs of Rastafarianism and fell 
within the protection of freedom of conscience afforded by Section19 (1) of the Aimbabwean 
Constitution.  See Re Chickeche (1995) 2 LRC 93.  In Malawi, Rastafari students are prevented from 
attending public schools on account of their dreadlocks.  For a discussion of the conformity of this 
prohibition with international obligations see generally MO Mhango ‗The Constitutional Protection of 
Minority Religious Rights in Malawi: The Case of Rastafari‘ Students‘ (2008) 52 Journal of African 
Law 218.  Mhango reflects on the unanimous Supreme Court of Zimbabwe decision in Farai Dzvova v 
Minister of Education, Sports and Culture and Others, in which the court ruled that the expulsion of six 
year-old Farai Dzvova from the Ruvheneko Government Primary School because of his expression of 
his religious belief through wearing dreadlocks, is a contravention of section 19 of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe.  See also Farai Dzvova v Minister of Education, Sports and Culture and Others, SC 26/07 
(2007) ZNSC 26; see also MO Mhango ‗Upholding the Rastafari religion in Zimbabwe: Farai Dzvova v 
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Rastafarian religion has also been evaluated by the Constitutional Court in the matter 
of Prince, discussed in more detail below.
207
 
 
It is argued that the court through interpreting the right in this broad and flexible 
manner indeed promoted and encouraged the respect and protection of the right to 
manifest religious and cultural practices.  The flexible interpretation of the court is 
further enhanced, in that the court is appreciative of the intersection between religion 
and culture as seen from the discussion below. 
 
Intersection between religion and culture 
 
Regarding the differences and similarities between culture and religion the court in 
Pillay pointed out that it does not really make a difference whether the discrimination 
was on religious or cultural grounds, especially since Sunali Pillay was part of the 
South Indian, Tamil and Hindu group.  This group was defined by a combination of 
religion, language, geographical origin, ethnicity and artistic tradition.
208
  In addition, 
it was possible for ‗a belief or practice to be purely religious or purely cultural, it is 
equally possible for it to be both religious and cultural‘.209  It is maintained that 
through acknowledging this interrelated nature of religion and culture the court 
ensured comprehensive protection of the right to manifest diverse religious and 
cultural practices.  However in acknowledging the interrelated nature of religion and 
culture it is reasoned that these rights should not per se be regarded as similar.  What 
follows next are some of the observations of the minority judgment in relation to the 
differences and similarities between culture and religion. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Minister of Education, Sports and Culture and Others‘ (2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 
221. 
207
 See section 8.7.1.1. 
208
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa J paragraph 50. 
209
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa J paragraph 47. 
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O‘Regan J identified the following difference between the right to freedom of religion, 
on the one hand, and the associative religious and cultural practices, on the other 
hand.
210
  Religion is associated with belief and conscience, which implies an 
individual state of mind.  Therefore religion is to be understood in an individualistic 
sense.
211
  However, culture involves associative practices and requires the 
participation of ‗other members in the group‘.212  The right to culture requires that the 
right must be an associative right, protected because of its shared meaning.  Therefore 
the associative quality of the right to culture is important.
213
 
 
Although appreciating this difference O‘Regan accepted that it may not always be 
possible to distinguish between culture and religion.  In addition the Constitution 
recognises two distinct rights, culture and religion, and therefore these two rights 
should not always be treated the same.
214
  The exclusion of culture from section 15 
and the inclusion of culture in sections 30 and 31 suggest that culture is different.
215
 
 
Despite emphasising the associative quality of the right to culture, O‘Regan also 
identified that the value of cultural rights is based on the value of human dignity.  
Cultural rights are valued because cultural practices ‗afford individuals the possibility 
and choice to live a meaningful life‘.216  The value of culture is further emphasised in 
the fact that an individual cannot achieve her full potential without relating to 
                                                          
210
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 148. 
211
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 143. 
212
 See section 31 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
213
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 157. 
214
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 143. 
215
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 144. 
216
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 157. 
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others,
217
 and ‗cultural identity is one of the most important parts of a person‘s identity 
precisely because it flows from belonging to a community and not from personal 
choice or achievement‘.218  For these reasons it is apparent that associative practices 
and the community is as important to the individual identity
219
 and therefore to human 
dignity.
220
  In addition to the value of culture in relation to human dignity, the 
protection of cultural rights is directly related to the constitutional purpose to establish 
unity and solidarity in our diverse society.  This unity and solidarity requires not mere 
toleration of difference, but institutional commitment.
221
 
 
It is agreed that at times a distinction ought to be drawn between culture and religion.  
However religion should not be seen as more important.  It is the value of culture in 
relation to human dignity that is of particular relevance.  Cultural practices may be as 
important to those who hold them as religious beliefs are to others.
222
  The importance 
of associative practices is also central to African thought in the notion that ‗we are not 
islands unto ourselves‘.223  Therefore religion and cultural practices can be equally 
                                                          
217
 K Gyekye Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies (1992) reprinted as ‗Person and 
Community in African Thought‘ in PH Coetzee and APJ Roux (eds) Philosophy from Africa: A Text 
with Readings (1998) 321. 
218
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 53. 
219
 See discussion in section 7.6.3 in which the approach of defining religion as an essentially private 
choice is criticised as the courts in doing so do not acknowledge the cultural and public demands of 
religion 
220
 The relationship between the right to freedom of religion and human dignity is explored in more 
detail in section 8.7.3. 
221
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per O‘Regan J paragraph 157. 
222
Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 53. 
223
 Often expressed as umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu which emphasises communality and the inter-
dependence of the members of a community‘ as included in the Pillay (note 9 above) 53.  A recognition 
of the importance of the community to the individual is not exclusive to African theory, in this regard 
see, for example, W Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995) 
89-90; M Chanock ‗Human Rights and Cultural Branding: Who Speaks and How‘ in An-Na‘im 
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important to a person‘s identity.  It is therefore not important in which category it is 
placed but what is of importance is the meaning to the person involved, as 
‗categorisation reinforces ideas about the importance of religion and culture in 
peoples‘ lives and fails to accommodate those who do not conform to that 
stereotype‘.224 
 
The approach of the Constitutional Court not to force grounds of discrimination into 
‗neatly self-contained categories‘225 is welcomed and the acknowledgement that 
culture and religion may at times ‗sing with the same voice‘226 is endorsed in this 
study.  Another matter in which the right of a minority religion was analysed by the 
Constitutional Court is the matter of Prince discussed next. 
 
8.7.2 Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 
 
In the matter of Prince the constitutional validity of the prohibition on the use or 
possession of cannabis
227
 inspired by religion was questioned by the Constitutional 
Court.  The Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope had refused to register Mr 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in Africa (2002) 41.  See also S Benhabib The Claims of 
Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (2002) 3, 9. 
224
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 91.  Religion is not just a question of belief or 
doctrine.  It is part of a way of life, of a people‘s temper and culture.  See AC Carmella ‗Mary Ann 
Glendon on Religious Liberty:  The Social Nature of the Person and the Public Nature of Religion‘ 
(1998) 73 (5) Notre Dame Law Review 1191, 1195. 
225
 Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), paragraph 50; 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC), 
paragraph 49.  The matter of Harksen considered an application for an declaration of constitutional 
invalidity of certain sections of the Insolvency Act on the basis of right to property and equality.  The 
majority of the court found the provisions constitutional. 
226
 Pillay (note 9 above) as per Langa CJ paragraph 60. 
227
 In terms of the provisions of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 and the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965. 
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Prince‘s contract of community service as a candidate attorney because of his religious 
habit of smoking marijuana.  The majority,
228
 held that Rastafarianism was a religion 
and therefore the legislation impacted on the Rastafarian‘s individual right (section 14 
of the Interim Constitution) and collective rights (section 31 of the Interim 
Constitution) to practice their religion.  To allow harmful drugs to be used by certain 
people for religious purposes, would impair the state‘s ability to enforce its drug 
legislation.
229
 
 
In a separate dissenting judgment, Sachs J emphasised that the legislation appeared 
benign but indeed forced a ‗constitutionally intolerable choice between their faith and 
the law‘.230  Therefore the majority judgment did not adequately consider the burden 
imposed on the right to freedom of religion and indeed values the ease of law 
enforcement above the demands of ‗tolerance and respect for diversity that our 
Constitution demands for and from all in society‘.231 
 
The judgement of Sachs J in the Prince case clearly illustrates an awareness of the 
needs of the religious ‗other‘.  He emphasised the vulnerability of Rastafarians – their 
‗experience of otherness‘,232 in comparison to mainstream religions. He acknowledged 
the dignity and vulnerability of the Rastafarians over expediency, obliging ‗the State 
                                                          
228
 The majority (in a judgment written by Chaskalson CJ, Ackermann and Kriegler JJ) Goldstone and 
Jacoob JJ concurring.  Dissenting judgments were put forward by Ngcobo J with Sachs J, Mokgoro J 
and Madlanga AJ concurring, in which it was argued that the regulation of cannabis for religious 
purposes would not unduly burden the state. Sachs J, with Mokgoro J concurring, put forward an 
additional separate dissent in which he added ‗some observations of a general kind‘.  Only nine of the 
eleven judges participated in this case. 
229
 For an overview of the Rastafarian movement see generally SP Pretorius ‗The significance of the use 
of ganja as a religious ritual in the Rastafari movement‘ (2006) 27(3) Verbum Et Ecclesia Journal 1012. 
230
 Prince (note 8 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 145. 
231
 Prince (note 8 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 147. 
232
 Prince (note 8 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 157. 
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to walk the extra mile‘233 to meet its obligation to respect difference.  Sachs J was 
appreciative of difference in religious beliefs and sought to accommodate such 
difference in a non-hierarchical framework of equality and non-discrimination.  He 
further confirmed that an obligation exists to dismantle religious stereotypes that 
impact on the right to equality.
234
 
 
The point of view of Sachs J in the matter of Prince, that difference should not be 
viewed as a basis for unequal treatment is supported.  The quest for substantive 
equality and demands for cultural or religious accommodation is imperative in a 
pluralistic society.
235
  The need to appreciate difference and to accommodate such 
difference in a non-hierarchical framework of equality and non-discrimination is vivid 
in the dissenting judgment of Sachs J.  The claim for the recognition of diversity is 
reinforced through the language of the celebration of ‗the right to be different‘ in the 
following manner: 
Given our dictatorial past in which those in power sought incessantly to command the behaviour, 
beliefs and taste of all in society, it is no accident that the right to be different has emerged as one 
of the most treasured aspects of our new constitutional order.
236
 
 
Accommodation of the right to freedom of religion was the main concern in the matter 
of Prince and Pillay.  In these matters the issue was whether a particular party should 
have been exempted from complying with generally applicable rules in order to 
                                                          
233
 Prince (note 8 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 149. 
234
 McLean argues that any acceptable concept of freedom of religion cannot be based on the idea that 
the government should be neutral and should not endorse a particular world view or belief system.  He 
argues that state neutrality is impossible because when we decide what religious beliefs and practices 
are acceptable for our society and which are not, we invariably base it on our religious or other beliefs 
and we can therefore never pretend to make such decisions from a neutral and objective point of view.  
In this regard see generally GR McLean (note 56 above) 174. 
235
 Prince (note 8 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 155. 
236
 Prince (note 8 above) as per Sachs J paragraph 170. 
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accommodate such party‘s religious beliefs or their rights to practise their culture.  It is 
interesting to note that even when the court's approach seemed progressive and open-
minded, the practical results of the majority decision in for example the Prince case 
was to affirm the normality or stability of traditional views.  The view of what 
constitutes a religion and what is protected as religious freedom is an affirmation of 
traditional views and ideas.
237
  The majority court endorses what a ‗good life‘ should 
entail and excludes ‗the other‘.238  This approach does not purposefully endeavour to 
accommodate diversity and is not in the interest of protecting diverse religious beliefs 
and cultural practices.  It is contended that the approach of the minority in Prince 
better serves the rights of the marginalised other in a diverse society. 
 
The historically privileged cultural and religious practices indeed may devalue the 
importance of religion and culture to minorities.  The point of view of Sachs J in the 
matter of Prince is brought to its full culmination in Pillay, where the historical 
typecasting of certain religions as preferred or acceptable and therefore superior are 
indeed dismantled so that the rights of all and not only the historically privileged and 
powerful are equally protected.  It is suggested that this emphasis on the dignity and 
vulnerability of the ‗other‘ in the dissent of Prince paved the way forward for a more 
inclusive jurisprudence regarding the protection of religious difference.  This was 
particularly seen in the decision of Pillay where the court in no uncertain terms 
endorsed the ‗rich tapestry‘ of cultural and religious difference in society in that: 
                                                          
237
 IJ Kroeze ‗God's Kingdom in the Law's Republic: Religious Freedom In South African 
Constitutional Jurisprudence‘ (2003) 470 South African Journal of Human Rights 19, 20.  This political 
choice is affirmed by van der Walt when he indicates that a political choice is ‗to affirm or deny, 
confirm or reject, include or exclude something‘. See AJ Van der Walt ‗Modernity, normality, and 
meaning: the struggle between progress and stability and the politics of interpretation‘ (2000) 11 (2) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 21,48. 
238
 Kroeze (note 237 above) 21. 
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[A]ffirm[s] the right of people to be who they are without being forced to subordinate 
themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others, and highlight[s] the 
importance of individuals and communities being able to enjoy what has been  called 
the ‗right to be different‘.239 
 
Du Plessis argues that the jurisprudence in Pillay has the makings of a jurisprudence 
of difference.
240
  This jurisprudence of difference has a particular understanding of the 
concept of ‗quality equality‘ which includes the full participation and inclusion of 
everyone to realise their own choices.
241
  The right to be different is essential to the 
well being of the members of society.
242
  It is important to appreciate the concept of 
‗quality equality‘ for through such appreciation, the right to manifest religious belief 
and cultural practices is afforded extensive protection.  An evaluation of the concept 
of ‗quality equality‘ follows next. 
 
8.7.3 Religion and substantive equality 
 
The Constitution provides for the protection of the right to freedom of religion
243
 as 
well as a prohibition on discrimination based on religion.
244
  Religious freedom can 
                                                          
239
 Christian Education (note 7 above) paragraph 24 and Prince (see see note 8 above) paragraph 171. 
240
 Du Plessis (note 124 above) 7.  See also Lenta (note 154 above) 282. 
241
 IM Young Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) 173.  For Young, ‗[g]roups cannot be 
socially equal unless their specific experience, culture and social contributions are publicly affirmed‘ at 
86.  In drawing on the work of Young, van Marle refers to an ethical interpretation of equality.  In this 
regard see generally K van Marle ‗Equality: An Ethical Interpretation‘ (2000) 63 Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg 595. 
242
 P Lenta ‗Religious Liberty and Cultural Accommodation‘ (2006) South African Law Journal 352, 
375.  See also generally J Raz ‗Multiculturalism: a liberal perspective‘ in his Ethics in the Public 
Domain (1994); B Parekh Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2000). 
243
  Section 15 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
244
 Section 9(3) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
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therefore operate both as a liberty right and as an equality right.  As a liberty right, 
freedom of religion entails the freedom to practice without interference and as an 
equality right, freedom of religion encapsulates that government may not favour one 
religion over another or religion over non-religion.
245
 
 
The Constitutional Court related equality to the equal worth of all human beings in the 
matter of President of the RSA v Hugo
246
 in which the court referred to equality in the 
following manner: 
Equality … means nothing if it does not represent a commitment to recognizing each 
person's equal worth as a human being, regardless of individual differences. Equality 
means that our society cannot tolerate legislative distinctions that treat certain people 
as second-class citizens, that demean them, that treat them as less capable for no good 
reason, or that otherwise offend fundamental human dignity.247 
 
From the above it is apparent that equality cannot be pursued in isolation from 
freedom and human dignity.  Therefore equality can never mean ‗uniformity‘, and 
should mean ‗equal worth‘.  The equal worth of all human beings must be respected 
and should accommodate peoples‘ difference.  Equality therefore requires not merely 
formal equality,
248
 (meaning that people in the same position should be treated the 
                                                          
245
 Freedman (note 58 above) 100. 
246
 President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (Hugo).  This case dealt with the constitutionality 
of a presidential act in terms of which the sentences of prisoners who were mothers of children under 12 
years on 10 May 1994 were reduced.  The respondent challenged the presidential act on basis of 
equality, argued on the basis of gender and sex discrimination. The majority judgment held that there 
was no unfair discrimination. While a dissent by Kriegler J held that the discrimination was unfair. 
247
 Hugo (note 246 above) paragraph 41. 
248
 Formal equality, based on the notion of fairness that requires like to be treated alike, thereby 
reducing the application of equality to an equation that only ‗likes‘ qualify for equal treatment.  In this 
regard see generally S Fredman Discrimination Law (2002).  Formal quality arguments presuppose that 
people deserve to be similarly treated if they can show themselves to be sufficiently alike.  Accordingly 
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same) but it also indicates that people in different situations should be treated 
differently.
249
  The right to equality, also known as the equality principle, protects the 
equal worth of all people.
250
 
 
The interpretation of the equality principle as protecting the equal worth of people is 
endorsed by the approach of Dworkin, who requires that people should be treated 
equally in the sense that they are entitled to the state‘s equal concern and respect.251  A 
fundamental difference between equal treatment and treatment as equals lies in the 
fact that equal treatment requires an evaluation of whether two people are sufficiently 
‗the same‘ that they warrant similar treatment.  Treatment as equals implies a more 
concrete conception of equality, not concerning itself with whether deviation is 
permitted but more particularly ‗what reasons for deviation are consistent with equal 
concern and respect‘.252 
                                                                                                                                                                       
members of a disfavoured group can only bring themselves within the scope of anti-discrimination 
protection if they show themselves to be comparable to members of the dominant group.  The 
consequence thereof is that distinctive attributes must be rendered as an equivalent to characteristics of 
the dominant group.  Thereby equality reinforces existing norms specific to formal equality. 
249
 The demand for different treatment is also referred to as substantive equality, which includes 
equality of results, aimed at opposing the effects of formal equal treatment which nonetheless has a 
negative impact on the individual, as well as equality of opportunity.  In this regard see generally 
Fredman ibid. 
250
 For a discussion on the interpretation of the equality provisions see generally IM Rautenbach ‗Die 
Konstitusionele Hof se riglyne vir die toepassing van die reg op gelykheid‘ (2001) 9 (2) Tydskrif vir 
Suid Afrikaanse Reg 329, 334; IM Rautenbach & EFJ Malherbe Constitutional Law (2004) 333. 
251
 R Dworkin A Matter of Principle (1986) 190-198. 
252
 R Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory of Practice and Equality (2000) 209.  See generally also P 
Bikhu Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000) who indicates that equality demands that cultural 
disadvantages may be reduced as much as possible.  See also Lenta (note 242 above) 352 who states 
that to hold that equality may require differential rather than uniform treatment is justified on the basis 
that by complying with legislation of general application religious observers may experience hardship 
of a kind that others who are aggrieved by the same provisions would not feel.  This concern is 
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Sachs claims that one of the most important areas for asserting the simultaneity of the 
right to be the same and the right to be different, is the right to freedom of religion.  
All have the same right to freedom of religion; however this right includes the right to 
be different, as we can choose if we wish to believe or not to believe, and if we believe 
how we will practice our belief.
253
  Consequently, equality does not mean 
homogeneity.  It presumes just the opposite.  Equality becomes the foundation for 
diversity.
254
 
 
From an overview of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court regarding the right 
to freedom of religion it is evident that before adjudicating the matter of Pillay the 
‗tendency has been to put all the eggs of judicial argumentation in support of the 
protection of religious rights in the freedom basket‘.255  In the matter of Pillay the 
focus of the court however shifted to the application of the provisions of equality, and 
in particular in relation to non-discrimination based on culture.  It is contended that the 
right to manifest diverse religious and cultural practices was afforded ultimate 
recognition in the right to freedom of religion as both a liberty and equality right. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
expressed by Sachs J in the following manner in the Prince case: that the legislation in question forced 
Rastafari, a small and vulnerable religious group, into a ‗constitutionally intolerable choice between 
their faith and the law‘.  Prince (see note 8 above) paragraph145.  Lenta supports the dissenting 
judgment in Prince as it does not force the Rastafari to choose between obeying the law and following 
the dictates of their religion.  See Lenta (note 242 above) 373. 
253
 Sachs (note 58 above) 180. 
254
 Sachs (note 58 above) 51. 
255
 LM du Plessis ‗Freedom of Religion or Freedom from Religion? An Overview of Issues Pertinent to 
the Constitutional Protection of Religious Rights and Freedom in "the New South Africa,"‘ (2001) 
Brigham Young University Law. Review. 439, 450-451.  For example in the matter of Christian 
Education (note 7 above).  The applicants began by arguing that a right to use corporal punishment in 
schools was based on both the right to religion and the right to culture.  The applicants later abandoned 
their claim to culture and proceeded on the sole ground of freedom of religion. 
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In Pillay the court scrutinised the school uniform code in terms of the provisions of 
section 14 of the Equality Act
256
 that deals with the determination of unfairness.  A 
discrimination that impairs or is likely to impair human dignity is considered unfair 
discrimination.
257
  The position of the complainant in society, whether she suffers 
from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from such patterns is 
also taken into consideration.
258
  The question as to if less restrictive and less 
disadvantageous means to achieve the purpose as well as to accommodate diversity is 
also considered.
259
 
 
Regarding the objective to accommodate diversity, it was held that the school must 
take positive measures and possibly incur additional hardship or expense in order to 
allow all people to participate and enjoy all their rights equally.  It ensures that we do 
not relegate people to the margins of society because they do not or cannot conform to 
certain social norms.
260
  The need to allow all people to enjoy their rights equally is of 
particular importance in a diverse society where dominant norms may indeed unduly 
benefit the dominant religion and culture.  This preference will consequently 
unjustifiably restrict the rights of minority cultures and religions.
261
  A suitable remedy 
                                                          
256
 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the Equality Act).  
The Equality Acts‘ main aim is to flesh out the equal protection and non-discrimination provisions of 
the Constitution of SA.  For a discussion on the Equality Act 4 of 2000 see generally CH Albertyn 
Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, Act 4 of 2000 
(2001) 41.  See also generally G Carpenter ‗The Equality Act in the Constitutional Court‘ (2008) 23(2) 
South African Public Law 185. 
257
 Section 14(3)(a) of the Equality Act, 4 of 2000. 
258
 Section 14(3)(c) of the Equality Act, 4 of 2000. 
259
 Section 14(3) (h)(iii) of the Equality Act , 4 of 2000. 
260
 Pillay (note 9 above) paragraph 73. 
261
 For a discussion of the role of dominance in plural communities see generally H Botha ‗Equality, 
plurality and structural power‘ (2009) 25(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 1. 
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to inhibit such privilege is through the adopting of a duty to accommodate diversity as 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
However, before proceeding to a discussion of the duty to accommodate diverse 
religious and cultural practices, the importance of the right to freedom of religion and 
the right to religious and cultural practice in relation to their centrality ‗to human 
identity and hence to human dignity‘262 is discussed next. 
 
8.7.4 Religion and dignity 
 
The right to human dignity may function not only as a contextual right with regards to 
the right to freedom of religion, but as an independent right as well.
263
  In this way the 
right to dignity may be viewed with regards to the inherent dignity of all human beings 
and not merely with regard to the dignity of bearers of the right to religious 
freedom.
264
  The right to dignity however, requires religious autonomy in terms of 
which each individual is able to make the choices best suited to the development of an 
identity and personality.  O‘Regan identified that individual dignity is directly related 
to being afforded ‗the possibility and choice to live a meaningful life‘.265 
 
Therefore the state has a duty to ensure that positive measures are taken to ensure the 
advancement of the right to freedom of religion, and the right to dignity, which should 
enjoy protection to advance the right to religious freedom.  The right to freedom of 
                                                          
262
Pillay (note 9 above) paragraph 62. 
263
 For a discussion on the dignity as a independent right see Woolman (note 93 above) 36; see also 
generally Botha (note 111 above) 171; D Cornell, ‗Dignity, freedom and the post-apartheid legal order: 
The critical jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann‘ (2008) Acta Juridica 18. 
264
 In this regard see GJ Pienaar ‗The effect of equality and human dignity on the right to religious 
freedom‘ (2003) 66 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 579. 
265
 Pillay (note 9 above) paragraph 157. 
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religion advances the inherent individual and collective identity of religious believers.  
It protects the interests of religious believers, allowing them to develop their own 
identities in line with their own persuasions.  The right to manifest religious belief 
require that individuals are afforded the freedom to make their own choices to live 
their own conception of a meaningful and dignified life. 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that the right to freedom of religion and in 
particular the right to manifest religious belief and cultural practices should be 
interpreted with full appreciation of the interrelated nature of the right as a collective 
right.  It is through an application of this broad interpretation of the right to freedom of 
religion, coupled with the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of one‘s‘ 
religious or cultural beliefs, that the full appreciation of the importance that the human 
dignity of the adherent is ensured. 
 
At times the right to manifest religious belief may need to be limited to ensure that the 
rights of other individuals are not infringed.
266
  What follows next is the need to 
balance the right to freedom of religion of adherents with the possible infringement on 
the fundamental rights of others, for example others‘ right to dignity.  The balancing 
of these conflicting rights is evaluated next. 
 
8.8 Protection of the fundamental rights of others 
 
The individual rights of others may from time to time be infringed through the 
religious or cultural practices of another.  What follows next is a discussion of the 
need to balance these rights that may be in tension with one another.  The possible 
                                                          
266
 Section 39(3) states that only laws conforming to the test for a valid limitation in section 36(1) can 
legitimately restrict rights while adding that rights can be justifiably limited in terms of ‗any other 
provision of the Constitution‘. 
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infringement of the following three independent rights, the right to dignity, the right to 
private property and the right to a fair trial, have been considered by the SA judiciary 
and are therefore evaluated next. 
 
8.8.1 The right to dignity: Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of 
Education 
 
In the Christian Education case, section 10 of the South African Schools Act,
267
 
outlawing corporal punishment in schools, was challenged on the basis that the 
prohibition infringed individual religious beliefs as protected in terms of section 15 of 
the Constitution, as well as community rights of Christian parents as entrenched in 
section 31 of the Constitution.
268
 
 
Sachs J, on behalf of the court, illustrated the conflicting nature of the interests in the 
matter.  On the one hand, the interest of a community to foster its culture and religious 
practices and on the other hand the need to protect society against practices that may 
infringe on the right of others as entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
 
The need to be accepting of cultural diversity and to create an environment in which 
believers are able to add meaning to their self-worth and dignity in an open and 
democratic society was emphasised.
269
  The right to be different was referred to in the 
following manner: 
There are a number of other provisions designed to protect the rights of members of 
communities. They underline the constitutional value of acknowledging diversity and 
                                                          
267
 South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996. 
268
 The applicants contended that their religious beliefs enjoined corporal punishment, referring by way 
of evidence to injunctions in the Book of Proverbs chapters 9, 22 and 23. 
269
 Christian Education (note 7 above) paragraph 36. 
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pluralism in our society …. Taken together, they affirm the right of people to be who 
they are without being forced to subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious 
norms of others, and highlight the importance of individuals and communities being 
able to enjoy what has been called the ―right to be different‖.  In each case, space has 
been found for members of communities to depart from a general norm. These 
provisions collectively and separately acknowledge the rich tapestry constituted by 
civil society,
 
indicating in particular that language, culture and religion constitute a 
strong weave in the overall pattern.
270 
 
In applying an approach towards reasonable accommodation, the importance of 
considering if the religious practice is in contravention of the law
271
 or if the practice 
infringes on the fundamental rights of others was emphasised.
272
  It was argued that in 
the matter of Christian Education the religious and cultural practice was in 
contravention of the law and infringed on the right to dignity and security of the 
person of the minor school children.
273
  The Constitutional Court held that religious 
and cultural practices cannot be employed as a shield to protect practices that are in 
conflict with the Bill of Rights and as the legislation in question gave effect to the 
rights of children to be protected from abuse, no exemption should be granted.  The 
court in a unanimous decision found that the limitation imposed by the South African 
Schools Act was therefore justified. 
 
8.8.2 The right to property: Bührmann v Nkosi and others 
 
The first case in which there was a call to balance an individual‘s right to religious and 
cultural beliefs with the right of ownership of another was the matter of Bührmann v 
                                                          
270
 Christian Education (note 7 above) paragraph 24. 
271
 Lenta (note 166) paragraph 311. 
272
 Lenta (note 242 above) 352, 376. 
273
 Christian Education (note 7 above) paragraph 7. 
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Nkosi.
274
  In brief the case involved the rights of farm-workers who lived and worked 
on farmland not belonging to them.
275
  The rights of farm-workers to ‗reside and 
use‘276 land in accordance with their culture277 and ‗freedom of religion, belief, 
opinion and expression‘278 is secured in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure 
Act (ESTA).
279
  This case related to the question as to whether the son of Grace 
Nkosi‘s could be buried on the farm where he was born on in 1968 and on which he 
was living legally with his mother at the time of his death in 1999.  One of Grace‘s 
grandsons and seven other family members were already buried on the farm with 
permission of the current landowners‘ father.  Mrs Nkosi alleged that according to her 
custom and religious belief a deceased family member is only physically separated 
from those left behind and needs to communicate with those left behind.  The burial 
space was a ‗home for the ancestors‘ from which such communication could take 
place. 
 
Both the full bench of the Transvaal Provincial Division (TPD) of the High Court and 
the majority bench in the Supreme Court of Appeal had no difficulty in concluding 
that the right to property weighed heavier and that the right to freedom of religion has 
‗internal limits‘.280  Satchwell J in the TPD balanced the rights of the landowner with 
the religious and cultural rights of the secure tenant in the following manner: 
                                                          
274
 Bührmann v Nkosi and Another 2001 (1) SA 1145 T (Bührmann v Nkosi) subsequent on appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Nkosi v Bührmann (note 182 above). 
275
 In casu Grace Nkosi and her family worked and lived on the farm De Emigratie from 1966 to 1981 
where after they moved to a neighbouring farm.  At all times the farm was owned by the Bührmanns. 
After the death of her husband, Grace returned with her sons to the farm De Emigratie in 1986 with 
permission of Bührmann. 
276
 Section 6(1) of ESTA, 62 of 1997. 
277
 Section 6(2)(d) of ESTA, 62 of 1997. 
278
 Section 5(d) of ESTA, 62 of 1997. 
279
 ESTA, 62 of 1997. 
280
 Nkosi v Bührmann (note 182 above) paragraph 49. 
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The Constitution clearly envisages that the second respondent is free to hold and act 
upon her religious convictions ... However, ... I know of ... [no authority] which 
imposes on an individual a positive obligation to promote the religious practices and 
beliefs of another at one‘s own expense.  If such were envisaged by the Constitution 
or the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, each occupier ... would be entitled to 
require of the landowner that he permit the erection of a church or tabernacle ... .
281
 
 
The judgment of Satchwell J exaggerates the possible infringement on the farm 
owners‘ right to property for the following reasons:  Grace Nkosi was not asking for a 
church to be built, but for an area the size of a grave on land where others had already 
been buried.  In the opinion of Ngoepe JP this does not represent such a drastic 
curtailment as suggested by Satchwell J above.
282
  I concur with the sentiment as 
expressed by Ngoepe JP.  In stating the infringement in this way, Satchwell J does not 
enable the court to undertake a true balancing analysis of conflicting rights.
283
 
 
8.8.3 The right to a fair trial: Crossley v National Commissioner of South African 
Police Service 
 
                                                          
281
 Bührmann v Nkosi (note 274 above) 1155 D – F. 
282
 Bührmann v Nkosi (note 274 above) 1161 F – G.  Regarding the decision in Bührmann v Nkosi see 
generally L M du Plessis ‗Die Grondwet as Gedenkteken en die Werkdadigheid van Onopvallende, 
Grondwetlike Kragte‘ (2005) 70(3) Koers 535-554; LM du Plessis, ‗The South African Constitution as 
a Monument and Memorial, and the Commemoration of the Dead‘ in R Christensen & B Pieroth (eds) 
Rechtstheorie in Rechtspraktischer Absicht (2008) 189 -205.  See also LM du Plessis ‗Affirmation and 
Celebration of the 'Religious Other' in South Africa's Constitutional Jurisprudence on Religious and 
Related Rights: Memorial Constitutionalism in Action‘ (2008) 8 (2) African Human Rights Law Journal 
376. 
283
 Subsequently ESTA has been amended to include permission to bury in accordance with cultural and 
religious belief on the condition that an established practice of burial on the land exists.  See section 
6(2)(dA) of ESTA, 62 of 1997. 
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Another case in which an individual‘s right to religious and cultural beliefs needed to 
be balanced with the right of another to a fair trial is the matter of Crossley.
284
  In this 
case charges were laid against a white farmer, Mark Scott-Crossley, and three of his 
workers for the murder of Nelson Chisale.  Chisale was dismissed by Scott-Crossley 
and on return to collect his belongings on the farm, was allegedly severely assaulted 
and thrown in an encampment that was home to a pride of lions.  Subsequently only 
the remains of a skull, broken bones and a finger were found that the family planned to 
bury at a family burial service on Saturday the 13
 
March 2004.  On Friday 12 March 
2004 Scott-Crossley and the other accused sought an urgent interdict to stay the 
funeral.  The applicants wanted the remains to be examined in order to be able to 
challenge the forensic evidence at the trial.  Patel J dismissed the application because 
the applicants failed to establish urgency. 
 
Consequently it was not necessary for the court to decide on how to reconcile the 
religious and cultural rights of the family to a family burial with Scott-Crossley‘s right 
to a fair trial.  Nevertheless Patel J held that the right to dignity of the deceased and his 
family take precedence over the right of the applicant to a fair trial.  In this conclusion 
Patel J advanced the African saying umumtu ngumntu ngabayne abantu
285
 while 
expressing an appreciation for the principle of ubuntu as follows: 
Ubuntu embraces humanness, group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, 
conformity to basic norms and collective unity, humanity, morality and 
conciliation.
286
 
Du Plessis
287
 evaluates the different outcomes in the matters of Bührmann v Nkosi and 
Crossley and concludes that in the matter of Crossley the Constitution was interpreted 
                                                          
284
 Crossley and Others v National Commissioner of South African Police Service and Others [2004] 3 
All SA 436 (T). 
285
 A person is a person through other people – See also the discussion on ubuntu in section 5.6. 
286
 Crossley (note 284 above) 18. 
 
 
 
 
433 
 
as a memorial of past injustice.  Past injustices in this case included the severe abuse 
inflicted on Chisale in that he was dismissed, assaulted and thrown to the lions while 
still alive.  The court therefore allows the family a measure of compassion and 
humanity in allowed them to proceed with the burial even though the burial may 
impact negatively on the right to a fair trial.  The judgment stands as a memorial in 
consideration of past injustice, inequality and discrimination. 
 
Through interpreting the right to manifest religious belief the court should reflect on 
past injustice, inequality and discrimination and should make every effort to show 
respect and appreciation of these past injustices.  It is only through the interpretation 
of the right as memorial of the past that reconciliation and quality equality can be 
achieved.  The right to manifest religious belief is best protected in being mindful of 
the reality that the rights entrenched in the Constitution are entrenched in memory of 
the past and the injustice of the past. 
 
8.8.4 The right to freedom of religion: Woodways v Vallie 
 
More recently the Western Cape High Court in the matter of Woodways
288
 confirmed a 
decision of the Equality Court that an instruction to remove a fez
289
 worn by male 
Muslims upon entering premises, indeed constituted discrimination based on religion.  
In the appeal to the High Court Mr and Mrs Hearn argued that they were expressing 
their faith through dissuading Mr Vallie, a Muslim male, from manifesting his 
religious beliefs.  In confirming the decision of the Equality Court the High Court 
                                                                                                                                                                       
287
 See generally du Plessis (note 282 above) 189.  For the role of ubuntu in reconciliation see also See 
D Cornell ‗A call for a nuanced constitutional jurisprudence: Ubuntu, dignity, and reconciliation‘ 
(2004) 19 South African Public Law 661.  See also the discussion on ubuntu in section 5.6. 
288
 Woodways CC v Vallie 2010 (6) SA 136 (WCC) (31 August 2009) (Woodways). 
289
 Worn by male Muslims to cover their heads, just as the headscarf is worn by female Muslims 
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focused on the impairment that the request had on the right to dignity and the right to 
identity of Mr Vallie.  The court emphasised that: 
The fact of the matter is not about injury to Vallie‘s religious feelings. It is about the 
extent to which a request impaired his dignity and identity. The wearing of a fez to 
Vallie is an expression of his religious belief which is central to his identity and 
dignity. It is his identity and dignity which are implicated in this matter.
290
 
 
The impact of the instruction on the dignity and right to identity was balanced against 
the right of the appellants to not be subjected to blasphemous belief.  Throughout this 
balancing process the court remained mindful of the history of dominance and 
marginalisation and took these injustices into consideration in balancing these 
conflicting rights.  Zondi J consequently emphasised the fact that Mr Vallie was a 
‗member of a historically disadvantaged group but also belongs to a religion which has 
suffered marginalisation in the past‘.291  In light of these past injustices the court 
evaluates the instruction that further impairs on the dignity and identity of a 
historically disadvantaged individual and finds the award of damages in light of the 
discriminating action justified. 
 
The interpretation of these conflicting rights is balanced in the spirit of reconciliation.  
The emphasis on reconciliation is in line with the view that the Constitution should be 
viewed as a memorial of past injustices as discussed in the matter of Crossley.  
Therefore the judgment is aimed at reconciliation and at addressing the indignity that 
people suffered because in the past as a result of discrimination. 
 
This decision is illustrative the right to manifest religious belief in a diverse society is 
best served through a judiciary that remains mindful of past discriminatory practices 
and of the injustice that was experienced by the historically disadvantaged.  In seeking 
                                                          
290
 Woodways (note 288 above) per Zondi J paragraph 62. 
291
 Woodways (note 288 above) per Zondi J paragraph 72. 
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to build integration and harmony the rights of these marginalised and disadvantaged 
groups requires particular care so that their dignity may be repaired. 
 
8.9 Conclusion 
 
What emanates from this overview of the legal context and application of the right to 
manifest religious belief in the South African context are the following aspects. 
 
First, the relationship between the state and religion requires even-handed interaction 
between the state and religion.  In the interpretation of this even-handed interaction, 
the right to freedom of religion should be interpreted as a liberty and an equality right.  
The state should therefore refrain from favouring one religion over others and should 
react impartially towards all religions.  The state furthermore has a duty of non-
identification and to treat and promote all religious denominations in an equal manner.  
Even apparently neutral provisions should be scrutinised to determine if they convey a 
message of exclusion. 
 
Second, coupled with the duty of evenhandedness and non-identification, the state has 
a duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
The state, therefore, has both a negative duty of non-interference in terms of which the 
state has to respect and protect rights, as well as a positive duty to act in the interest of 
religious freedom.  The duty to promote and fulfil requires that the state take steps to 
facilitate the exercise of the right, so that the right to freedom of religion may flourish. 
 
Third, the importance of the right to freedom of religion as well as the interrelated 
nature of the right is firmly acknowledged by the courts.  The right is entrenched as an 
individual right, a collective right and as an institutional right.  The equality clause 
further explicitly prohibits unfair discrimination, either directly or indirectly, based on 
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religion.  The right to freedom of religion consequently operates both as a liberty right, 
on an individual and collective basis, and as an equality right. 
 
Fourth, in addition to the interrelated nature of the right as an individual and 
collective, liberty and equality right, the importance of the right to freedom of religion 
to the individuals‘ sense of self worth, identity and dignity is acknowledged.  Respect 
for human dignity is further related to the whole constitutional purpose of establishing 
unity and solidarity in our diverse society.  This unity and solidarity requires not mere 
toleration of difference but institutional commitment towards accommodating 
difference. 
 
Fifth, any limitation of the right will have to be balanced in the context of a lived and 
experienced historical reality in which the rights of vulnerable and marginalised 
people in particular are protected.  In protecting the right to manifest religious belief 
the need for reconciliation and remembrance of the injustice of the past must also be 
prevalent and any limitation on the rights of the vulnerable and previously 
marginalised therefore must be strictly scrutinised. 
 
Lastly, this high level of protection as provided by the South African courts in 
accommodating religious and cultural practices that signifies and emphasises the value 
of multiculturalism and diversity must be honoured with regards to all cultural and 
religious practices and not only mainstream dominant practices. 
 
In comparing the approach of the South African courts towards the application of the 
right to manifest religious belief with the interpretation of the courts evaluated in the 
previous chapter, the following commendable attributes can be drawn from the South 
African jurisprudence. 
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The requirement of state neutrality aimed at achieving equality between religious and 
cultural practices is interpreted mindful of the fact that the religious and cultural 
equality may at times best be achieved through the implementation of positive 
measures that enable a specific religion or culture to flourish.  For this reason the 
South African courts may from time to time positively promote a particular religious 
or cultural point of view.  This promotion will however not be seen as an endorsement 
that is in conflict with state neutrality.  The promotion will in actual fact be considered 
as a means of ensuring ‗quality equality‘.  ‗Quality equality‘ celebrates the equal 
worth of all and enhances the application of rights that by the very nature protect 
difference, such as the right to freedom of religion. 
 
In striving for quality equality the state not only has a duty to promote and fulfil the 
right to manifest religious belief.  The state further has a duty to consider even 
seemingly neutral rules that may perpetuate discrimination and inequality.  The court 
therefore considers the impact of legislative measures that may maintain the historical 
privileges of the past or unduly burden an individual or group.  Through this approach 
the court is specifically focussed on addressing the needs of the vulnerable and 
marginalised. 
 
In promoting and protecting the rights of the vulnerable and marginalised the court is 
mindful of the injustices of the past and is focused on addressing these injustices while 
at the same time striving towards facilitating reconciliation and social justice. 
 
The South African courts are in general conscious of the injustice and suffering of the 
past as a result of discrimination and the non-recognition of human rights.  The need 
to overcome the divisions and marginalisation of the past has made the court aware of 
the need to go the extra mile in ensuring that all people are treated with equal concern 
and respect.  In doing so the courts endeavour to promote and celebrate diversity 
through the acceptance of people with all their differences. 
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This approach is in stark contrast with the approaches evaluated in the previous 
chapter and it is therefore contended that the South African jurisprudential approach 
provides more extensive protection of the right to manifest religious belief and is 
preferable.
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
The central aim of this thesis, as set out in Chapter 1, has been to evaluate the 
constitutional, juridical and philosophical framework in terms of which the right to 
manifest religious belief is optimally protected. 
 
To this end, a historical overview of certain religious conflicts was provided.  It was 
shown that it was in response to these conflicts that various instruments aimed at 
protecting the right to freedom of religion were developed.
1
  This examination sought 
to appreciate the need, effectiveness and approach of these instruments in protecting 
the right to manifest religious belief.  From this overview it was however clear that the 
main purpose of these instruments was not to observe the right to freedom of religion 
but to constrain religious conflict.  Therefore these instruments merely granted 
reluctant recognition to different religions and not equivalent treatment of these 
different religions in relation to others.
2
  Another way in which religious conflict has 
generally been managed has been through imposing a restriction on religious practices 
that do not conform to the norms of the dominant religion.
3
 
 
From this historical overview of the development of the right to freedom of religion it 
is clear that religious freedom has been traditionally been protected either by means of 
reluctant recognition or by means of a limitations imposed on the right.
4
  The approach 
                                                          
1
 See section 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. 
2
 See section 2.3 and 2.4. 
3
 See section 6.2. 
4
 See section 2.3. 
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to religious freedom has not been to find ways in terms of which the interests of all 
diverse religious adherents concerned can be accommodated.  It can therefore be 
argued that the international protection of the right to manifest religious belief was not 
designed to address the need for equal protection of all religions.  Furthermore the 
manner in which conflict has generally been dealt with has been through limitation 
and not accommodation.
5
 
 
The historical overview of religious conflict further revealed that the protection of the 
right to freedom of religion has also been addressed through the separation of the state 
from religion.
6
  Therefore the relationship between the state and religion was 
evaluated next.   The aim of this evaluation was to foreground the impact of this 
relationship on the protection of the right to freedom of religion.
7
  Here, too, it was 
identified that the ways in which this relationship is structured had been in response to 
religious conflict or religious domination.
8
  A critical analysis of various manners in 
which the relationship can be structured revealed the following insights. 
 
In principal three main categories of relationship between state and religion were 
identified.
9
  First, religious states or states with an established or recognised religion.
10
  
Second, states with a degree of separation between the state and religion
11
  and third 
secular states.
12
   None of these arrangements were evaluated to be ideally suited to 
ensuring the ultimate protection of the right to freedom of religion.  However, it was 
                                                          
5
 See section 2.7. 
6
 See section 3.2 and 3.3. 
7
 See section 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.7. 
8
 See section 3.3.2, 3.3.3 
9
 See section 3.4 and 3.5. 
10
 See section 3.5.1. 
11
 See section 3.5.2. 
12
 See section 3.5.3. 
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concluded that a secular state was most suited to enhance the protection of the right to 
manifest religious belief as the secular state does not per se positively identify or 
arbitrarily promote a particular religion.
13
 
 
The manner in which the secular state constructs the separation between the state and 
religion was identified as an area of cause for concern.  The concern was related to the 
protection of the right manifest religious belief for the following reasons:  First, 
absolute disestablishment ought to be questioned, as the state should not separate a 
nation from religion.
14
  Therefore separation should not result in freedom from 
religion - where religion is actively excluded from the public domain.  Second, the 
original aim of separation, namely to ensure a state in which one or certain religions 
are not favoured above other religions but all religions are treated equally, must be 
kept in mind.
15
  Accordingly, religions that have a public dimension, in terms of which 
religion is considered a way of life, should be afforded equal protection and adherents 
of these religions should not be relegated to living their religious lives in the private 
sphere.  Third, the state must be aware that in treating all religions equally even 
apparently neutral norms may impose an undue disadvantage on certain minorities or 
marginalised religions.  
 
From the evaluation of the above two phases, first, the development of instruments 
aimed at protecting the right to freedom of religion
16
 and second, the structuring of the 
relationship between the state and religion, the following two main conclusions have 
been drawn.  First, the international framework in terms of which the individual right 
to freedom of religion is protected has in general accommodated diversity through 
limiting the right to manifest religious belief.  Second, the secular state has in general 
                                                          
13
 See section 3.7 and 3.8. 
14
 See section 3.5.3, 3.6 and 3.7. 
15
 See section 3.6. 
16
 See section 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. 
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not been able to adequately address the needs of religious adherents, in particular the 
need of those adherents of religions that have a public dimension. 
 
These two conclusions were supported not only in the overview of the above two 
phases but also in the jurisprudence of the international,
17
 regional
18
 and selected 
national bodies
19
 concerning the right to manifest religious belief. 
                                                          
17
 Matters heard by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights judicial bodies include the 
following: Singh Binder v Canada, Comm No 208/ 1986 (UN Human Rights Committee); Assembly of 
the Church of the Universe v Canada  - MAB, WAT and J AYT v Canada Comm No 570/1993 (UN 
Human Rights Committee); Clement Boodoo v Trinidad and Tobago Comm No 721/1996 (UN Human 
Rights Committee); Raihon Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan, Comm No. 931/2000 and heard by the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Rahime 
Kayhan v Turkey, Comm No 8/2005, CEDAW/C/34/D/8/2005 (2006). 
18
 Matters heard by the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) included the following: Ahmad v 
United Kingdom App No 8160/78 (4 Eur Comm HR 126 (1981) inadmissibility decision; X v United 
Kingdom App No 8231/78 (EComHR 28 Decisions and Reports 5, 28, 1982) inadmissibility decision; 
Karaduman v Turkey App No. 16278/90 (EComHR 74, DR 93, 1993) inadmissibility decision; Bulut v 
Turkey App No 18783/91 inadmissibility decision; Kokkinakis v Greece 17 EHRR 397 (1994); 
Hoffmann v Austria, 17 EHRR 293 (1994); Stedman v United Kingdom App. No.29107/95, Kurtulmuş v 
Turkey  application No 65500/01; Dahlab v Switzerland, application No. 42393/98; Refah Partisi (The 
Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, Judgment of 13 February 2003; Dogru v France application No 
27058/05); Kervanci v France application No 31645/04); Leyla Sahin v Turkey application No 
44774/98, Grand Chambers, Judgment of 10 November 2005, 19 BHCR 590, (2006) ELR; Mann Singh 
v France application No 24479/07; Atkas v France application No. 43563/08; Ahmet Arslan v Turkey 
ECtHR, application No. 41135/98; Lautsi v Italy – application number 30814/06 (2009). 
19
 Selected matters heard in national jurisdictions concerning the right to freedom of religion and culture 
included the following: Germany: Ludin v Land Baden-Württemberg Case No 2BvR 1436/02, 
Judgment of 24 September 2003, 50.  Canada: Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite- Bourgeoys 
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.)79; Big M Drug Mart Ltd.; R.B. v Children‟s Aid Society of Metropolitan 
Toronto [1995]; Zylberburg v Sudbury Board of Education [1988] 52 D.L.R. (4th); Syndicat Northcrest 
v Amselem (2005) 29 S.C.L.R., 39; Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta, 2007 ABCA 160.  
United Kingdom – England: Suleiman v Juffali 1 FLE 479, 490 (2002); Singh v  British Rail 
Engineering Ltd. [1986] ICR 22; Panesar v Nestle Co. Ltd. [1980] I.C.R. 144; Singh v Rowntree 
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9.2 Approach in general followed in international and other jurisdictions 
 
The jurisprudence of the international
20
 and national judicial bodies, in France,
21
 
United Kingdom (UK) – England,22 Germany,23 the United States of America (USA)24 
and Canada
25
 were evaluated.  In this evaluation the following conclusions regarding 
the interpretation and application of the right to manifest religious belief the following 
conclusions can be made. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Mackintosh Ltd. [1979] I.R.L.R. 199; Kabal Singh v R.H.M. Bakeries (Southern) Ltd., EAT 818/77; 
Singh v Lyons Maid Ltd. [1975] IRLR 328; Mandla v Lee [1983] IRLR 209; Seide v Gillette Industries 
Ltd. [1980], IRLR 427; Dawkins v Dept. of Environment [1993] IRLR 284, CA 528 -29; R v Paul 
Simon Taylor [2001] EWCA Crim. 2263 (Criminal Division); R (on the application of Begum) v 
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; R (on the application of X) v 
Head Teacher and Governors of Y School [2008] 1 All ER 249; R (on the application of Playfoot) v 
Governing Body of Millais School [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin); Aishah Azmi v Headfield School and 
Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council (271) Employment Tribunal, case number 1801450/2006, 6 
October 2006; United States of America: Van Orden v Perry 545 U.S. 677, Lee v Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 631 (1992); County of Allegheny v ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,657 (1989); Lemon v Kurtman 403 U.S. 
602, 612-13(1971); Mitchell v Helms 530 U.S. 793,809 (2000); Lynch v Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675, 
104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984); Sherbert v Verner  374 US 398, 404 (1963); Wisconsin v Yoder 
406 U S 205 (1972); Goldman v Weinberger 475 U S 503 (1986); Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association 485 U S 439 (1988); Oregon Department of Human Resources v Smith  494 U S 
872 (1990); State v McBride 955 P 2d 133 (Kan Ct App (1998)); Gonzales v O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006); City of Boerne v Flores 521 US 506 (1997); 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (S.D. Fla. 1989), 
afl'dmem., 936 F.2d 586 (11 th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, No. 91-948, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1707 (U.S. 
Mar. 23, 1992). 
20
 See section 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. 
21
 See section 7.2. 
22
 See section 7.3. 
23
 See section 7.4. 
24
 See section 7.5 
25
 See section 7.6. 
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In general it can be reasoned that the approach of these bodies has largely contributed 
to the restricted enjoyment of the right to manifest religious belief.  In principal the 
following factors in particular have contributed to this limited interpretation. 
 
First, the nature of the state and the manner in which the secular relationship between 
the state and religion has been interpreted has contributed to a limited interpretation of 
the right to freedom of religion.  In general the notion of a secular state has been 
interpreted in an extensive manner.
26
  In this way the public interest requirement of 
public order has been construed in such a manner as to demand the exclusion of 
religion from the public sphere.  This approach has resulted in the devaluation of 
religious convictions and manifestations in the public domain.  As a result, support for 
religious diversity has been neglected.  States that have limited the right to freedom of 
religion on the basis of maintaining the public order of the secular state have 
accordingly not been subjected to having their actions overseen by the judiciary.
27
 
 
Second, the function of the judiciary to scrutinise limiting provisions and to justify the 
necessity of the limiting provisions and the proportionality thereof to serve a 
legitimate public interest has not been examined in the following instances.  Firstly, 
instances in which the judiciary argued that the religious adherent had voluntary 
consented to the waiving of her right;
28
 secondly instances in which the adherent had 
another option or choice in terms of which her right would not have been infringed; 
thirdly, instances in which the adherents manifestation was not in accordance with the 
dictates of mainstream religious opinion.  The judicial bodies in the latter instance 
appear oblivious of the fact that secularism may indeed just be a perpetuation of the 
dominant religion.
29
  It is contended that in finding that in these instances there was no 
                                                          
26
 See section 6.3. 
27
 See section 6.3 and 77. 
28
 See section 6.3.2.2 and 7.3.3.3. 
29
 See section 6.3. 
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limitation, the judicial bodies erred in so far as these bodies did not consider the 
burden that was placed on adherents to make a decision that was not required from 
other believers.  The courts further did not consider the vulnerable and marginalised 
position of these believers vis a vis the position of adherents of the dominant faith.
30
 
 
Judicial bodies therefore have failed to adequately scrutinise limiting provisions 
imposed on the right to freely manifest religious belief, if these limitations supposedly 
were imposed to ensure the neutrality of a secular state or if the religious adherent 
purportedly had a choice to avert a limitation on her right to manifest religious belief. 
 
Third, in addition to these two points raised above, the ECtHR has through its 
application of the ‗margin of appreciation‘ doctrine permitted deference to the national 
authorities to determine the most suitable approach in imposing limitations on the 
right to freely manifest religious belief.  This deference to the national authorities has 
had a cumulative negative effect on the right to manifest religious belief.  Particularly 
in so far as this deference has resulted in limitations on the right to manifest religious 
belief not adequately being scrutinised by the ECtHR.
 31
  In following this approach 
the judicial bodies have failed to proportionately balance the limitation with the public 
interest sought on a case by case basis. 
 
Fourth, it is apparent that in general, the judicial bodies, in their interpretation of the 
right to manifest religious belief, have not been receptive to the notion that the duty of 
the state in a diverse society is to foster religious diversity in that an ‗indissociable‘ 
union exists between democratic society and religious diversity.  Furthermore, they 
have not acknowledged that religious pluralism necessitates the full and equal rights of 
                                                          
30
 See section 6.2, 5.3 and 6.3.4.6. 
31
 See section 6.2.2.1. 
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adherents to all faiths to choose their own way of a good life, as long as their choice 
does not interfere with the rights of others. 
 
Finally, the judicial bodies have largely contributed to a restricted enjoyment of the 
right to manifest religious belief as well as perpetuation of the conception of the 
individual as a fragmented being in which the private individual is separated from the 
individual who participates in the public domain.  In terms of this approach, religion is 
simply seen as a system of belief, and not as a way of life that is central to all activities 
of the adherent.  The importance of religion to dignity and identity, both individual 
and collective, is not valued in following this approach.  In conclusion it is contended 
that the approach of the courts in the various jurisdictions did not allow for the 
maximum enjoyment of the right to manifest religious belief.
32
 
 
From the discussion above it can be deduced that the South African jurisprudence, in 
contrast with the general approach of the international and selected national bodies, is 
to be preferred for the following reasons. 
 
9.3 The approach of the South African courts 
 
The arrival of the South African Constitution, like other human rights instruments 
elsewhere in the world, has over the relatively short span of 15 years produced a large 
array of constitutional litigation in which the right to manifest religious belief or 
cultural practices has collided with the practices of (for example) the workplace or 
education policy or the rights of others.
33
  From an evaluation of these and other cases 
                                                          
32
 See section 6.5 and 7.7. 
33
 The Constitutional Court has in general addressed the right to freedom of religion and culture in the 
following matters: Lawrence v The State and Another, Negal The State and Another, Solberg v The 
State and Another 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC) 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC); Christian Education South 
 
 
 
 
448 
 
the following considerations regarding the approach of the South African courts 
regarding religious and cultural rights were drawn. 
 
The South African Constitution enshrines a secular state.  However, ‗secular‘ is 
interpreted in the following manner:  The state may indeed accommodate religion in 
so far as such accommodation is on an equitable basis and is free and voluntary.
34
  In 
addition, religious and/or denominationally specific schools are allowed and marriages 
concluded under systems of religious personal or family law may be acknowledged.  It 
is therefore clear that the South African Constitution does not prohibit a relationship 
between the state and religion.  It can be said that the relationship between the state 
and religion displays an even-handed approach that may at times even be constructive 
towards religion.  However, the state should refrain from favouring one religion over 
another but should react impartially towards all religions.
35
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC), 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC); Prince v President, 
Cape Law Society and Others 2001 (2) SA 388 (CC); 2001 (2) BCLR 133 (CC); Bhe & Others v 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 
2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 1 SA 474 (CC).  Higher courts have in general addressed the right to 
freedom of religion and culture in the following matters: Ryland v Edros 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C); 
Garden Cities Incorporated Association Not for Gain v Northpine Islamic Society 1999 2 SA 268 (C); 
Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA); Mthembu v Letsela & 
Another 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA); Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 
4 SA 294 (CC); Antonie v Governing Body, Settlers High School and Others  2002 (4) SA 738 TPD; 
Nkosi & Another v Bührmann 2002 (1) SA 372 (SCA); Crossley and Others v National Commissioner 
of South African Police Service and Others [2004] 3 All SA 436 (T); Dlamini and Others v Green Four 
Security (2006) 27 ILJ 2098 (LC); Gumede v President of the Republic of South. Africa & Others 2009 
(3) BCLR 243 (CC); Police and Prisoners Rights Union and Others v Department of Correctional 
Services and Another 2010 (9) BCLR 921 (LC) and Woodways CC v Vallie 2010 (6) SA 136 (WCC). 
34
 See section 8.4. 
35
 See section 8.4. 
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The overall approach of the South African courts in managing conflicts over the right 
to manifest religious belief can be described as follows:  Firstly, the courts have 
considered the right to freedom of religion not only as a negative right in terms of 
which the state has a duty to refrain from interfering with the right to freedom of 
religion of its citizens.  The state has interpreted the right as a positive right as well.  
In terms of this interpretation the state has appreciated that it has a duty to positively 
promote the right freedom of religion.
36
 
 
Second, the courts have interpreted the right to freedom of religion in a broad and 
interrelated manner.  The right to freedom of religion has been understood as an 
individual right and as a collective right.  The court has furthermore been appreciative 
of the intersection between the right to freedom of religion and culture.  Freedom of 
religion is important to the individuals‘ sense of self worth, and influences both the 
individual and collective identity.  The collective and cultural importance of the right 
to freedom of religion is therefore firmly acknowledged by the South African courts.
37
 
 
Third, the courts have appreciated the interrelation between the right to freedom of 
religion of the individual and the right to dignity.  The importance of the right to 
freedom of religion to the individuals‘ sense of self-worth, identity and dignity is 
firmly acknowledged.
38
   The respect for human dignity is also further related to the 
whole constitutional purpose of establishing unity and solidarity in South Africa.
39
  In 
this regard it is affirmed by the courts that unity and solidarity requires not only 
toleration of difference but institutional commitment towards accommodating and 
even celebrating difference. 
 
                                                          
36
 See section 8.4.3. 
37
 See section 8.5 and 8.7.1. 
38
 See section 8.7.1 and 8.7.2. 
39
 See section 5.6. 
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Fourth, the right to freedom of religion is considered as both as a liberty right, on an 
individual and collective basis, and as an equality right.  In terms thereof unfair 
discrimination, either directly or indirectly, based on religion is prohibited.
40
   The 
court has shown sensitivity to the fact that even apparently neutral norms may be 
representative of a system of entrenched dominance and therefore may impose harm 
on marginalised or vulnerable religions that may not be readily observed.  It can 
therefore be contended that the South African courts have been active in furthering the 
principle of ‗quality equality‘.41 
 
Fifth, closely associated with the broad interpretation of the right to freedom of 
religion as a collective and equality right, as well as the interrelation between religion 
and the self-worth, dignity and identity of the individual, is an awareness by the South 
African courts of the historical context.  In this regard the courts have been attentive to 
the creation of an environment aimed at establishing unity and solidarity amongst all, 
including the marginalised.  Therefore, the South African courts have been aware of 
protecting the rights of the vulnerable and have truly sought to promote recognition of 
the diversity of all the South African people.
42
 
 
Finally, the courts have not only acknowledged the complex nature of the right to 
freedom of religion and the need for a transformative jurisprudence.  The courts have 
further aligned these ideals with the African concept of ubuntu.
43
 
 
This thesis had further investigated the scope and contents of the right to freedom of 
religion in the international
44
 and regional context.
45
  In balancing the approach of the 
                                                          
40
 See section 8.7.2 and 789 
41
 See section 8.7.2. 
42
 See section 8.9. 
43
 See section 8.8 and 5.6. 
44
 See section 4.2.1, 4.4 and 4.3.3. 
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South African courts with the international framework discussed, it is concluded that 
the approach of the South African courts is in conformity with the ethos of the 
international instruments for the following reasons. 
 
9.4 Conformity of the South African approach with international instruments 
 
It is contended that an inference can be drawn that the South African approach is in 
conformity with the philosophy of the international and regional frameworks based on 
the following aspects: Firstly, in particular during the drafting of the UDHR, it was 
apparent that the drafters were more influenced by a dignitarian approach than the 
furtherance of individualistic rights.  The dignitarian approach places more emphasis 
on the aspect that the individual bearer of rights is situated within a family and a 
community.  Everyone is considered a unique individual but is constituted in relation 
to others, in terms of the premise that everyone acts towards one another ‗in a spirit of 
brotherhood‘.46  It is inferred that the approach of the South African judiciary 
encapsulates the notion of ubuntu and is mindful of the premise that individuals are 
constituted in relation to others.
47
 
 
Second, the duty to promote rights is also advanced in the international framework.  
The ICCPR Human Rights Committee by means of a General Comment 23
48
 has 
determined that states have a proactive obligation to ensure the maintenance of 
religious identities.  Accordingly, states have a duty to stimulate an environment in 
which believers may fully express their religious identities.  Here to it is understood 
that the active approach of the South African courts in furthering the principle of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
45
 See section 4.8.3 and 4.10. 
46
 As indicated in article 1 of the UDHR. 
47
 See section 8.8 and 5.6 
48
 See section 4.3.3 and 4.8.3. 
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‗quality equality‘ has indeed created an environment in which diverse religious 
adherents are able to express their religious identities.  The South African 
Constitutional Court has indeed celebrated difference.
49
 
 
Third, the interrelation between individual and collective rights is also acknowledged 
in terms of the African Charter in particular.  It is contended that the approach of the 
South African courts in being sensitive to the collective and cultural aspects of the 
right to manifest religious belief indeed is in accordance with this regional obligation.  
Therefore it is contended that the emphasis of the courts on the dignity of the 
individual as part of a community as well as the appreciation by the courts that a 
positive duty to promote an environment in which believers may express their 
religious identities is in conformity with the ethos of the regional legal context.
50
 
 
9.5 A postmodern approach 
 
In comparing the methodology of the South African courts with the international and 
other national enforcement bodies it is apparent that the South African framework is 
more desirable in that it moves the protection of the right to manifest diverse religious 
belief from merely tolerating different religious practices to truly celebrating these 
practices.  The methodology of the South African courts may be comparable to a 
postmodern transformative approach. 
 
A postmodern approach reconceptualises the protection of the right to manifest 
religious belief and views this right as a dimension that involves interaction from the 
                                                          
49
 See section 8.7.1.1. 
50
 See section 4.10. 
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individual, the community and the state.
51
   With regards to the role of the state, the 
post modern approach interprets a neutral state as a state in which all voices are 
heard.
52
  A neutral state is aware of the fact that seemingly neutral rules may 
disproportionately negatively affect minority vulnerable religions and that this 
discrimination does not serve the purpose of the neutral state.  For this reason such a 
neutral state will be sensitive to these forms of dominance and oppression and actively 
seek to further equal opportunities for all.  This sensitivity is also in line with the 
obligation of states to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right to freedom of 
religion.  In complying with these obligations the purpose of neutrality is to ensure 
‗quality equality‘.  The state therefore has a duty to proactively support of an 
environment in which religious adherents can achieve full religious recognition.
53
 
 
With regards to the individual, a postmodern approach is appreciative of the fact that 
religious people view life as a whole and accordingly seek to manifest their beliefs in 
their private and public lives.  In addition the right to freedom of religion is 
intrinsically linked to the individual sense of self-worth and identity as religion defines 
the very essence of a person‘s being which is further enhanced in the individual‘s 
sense of belonging.  Therefore the right to manifest religious belief incorporates the 
individuals‘ sense of belonging to a religious community.  A postmodern approach 
acknowledges the collective dimension of religion.  
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9.6 Overall conclusion 
 
It is concluded that a state is best able to ensure the protection of diverse religions if 
the relationship between the state and religion is structured in accordance with the 
principle of secularism.  This is so, as a neutral state is best situated to treat all 
religions equally.  However, the requirement for neutrality must not be interpreted to 
indicate a public domain void of religion.  For this reason, this thesis maintains that 
the optimal protection of the right to freedom of religion and in particular the right to 
manifest religious belief requires the return of religion to the public domain. 
 
This thesis strongly avers that the denial of a space for religion in the public domain is 
a denial of the core aspect of religion.  It is evident that for many believers religion is 
not only part of their internal belief but is indeed a way of life, religion determines 
their whole being, their sense of self-worth and dignity.  It is only when all these 
facets of the importance of religion are valued that the right to freedom of religion is 
indeed optimally protected.  The very nature of religion dictates a manifestation in 
community with others and this manifestation cannot merely occur in the realm of the 
private.  It is asserted that the very nature of manifestation necessitates a display in the 
public domain. 
 
Religion is further also related to the identity of the individual.  This identity is 
affirmed if the individual is able to reveal her life choices and have these choices 
acknowledged in the community in which she finds herself.  In a diverse society the 
need for affirmation of identity may even be more prevalent as this is a way in which 
the individual may exert her uniqueness and individual worth.  The increase in 
challenges to the international and national judicial bodies relating to the right to 
manifest religious belief as evaluated in this thesis confirms this prevalence. 
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It is maintained that a postmodern approach that enables the return of religion to the 
public domain is the best approach to ensure the protection of the right to freedom of 
religion and to acknowledge the unique identity of all.  It is through this return that 
difference is not merely tolerated or accommodated but indeed celebrated.  It can be 
concluded that the South African jurisprudence that incorporates as postmodern and 
transformative approach provides the best case study of the full protection of the right 
to manifest religious belief. 
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